GIFT   OF 
Miss   Louise  Katz 


STATE  PAPERS  AND  CORRESPONDENCE 


BEARING  UPON  THE 


"^ 


WASHINGTON: 

\ 

GOVERNMENT    FEINTING    OFFICE. 
1903. 


HOUSE  CONCURRENT  RESOLUTION. 

By  Mr.  GAINES. 

Resolved  by  the  House  of  Representatives  (the  Senate  concurring], 
That  there  be  published  and  bound  6,000  copies  of  the  State  papers 
and  all  correspondence  bearing  upon  the  purchase  of  the  territory  of 
Louisiana  by  the  United  States,  including  the  treaty  of  purchase, 
4,000  for  the  use  of  the  House  of  Representatives  and  2,000  for  the 
use  of  the  Senate. 

Passed  the  House  May  10,  1902. 

Concurred  in  by  the  Senate  May  13,  1902. 
2 


p 


STATE  PAPERS  AND  CORRESPONDENCE  BEARING  UPON  THE 
PURCHASE  OF  THE  TERRITORY  OF  LOUISIANA. 


Mr.  King  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

LONDON,  March  29,  1801. 

DEAR  SIR:  In  confirmation  of  the  rumors  of  the  day,  Carnot's  answer 
to  Bailleul,  published  during  the  exile  of  the  former,  states  the  project 
which  has  been  discussed  in  the  •  Directory,  to  obtain  from  Spain  a 
cession  of  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas.  A  reference  to  that  perform 
ance,  copies  of  which  I  at  the  time  sent  to  the  Department  of  State, 
will  show  the  manner  in  which  it  was  expected  to  obtain  the  consent 
of  Spain,  as  well  as  afford  a  clue  to  the  views  of  France  in  seeking  this 
establishment.  What  was  then  meditated,  has,  in  all  probability,  since 
been  executed.  The  cession  of  Tuscany  to  the  Infant,  Duke  of  Parma, 
by  the  treaty  between  France  and  Austria,  forms  a  more  compact  and 
valuable  compensation  to  this  branch  of  the  House  of  Spain  than  was 
formerly  thought  of,  and  adds  very  great  credit  to  the  opinion  which, 
at  this  time,  prevails  both  at  Paris  and  London,  that  Spain  has  in  return 
actually  ceded  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas  to  France.  There  is  reason 
to  know  that  it  is  the  opinion  of  certain  influential  persons  in  France, 
that  nature  has  marked  a  line  of  separation  between  the  people  of  the 
United  States  living  upon  the  two  sides  of  the  range  of  mountains 
which  divides  their  territory.  Without  discussing  the  considerations 
which  are  suggested  in  support  of  this  opinion,  or  the  false  conse 
quences,  as  I  wish  to  believe  them,  deduced  from  it,  I  am  apprehen 
sive  that  this  cession  is  intended  to  have,  and  may  actually  produce, 
effects  injurious  to  the  Union  and  consequent  happiness  of  the  people 
of  the  United  States.  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas  may  be  given  to  the 
French  emigrants,  as  England  once  thought  of  giving  them  to  the 
American  tories;  or,  they  may  constitute  the  reward  of  some  of  the 
armies  which  can  be  spared  at  the  end  of  the  war. 

I  learn  that  General  Collot,  who  was  a  few  years  ago  in  America, 
and  a  traveler  in  the  western  country,  and  who,  for  some  time,  has  been 
in  disgrace  and  confinement  in  France,  has  been  lately  set  at  liberty; 
and  that  he,  with  a  considerable  number  of  disaffected  and  exiled 
Englishmen,  Scotchmen,  and  Irishmen,  is  soon  to  proceed  from  France 
to  the  United  States.  Whether  their  voyage  has  any  relation  to  the 

242525 


4  ;   tlTRCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

cession  of  Louisiana  is  a  matter  of  mere  conjecture;  but  having  heard 
of  it  in  connection  with  that  project  I  think  proper  to  mention  it  to  you. 

What  effect  a  plain  and  judicious  representation  upon  this  subject, 
made  to  the  French  Government  by  a  minister  of  talents  and  entitled 
to  confidence,  would  be  likely  to  have,  is  quite  beyond  any  means  of 
judging  which  I  possess;  but  on  this  account,  as  well  as  others  of 
importance,  it  is  a  subject  of  regret  that  we  have  not  such  a  character 
at  Paris  at  this  time. 

With  perfect  respect  and  esteem,  1  have  the  honor  to  be,  dear  sir, 
your  obedient  and  faithful  servant, 

RUFUS  KING. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  King  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

LONDON,  June  7,  1801. 

On  this  occasion,  among  other  topics  of  conversation,  His  Lordship 
(Hawkesbury)  introduced  the  subject  of  Louisiana.  He  had,  from 
different  quarters,  received  information  of  its  cession  to  France,  and 
very  unreservedly  expressed  the  reluctance  with  which  they  should  be 
led  to  acquiesce  in  a  measure  that  might  be  followed  by  the  most 
important  consequences.  The  acquisition  might  enable  France  to 
extend  her  influence  and  perhaps  her  dominion  up  the  Mississippi; 
and  through  the  Lakes  even  to  Canada.  This  would  be  realizing  the 
plan,  to  prevent  the  accomplishment  of  which,  the  seven  years'  war 
took  place;  besides,  the  vicinity  of  the  Floridas  to  the  West  Indies, 
and  the  facility  with  which  the  trade  of  the  latter  might  be  inter 
rupted,  and  the  islands  even  invaded  should  the  transfer  be  made,  were 
strong  reason  why  England  must  be  unwilling  that  the  territory 
should  pass  under  the  dominion  of  France.  As  I  could  not  mistake 
his  Lordship's  object  in  speaking  to  me  on  the  subject,  I  had  no  diffi 
culty  or  reserve  in  expressing  my  private  sentiments  respecting  it; 
taking  for  my  text  the  observation  of  Montesquieu,  "  That  it  is  happy 
for  trading  Powers  that  God  has  permitted  Turks  and  Spaniards  to  be 
in  the  world,  since  of  all  nations  they  are  the  most  proper  to  possess  a 
great  empire  with  insignificance."  The  purport  of  what  I  said  was, 
that  we  are  contented  that  the  Floridas  remain  in  the  hands  of  Spain, 
but  should  not  be  willing  to  see  them  transferred  except  to  ourselves. 

With  perfect  respect  and  esteem,  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your 
obedient  and  faithful  servant, 

RUFUS  KING. 


PURCHASE   OF   THE   TERRITORY   OF   LOUISIANA.  5 

[Extract.]  J 

Mr.  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Charles  Pinckney. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE, 
Washington,  June  9,  1801. 

On  different  occasions,  since  the  commencement  of  the  French  Revo 
lution,  opinions  and  reports  have  prevailed  that  some  part  of  the 
Spanish  possessions,  including  New  Orleans  and  the  mouth  of  the 
Mississippi,  had  been  or  was  to  be  transferred  to  France.  Of  late, 
information  has  been  received  through  several  channels,  making  it 
probable  that  some  arrangement  for  that  purpose  has  been  concerted. 
Neither  the  extent  of  the  cession,  however,  nor  the  consideration  on 
which  it  is  nrnde,  is  yet  reduced  to  certainty  and  precision.  The  whole 
subject  will  deserve  and  engage  your  early  and  vigilant  inquiries,  and 
may  require  a  very  delicate  and  circumspect  management.  What  the 
motives  of  Spain  in  this  transaction  may  be,  is  not  so  obvious.  The 
policy  of  France  in  it,  so  far,  at  least,  as  relates  to  the  United  States, 
can  not  be  mistaken.  While  she  remained  on  the  footing  of  confi 
dence  and  affection  with  the  United  States,  which  originated  during 
our  Revolution  and  was  strengthened  during  the  early  stages  of  her 
own,  it  may  be  presumed  that  she  adhered  to  the  policy  which,  in  the 
treat^v  of  1778,  renounced  the  acquisition  of  continental  territory  in 
North  America,  and  was  more  disposed  to  shun  the  collisions  threat 
ened  by  possessions  in  that  quarter,  coterminous  with  ours,  than  to 
pursue  objects  to  which  the  commanding  position  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Mississippi  might  be  made  subservient.  Circumstances  are  not  now 
the  same.  Although  the  two  countries  are  again  brought  together  by 
stipulations  of  amity  and  commerce,  the  confidence  and  cordiality 
which  formerly  subsisted  have  had  a  deep  wound  from  the  occurrences 
of  late  years. 

Jealousies  probably  still  remain,  that  the  Atlantic  States  have  a  par 
tiality  for  Great  Britain,  which  may,  in  future,  throw  their  weight  into 
the  scale  of  that  rival.  It  is  more  than  possible,  also,  that,  under  the 
influence  of  those  jealousies,  and  of  the  alarms  which  have  at  times 
prevailed,  of  a  projected  operation  for  wresting  the  mouth  of  the 
Mississippi  into  the  hands  of  Great  Britain,  she  may  have  concluded  a 
preoccupancy  of  it  by  herself  to  be  a  necessary  safeguard  against  an 
event  from  which  that  nation  would  derive  the  double  advantage  of 
strengthening  her  hold  on  the  United  States,  and  of  adding  to  her  com 
merce  a  monopoly  of  the  immense  and  fertile  region  communicating 
with  the  sea  through  a  single  outlet.  This  view  of  the  subject,  which^"" 
suggests  the  difficulty  which  may  be  found  in  diverting  France  from 
the  object,  points,  at  the  same  time,  to  the  means  that  may  most  tend 
to  induce  a  voluntary  relinquishment  of  it.  She  must  infer,  from  our 
conduct  and  our  communications,  that  the  Atlantic  States  are  not  dis- 


6  PURCHASE    OF   THE   TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

posed  to  enter,  nor  are  in  danger  of  being  drawn,  into  partialities 
toward  Great  Britain  unjust  or  injurious  to  France;  that  our  political 
and  commercial  interests  afford  a  sufficient  guarant}T  against  such  a 
state  of  things;  that  without  the  cooperation  of  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain  is  not  likely  to  acquire  any  part  of  the  Spanish  posses 
sions  on  the  Mississippi;  and  that  the  United  States  never  have  favored 
nor,  so  long  as  they  are  guided  b}T  the  clearest  policy,  ever  can  favor, 
such  a  project.  She  must  be  led  to  see  again,  and  with  a  desire  to 
shun,  the  danger  of  collisions  between  the  two  Republics  from  the 
contact  of  their  territories;  and  from  the  conflicts  in  their  regulations 
of  a  commerce  involving  the  peculiarities  which  distinguish  that  of  the 
Mississippi.  Such  are  the  general  observations  which  the  President 
has  thought  it  proper  should  be  communicated  to  you,  ftat,  knowing 
the  light  in  which  the  subject  is  viewed  by  him,  you  may  be  less  in 
danger  of  presenting  it  in  any  other.  It  is  not  expected  that  you 
will  have  occasion  to  make  any  positive  use  of  them  in  relation  to  the 
councils  of  the  French  Republic,  the  Minister  to  which  will  be  charged 
with  that  task.  In  relation  to  the  Spanish  Government,  although  the 
chief  difficult}7  is  not  supposed  to  lie  there,  the  President  wishes  you  to 
cultivate  a  favorable  disposition  by  every  proper  demonstration  of  the 
preference  given  by  the  United  States  to  the  neighborhood  of  that  of 
every  other  nation.  This  may  be  the  more  important,  as  it  is  not 
improbable  that  her  councils  also  may  have  been  affected  by  rumors  of 
proceedings  in  this  country,  connected  with  schemes  of  Great  Britain 
for  getting  possession  of  New  Orleans. 


[Extract.] 

James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to 

France. 
£X.S.P    I'.  SI&-1 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  September  28,  1801. 

You  have  been  already  informed  of  the  intention  of  the  President 
that  your  departure  from  France  should  be  hastened,  and  that  you 
would  be  furnished  with  a  passage  in  the  Boston  frigate,  which,  after 
landing  you  in  Bordeaux,  is  to  proceed  to  the  Mediterranean. 

From  different  sources  information  has  been  received  that,  by  some 
transaction  concluded  or  contemplated  between  France  and  Spain, 
the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  with  certain  portions  of  adjacent  terri 
tory,  is  to  pass  from  the  hands  of  the  latter  to  the  former  nation. 
Such  a  change  of  our  neighbors  in  that  quarter  is  of  too  momentous 
concern  not  to  have  engaged  the  most  serious  attention  of  the  Execu 
tive.  It  was  accordingly  made  one  of  the  subjects  of  instruction  to 
Mr.  Charles  Pinckney,  our  Minister  Plenipotentiary  to  the  Court  of 
Spain.  You  will  find  an  extract  of  the  passage  hereto  annexed, 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  7 

No.  1.  A  paragraph  connected  with  the  same  subject,  in  a  letter  to 
Mr.  King,  is  also  extracted  and  annexed,  No.  2.  In  these  extracts 
you  will  see  the  ideas  entertained  by  the  Executive,  and  the  general 
considerations  which,  it  is  presumed,  will  have  most  tendency  to  isd- 
suade  the  parties  from  adhering  to  their  object.  As  soon  as  you  shall 
have  prepared  the  way  by  the  necessary  inquiries  at  Paris,  it  will  be 
proper  for  you  to  break  the  subject  to  the  French  Government,  and 
to  make  the  use  of  these  considerations  most  likely  to  give  them  their 
full  weight.  You  will  probably  find  it  advantageous  to  press,  in  a 
particular  manner,  the  anxiety  of  the  United  States  to  maintain  har 
mony  and  confidence  with  the  French  Republic,  the  danger  to  which 
these  will  be  exposed  by  collisions,  more  or  less  inseparable  from  a 
neighborhood  under  such  circumstances,  and  the  security  which 
France  ought  to  feel  that  it  can  not  be  the  interest  of  this  country  to 
favor  any  voluntary  or  compulsive  transfer  of  the  possessions  in 
question  from  Spain  to  France. 

Among  other  topics  to  be  employed  on  the  occasion,  you  may,  per 
haps,  find  it  eligible  to  remark  on  the  frequent  recurrence  of  war 
between  France  and  Great  Britain,  the  danger  to  which  the  Western 
settlements  of  the  United  States  would  be  subject,  of  being  embroiled 
by  military  expeditions  between  Canada  and  Louisiana,  the  inquietudes 
which  would  be  excited  in  the  Southern  States,  whose  numerous  slaves 
have  been  taught  to  regard  the  French  as  the  patrons  of  their  cause, 
and  the  tendency  of  a  French  neighborhood,  on  this  and  other  accounts, 
to  inspire  jealousies  and  apprehensions  which  may  turn  the  thoughts 
of  our  citizens  toward  a  closer  connection  with  her  rival,  and  possibly 
produce  a  crisis  in  which  a  very  valuable  part  of  her  dominions  would 
be  exposed  to  the  joint  operation  of  a  naval  and  territorial  power. 
Suggestions  of  these  kinds  must  be  managed  with  much  delicacy,  or 
rather  the  expediency  of  hazarding  them  at  all,  as  well  as  the  manner 
of  doing  it,  must  be  left  to  your  own  information  and  discretion. 

Should  it  be  found  that  the  cession  from  Spain  to  France  has  irre 
vocably  taken  place,  or  certainly  will  take  place,  sound  policy  will 
require  in  that  state  of  things,  that  nothing  be  said  or  done  which  will 
unnecessarily  irritate  our  future  neighbors,  or  check  the  liberality 
which  they  may  be  disposed  to  exercise  in  relation  to  the  trade  and 
navigation  through  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi;  eveiy thing  being 
equally  avoided  at  the  same  time,  which  may  compromit  the  rights  of 
the  United  States  beyond  those  stipulated  in  the  treaty  between  them 
and  Spain.  It  will  be  proper,  on  the  contrary,  to  patronize  the  inter 
ests  of  our  Western  fellow-citizens  by  cherishing  in  France  every  just 
and  liberal  disposition  toward  their  commerce.  In  the  next  place,  it 
will  deserve  to  be  tried  whether  France  can  not  be  induced  to  make 
over  to  the  United  States  the  Floridas,  if  included  in  the  cession  to 
her  from  Spain,  or  at  least  WestJE^ida,  through  which  several  of 


8  PURCHASE    OF    THE   TERRITORY    OF   LOUISIANA. 

our  rivers  (particularly  the  important  river  Mobile)  empty  them 
selves  into  the  sea.  Such  a  proof  on  the  part  of  France,  of  good  will 
toward  the  United  States,  would  contribute  to  reconcile  the  latter  to  an 
arrangement  in  itself  much  disrelished  by  them  and  to  strengthen  the 
returning  friendship  between  the  two  countries;  and  by  affording  a 
fund  for  indemnifying  and  soothing  our  fellow-citizens  who  have  suf 
fered  from  her  wrongs,  would,  in  that  view  also,  be  a  measure  founded 
not  less  in  an  enlarged  policy  than  in  solid  justice.  The  great  impor- 
^tance  of  West  Florida  to  the  United  States  recommends  to  your 
patriotism  the  prudent  use  of  every  fair  consideration  which  may 
favor  the  attainment  of  the  object. 

These  ideas  suppose  that  the  cession  to  the  United  States  is  to  be 
obtained  from  the  single  will  of  France.  But  it  may  happen  that  the 
Floridas  are  so  far  suspended,  on  unfinished  negotiations  between  her 
and  Spain,  as  to  admit  or  require  the  concurrence  of  both  in  gratifying 
the  wishes  of  the  United  States.  In  this  state  of  things,  France  may 
yield  to  the  considerations  suggested  with  less  of  concession  and 
reluctance;  and  as  Spain,  too,  must  feel  an  interest  in  the  good  will  of 
the  United  States,  and  is  responsible,  in  justice,  for  very  considerable 
depredations  on  their  commerce,  there  may  be  the  greater  possibility 
of  her  joining  in  the  measure. 

Should  the  Floridas  neither  have  been  ceded  to  France,  nor  be  an 
acquisition  contemplated  by  her,  still  it  will  be  material,  considering 
her  intimate  and  influential  relations  to  Spain,  to  dispose  her  to  favor 
experiments  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  for  obtaining  from  Spain 
the  cession  in  view.  The  interest  which  the  latter  has  in  cultivating 
our  friendly  dispositions,  and  the  obligation  she  is  under  to  satisfy  our 
claims  for  spoliations,  for  doing  which  no  other  mode  may  be  so  con 
venient  to  her,  are  motives  to  which  an  appeal  may  be  made  with  no 
inconsiderable  force.  Mr.  Pinckney  is  accordingly  to  avail  himself  of 
the  most  auspicious  occasions  for  sounding  and  exciting  the  disposi 
tions  of  the  Spanish  Government  on  this  subject;  and  your  efforts  at 
Paris  can  not  be  too  attentively  combined  with  his  at  Madrid,  as  well 
on  the  last  supposition  that  Spain  alone  is  to  make  the  cession,  as  on 
the  former,  that  France  is  to  have  a  direct  share  in  the  transaction. 
Mr.  Pinckney 's  instructions  will  relate  to  each  alternative,  and  you 
will  be  sensible  of  the  advantages  of  such  a  correspondence  between 
you  as  will  give  the  proper  concert  to  your  operations. 


Mr.  King  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 
r    c    |p   s  ,   511 

t  LONDON,  November  20,  1801. 

SIR:  If  the  annexed  copy  of  the  treaty  between  France  and  Spain, 
respecting  the  establishment  of  the  Prince  of  Parma  in  Tuscany,  be 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF   LOUISIANA.  9 

genuine,  of  which  I  have  no  reason  to  doubt,  you  will  perceive  the 
value  which  these  Powers  seem  to  have  placed  upon  Louisiana;  the 
cession  whereof  to  France  is  confirmed  by  the  seventh  article  of  this 
treaty. 

I  am  in  hopes  that  I  shall  be  able  to  obtain  and  send  you  a  copy  of 
the  treaty  ceding  Louisiana  to  France:  this  would  enable  us  to  deter 
mine  whether  it  includes  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas. 

There  is,  doubtless,  an  understanding  between  England  and  France 
in  respect  to  the  expedition  now  nearly  ready  to  proceed  to  Saint 
Domingo,  and  I  think  I  am  not  mistaken  in  the  belief,  whatever  may 
be  the  intentions  of  France  in  respect  to  the  occupation  of  Louisiana, 
that  no  part  of  the  forces  now  collecting  and  which  are  going  to  Saint 
Domingo,  will  be  employed  for  this  purpose. 

It  is  not  a  little  extraordinary  that  during  the  whole  negotiation 
between  France  and  England  not  a  word  was  mentioned  on  either  side 
respecting  Louisiana,  though  this  Government  was  not  ignorant  of 
the  views  of  France  in  this  quarter. 

With  perfect  respect  and  esteem,  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your 
obedient  and  faithful  servant, 

RUFUS  KING. 

[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

fr  .C    £    .,    .    er\  n 

PARIS,  December  10,  1801. 

I  found,  from  a  variety  of  sources  here,  and  some  I  think  I  can 
depend  on,  the  business  of  Louisiana  has  been  concluded,  and  it  was 
understood  it  had  been  given  in  exchange  for  the  Spanish  port  of  St. 
Domingo,  to  be  restored  to  its  old  master.  Several  circumstances 
concurred  to  induce  me  to  believe  this  report  was  not  void  of  truth. 
I  therefore  took  the  earliest  opportunity  to  touch  upon  that  subject 
with  the  Minister,  and  to  hint  at  the  reason  of  policy  (as  it  respected 
the  French  Government  as  well  as  ourselves)  that  made  the  object 
interesting  to  us.  He  seemed  at  first  inclined  to  waive  the  subject; 
but  when  he  found  I  pressed  more  closely  he  admitted  that  it  had  been 
a  subject  of  conversation,  but  nothing  had  been  concluded  or  even 
resolved  on,  in  that  affair.  I  left  him  with  a  hint  that  perhaps  both 
France  and  Spain  might  find  a  mutual  interest  in  ceding  the  Floridas 
to  the  United  States. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  December  12, 1801. 

In  addition  to  what  I  wrote  yesterday,  I  have  only  to  mention  that 
I  am  more  and  more  confirmed,  notwithstanding  what  I  there  say  of 


10  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

the  Minister's  assurance,  that  Louisiana  is  a  favorite  object,  and  that 
they  will  be  unwilling  to  part  with  it  on  the  condition  I  mentioned. 
Speaking  of  the  means  of  paying-  their  debts  to  one  of  their  Ministers, 
yesterday,  I  hinted  at  this.  His  answer  was,  "  None  but  spendthrifts 
satisfy  their  debts  by  selling  their  lands;'1  adding,  however,  after  a 
short  pause,  "but  it  is  not  ours  to  give." 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  Mr.  King,  Minister  to  England. 

<A-S.*\ 

PARIS,  December  30, 1801. 

Among  the  objects  that  would  most  naturally  engage  my  attention 
on  my  arrival  was  the  state  of  the  negotiation  between  France  and 
Spain  regarding  Louisiana;  with  a  \riew,  if  it  had  not  been  concluded 
on,  to  throw  obstacles  in  the  way,  so  far  as  it  could  be  advantageously 
done;  or,  if  it  had  been  effected,  to  make  some  such  arrangements  as 
would  lessen  the  inconveniences  which  might  result  from  it  to  our 
Western  territory.  I  have,  however,  reason  to  think  the  whole  busi 
ness  had  been  settled  before  my  arrival.  1  took  occasion,  on  my  first 
private  audience  of  the  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations,  to  press  him 
directly  upon  the  subject,  taking  the  common  reports  as  a  foundation 
for  my  inquiry.  He  explicitly  denied  that  anything  had  been  con 
cluded,  but  admitted  that  it  had  been  a  subject  of  conversation.  I  know, 
however,  from  a  variety  of  channels,  that  it  is  not  a  mere  matter  of 
conversation,  but  that  the  exchange  has  actually  been  agreed  upon; 
that  the  armament  destined,  in  the  first  instance,  for  Hispaniola,  is  to 
proceed  to  Louisiana,  provided  Toussaint  makes  no  opposition.  Gen 
eral  Collot,  whom  you  may  have  seen  in  America,  was  originally 
intended  for  Governor  of  the  province,  but  he  is  at  present  out  of 
favor.  I  think  it  probable  the  Minister  will  justify  his  concealment  to 
me,  by  its  not  having  been  definitely  closed  with  Spain,  as  this,  though 
determined  between  the  two  Governments,  may  form  an  article  in  the 
general  treaty.  His  absence  (being  at  Lyons)  prevents  my  coming  to 
something  more  explicit  with  him.  That  Spain  has  made  this  cession 
(which  contravenes  all  her  former  maxims  of  policy)  can  not  be  doubted, 
but  she  is  no  longer  a  free  agent. 

I  wish  to  know  from  you  in  what  light  this  is  seen  by  England.  It 
will  certainly,  in  its  consequences,  be  extremely  dangerous  to  her,  as 
it  will  give  an  almost  unbounded  power  to  her  rival. 

It  puts  Spain  in  a  perpetual  state  of  pupilage,  since  she  must  always 
tremble  for  the  safety  of  her  colonies  in  case  of  rupture.  To  avoid 
this  evil,  she  must  grant  every  commercial  and  political  advantage  to 
France.  Her  manufactures  will  find  their  way,  through  this  channel, 
into  every  part  of  the  Spanish  territory,  to  the  exclusion  of  those  of 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  11 

Britain.  Our  Western  territory  may  be  rendered  so  dependent  upon 
them  as  to  promote  their  political  views,  while  the  interest  they  have 
always  nurtured  with  the  Indians,  and  the  national  character  of  the 
peasantry  of  Canada,  may  render  the  possessions  of  Britain  very  pre 
carious,  to  say  nothing1  of  the  danger  which  must  threaten  her  islands 
in  case  a  respectable  establishment  should  be  made  by  France  in 
Louisiana,  which  will  not  fail  to  be  the  case,  as  the  territory  is  uncom 
monly  h'ne,  and  produces  sugar  and  every  article  now  cultivated  in 
the  islands. 

I  suggest  these  hints,  that  the}^,  with  many  others  which  may  occur 
to  you,  may  be  made  use  of  with  the  British  Ministry  to  induce  them 
to  throw  all  the  obstacles  in  their  power  in  the  way  of  a  final  settle 
ment  of  this  business,  if  it  is  not  already  too  late.  You  know,  how 
ever,  the  importance  of  not  appearing  yourself  or  permitting  me  to 
appear  much  opposed  to  it,  if  you  find  the  thing  concluded,  since  it 
might  be  made  use  of  to  embroil  us  with  France,  and  Britain  will  have 
sufficient  address  to  endeavor  to  keep  up  a  mutual  jealousy,  if  possible, 
between  us. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  December  31,  1801. 

The  business  of  Louisiana  is  very  disagreeable  to  Spain,  as  far  as  I 
can  learn.  If  it  should  be  equally  so  to  Britain,  perhaps  it  may  meet 
with  some  obstacles.  It  is  a  very  favorite  measure  here.  Marbois 
told  me  yesterday  it  was  considered  important  to  have  an  outlet  for 
their  turbulent  spirits;  yet  would  not  explicitly  acknowledge  that  the 
business  had  been  concluded. 


[Extract.] 

-k 
Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  January  IS,  1802. 

My  former  letters  left  you  little  doubt  on  the  subject  of  the  cession 
of  Louisiana.  By  the  inclosed  copy  of  the  late  treaty  between  France, 
and  Spain  you  will  find  that  it  is  a  transaction  of  pretty  long  standing. 

The  absence  of  the  Minister  prevents  my  applying  to  him  for  the 
former  treaty,  which  he  will  hardly  know  how  to  give  me  after  abso 
lutely  denying  that  any  had  been  formed  on  the  subject.  By  the 
secrecy  and  duplicity  practiced  relative  to  this  object,  it  is  clear  to 
me  that  they  apprehend  some  opposition  on  the  part  of  America  to 
their  plans.  I  have,  however,  upon  all  occasions,  declared  that,  as  long 
as  France  conforms  to  the  existing  treaty  between  us  and  Spain,  tEe 


12  PURCHASE    OF   THE   TERRITORY    OF   LOUISIANA. 

GojEarjmient  of  the  United  States  does  not  consider  herself  as  having 
anj_Jiiterest  in  opposing  the  exchange.  The  evil  our  country  has 
suffered  by  their  rupture  with  France  is  not  to  be  calculated.  We 
have  become  an  object  of  jealousy  both  to  the  Government  and  people. 
The  reluctance  we  have  shown  to  a  renewal  of  the  Treaty  of  1778 
has  created  many  suspicions.  Among  other  absurd  ones,  they  believe 
seriously  that  we  have  an  eye  to  a  conquest  of  their  islands.  The  busi 
ness  of  Louisiana  also  originated  in  that;  and  they  say  expressly  that 
they  could  have  no  pretense,  so  far  as  related  to  the  Floridas,  to  make 
this  exchange,  had  the  treaty  been  renewed,  since  by  the  sixth  article 
they  were  expressly  prohibited  from  touching  the  Floridas.  I  own  I 
have  always  considered  this  article  and  the  guaranty  of  our  independ 
ence  as  more  important  to  us  than  the  guaranty  of  the  islands  was  to 
France;  and  the  sacrifices  we  have  made  of  an  immense  claim  to  get 
rid  of  it  at  a  dead  loss.  We  must  calculate  upon  every  effort  from 
every  maritime  Power  in  Europe  to  diminish  our  commerce.  France 
has  already  excluded  us  from  her  African  colonies.  Her  premiums 
will  exclude  our  oil;  and  her  heavy  duties  upon  tobacco  in  foreign 
bottoms  will  prevent  our  carrying  that  article  for  ourselves.  She 
refuses  to  naturalize  our  ships,  so  that  a  large  capital  in  that  article 
will  sink  in  our  hands.  The  American  Government  have  it  in  their 
power  to  counteract  these  measures;  but  they  must  do  it  instantly  and 
decidedly,  so  as  to  show  that  measures  of  hostility  to  her  commerce 
will  not  produce  the  effect  contemplated  by  the  nations  of  Europe. 
Let  the  United  States  impose  a  duty  upon  special  articles,  of  her  own 
produce,  exported  in  foreign  bottoms,  equivalent  to  the  difference  of 
duty  paid  in  Europe  on  such  articles  when  imported  in  American  or 
national  vessels.  This  will  secure  to  us  the  carriage  of  our  own  arti 
cles;  first,  because  we  can  carry  cheaper;  and,  second,  because  this 
duty  being  paid  in  advance  imposes  a  greater  burden  than  one  that  is 
paid  out  of  the  sale  of  the  produce. 


J^»  [Extract.] 

(A 

Mr.  King  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 


LONDON,  January  15, 1802. 
SIR:  I  have  before  mentioned  to  you  that  the  cession  of  Louisiana 
(of  which  it  seems  to  me  we  can  have  no  doubt,  notwithstanding  what 
may  be  said  to  amuse  us)  was  not  only  a  topic  of  inquiry  or  discussion 

rin  the  negotiation  of  the  preliminaries:  and  for  the  same  reason  that 
it  was  not  heard  of  on  that  occasion,  Lord  Hawkesbury  has  recently 
informed  me  that  it  had  not  been  and  would  not  be,  mentioned  at 
Amiens.  It  is  impossible  for  me  to  suspect  collusion  in  this  affair, 
and  my  persuasion,  after  most  careful  attention,  is,  that  England 


PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF   LOUISIANA.  13 

abstains  from  mixing  herself  in  it,  precisely  from  those  considera 
tions  which  have  led  her  to  acquiesce  in  others  of  great  importance  to 
the  balance  of  Europe,  as  well  as  her  own  repose,  and  upon  which  she 

has  been  altogether  silent. 

KUFUS  KING. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  King  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

LONDON,  February  5,  1802. 

SIR:  I  have  seen  a  letter,  dated  Paris,  February  26,  which  says,  it  is 
definitively  settled  to  send  a  colony  to  Louisiana  and  Florida.  Gen 
eral  Bernadotte  is  to  have  the  direction  and  command  of  it:  prepara 
tions  are  making  for  the  first  expedition,  whose  departure  will  perhaps 
depend  upon  the  accounts  expected  from  St.  Domingo.  It  is  asserted 
that  the  Indian  nations,  adjoining  to  Florida,  have  agents,  now  here,  for 
the  purpose  of  making  treaties  with  this  country  to  unite  themselves 
with  the  troops  and  settlers  that  may  be, sent  hence.  The  establish 
ment  of  this  colony  is  a  darling  object,  and  will  be  pursued  with  ardor 
and  upon  a  great  scale,  unless  affairs  of  St.  Domingo  shall,  for  the 
moment,  derange  the  plan.  Louisiana,  Guiana,  and  the  desert  islands 
of  Tristan  de  Cunha,  are  each  spoken  of  as  places  to  which  the  rebel 
lious  and  untractable  negroes  and  people  of  color  may  be  sent  from 
St.  Domingo  and  the  other  French  colonies. 

With  perfect  respect  and  esteem,  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your 

obedient  and  faithful  servant, 

KUFUS  KING. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  February  26,  1802. 

On  the  subject  of  Louisiana,  I  have  nothing  new.  The  establish 
ment  is  disapproved  by  every  statesman  here  as  one  that  will  occasion 
a  great  waste  of  men  and  money,  excite  enmities  with  us,  and  produce 
no  possible  advantage  to  the  nation.  But  it  is  a  scheme  to  which  the 
First  Consul  is  extremely  attached;  and  it  must,  of  course,  be  supported. 
You  will  find,  by  the  enclosed  note,  that  I  have  pressed  an  explanation 
on  the  subject,  but  I  have  received  no  answer.  I  have  it,  however, 
through  a  friend,  from  the  First  Consul,  that  it  is  by  no  means  their 
intention  to  obstruct  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  or  violate  our 
Treaty  with  Spain.  General  Bernadotte  is  understood  to  be  designed 
for  the  command,  and  to  have  asked  10,000  troops. 


14  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TEERITOKY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations. 

PARIS,  February  W, 

The  undersigned,  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States,  has 
seen,  with  some  concern,  the  reserve  of  the  French  Government,  with 
respect  to  the  cession  they  have  received  from  Spain  of  Louisiana. 

He  had  hoped  that  they  would  have  found  a  propriety  in  making 
such  frank  and  open  communications  to  him  as  would  have  enabled 
him  to  satisfy  the  Government  of  the  United  States  that  neither  their 
boundary,  nor  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  secured  by  their 
treaties  with  Spain,  would  be,  in  any  way,  affected  by  the  measure. 
It  would  also  have  been  very  satisfactory  to  him  to  have  taken  such 
arrangements  with  the  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations  as  would  have 
had  a  tendency  to  dissipate  the  alarms  the  people  of  the  Western  ter 
ritory  of  the  United  States  will  not  fail  to  feel  on  the  arrival  of  a 
large  body  of  French  troops  in  their  vicinity;  alarms  which  will  proba 
bly  be  increased  by  the  exertions  of  those  Powers  that  are  interested 
in  keeping  the  two  Republics  from  cementing  their  connection.  The 
policy  of  the  former  Government  of  France  led  it  to  avoid  all  ground 
of  controversy  with  the  United  States,  not  only  by  declining  to  possess 
any  territory  in  their  neighborhood,  but  by  stipulating  never  to  hold 
any.  The  undersigned  does  not,  by  this  reference  to  the  Treat}r  of 
1778,  mean  to  reclaim  any  rights  under  it,  since,  by  the  convention 
of  Paris,  30th  September,  1800,  it  is  understood  to  be  revoked;  but 
merely  to  lead  the  French  Government  to  reflect  how  far  a  regard  to 
the  same  policy  might  render  it  conducive  to  the  mutual  interests  of 
both  nations  to  cover,  by  a  natural  barrier,  their  possessions  in 
America,  as  France  has  invariably  sought  to  do  in  Europe. 

The^  undersigned  prays  the  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations  (if  the 
request  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  views  of  the  Government)  to  inform 
him  whether  East  and  West  Florida,  or  either  of  them,  are  included  in 
the  treaty  made  between  France  and  Spain;  and  to  afford  him  such 
assurances,  with  respect  to  the  limits  of  their  territory  and  the  navi 
gation  of  the  Mississippi,  heretofore  agreed  on  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States,  as  may  prove  satisfactory  to  the  latter. 

If  the  territories  of  East  and  West  Florida  should  be  included  within 
the  limits  of  the  cession  obtained  by  France,  the  undersigned  desires 
to  be  informed  how  far  it  would  be  practicable  to  make  such  arrange 
ments  between  their  respective  Governments  as  would,  at  the  same 
time,  aid  the  financial  operations  of  France,  and  remove,  by  a  strong 
natural  boundary,  all  future  causes  of  discontent  between  her  and  the 
United  States.  The  undersigned  embraces  this  opportunity  of  renew 
ing  to  the  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations  his,  etc. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  15 

[Extract.] 

X«- 

Mr.  King  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

LONDON,  February  87,  1802. 

SIR:  From  all  I  can  gather  upon  the  subject  we  may  consider  the 
cession  of  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas  as  an  affair  decided.  Without 
doubt,  you  are  fully  aware  of  its  various  and  extensive  consequences. 
Has  it  occurred  to  you  that  the  French  Government  will  probably 
send  thither  a  large  body  of  people  from  France,  and  that  it  may  add 
to  them  all  the  refractory  and  discontented  blacks  and  persons  of  color 
of  their  West  India  colonies? 

With  perfect  respect  and  esteem,  etc., 

RUFUS  KING. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  March  15,  1802. 

SIR:  After  closing  my  packet,  I  received  the  note  of  which  the  within 
is  a  copy.  It  amounts  to  nothing,  but  must  serve  to  keep  me  quite  a 
few  days  longer,  till  they  see  what  turn  the  business  takes  at  Amiens, 
which  becomes  more  and  more  doubtful.  The  bad  news  from  St. 
Domingo  also  renders  it  necessary  to  keep  us  in  suspense.  I  have 
already  expressed  my  fear  that  American  property  in  the  island  will 
not  be  very  safe;  and  the  passage  in  Leclerc's  letter  relative  to  the 
powder  and  arms  may  serve  as  an  apology. 

I  am,  sir,  etc.,  R.  R.  L. 


v 

PARIS,  March  13,  year  10. 

SIR:  I  have  received  the  different  notes  which  you  have  done  me 
the  honor  to  address  to  me,  relating  to  the  debts,  and  to  the  American 
captures;  and  I  have  made  them  the  subject  of  a  report  to  the  First 
Consul.  As  soon  as  his  decision  shall  be  made,  1  shall  hasten  to  inform 
you  of  the  result. 

Do  you  doubt,  sir,  that  the  questions  which  concern  the  United 
States,  the  determination  of  which  may  affect  their  relations  with 
France,  will  be  examined  with  equal  interest  and  attention? 
Accept,  sir,  .the  assurances  of  my  high  consideration. 

CH.  MAU.  TALLEYRAND. 


rr  '    >.  i  i     i 

President  Jefferson  to  Mr.  Livingston. 

*o  ,  7W 


WASHINGTON,  April  18,  1802. 

i     The  cession  of  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas  by  Spain  to  France,  works 
most  sorely  on  the  United  States.     On  this  subject  the  Secretary  of 


16  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

State  has  written  to  you  fully,  yet  I  cannot  forbear  recurring  to  jit 
personally,  so  deep  is  the  impression  it  makes  on  my  mind.  It  com 
plete^  reverses  all  the  political  relations  of  the  United  States,  and 
will  form  a  new  epoch  in  our  political  course.  Of  all  nations  of  any 
consideration,  France  is  the  one  which,  hitherto,  has  offered  the  few 
est  points  on  which  we  could  have  any  conflict  of  right,  and  the  most 
points  of  a  communion  of  interests.  From  these  causes,  we  have  ever 
looked  to  her  as  our  natural  friend,  as  one  with  which  we  never  could 
have  an  occasion  of  difference.  Hej-  growth,  therefore,  we  viewed 
as  our  own,  her  misfortunes  ours.^^here  is  on  the  globe  one  single 
spot,  the  possessor  of  which  is  ournatural  and  habitual  enemy.  It  is 
New  Orleans,  through  which  the  produce  of  three-eighths  of  our  ter 
ritory  must  pass  to  market,  and  from  its  f ertilit}7  it  will  ere  long  yield 
more  than  half  of  our  whole  produce,  and  contain  more  than  half  of 
our  inhabitants.  France,  placing  herself  in  that  door,  assumes  to  us 
the  attitude  of  defiance.  Spain  might  have  retained  it  quietly  for 
years.  Her  pacific  dispositions,  her  feeble  state,  would  induce  her 
to  increase  our  facilities  there,  so  that  her  possession  of  the  place 
would  be  hardly  felt  by  us,  and  it  would  not,  perhaps,  be  very  long 
before  some  circumstance  might  arise,  which  might  make  the  cession 
of  it  to  us  the  price  of  something  of  more  worth  to  her.  Not  so  can 
it  ever  be  in  the  hands  of  France:  the  impetuosity  of  her  temper,  the 
energy  and  restlessness  of  her  character,  placed  in  a  point  of  eternal 
friction  with  us,  and  our  character,  which,  though  quiet  and  loving 
peace  and  the  pursuit  of  wealth,  is  high-minded,  despising  wealth  in 
competition  with  insult  or  injury,  enterprising  and  energetic  as  any 
nation  on  earth;  these  circumstances  render  it  impossible  that  France 
and  the  United  States  can  continue  long  friends,  when  they  meet  in  so 
irritable  a  position.  They,  as  well  as  we,  must  be  blind  if  the}7  do 
not  see  this;  and  we  must  be  very  improvident  if  we  do  not  begin  to 
make  arrangements  on  that  hypothesis.  The  day  that  France  takes 
possession  of  New  Orleans,  fixes  the  sentence  which  is  to  restrain  her 
forever  within  her  low-water  mark.  It  seals  the  union  of  two  nations, 
who,  in  conjunction,  can  maintain  exclusive  possession  of  the  ocean. 
From  that  moment,  we  must  marry  ourselves  to  the  British  fleet  and 
nation./  We  must  turn  all  our  attention  to  a  maritime  force,  for  which 
our  resources  place  us  on  very  high  ground;  and  having  formed  and 
connected  together  a  power  which  may  render  reinforcement  of  her 
settlements  here  impossible  to  France,  make  the  first  cannon  which 
\shall  be  fired  in  Europe  the  signal  for  the  tearing  up  any  settlement 
she  may  have  made,  and  for  holding  the  two  continents  of  America  in 
sequestration  for  the  common  purposes  of  the  United  British  and 
American  nations,/  This  is  not  a  state  of  things  we  seek  or  desire. 
It  is  one  which  this  measure,  if  adopted  by  France,  forces  on  us  as 
necessarily,  as  any  other  cause,  by  the  laws  of  nature,  brings  on  its 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  17 

necessary  effect.  It  is  not  from  a  fear  of  France  that  we  deprecate 
this  measure  proposed  by  her.  For  however  greater  her  force  is  than 
ours,  compared  in  the  abstract,  it  is  nothing  in  comparison  of  ours, 
when  to  be  exerted  on  our  soil.  But  it  is  from  a  sincere  love  of  peace, 
and  a  firm  persuasion,  that  bound  to  France  by  the  interests  and  the 
strong  sympathies  still  existing  in  the  minds  of  our  citizens,  and  hold 
ing  relative  positions  which  insure  their  continuance,  we  are  secure  of 
a  long  course  of  peace.  Whereas,  the  change  of  friends,  which  will 
be  rendered  necessary  if  France  changes  that  position,  embarks  us 
necessarily  as  a  belligerent  pOAver  in  the  first  war  of  Europe.  In 
that  case,  France  will  have  held  possession  of  New  Orleans  during 
the  interval  of  a  peace,  long  or  short,  at  the  end  of  which  it  will  be 
wrested  from  her.  Will  this  short-lived  possession  have  been  an 
equivalent  to  her  for  the  transfer  of  such  a  weight  into  the  scale  of 
her  enemy?  Will  not  the  amalgamation  of  a  young,  thriving  nation, 
continue  to  that  enemy  the  health  and  force  which  are  at  present  so 
evidently  on  the  decline?  And  will  a  few  years'  possession  of  New 
Orleans  add  equally  to  the  strength  of  France?  She  may  sayr  she 
needs  Louisiana  for  the  supply  of  her  West  Indies.  She  does  not 
need  it  in  time  of  peace,  and  in  war  she  could  not  depend  on  them, 
because  they  would  be  so  easily  intercepted.  I  should  suppose  that 
all  these  considerations  might,  in  some  proper  form,  be  brought  into 
view  of  the'  Government  of  France.  Though  stated  by  us,  it  ought 
not  to  give  offence;  because  we  do  not  bring  them  forward  as  a  men 
ace,  but  as  consequences  not  controllable  by  us,  but  inevitable  from 
the  course  of  things-.  We  mention  them,  not  as  things  which  we  desire 
by  any  means,  but  as  things  we  deprecate;  and  Ave  beseech  a  friend  to 
look  forward  and  to  prevent  them  for  our  common  interest. 

If  France  considers  Louisiana,  howeArer,  as  indispensable  for  her 
views,  she  might  perhaps  be  willing  to  look  about  for  arrangements 
which  might  reconcile  it  to  our  interests.  If  anything  could  do  this, 
it  would  be  the  ceding  to  us  the  island  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Flori- 
das.  This  Avould  certainly,  in  a  great  degree,  remoAre  the  causes  of 
jarring  and  irritation  between  us,  and  perhaps  for  such  a  length  of 
time,  as  might  produce  other  means  of  making  the  measure  perma 
nently  conciliate ly  to  our  interests  and  friendships.  It  would,  at  any 
rate,  relieve  us  from  the  necessit}r  of  taking  immediate  measures  for 
countervailing  such  an  operation  by  arrangements  in.another  quarter. 
But  still  Ave  should  consider  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas  as  no 
equivalent  for  the  risk  of  a  quarrel  with  France,  produced  by  her 
vicinage. 

I  have  no  doubt  you  have  urged  these  considerations,  on  every 

proper  occasion,  Avith  the  government  where  you  are.     They  are  such 

as  must  have  effect,  if  }TOU  can  find  means  of  producing  thorough 

reflection  on  them  by  that  government.     The  idea  here  is,  that  the 

H.  Doc.  431 2 


18  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

troops  sent  to  St.  Domingo,  were  to  proceed  to  Louisiana  after  finish 
ing  their  work  in  that  island.  If  this  were  the  arrangement,  it  will 
give  yon  time  to  return  again  and  again  to  the  charge.  For  the  con 
quest  of  St.  Domingo  will  not  be  a  short  work.  It  will  take  consider 
able  time,  and  wear  down  a  great  number  of  soldiers.  /Every  eye  in 
the  United  States  is  now  fixed  on  the  affairs  of  Louisiana.  Perhaps 
nothing  since  the  revolutionary  war,  has  produced  more  uneasy  sensa 
tions  through  the  body  of  the  nation./  Notwithstanding  temporary 
bickerings  have  taken  place  with  France,  she  has  still  a  strong  hold 
on  the  affections  of  our  citizens  generally.  I  have  thought  it  not 
amiss,  by  way  of  supplement  to  the  letters  of  the  Secretary  of  State, 
to  write  you  this  private  one,  to  impress  }TOU  with  the  importance  we 
affix  to  this  transaction.  I  pr&y  you  to  cherish  Dupont.  He  has  the 
best  disposition  for  the  continuance  of  friendship  between  the  two 
nations,  and  perhaps  you  may  be  able  to  make  a  good  use  of  him. 


President  Jefferson  to  M.  Dupont  de  Nemours.  ' 

WASHINGTON,  April  £5, 1802. 

DEAR  SIR, — The  week  being  now  closed,  during  which  you  had  given 
me  a  hope  of  seeing  you  here,  I  think  it  safe  to  enclose  you  my  letters 
for  Paris,  lest  they  should  fail  of  the  benefit  of  so  desirable  a  convey 
ance.  They  are  addressed  to  Kosciugha,  Madame  de  Corney,  Mrs. 
Short,  and  Chancellor  Livingston.  You  will  perceive  the  unlimited 
confidence  I  repose  in  your  good  faith,  and  in  your  cordial  dispositions 
to  serve  both  countries,  when  you  observe  that  I  leave  the  letters  for 
Chancellor  Livingston  open  for  your  perusal.  The  first  page  respects 
a  cypher,  as  do  the  loose  sheets  folded  with  the  letter.  These  are 
interesting  to  him  and  myself  only,  and  therefore  are  not  for  your 
perusal.  It  is  the  second,  third,  and  fourth  pages  which  I.  wish  you 
to  read  to  possess  j^ourself  of  completely,  and  then  seal  the  letter 
with  wafers  stuck  under  the  flying  seal,  that  it  may  be  seen  by  nobody 
else  if  any  accident  should  happen  to  you.  I  wish  you  to  be  possessed 
'of  the  subject,  because  you  may  be  able  to  impress  on  the  government 
of  France  the  inevitable  consequences  of  their  taking  possession 
of  Louisiana;  and  though,  as  I  here  mention,  the  cession  of  New 
Orleans  and  the  Floridas  to  us  would  be  a  palliation,  yet  I  believe 
it  would  be  no  more,  and  that  this  measure  will  cost  France,  and 
perhaps  not  very  long  hence,  a  war  which  will  annihilate  her  on 
the  ocean,  and  place  that  element  under  the  despotism  of  two 
nations,  which  I  am  not  reconciled  to  the  more  because  my  own 
would  be  one  of  them.  Add  to  this  the  exclusive  appropriation  of 
both  continents  of  America  as  a  consequence.  I  wish  the  present 
order  of  things  to  continue,  and  with  a  view  to  this  1  value  highly 
a  state  of  friendship  between  France  and  us.  You  know  too  well 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  19 

how  sincere  I  have  ever  been  in  these  dispositions  to  doubt  them. 
You  know,  too,  how  much  I  value  peace,  and  how  unwillingly  I 
should  see  any  event  take  place  which  would  render  war  a  neces 
sary  resource;  and  that  all  our  movements  should  change  their  char 
acter  and  object.  I  am  thus  open  with  you,  because  I  trust  that  you 
will  have  it  in  your  power  to  impress  on  that  government  considera 
tions,  in  the  scale  against  which  the  possession  of  Louisiana  is  nothing. 
In  Europe,  nothing  but  Europe  is  seen,  or  supposed  to  have  any  right 
in  the  affairs  of  nations;  but  this  little  event,  of  France's  possessing 
herself  of  Louisiana,  which  is  thrown  in  as  nothing,  as  a  mere  make 
weight  in  the  general  settlement  of  accounts, — this  speck  which  now 
appears  as  an  almost  invisible  point  in  the  horizon,  is  the  embryo  of  a 
tornado  which  will  burst  on  the  countries  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlan 
tic,  and  involve  in  its  effects  their  highest  destinies.  That  it  may  yet 
be  avoided  is  my  sincere  prayer;  and  if  you  can  be  the  means  of 
informing  the  wisdom  of  Bonaparte  of  all  its  consequences,  you  have 
deserved  well  of  both  countries.  Peace  and  abstinence  from  Euro 
pean  interferences  are  our  objects,  and  so  will  continue  while  the  pres 
ent  order  of  things  in  America  remain  uninterrupted.  There  is 
another  service  you  can  render.  I  am  told  that  Talleyrand  is  person 
ally  hostile  to  us.  This,  I  suppose,  has  been  occasioned  by  the  X  Y  Z 
history.  But  he  should  consider  that  that  was  the  artifice  of  a  party, 
willing  to  sacrifice  him  to  the  consolidation  of  their  power.  This 
nation  has  done  him  justice  by  dismissing  them;  that  those  in  power 
are  preciselyjLhotfe  who  disbelieved  that  story,  and  saw  in  it  nothing 
but  an  attempt  to  deceive  our  country;  that  we  entertain  towards  him 
personally  the  most  friendly  dispositions;  that  as  to  the  government 
of  France,  we  know  too  little  of  the  state  of  things  there  to  under 
stand  what  it  is,  and  have  no  inclination  to  meddle  in  their  settlement. 
Whatever  government  they  establish,  we  wish  to  be  well  with  it. 
One  more  request, — that  you  deliver  the  letter  to  Chancellor  Livings 
ton  with  your  own  hands,  and,  moreover,  that  you  charge  Madam 
Dupont,  if  any  accident  happen  to  you,  that  she  deliver  the  letter  with 
her  own  hands.  If  it  passes  only  through  her's  and  your's,  I  shall 
have  perfect  confidence  in  its  safety.  Present  her  my  most  sincere 
respects,  and  accept  yourself  assurances  of  my  constant  affection,  and 
my  prayers,  that  a  genial  sky  and  propitious  gales  may  place  you, 
after  a  pleasant  voyage,  in  the  midst  of  your  friends. 


[Extract.] 

James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  R.  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to  France. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  March  16,  1802. 

The  subject  of  your  letter  to  Mr.  King,  of  the  30th  of  December, 
is  regarded  by  the  President  as  not  less  delicate  than  you  have  supposed. 


20  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

Considering  the  particular  views  which  Great  Britain  may  mingle  with 
ours,  and  the  danger  that  a  confidential  resort  to  her  may  be  abused, 
for  the  purpose  of  sowing  jealousies  in  France,  and  thereby  thwart 
our  object,  }^ou  and  Mr.  King  will  both  be  sensible  that  too  much 
circumspection  cannot  be  employed. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

r    P  <\  •    ^  \  H  *\  |>~ 

PARIS,  March  24,  1802. 

On  the  business  of  Louisiana,  they  have,  as  yet,  not  thought  it  proper 
to  give  me  any  explanations,  though  I  have  omitted  no  opportunity  to 
press  the  subject  in  conversation,  and  ultimately  ^  by  the  note  sent  you 
on  the  25th  of  February,  (a  duplicate  of  which  was  forwarded  on  the 
28th),  with  a  copy  of  another  note  enforcing  the  above,  to  which  I 
have,  as  yet,  received  no  answer. 

The  fact  is,  they  believe  us  to  be  certainly  hostile  to  this  measure, 
and  they  mean  to  take  possession  of  it  as  early  as  possible,  and  with 
as  little  notice  to  us  as  they  can. 

They  are  made  to  believe  this  is  one  of  the  most  fertile  and  impor 
tant  countries  in  the  world;  that  they  have  a  much  greater  interest 
with  the  Indians  than  any  other  people;  that  New  Orleans  must  com 
mand  the  trade  of  our  whole  Western  country;  and,  of  course,  that 
they  will  have  a  leading  interest  in  its  politics.  It  is  a  darling  object 
with  the  First  Consul,  who  sees  in  it  a  mean  to  gratify  his  friends,  and 
to  dispose  of  his  armies.  There  is  a  man  here,  who  calls  himself  a 
Frenchman,  by  the  name  of  Francis  Tatergem,  who  pretends  to  have 
great  interest  with  the  Creek  nations.  He  has  been  advanced  to  the 
rank  of  General  of  Division.  He  persuades  them  that  the  Indians  are 
extremely  attached  to  France,  and  hate  the  Americans;  that  they  can 
raise  20,000  warriors;  that  the  country  is  a  paradise,  etc.  I  believe 
him  to  be  a  mere  adventurer;  but  he  is  listened  to,  and  was  first  taken 
up  by  the  old  Directors. 

I  can  not  help  thinking  that  it  would  be  advisable  for  the  present 
Congress  to  take  measures  for  establishing  the  Natchez,  or  some  other 
port,  and  giving  it  such  advantages  as  would  bring  our  vessels  to  it 
without  touching  at  Orleans.  On  this  subject,  however,  you  will  form 
a  better  judgment  than  I  can.  I  have  but' one  hope  left  as  to  defeat 
ing  this  cession:  it  consists  in  alarming  Spain  and  England.  The 
SpanislrMinister  is  now  absent;  but  I  have  not  failed,  to  show,  in  the 
strongest  light,  to  the  Minister  of  Britain,  the  danger  that  will  result 
to  them  from  the  extension  of  the  French  possessions  into  Mexico, 
and  the  probable  loss  of  Canada,  if  they  are  suffered  to  possess  it. 

I  have  requested  Mr.  King  to  press  this  subject,  also  a.s  opportunity 


PURCHASE    OF    THE   TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  21 

offers.  I  enclose  a  copy  of  my  last  letter  to  him.  If  the  treaty  does 
not  close  soon,  I  think  it  would  be  advisable  for  us  to  meet  at  Amiens, 
and  have  accordingly  proposed  it  to  him. 

I  believe,  such  is  the  state  of  things  here  and  such  the  desire  for 
peace,  that  Britain  may  force  them  to  relinquish  Louisiana;  particu 
larly  as  the  people  here  are  far  from  desiring  the  establishment  of 
any  foreign  colony  which  they  consider  as  a  weak  point  and  drain  for 
the  population  and  wealth. 


[Extract,]  / 

Mr.  Livingston  to  Mr.  King,  Minister  at  London. 

PARIS,  March  10,  1802. 

If  Louisiana  goes  into  the  hands  of  France  without  any  explana 
tions  on  the  part  of  her  Government  to  us,  (and  this  I  have  not  yet  been 
able  to  bring  it  to,  though  1  have  pointedly  pressed  it,  both  verbally 
and  by  note,)  on  the  subject  either  of  her  boundary  or  the  navigation 
of  the  Mississippi,  it  is  impossible  to  see  the  extent  of  the  power  she 
will  have  in  and  over  America.  As  part  of  the  territory  of  Spain, 
Louisiana  has  no  precise  boundary;  so  that  it  is  easy  to  foresee  the  fate 
of  Mexico,  especially  when  it  is  considered  that  General  Bernadotte, 
who  is  marked  for  this  expedition,  has  demanded,  it  is  said,  a  large 
body  of  men.  Britain  will  judge  how  far  she  is  able  to  contend  with 
France,  enriched  by  the  treasures  of  Spain.  The  boundary  between 
Canada  and  Louisiana  is  alike  unsettled.  The  dispositions  of  a  great 
part  of  the  natives  of  that  country  are  friendly  to  France;  her  influ 
ence  over  the  Indian  tribes  has  always  been,  and  will  again  be,  much 
greater  than  that  of  the  British,  both  from  the  disposition  and  manners 
of  her  people,  and  from  the  whole  body  of  carriers  in  the  Indian  trade 
being  native  Canadians,  and  much  the  greater  part  of  them  mongrel 
French.  It  is  impossible  to  say  what  their  influence  may  be  upon  our 
Western  country,  in  case  of  a  controversy  with  Great  Britain,  particu 
larly  if  they  keep  the  keys  of  it  by  possessing  the  mouth  of  the 
Mississippi  or  invite  their  aid  in  the  plunder  of  Mexico.  That  the 
possession  of  that  country,  aided  by  the  power  of  France  in  Europe, 
will  draw  after  it  that  of  all  the  islands,  is  easily  foreseen.  I  mention 
these  circumstances  to  you  (though  I  know  they  could  hardly  escape 
you)  as  hints  that  you  may  use  with  advantage  to  introduce  this  busi 
ness  at  Amiens.  You  well  know  how  to  give  them  additional  weight. 
Nor  is  the  right  of  Britain  to  interfere  unfounded.  By  the  sixth 
article  of  the  treaty  with  us  of  1778,  they  absolutely  renounce  all  right 
to  take,  under  any  circumstances,  any  part  of  the  country  possessed 
then  or  before  by  Great  Britain  on  that  continent.  Though  we  have 
relinquished  all  advantages  deducible  from  that  treaty,  yet,  so  far  as 


22  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

other  nations  were  interested  in  it,  at  the  close  of  the  last  war,  they 
have  a  right  to  enforce  it.  And  surely  it  was  a  very  important  guar 
anty  to  Britain  of  her  colonies;  and  it  might,  for  aught  we  know, 
have  had  great  influence  upon  the  terms  of  the  then  peace. 


[Extract,] 

James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  Pinckney. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  March  30,  1802. 

We  are  anxious  to  hear  from  you  on  the  several  subjects  with  which 
you  have  been  charged;  particularly  on  that  of  Louisiana.  By  a  treaty 
entered  into  between  Spain  and  France,  in  March,  1801,  and  lately 
published  in  the  Paris  newspapers,  it  appears  that  in  an  antecedent 
treaty  the  cession  of  that  country  had  been  stipulated  by  Spain.  Still 
it  is  possible  that  the  cession  may  have  been  since  annulled;  and  that 
such  was,  or  was  to  be  the  case,  has  been  stated  in  verbal  accounts  from 
Madrid.  At  Paris  Mr.  Livingston  has  been  given  to  understand,  by 
the  French  Government,  that  the  cession  has  never  been  more  than  a 
subject  of  conversation  between  the  two  Governments.  No  informa 
tion,  however,  has  been  received  from  him  subsequent  to  the  publica 
tion  of  the  Treaty  of  March,  1801,  which  must  have' led  to  some  more 
decisive  explanations. 

The  copies  herewith  enclosed  of  a  memorial  of  sundry  inhabitants 
living  on  waters  running  from  the  United  States  through  Florida  into 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  of  a  letter  from  the  late  Mr.  Hunter,  repre 
sentative  in  Congress  of  the  Mississippi  Territory,  will  present  to 
your  attention  a  subject  of  some  importance  at  this  time,  and  of  very 
great  importance  in  a  future  view.  The  Treaty  with  Spain  having,  as 
these  documents  observe,  omitted  to  provide  for  the  use  of  the  Mobile, 
Chatahoochee,  and  other  rivers  running  from  our  territory  through 
that  of  Spain,  by  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  in  like  manner  with 
the  use  of  the  Mississippi,  it  will  be  proper  to  make  early  efforts  to 
supply  the  defect.  Should  a  cession,  indeed,  including  the  Spanish 
territor}T  eastward  of  the  Mississippi,  have  finally  taken  place,  it  can 
answer  no  purpose  to  seek  from  the  Spanish  Government  this  supple 
mental  arrangement.  On  a  contrary  supposition  3^011  will  avail  your 
self  of  the  most  favorable  moment  and  manner  of  calling  its  attention 
to  the  object.  In  support  of  our  claim  you  will  be  able  to  use  the 
arguments  which  enforced  that  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 
If  it  should  be  observed  that  a  greater  proportion  of  these  rivers  than 
of  the  Mississippi  run  through  the  exclusive  territory  of  Spain,  it  may 
be  a  set-off  that  the  upper  parts  of  the  rivers  run,  exclusively,  through 
the  territory  of  the  United  States,  and  do  not  merely  divide  it,  like  the 
Mississippi,  from  that  of  Spain. 


PUECHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  23 

But  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  circumstance  can  essentially  affect 
our  natural  rights.  Should  the  Spanish  Government  be  favorably 
disposed,  it  will  be  proper  for  you  to  pave  the  way  for  a  formal  con 
vention  on  the  subject,  endeavoring  to  obtain,  in  the  meantime,  such 
regulations  from  its  authority,  and  such  instructions  to  its  officers,  as 
will  answer  the  purposes  of  our  citizens.  Among  other  hardships,  of 
which  they  now  complain,  and  for  which  a  regulation  is  particularly 
wanted,  one  1  understand,  is,  that  the  article,  cotton,  which  is  acquir 
ing  rapid  importance  in  that  quarter,  must,  after  it  has  been  conveyed 
to  Mobile,  be  shipped  to  New  Orleans  and  pay  a  duty  of  about  twelve 
and  one-half  per  cent,  before  it  can  be  exported. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  April  ^,  1802. 

The  business  most  interesting  to  us,  that  of  Louisiana,  still  remains 
in  the  state  it  was.  The  Minister  will  give  no  answer  to  any  inquiries 
I  make  on  that  subject.  He  will  not  say  what  their  boundaries  are, 
what  are  their  intentions,  and  when  they  are  to  take  possession.  And 
what  appears  very  extraordinary  to  me,  is,  that  by  a  letter  I  have  just 
received  from  Mr.  Pinckney,  I  find  that  he  still  supposes  that  the  Flor- 
idas  are  not  included  in  the  cession:  and  he  writes  me  that  he  has  made 
a  proposition  to  purchase  them,  which  lies  before  the  Minister,  with 
whom  he  is  to  have  a  conference  on  the  subject.  You  may,  however, 
be  fully  assured  that  the  Floridas  are  given  to  France;  that  the}^  are 
at  this  moment  fitting  out  an  armament  from  here  to  take  possession. 
This  will  be  commanded  by  General  Bernadotte.  The  number  of 
troops  designed  for  this  object  is  between  five  and  seven  thousand. 
They  will  shortly  sail  for  New  Orleans,  unless  the  state  of  affairs  in 
St.  Domingo  should  change  their  destination.  You  may  act  upon  this 
information  with  absolute  certainty,  since  I  have  no  doubt  of  the  chan 
nel  through  which  I  have  received  it.  It  would  be  wise  immediately 
to  take  measures  to  enable  the  Natchez  to  rival  Orleans.  I  have  sug 
gested  the  means:  and  I  hope  they  will  not  be  neglected  by  the  Congress 
now  sitting.  That  you  may  judge  of  the  light  in  which  this  country 
is  viewed  by  some  here,  I  send  you  the  extract  of  a  paper  that  now  lies 
before  the  Minister.  If  Congress  makes  the  Natchez  a  free  port,  and 
if  the  state  of  affairs  in  St.  Domingo  should  emplo}^  the  troops  designed 
for  Louisiana,  time  will  still  be  left  for  gold  to  operate  here.  But  it 
must  be  plentifully  and  liberally  bestowed,  not  barely  in  the  assump 
tion  of  debts,  but  in  active  capital,  afforded  in  supplies,  to  aid  their 
armaments  in  the  islands.  Give  me  your  instructions  as  to  the  utmost 
amount,  if,  as  you  will  be  better  able  to  judge  than  I  can,  the  affairs  of 
St.  Domingo  are  likely  to  be  protracted. 


24  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

[Extract.] 

James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Robert  R.  Livingston. 

ft.^.P,  1 '•  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE, 

Washington,  May  1,  1802. 

The  conduct  of  the  French  Government,  in  paying  so  little  attention 
to  its  obligations  under  the  treaty;  in  neglecting  its  debts  to  our  citi 
zens;  in  giving  no  answer  to  your  complaints  and  expostulations, 
which  you  say  is  the  case  with  those  of  other  foreign  Ministers  also; 
and  particularly  in  its  reserve  as  to  Louisiana,  which  tacitly  contra 
dicts  the  language  first  held  to  you  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Relations — gives  tokens  as  little  auspicious  to  the  true  interests  of 
France  herself,  as  to  the  rights  and  just  objects  of  the  United  States. 

The  cession  of  Louisiana  to  France  becomes  daily  more  and  more 
a  source  of  painful  apprehensions.  Notwithstanding  the  Treaty  of 
March,  1801,  and  notwithstanding  the  general  belief  in  France  on  the 
subject,  and  the  accounts  from  St.  Domingo  that  part  of  the  armament 
sent  to  that  island  was  eventually  destined  for  Louisiana,  a  hope  was 
still  drawn,  from  your  early  conversations  with  M.  Talleyrand,  that 
the  French  Government  did  not  mean  to  pursue  the  object.  Since  the 
receipt  of  your  last  communication,  no  hope  remains,  but,  from  the 
accumulating  difficulties  of  going  through  with  the  undertaking,  and 
from  the  conviction  you  may  be  able  to  impress,  that  it  must  have  an 
instant  and  powerful  effect  in  changing  the  relations  between  France 
and  the  United  States.  The  change  is  obvious:  and  the  more  it  can  be 
developed  in  candid  and  friendly  appeals  to  the  reflections  of  the 
French  Government,  the  more  it  will  urge  it  to  revise  and  abandon 
the  project.  A  mere  neighborhood  could  not  be  friendly  to  the  harmony 
which  both  countries  have  so  much  an  interest  in  cherishing;  but  if  a 
possession  of  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  is  to  be  added  to  other 
causes  of  discord,  the  worst  events  are  to  be  apprehended.  You  will 
consequently  spare  no  efforts,  that  will  consist  with  prudence  and  dig 
nity,  to  lead  the  councils  of  France  to  proper  views  of  this  subject, 
and  to  an  abandonment  of  her  present  purpose.  You  will  also  pur 
sue,  by  prudent  means,  the  inquiry  into  the  extent  of  the  cession— 
particularly  whether  it  includes  the  Floridas  as  well  as  New  Orleans — 
and  endeavor  to  ascertain  the  price  at  which  these,  if  .included  in  the 
cession,  would  be  yielded  to  the  United  States.  I  cannot,  in  the 
present  state  of  things,  be  more  particular  on  this  head  than  to  •bservc 
that,  in  every  view,  it  would  be  a  most  precious  acquisition,  and  that, 
as  far  as  the  terms  could  be  satisfied  by  charging  on  the  acquisition 
itself  the  restitution  and  other  debts  to  American  citizens,  great  liber 
ality  would  doubtless  be  indulged  by  this  Government.  The  President 
wishes  you  to  devote  every  attention  to  this  object,  and  to  be  frequent 
and  particular  in  your  communications  relating  to  it. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  25 

[Extract.] 

James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Rufus  King,  Minister  to  England. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  May  1,  1802. 

,  We  are  fully  aware  of  the  tendency  of  the  reported  cession  of 
Louisiana  to  plant  in  our  neighborhood  troubles  of  different  kinds, 
and  to  prepare  the  way  for  very  serious  events.  It  has  accordingly 
been  a  primary  object  with  the  President  to  obviate  such  an  event. 


Mr.  King  to  the  Secretary  of  State.    J 

LONDON,  May  7,  1802. 

SIR:  Among  the  few  great  principles  of  national  policy  worthy  of 
fixing  the  attention  of  our  statesmen,  I  am  willing  to  hope  there  is  not 
one  concerning  which  there  is  greater  unanimity,  in  opinion,  than  in 
that  which  enjoins  upon  us  all  to  do  our  utmost  in  every  way,  and 
upon  all  occasions,  to  maintain  and  perpetuate  the  union  of  our  country. 

With  this  persuasion,  though  the  subject  may  not  be  thought  to  be 
included  among  the  duties  of  my  mission,  1  have  not  been  able  to 
remain  inattentive  or  indifferent  to  the  cession  of  Louisiana  and  the 
Floridas  to  France,  because  I  have  viewed  it  as  a  measure  calculated 
and  possibly  intended  to  weaken  and  divide  us.  I  have  already  com 
municated  to  you  what  passed  between  me  and  the  Minister  of  this 
country  in  relation  to  this  cession,  during  the  negotiation  of  peace;  but 
as  these  communications  were  merely  verbal,  and  as  it  appeared  to  me 
to  be  of  some  importance  that  they  should  be  distinctly  and  formally 
confirmed,  as  well  as  that  we  should  be  ascertained  of  the  sentiments 
of  this  Government  in  respect  to  this  cession,  I  prepared  and  sent  to 
Lord  Hawkesbury  a  confidential  letter  upon  the  subject,  a  copy 
whereof,  together  with  a  copy  of  his  answer,  is  annexed.  I  will  only 
add  that  I  have  reason  to  be  satisfied  that  the  cession  of  Louisiana  and 
the  Floridas  is  considered  by  all  the  late  Ministry,  as  well  assail  other 
men  of  influence  in  this  country,  as  a  measure  of  the  greatest  conse 
quence,  and  which  must  have  an  unavoidable  influence  upon  the  dura 
tion  of  peace. 

With  perfect  respect  and  esteem,  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your 
obedient  and  faithful  servant, 

RUFUS  KING. 


Mr.  King  to  Lord  Hawkesbury. 

LONDON,  April  21,  1802. 

MY  LORD:  By  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  concluded  at  Paris,  in  1778, 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and  France,  the  latter  renounced 


26  PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

forever  the  possession  of  every  part  of  the  continent  of  America  lying 
to  the  east  of  the  course  of  the  river  Mississippi.  This  renunciation, 
confirming  that  which  had  been  previously  made  in  the  treaty  of  1763, 
between  Great  Britain  and  France,  authorized  the  expectation  that 
France,  content  with  her  widely  spread  dominions,  would  abstain  from 
seeking  an  extension  of  them  in  this  part  of  the  American  continent; 
an  expectation  that  appeared  the  more  reasonable,  inasmuch  as  the 
motives  to  such  extension  could  not  be  satisfactorily  reconciled  with  a 
just  regard  to  the  rights  and  security  of  those  Powers  between  which 
this  portion  of  America  is  divided,  and  by  which  the  same  is  at  present 
possessed. 

Contrary,  nevertheless,  to  expectations  which  have  been  entertained 
on  this  subject,  if  credit  be  due  to  uniform  and  uncontradictecl  reports, 
the  Government  of  France  has  prevailed  upon  His  Catholic  Majesty 
to  cede  to  France  both  the  provinces  of  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas, 
and  having  thus  acquired  a  station  at  the  mouth,  and  on  the  sides  of 
the  Mississippi,  may  be  inclined  to  interfere  with  and  interrupt  the 
open  navigation  of  the  same. 

By  the  Treaty  of  Peace  concluded  at  Paris,  in  1783,  between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  Great  Britain,  it  is  mutually  stipulated 
that  "the  navigation  of  the  river  Mississippi,  from  its  source  to  the 
ocean,  shall  forever  remain  free  and  open  to  the  subjects  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  citizens  of  the  United  States."  Without  enlarging 
upon  the  great  and  peculiar  importance  of  this  navigation  to  the 
United  States,  a  large  and  increasing  proportion  of  whose  people  can 
conveniently  communicate  with  each  other,  and  with  foreign  countries, 
by  no  other  route,  I  take  the  liberty,  through  your  Lordship,  to  request 
that  the  British  Government  will,  in  confidence,  explain  itself  upon 
this  subject,  and  especially  that  it  will  explicitly  declare  whether  any 
communication  has  been  received  by  it  from  the  Government  of 
France  or  Spain  respecting  the  said  cession;  or  whether  His  Britannic 
Majesty  has,  in  any  manner,  acquiesced  in  or  sanctioned  the  same,  so 
as  to  impair  or  affect  the  stipulation  above  referred  to  concerning  the 
free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  In  a  word,  I  entreat  your  Lordship 
to  open  yourself  on  this  occasion  with  that  freedom  which,  in  matters 
of  weighty  concern,  is  due  from  one  friendly  nation  to  another,  and 
which,  in  the  present  instance,  will  have  the  effect  to  do  away  all  those 
misconceptions  that  may  otherwise  prevail  in  respect  to  the  privity  of 
Great  Britain  to  the  cession  in  question. 

With  the  highest  consideration,  1  have  the  honor  to  be, 

KUFUS  KING. 


PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF   LOUISIANA.  27 

Lord  Hawkesbury  to  Mr.  King. 

DOWNING  STREET,  May  7,  1802. 

SIR:  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  your  letter  of  the 
21st  ultimo. 

It  is  impossible  that  so  important  an  event  as  the  cession  of  Louisi 
ana  by  Spain  to  France  should  be  regarded  by  the  King  in  any  other 
light  than  as  highly  interesting  to  His  Majesty,  and  to  the  United 
States;  and  should  render  it  more  necessary  than  ever  that  there  should 
subsist  between  the  two  Governments  that  spirit  of  confidence  which  is 
become  so  essential  to  the  security  of  their  respective  territories  and 
possessions. 

With  regard  to  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  I  conceive 
that  it  is  perfectly  clear,  according  to  the  law  of  nations,  that,  in  the 
event  of  the  district  of  Louisiana  being  ceded  to  France,  that  country 
would  come  into  possession  of  it  subject  to  all  the  engagements  which 
appertained  to  it  at  the  time  of  cession;  and  that  the  French  Govern 
ment  could,  consequently,  allege  no  colorable  pretext  for  excluding 
His  Majesty's  subjects,  or  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  from  the 
.navigation  of  the  river  Mississippi. 

With  regard  to  the  second  question  in  your  letter,  I  can  have  no 
difficulty  in  informing  you  that  no  communication  whatever  has  been 
received  by  His  Majesty  from  the  Government  of  France  or  Spain, 
relative  to  any  convention  or  treaty  for  the  cession  of  Louisiana  or  the 
lloridas;  and  I  can,  at  the  same  time,  most  truly  assure  you  that  His 
Majesty  has  not  in  any  manner,  directly  or  indirectly,  acquiesced  in 
or  sanctioned  this  cession. 

In  making  this  communication  to  you,  for  the  information  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  I  think  it  right  to  acquaint  you  that 
His  Majesty  will  be  anxious  to  learn  their  sentiments  on  every^  part  of 
this  subject,  and  the  line  of  policy  which  they  will  be  inclined  to  adopt 
in  the  event  of  this  arrangement  being  carried  into  effect. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  great  respect,  sir,  your  most  obedient, 
humble  servant, 

HAWKESBURY. 


James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Charles  Pinckney,  Minister  of 

Spain. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  May  11,  1802. 

We  are  still  without  a  line  from  you  since  your  arrival  at  Madrid, 
and  feel  an  increasing  solicitude  to  hear  from  you  on  the  subject  of 
Louisiana.  The  latest  information  from  Paris  has  confirmed  the  fact 
that  it  was  ceded  by  a  treaty  prior  to  that  of  March,  1801;  and,  not 
withstanding  the  virtual  denial  of  the  cession  in  the  early  conversa 
tions  between  Mr.  Livingston  and  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  a 


28  PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

refusal  of  any  explanations  at  present  seems  to  admit  that  the  cession 
has  taken  place.  Still  there  are  chances  of  obtaining  a  reversal  of 
the  transaction.  The  repugnance  of  the  United  States  to  it  is,  and 
will  be,  pressed  in  a  manner  that  can  not  be  without  some  effect:  it  is 
known  that  most  of  the  French  statesmen  best  informed  on  the  sub 
ject,  disapproved  of  it;  the  pecuniary  difficulties  of  the  French  Gov 
ernment  must,  also,  be  felt  as  a  check;  whilst  the  prospect  of  a  protracted 
and  expensive  war  in  St.  Domingo;  must  form  a  very  powerful  obstacle 
to  the  execution  of  the  project.  The  councils  of  England  appear  to 
have  been  torpid  on  this  occasion.  Whether  it  proceeded  from  an 
unwillingness  to  risk  a  fresh  altercation  with  France,  or  from  a  hope 
that  such  a  neighborhood  between  France  and  the  United  States  would 
lead  to  collisions  which  might  be  turned  to  her  advantage,  is  more 
than  I  can  decide.  The  latter  consideration  might  justly  have  great 
weight  with  her;  but  as  her  eyes  may  be  more  readily  turned  to  the 
immediate  and  certain  purposes  to  be  answered  to  her  rival,  it  is  to  be 
presumed  that  the  policy  of  England  will  contribute  to  thwart  the 
acquisition.  What  the  intentions  of  Spain  may  be,  we  wait  to  learn 
from  you.  Verbal  information  from  inofficial  sources,  has  led  us  to 
infer  that  she  disowns  the  instrument  of  cession,  and  will  rigorously 
oppose  it, /Should  the  cession  actually  fail  from  this,  or  any  other 
cause,  and  Spain  retain  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas,  I  repeat  to  you 
the  wish  of  the  President,  that  every  effort  and  address  be  employed 
to  obtain  the  arrangement  by  which  the  territory  on  the  east  side  of 
the  Mississippi,  including  New  Orleans,  may  be  ceded  to  the  United 
States,  and  the  Mississippi  made  a  common  boundary,  with  a  common 
use  of  its  navigation  for  them  and  Spain.  The  inducements  to  be  held 
out  to  Spain  were  intimated  in  your  original  instructions  on  this  point. 
I  am  charged  by  the  President  now  to  add,  that  you  may  not  only 
receive  and  transmit  a  proposition  of  guaranty  of  her  territory  beyond 
the  Mississippi,  as  a  condition  of  her  ceding  to  the  United  States  the 
territory,  including  New  Orleans,  on  this  side,  but,  in  case  it  may  be 
necessary a  may  make  the  proposition  yourself,  in  the  forms  required 
by  our  constitution.  You  will  infer  from  this  enlargement  of  your 
authority,  how  much  importance  is  attached  to  the  object  in  question, 
as  securing  a  precious  acquisition  to  the  United  States,  as  well  as  a 
natural  and  quiet  boundary  with  Spain;  and  will  derive  from  this  con 
sideration  additional  motives  to  discharge,  with  a  prudent  zeal,  the  task 
committed  to  you. 

[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  May  20,  180%. 

The  same  conduct  was  held  (by  the  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations) 
with  respect  to  Louisiana.     He  would  not  acknowledge  that  the  Gov- 


PUECHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  29 

eminent  had  yet  formed  any  specific  plan  with  respect  to  it,  or  that 
any  troops  were  going  out;  but  assured  me,  in  general  terms,  that  noth 
ing  should  be  done  that  should  give  us  any  ground  of  complaint;  on 
the  contrary,  their  vicinity  would  promote  our  friendship. 

I  will  not  trouble  you  with  the  answers  that  obviously  presented  to 
this  reasoning.  It  terminated,  however,  as  all  my  conversations  on  the 
subject  have  done,  in  nothing. 

I  shall  wait  a  few  days  in  hopes  of  hearing  from  you,  after  having 
received  a  copy  of  my  first  n6te,  when  I  shall  act  agreeably  to  your 
instructions,  or,  if  you  afford  me  none,  send  in  a  second,  in  which  1 
shall  press  for  a  communication  of  the  treaty  with  Spain,  which, 
however,  I  am  in  hopes  you  may  receive  through  Mr.  Pinckney. 

I  believe  that,  for  the  present,  the  armament  designed  for  Louisiana 
will  be  sent  to  Hispaniola,  about  which,  I  find,  that  much  anxiety  is 
entertained  here. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

01  .£,  £  5,  '.  5  I  6  PARIS,  May  28,  1802. 

SIR:  Since  my  last  I  have  acquired  information  which  I  can  depend 
on,  relative  to  the  intentions  of  this  Government  witli  respect  to  Loui 
siana.  Bernadotte  is,  as  I  told  you,  to  command:  Collot  second  in  com 
mand.  Adet  is  to  be  prefect:  but  the  expedition  is  delayed  till  about 
September,  on  account  (as  Talleyrand  expressed  himself  to  Bernadotte) 
of  some  difficulty  which  he  did  not  explain;  but  which,  I  have  no  doubt, 
has  arisen  from  the  different  apprehensions  of  France  and  Spain  rela 
tive  to  the  meaning  of  the  term  Lousiana,  which  has  been  understood 
by  France  to  include  the  Floridas,  but  probably  by  Spain  to  have  been 
confined  to  the  strict  meaning  of  the  term.  This  explains  why  I  could 
never  get  an  answer  to  my  questions  relative  to  the  extent  of  the  ces 
sions;  and  upon  which  the  French  Government  had  probably  no  doubt 
till  we  started  it.  Believing,  if  this  conjecture  as  to  the  cause  of  delay 
of  the  expedition  was  right,  that  no  time  should  be  lost  in  throwing 
obstructions  in  the  way  of  its  conclusion,  I  wrote  the  note  of  which 
the  inclosed  is  a  copy,  with  the  double  purpose  of  alarming  Spain,  and 
furnishing  with  arguments,  arising  from  the  good  faith  they  owed  us, 
against  giving  their  cession  the  construction  France  would  wish.  I 
consider  this  as  the  more  important,  because  1  believe  that  every  nego 
tiation  for  this  object  will  be  carried  on  here.  I  shall,  however,  give 
the  earliest  and  fullest  information  I  can  on  this  subject  to  Mr.  Pinck 
ney,  who  will  enforce  at  Madrid  the  arguments  1  may  use  here  to 
excite  the  alarm  of  the  Court  of  Spain. 

I  wait  impatiently  some  further  instructions  from  you;  those  1  have 
in  some  sort  prohibiting  such  measures  as  may  show  any  dissatisfac- 


30  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

tion  on  the  subject,  of  which,  however,  I  doubt  the  policy.     The  sub 
ject  is  so  interesting  as  to  induce  us  to  risk  something  to  defeat  it. 

If  I  do  not  hear  from  you  soon  I  shall  present  a  pointed  memorial 
to  this  Government  stating  fully  and  candidly  our  objections  to  their 
taking  possession  of  the  Floridas,  and  demanding  security  for  the 
rights  we  had  originally,  and  by  treaty  with  Spain. 

I  am,  sir,  etc.,  R.  R.  L. 


Mr.  Livingston,  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States,  to  His 
Excellency  Chevalier  d'Azara,  Ambassador  of  His  Catholic  Majesty. 

r\  ^  $  *  '  S \^ 

PARIS,  May  28,  1802. 

SIR:  The  powerful  interests  that  our  respective  Governments  have, 
that  the  sincerest  friendship  and  harmony  should  subsist  between  their 
territories  in  America,  naturally  leads  to  mutual  confidence  between 
their  Ministers,  and  a  full  exposition  of  their  sentiments  upon  subjects 
which  may  have  a  tendency  to  interrupt  that  union.  I  think  it  my 
dut}",  therefore,  to  open  myself  to  }^ou  with  freedom  on  one  which  is 
very  important  as  it  regards  the  good  faith  which,  I  trust,  both  your 
Government  and  mine  will  consider  as  the  first  of  obligations,  as  it 
respects  the  great  territorial  interests  of  both  Spain  and  the  United 
States;  and  I  flatter  myself,  sir,  that  with  these  objects  in  view,  I 
shall  meet  with  equal  frankness  and  confidence  on  your  part.  It  is 
generally  understood  that  Spain  has  made  a  cession  of  Louisiana  to 
France;  and  it  might  have  been  expected,  considering  the  situation  of 
this  territory,  and  the  friendly  connection  between  both  countries  and 
the  United  States,  that  a  communication  would  have  been  made  of  this 
treaty  to  their  Government.  Passing  over  this  circumstance,  probably 
owing  rather  to  inattention  than  to  a  want  of  confidence,  I  proceed  to 
make  some  observations  on  the  treat}^  now  in  force  between  the  Court 
of  Madrid  and  the  United  States,  and  to  inquire  how  far  Spain  has  pro 
vided  for  the  stipulations  contained  in  that  treaty,  and  secured  thereby 
to  the  United  States.  The  boundary  between  our  respective  Govern 
ments  having  been  established,  it  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  the  cession 
has  confined  itself  to  the  same  limits.  But,  sir,  by  the  fourth  article 
of  that  treaty,  it  is  agreed  that  the  midchannel  of  the  Mississippi, 
where  it  divides  the  territories  of  Spain  from  those  of  the  United 
States,  shall  be  the  boundary,  and  that  the  navigation  of  this  river 
shall  be  confined  to  the  subjects  of  Spain  and  the  citizens.of  the  United 
States,  unless  it  shall  be  extended  to  others  by  special  convention.  I 
am  solicitous  to  know,  sir,  in  what  manner  the  rights  of  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States  in  this  river  are  preserved  by  the  terms  of  the 
cession. 

Where  the  river  runs  wholly  within  the  territory  of  Spain,  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  31 

United  States  have,  by  the  treaty,  a  qualified  right  of  navigation  of 
which  they  can  not  be  divested.  They  have  also  the  assurance  of 
Spain  that  no  other  nation  shall  share  this  right  unless  by  convention; 
by  which  I  understand  that  Spain  binds  herself  not  to  grant  this  right 
without  some  previous  agreement  on  the  subject  with  the  United 
States:  and  this  is  rendered  more  evident  from  the  words  of  the  article 
not  being  confined  to  the  river  below  the  thirty-first  degree  of  north 
latitude,  but  extending  to  the  whole  of  the  Mississippi,  as  well  above 
as  below:  whereas,  half  the  river  above  that  boundary  belonging  to 
the  United  States,  it  could  not  have  been  intended  that  either  of  the 
contracting  parties  should  have  a  right  to  grant,  without  the  consent 
of  the  other,  a  right  that  was  held  in  common.  The  word  convention 
must,  therefore,  be  intended  to  mean  a  convention  between  Spain  and 
the  United  States;  nor  can  any  cession  of  the  territory  carry  with  it  a 
right  to  admit  other  Powers  to  a  participation  of  the  advantages  of  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  unless  by  convention  previously  entered 
into  between  His  Catholic  Majesty  and  the  United  States.  It  is  to  be 
presumed  that,  in  the  cession  which  Spain  has  made,  the  Floridas  are 
not  included,  because  of  the  evident  interest  that  she  has  in  retaining 
them  as  security  for  her  territories  in  South  America,  if  unfortunate 
events  should  hereafter  produce  a  rupture  between  France  and  Spain. 
In  this  case,  the  Floridas,  by  lying  in  the  rear  of  the  French  colonies, 
would  serve  as  an  effectual  check  as  well  to  them  as  to  those  turbulent 
spirits  in  the  adjoining  States  who  might,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of 
their  Government,  incline  to  associate  in  the  enterprises  of  France. 
Upon  this  subject,  sir,  however,  I  pray  to  have  more  explicit  informa 
tion,  because  you  will  observe  that,  by  the  existing  treaty  between  our 
respective  nations,  there  are  special  stipulations  mutually  agreed  upon, 
and  which  the  United  States  have  a  right  to  expect  some  security  for, 
in  any  cession  that  Spain  may  make  of  that  country. 

By  the  fifth  article  it  is  agreed  that  Spain  will  restrain  by  force  all 
hostilities  on  the  part  of  the  Indian  nations  living  within  their  bound 
ary,  either  on  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  or  the  Indians  within 
their  territory,  &c.  You  will  easily  see,  sir,  that  as  this  is  a  national 
obligation,  it  may  be  doubtful  whether  it  will  pass  with  the  territory, 
and  yet  is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  entitle  the  United  States  to  look  for 
its  performance  from  the  good  faith  of  Spain,  who  can  not,  without 
the  consent  of  the  United  States,  place  herself  in  a  situation  to  render 
it  of  no  effect.  /By  the  twenty-second  article  of  the  same  treaty,  Spain 
stipulates  to  permit  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  to  deposit  their 
goods  at  New  Orleans,  and  to  export  from  thence  free  of  duty;  or,  in 
case  of  withdrawing  this  permission,  to  assign  them  an  establishment 
for  this  purpose  on  another  part  of  the  banks  of  the  MississipjDiA  I 
take  the  liberty  to  ask,  sir,  (if  the  Floridas  are  included  in  the  cession 
to  France,)  what  stipulations  the  cession  contains  insuring  to  the 


32  PUKCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

United  States  this  important  privilege,  which  they  considered  them 
selves  entitled  to  by  the  best  of  all  guaranties,  the  good  faith  of  His 
Catholic  Majesty?  You  will  easily  see,  sir,  that  if  a  naked  cession  has 
been  made  to  France,  without  attention  to  these  articles,  how  much 
reason  the  United  States  will  have  to  complain  of  the  measure:  and  I 
trust,  sir,  that  you  will  see  the  propriety  of  their  forming  one  of  the 
parties  to  any  treaty  in  which  their  rights  may  be  so  materially  affected. 
I  know,  sir,  that  observations  might,  and  I  doubt  not  will  be  made 
officially  to  your  Court  by  the  Minister  of  the  United  States  at  Madrid; 
but,  in  the  meantime,  sir,  as  it  is  my  intention  to  address  myself  upon 
this  subject  to  the  Government  of  France^.!  wish  to  receive  from  you 
every  information  which  might  throw  light  upon  the  subject,  and  the 
rather  as  knowing  the  confidence  that  His  Catholic  Majesty  reposed  in 
your  talents  and  patriotism;  and  seeing,  at  the  same  time,  that  in 
everything  that  related  to  this  object  our  respective  nations  had  a  joint 
interest.  1  have  believed  that  you  will  receive  with  pleasure  this 
unofficial  note  as  a  mark  of  my  confidence,  and  afford  me  your  aid  in 
giving  efficacy  to  a  treaty  which  has  served  as  a  basis  of  friendship 
between  our  respective  nations. 

R.  R.  L. 

[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  JMW  8,  180%. 

Enclosed  is  the  answer  of  the  Spanish  Ambassador  to  my  letter,  a 
copy  of  which  was  forwarded  on  the  28th  ult.  It  accords  with  the 
conclusions  I  drew  from  the  delay  of  the  expedition,  and  the  conduct 
of  the  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations.  I  have  had  a  conversation  with 
Collot  and  Adet,  separately.  I  find  that,  though  they  both  consider 
their  going  in  official  characters  to  Louisiana  as  settled,  yet  that  they 
have  neither  seen  the  treaty,  nor  know  precisely  the  boundary  of  the 
territory  acquired.  Pensacola  and  Mobile,  they  say,  are  expressly 
given:  as  to  the  rest,  or  whether  it  includes  West  Florida,  they  can  not 
say.  That  France  intended  that  it  should.  1  have  no  doubt;  and  I  still 
think  it  probable  that  she  will  make  it  yield  to  her  intentions:  for  in 
Europe  she  does  what  she  will,  and  it  will  require  firmness  and  exer 
tion  to  prevent  her  doing  so  in  America. 


The  Chevalier  d'Azara,  Ambassador  of  His  Catholic  Majesty,  near  the 
French  Republic,  to  Mr.  Livingston,  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the 
United  States. 

^  -  b,  £.  V,  5  \°\  PARIS,  June  2,  180%. 

SIR:  I  pray  you  to  excuse  my  not  having  been  able  to  see  you  when 

you  were  so  good  as  to  call  at  my  dwelling;  the  ill  state  of  my  health 

for  the  last  ten  days  has  deprived  me  of  that  honor. 

/ ,.  L^-,     v^  ^  xU.v.  *  L 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  33 

I  return  you  thanks  for  the  frankness  disclosed  in  your  unofficial 
note  of  the  28th  May;  and,  in  adopting  the  same  friendship  and  equal 
frankness,  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  the  affair  concerning 
which  you  have  addressed  me,  not  having  passed  through  my  hands,  1 
am  unable  to  give  you  all  the  information  which  you  have  desired.  It 
appears  certain,  however,  that  a  treaty  ceding  Louisiana  has  been  con 
cluded;  but  I  am  of  opinion  that  the  Floridas  are  not  comprised  in  the 
cession. 

As  the  Minister  of  the  United  States  at  Madrid  will  be  required, 
(agreeably  to  what  you  have  had  the  goodness  to  inform  me),  to  demand 
explanation  of  my  Court  concerning  the  treaty  in  question,  your  Gov 
ernment  will  receive,  through  him,  all  the  information  which  may  be 
proper.  Nevertheless,  I  will  write  to  my  Court,  and  will  not  fail  to 
communicate  all  that  I  may  learn,  for  the  purpose,  as  far  as  depends 
on  me,  of  removing  your  doubts  and  dispelling  your  inquietude. 

J.  NICOLAY  D'AZARA. 


[Extract.] 

James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Rufus  King,  Minister  to  England. 

4  •  £ .  /°.  &  :    ir  j  q 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  Jidy  23,  180%, 

The  subject  of  your  letter  of  May  7th,  namely,  your  correspondence 
with  Lord  Kawkesbury  on  the  cession  of  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas 
to  France  will  receive  from  the  President  all  the  consideration  which 
its  great  importance  demands;  and  as  soon  as  an  answer  can  be  founded 
on  the  result  of  his  reflections  no  time  will  be  lost  in  transmitting  it. 


[Extract.]- 

James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  C.  Pinckney,  Minister  to  Spain. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  July  %6,  1802. 

The  information  from  Paris  renders  it  certain  that  the  cession  of 
Louisiana  to  France  has  actually  been  concluded,  and  that  the  cession 
comprehends  the  two  Floridas.  In  this  state  of  the  business,  it  seems 
unnecessary  to  decide  on  the  price  which  Spain  might  be  led  to  expect 
for  a  cession  of  the  Floridas,  including  New  Orleans,  to  the  United 
States;  and  the  more  so,  as  it  would  be  of  use  for  us  previously  to 
know  the  value  she  places  on  the  guaranty  proposed  in  my  letter  to 
you  of  the  25th  of  September  last.  For  the  present,  the  cession 
wished  by  the  United  States  must  be  an  object  of  negotiation  with  the 
French  Government.  It  will,  notwithstanding,  continue  to  be  proper 
for  you  to  cultivate  the  good  dispositions  of  Spain  in  relation  to  it, 
both  as  they  may  not  be  entirely  disregarded  by  France,  and  as,  in 
H.  Doc.  431 3 


34  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

the  turn  of  events,  Spain  may  possibly  be  extricated  from  her  engage 
ments  to  France,  and  again  have  the  disposal  of  the  territories  in 
question. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  July  JO,  1802. 

I  have  received  your  dispatches  and  the  President's  by  M.  Dupont 
de  Nemours.  I  shall  reply  more  particularly  to  them  at  the  next 
opportunity,  as  I  am  now  very  much  engaged  in  preparing  a  lengthy 
memoir  on  the  subject  of  the  mutual  interests  of  France  and  the  United 
States,  relative  to  Louisiana,  by  which  I  hope  to  convince  them  that, 
both  in  a  commercial  and  a  political  view,  the  posession  of  it  would  be 
disadvantageous  to  France.  In  my  last,  I  hinted  to  you  my  suspicions 
that  France  and  Spain  did  not  understand  each  other  on  the  subject  of 
Louisiana,  and  communicated  to  you  my  letters  to  the  Spanish  Ambas 
sador,  calculated  to  sound  this  business,  and  interpose  some  difficulty 
to  its  execution.  His  answer  confirmed  my  opinion.  I  have  since 
received,  verbally,  his  explicit  assurance  that  the  Floridas  are  not 
included  in  the  cession;  and  I  have  been  applied  to,  by  one  of  the 
Ministers  here,  to  know  what  we  understand,  in  America,  by  Louisi 
ana.  You  can  easily  conceive  my  answer.  I  have  just  received  a  let 
ter  from  Mr.  Graham,  in  which  he  communicates  the  Spanish  Minister's 
answer  to  Mr.  Pinckney's  application  upon  the  same  subject,  in  these 
words:  "  If  the  King  should  think  proper  to  cede  Louisiana,  he  will 
take  care  that  the  interest  of  the  United  States  shall  not  be  affected  by 
it."  It  appears  also,  by  the  fifth  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Madrid,  March 
21st,  1801,  that  the  cession  had  been  made  of  Louisiana  generally.  The 
French,  you  know,  have  always  extended  it  to  South  Carolina  and  all 
the  country  on  the  Ohio.  Since  the  possession  of  the  Floridas  by 
Britain,  and  the  Treaty  of  1703, 1  think  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the 
precise  meaning  of  the  term. 

I  find  a  certain  degree  of  raideur  in  the  Spanish  Ambassador,  on  that 
subject,  which  it  will  be  our  interest  to  cherish  at  the  Court  of  Spain 
unless  we  should  have  a  prospect  of  purchasing  the  Floridas.  In  the 
present  state  of  things,  until  the  point  is  settled,  I  think  it  probable 
the  expedition  to  Louisiana  will  be  postponed.  In  the  meantime,  all 
that  can  be  done  here  will  be  to  endeavor  to  obtain  a  cession  of  New 
Orleans,  either  by  purchase,  or  by  offering  to  make  it  a  port  of  entry 
to  France,  on  such  terms  as  shall  promise  ad  vantages  to  her  commerce, 
and  give  her  hopes  of  introducing  her  manufactures  and  wines  into 
our  western  country.  An  arrangement  of  this  sort,  if  they  listen  to  it, 
would  certainly  be  beneficial  to  both  countries  and  only  hurtful  to 


PITECHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  35 

Britain.  If  to  this  we  could  add  a  stipulation  that  she  shall  never  pos 
sess  the  Floridas,  but,  on  the  contrary,  in  case  of  a  rupture  with  Spain, 
and  a  conquest  of  them,  cede  them  to  us,  our  affairs  in  that  quarter 
would  stand  as  well  as  I  would  wish;  and  the  colonies  that  France 
might  attempt  to  establish  on  the  west  side  of  the  Mississippi  would 
be  too  feeble  to  injure  us. 

I  find  them  very  anxious  to  have  the  ports  of  Pensacola  and  St. 
Augustine,  as  they  dread  our  having  command  of  the  Gulf.  I  confess 
this  appears  to  me  novery'important  object;  and  if  they  would  be  con 
tent  with  these,  and  give  us  West  Florida  and  New  Orleans,  even  at  a 
large  price,  we  should  not  hesitate.  I  am  sorry  that  you  have  not  com 
municated  to  me  what  are  precisely  the  utmost  limits  of  the  sum  I  may 
venture  to  offer  in  cash,  or  in  our  own  demands.  As  the  Minister  has 
been  absent  some  time,  and  has  but  just  returned,  I  can  not  state  precisely 
to  you  what  we  may  hope  on  this  subject;  but  be  persuaded  that  I  am 
fully  impressed  with  the  importance  of  the  subject,  and  that  nothing 
will  be  left  undone  which  I  can  do  to  effectuate  }rour  wishes.  I  saw 
him  last  night,  and  was  very  cordially  received.  His  health  is  so  much 
amended  by  the  waters,  that  1  hope  he  will  be  able  to  go  through  busi 
ness  more  speedily  than  he  has  done. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  'August  10, 1802. 

Our  own  affairs  have  advanced  but  little,  since  the  whole  attention 
of  those  in  power  are  turned  to  objects  nearer  home.  1  have  had  sev 
eral  conferences  on  the  subject  of  Louisiana,  but  can  get  nothing  more 
from  them  than  I  have  already  communicated.  I  have  thought  it  best, 
bv  conversation  and  by  writing,  to  pave  the  way,  prior  to  any  direct 
application,  till  I  know  better  to  what  object  to  point.  For  this  pur 
pose,  I  have  written  the  enclosed  essay,  which  I  have  had  translated, 
and  struck  off  twent}r  copies;  I  have  just  got  them  finished;  I  have 
placed  some  of  them  in  such  hands  as  I  think  will  best  serve  our  pur 
poses.  Talleyrand  has  promised  me  to  give  it  an  attentive  perusal; 
after  which,  when  I  find  how  it  works,  I  will  come  forward  with  some 
proposition.  u4  am  very  much,  however,  at  a  loss,  as  to  what  terms 
you  would  consider  it  as  allowable  to  offer,  if  they  can  be  brought  to 
a  sale  of  the  Floridas,  either  with  or  without  New  Orleans:  which  last 
place  will  be  of  little  consequence,  if  we  possess  the  Floridas,  because 
a  much  better  passage  may  be  formed  on  the  east  side  of  the  river. 
I  may,  perhaps,  carry  my  estimate  of  them  too  high;  but  when  I  con 
sider,  first,  the  expense  it  will  save  us  in  guards  and  garrisons,  the 
risk  of  war,  the  value  of  duties,  and  what  may  be  raised  by  the  sale  of 


36  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

lands,  I  should  think  them  a  cheap  purchase.  I  trust,  however,  that 
you  will  give  me  some  directions  on  this  head,  and  not  leave  the  respon 
sibility  of  offering  too  much  or  too  little,  entirely  at  my  door.  I 
speak,  in  all  this  business,  as  if  the  affair  of  the  Floridas  was  arranged 
with  Spain;  which,  I  believe,  is  not  yet  the  case.  But  I  took  occasion 
to  touch  on  the  subject  three  days  ago,  with  the  Spanish  Ambassador, 
with  whom  I  was  dining,  and  think  he  appeared  to  have  somewhat 
relaxed  on  that  ground,  but  would  say  nothing  decisive;  nor  were  the 
time  and  place  proper  to  press  him. 


r    r   «p         Memoir,  referred  to  in  the  preceding  dispatch. 

Whether  it  will  be  advantageous  to  France  to  take  possession  of 
Louisiana? 

This  question  presents  itself  in  two  points  of  view: 

First,  as  it  affects  the  commerce  and  manufactures  of  France. 

Second,  as  it  affects  her  positive  or  relative  strength. 

Colonies  are  never  cherished  for  themselves,  but  on  account  of  the 
influence  they  may  have  upon  the  general  prosperity  of  the  nation. 
And  as  one  man  at  home,  contributes  more  to  this  than  two  at  a  dis 
tance,  no  wise  nation  colonizes  but  when  it  has  a  superfluous  popula 
tion,  or  when  it  has  a  superfluous  capital  that  can  not  otherwise  be 
rendered  productive. 

The  population  of  France,  though  very  considerable,  has  by  no 
means  attained  the  point  which  renders  it  necessary  to  colonize.  The 
soil,  climate,  and  local  situation,  give  it  advantages  as  a  commercial 
and  more  particularly  as  a  manufacturing,  nation,  over  every  other 
part  of  Europe.  The  ingenuity,  taste,  and  industry  of  the  inhabit 
ants  have  placed  them  in  the  highest  rank;  but  these  advantages  are 
very  much  restricted  by  the  want  of  a  sufficient  capital  to  bring  them 
into  operation.  A  rival  nation,  inferior  in  all  the  circumstances  I  have 
mentioned,  by  the  single  effect  of  a  large  capital,  has  attained  a  superi 
ority  both  in  commerce  and  manufactures  which,  in  return,  those  cir 
cumstances  enable  it  to  maintain  by  continually  adding  to  that 
national  wealth.  Capital  increases  manufactures  by  the  introduction 
of  machines,  by  the  regular  payment  of  workmen,  by  reducing  the 
interest  of  money,  and,  above  all,  by  forcing  new  markets.  The 
wealthy  mechanic  alone  can  afford  those  expensive  and  slow  opera 
tions  which,  in  many  cases,  give  perfection  to  a  fabric.  And  the  rich 
merchant,  alone,  can  afford  to  make  long  voyages,  from  which  he  has 
slow  returns;  or  give  such  extensive  credits  as  will  tempt  those  of  for 
eign  countries  to  purchase  his  commodities  in  preference  to  such  as 
are  offered  by  nations  who  expect  more  speedy  payment.  Such  is  the 
want  of  capital  in  France,  that  no  manufacturer  has  any  quantity  of 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OP    LOUISIANA.  37 

goods  on  hand  to  answer  an  immediate  demand;  and,  of  course,  no  for 
eign  merchant  can  rely  upon  the  certainty  of  obtaining  such  an  assort 
ment  of  goods  from  the  French  consignee  of  his  cargo,  as  will  answer 
his  purpose,  without  either  detaining  his  vessel,  or  being  compelled  to 
take  a  considerable  proportion  in  articles  of  very  inferior  value, 
picked  up  from  different  manufactories;  so  that  if  frauds  are  com 
mitted,  no  one  can  be  charged  with  them;  a  circumstance  that  renders 
character  of  little  importance  to  the  French  mechanic. 

To  this  cause  is  owing  that  when  a  foreign  ship,  particularly  one 
from  a  distant  nation,  disposes  of  her  cargo  in  France,  she  has  orders 
to  take  wines  and  brandies  in  return,  because  these  are  the  only 
articles  that  the  owner  can  depend  upon  having,  in  time,  of  the  quan 
tity  he  orders.  On  the  contrary,  any  species  of  goods  is  obtained  in 
England  at  an  hour's  warning  from  a  single  manufacturer,  whose 
character  is  at  stake  if  they  should  not  prove  equal  to  the  sample. 
This  circumstance  will  always  induce  a  foreign  merchant  to  prefer 
dealing  for  goods  of  the  same  nature  with  a  British,  rather  than  with 
a  French  factor:  and  accordingly  we  find  cargoes  sold  in  France,  and 
the  money  remitted  to  England  to  purchase  articles  that  France  might 
furnish,  were  her  manufacturers  sufficiently  rich  to  supply  them,  at  a 
short  notice,  without  compelling  the  buyer  to  seek  them  at  different 
deposits.  This  evil  can  only  be  remedied  by  an  increase  of  capital  in 
the  hands  of  manufacturers.  To  show  how  this  capital  might  be 
obtained,  would  lead  me  too  far  out  of  1113-  present  subject.  But  it 
must  be  obviously  diminished  either  where  a  navy  is  raised  at  the 
expense  of  the  manufacturer,  or  where  the  capital  of  the  nation  is 
employed  in  distant  countries.  The  operation  of  capital  in  opening 
new  markets  is  obvious;  for  nothing  is  more  evident  than  that  mer 
chants  of  foreign  countries,  not  possessing  large  capitals,  are  content 
to  be  agents  of  those  who  can  furnish  them  goods  upon  credit.  And 
it  is  by  this  means  that  Britain  has  found  no  loss  of  market  in  America, 
in  consequence  of  their  having  become  independent;  their  immense 
capital  having  created  a  moneyed  dependence  which  has  supplied,  in  a 
commercial  point  of  view,  that  which  they  before  derived  from  the 
supremacy  of  her  Government.  The  increase  of  American  capital  is 
now  freeing  her,  in  some  sort,  from  that  dependence,  and  enabling  her 
to  extend  her  commercial  operations,  and  even  to  afford  a  capital  to 
other  nations,  who  shall  know  how  to  estimate  the  value  of  the  market 
she  affords  to  the  manufactures  and  luxuries  of  Europe.  It  will  readily 
be  admitted  that  transmarine  colonies  add  nothing  to  the  strength  of 
a  nation.  They  are,  on  the  contrary,  weak  points,  that  are  guarded  at 
great  expense  of  men  and  money;  more  particularly  where  they  are 
placed  in  warm  and  unhealthy  climates.  The  simple  question,  then, 
is — Has  France  such  a  superfluity  of  capital  or  people  as  will  justify 
the  establishment  of  new  colonies  ? 


38  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OP    LOUISIANA. 

Those  that  France  already  possesses  in  the  West  Indies  and  at  Cayenne 
are  more  than  sufficient  to  supply  all  the  demands  of  France,  and 
indeed,  the  demands  of  all  Europe,  were  they  fully  cultivated,  for  those 
commodities  that  constitute  their  staples.  But  how  are  they  to  be 
cultivated  ?  Experience  has  proved  that  the  inhabitants  of  warm  cli 
mates  are  never  led  by  their  necessities  to  labor.  Force  alone  can 
supply  those  taskmasters  (cold  and  hunger)  which  nature  has  placed 
under  northern  skies.  Hence  the  necessity  of  slaves  in  rendering  the 
West  Indies  productive.  These  are  only  to  be  procured  at  a  very  con 
siderable  expense.  The  Spanish  port  of  St.  Domingo  was  almost 
uncultivated  for  want  of  slaves.  It  is  now  in  the  hands  of  France; 
and  to  render  it  productive,  an  immense  capital  in  slaves,  in  buildings, 
and  in  improvements  of  uncultivated  lands,  will  be  necessary.  Great 
capital  will  also  be  required  to  supply  the  losses  that  the  French  part 
of  the  island  has  sustained,  to  say  nothing  of  the  other  islands.  From 
whence  is  this  capital  to  be  drawn?  Persons  that  settle  in  remote  and 
unhealthy  climates  seldom  possess  much.  It  must,  then,  be  drawn 
either  from  France,  or  some  other  country  that  possesses  superfluous 
capital.  If  drawn  from  France,  it  must,  to  a  certain  degree,  injure 
the  manufactures  of  France  at  home.  It  may,  however,  where  the 
territory  is  so  extremely  productive  as  the  French  islands  are,  where 
the  lands  are  already  in  a  state  of  cultivation,  and  the  capital  advanced 
will  produce  an  immediate  interest,  be  found  advantageous,  in  a  national 
point  of  view,  to  encourage  the  application  of  French  capital  to  this 
object.  But  while  the  interest  of  money  is  high  in  France,  while  the 
interior  of  the  Republic  affords  a  variety  of  profitable  speculations  to 
the  capitalist,  and  while  few  persons  are  found  possessed  of  superfluous 
wealth,  it  will  be  difficult  to  induce  many  to  vest  their  capital  in  a 
distant  country,  subject  to  risk  from  the  dishonesty  of  their  agents, 
and  those  others  which  recent  transactions  will  teach  them  to  dread. 
Foreign  capital  was  once  drawn  from  the  United  Provinces.  The 
state,  however,  of  the  Batavian  colonies,  and  the  losses  sustained  by 
the  war,  preclude  all  hope  that  much  of  this  will  now  be  applied  to 
ameliorate  the  French  islands.  The  United  States  possess  an  extensive 
capital  in  money,  and  in  products  necessary  for  the  reestablishment  of 
the  islands.  Money  will  not  be  lent,  in  large  quantities,  upon  the  credit 
of  the  planters;  but  with  proper  encouragement,  there  is  little  doubt 
that  products  for  which  money  must  otherwise  be  paid,  might  be 
obtained.  And  the  mercantile  speculations  of  the  United  States  will 
embrace  the  French  islands,  when  the  private  and  public  credit  of 
France  shall  be  reestablished,  and  experience  shall  have  taught  her  the 
futility  of  attempting  to  raise  a  revenue  upon  foreign  commerce,  while 
in  fact  she  is  throwing  it  upon  her  own  citizens. 

In  St.  Domingo  20  per  cent  is  paid  on  articles  introduced  by  foreign 
ers.  This  is,  indeed,  collected  from  the  foreigners;  and  owing  to  the 


PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  39 

mismanagement  and  frauds  which  generally  prevail  in  custom-houses 
at  a  distance,  is  a  source  of  very  considerable  vexation  to  the  trader. 
But  the  money  is  paid  by  the  planter:  for  it  is  always  added  to  the 
price,  and  even  an  interest  or  profit  charged  upon  the  duty  itself,  and 
a  compensation  for  all  the  vexations  the  merchant  suffers.  What, 
then,  is  the  effect  of  this  operation  but  to  deduct,  at  least,  one-quarter 
from  the  money  which  the  planter  has  with  difficulty  drawn  from 
France  or  elsewhere,  and  so  far  to  impede  the  reestablishment  of  the 
capital  that  can  alone  render  the  island  ultimately  productive  to  France? 
I  say  ultimately,  for  it  will  be  idle  to  expect  that  they  should  compen 
sate  the  actual  expenses  of  the  French  Government  till  years  have 
elapsed.  Na}r,  I  will  venture  to  say,  that,  unless  the  ports  of  St. 
Domingo  are  throw^n  open  to  all  vessels  bringing  necessaries,  unless 
the  inhabitants  are  permitted  to  buy  cheap  and  to  sell  dear,  by  encour 
aging  a  competition  among  buyers  and  sellers,  unless  every  species  of 
vexation  is  removed,  and  every  possible  assurance  given  that  foreign 
capitals  entrusted  to  the  islands  will  be  perfectly  safe,  ages  will  elapse 
before  St.  Domingo  will  cease  to  drain  the  wealth  and  strength  of 
France  without  offering  an  equivalent  return.  It^  is  obyiojis^-Lhen, 
that  if  France  possessed  no  other  transmarine  property  than  her  islands  ( 
in  the  West  Indies,  she  would  find  room  to  place  all  the  capital  she  can  ( 
now,  or  probably  will  be  able  to  spare  in  a  long  course  of  3Tears.  But,  t 
if,  in  connection  with  this,  we  look  to  her  immense  territory  in  the 
Brazils,  to  its  productions,  and  the  capital  it  will  require  to  give  it  the 
value  it  is  susceptible  of;  if  we  add  to  this  the  establishments  it  may 
be  necessary  to  make  in  the  East  Indies  in  order  to  enable  the  French 
ports  to  possess  all  that  variety  of  commodities  which  invite  exchanges 
and  give  activity  to  commerce;  we  shall  find  a  century,  at  least,  will 
elapse  before  France  needs  such  new  establishments.  But  as  she,  like 
every  other  country,  possesses  a  limited  capital,  the  sole  object  of 
inquiry  should  be,  where  can  this  capital  be  best  placed?  At  home? 
In  the  islands ?  At  Cayenne?  In  the  East  Indies?  Or  in  Louisiana? 
For  it  is  obvious,  that  whatever  is  placed  in  one  is  taken  from  the 
other.  It  is  equally  obvious  that  the  national  expense  must  be  increased 
by  the  increase  of  its  establishments,  and  the  points  of  attack  and 
defense  be  multiplied  in  the  same  proportion  in  case  of  war. 

Many  able  statesmen  have  doubted  whether,  to  a  country  situated  as 
France,  any  colonies  were  of  use;  but  it  is  not  my  design  to  enter  into 
those  theories.  France  possesses  colonies.  She  has  urged  her  citizens 
to  remove  themselves,  and  invest  their  property  therein,  and  she  is 
bound  in  good  faith  to  retain  and  protect  them.  But  she  is  not  bound 
to  create  new  colonies,  to  multiply  her  points  of  defense,  and  to  waste 
a  capital  which  she  needs  both  at  home  and  abroad.  In  what  view 
would  the  possession  of  Louisiana  be  useful  to  France?  First,  like 
every  other  warm  climate,  it  must  be  cultivated  by  slaves.  The  capi- 


40  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

tal  employed  in  purchasing  these  slaves,  or  the  slaves  themselves, would 
be  carried  to  the  islands,  if  a  new  market  was  not  open  for  them.  The 
competition  will  enhance  the  price  to  the  planters  in  the  islands,  and 
so  far  obstruct  their  speedy  reestablishment.  When  the  slaves  arrive 
in  Louisiana,  they  must  be  employed  in  the  unproductive  labor  of  clear 
ing  the  immense  forests  with  which  that  country  is  covered;  a  labor 
ill  calculated  for  slaves,  since  it  requires  long  habit  in  the  use  of  the 
ax,  and  a  strength  and  activity  seldom  found  in  slaves.  At  all  events, 
they  must  be  maintained,  clothed,  and  fed  for  years  before  any  profit 
will  result  from  their  labor:  how  long,  may  be  determined,  in  some 
sort,  from  this  fact.  When  new  lands  are  put  out  to  lease  in  the 
Northern  or  Middle  States  of  America  the  usual  terms  are  ten  years 
free  of  rent,  and,  after  that,  twelve  bushels  of  wheat  per  hundred  acres 
forever.  It  is  obvious,  then,  that  the  first  ten  years  are  considered  as 
years  of  expense,  during  which  the  landlord  asks  nothing;  but,  in  the 
Southern  States,  land  can  not  even  be  put  out  on  these  terms,  because 
there  the  white  inhabitants  place  a  higher  value  upon  their  labor,  and 
the  clearing  lands  by  slaves  involves  too  great  an  expense  for  any  man 
who  is  not  absolute  owner  of  the  soil.  Who,  then,  will  cultivate  Loui 
siana  with  slaves?  Who  among  the  French  citizens  will  vest  a  large 
capital  in  so  precarious  a  property,  with  the  hope  of  a  distant  return? 
There  are,  also,  circumstances  in  the  situation  of  Louisiana  which  ren 
der  it  more  difficult. 

Louisiana  is  bounded  by  an  immense  wilderness.  Slaves,  employed 
in  the  clearing  of  forests,  will  form  acquaintances  with  the  natives; 
and  they  will,  upon  every  occasion,  escape  from  labor  to  the  indolence 
of  a  savage  life.  Jt  may  be  asked,  why  does  this  not  happen  in  the 
Southern  States  of  America?  First,  because  none  are  so  far  south  as 
to  be  free  from  the  rigors  of  winter,  which  make  it  difficult  for  the 
inhabitants  of  a  warm  climate  to  endure  a  savage  life;  and,  next,  be 
cause  the  Southern  States  are,  in  a  great  measure,  surrounded  by  the 
sea,  and  by  the  mountains  which  only  know  a  white  population,  and 
intercept  the  communication  of  the  slaves  with  the  waste  forests  in 
their  rear.  But  supposing  all  these  difficulties  surmounted,  what 
advantage  would  result  to  France,  in  a  commercial  point  of  view,  from 
the  establishment  of  this  colony;  so  far  as  its  productions  are  similar 
to  those  of  their  islands,  nothing  would  be  gained,  because  the  islands, 
well  cultivated,  are  equal  to  every  demand  of  France,  and,  indeed,  of 
Europe.  The  introduction  of  those  from  Louisiana  would  only  reduce 
the  price,  without  adding  to  the  value;  and  France  would  find  herself 
compelled,  in  order  to  prevent  the  ruin  of  those  who  had  vested  their 
capital  in  the  colonies,  to  imitate  the  Dutch,  who  destroy  their  spices 
and  teas  when  they  find  that  the  quantity  debases  the  value.  Commodi 
ties  not  raised  in  the  islands,  and  which  might  be  found  in  Louisiana, 
are  only  wood,  and,  perhaps,  rice;  but  it  is  certain  that  these  produc- 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  41 

tions,  when  attended  with  the  expense  of  procuring  them  in  a  warm 
and  unhealthy  climate,  will  not  compensate  the  expense,  or,  at  least, 
furnish  the  same  profit  to  labor  that  might  be  obtained,  were  it  em 
ployed  as  in  the  islands,  in  raising  more  valuable  commodities;  a  proof 
of  which  will  be  found  in  the  United  States.  It  is  not  from  Georgia 
or  South  Carolina  that  the  West  India  islands  are  supplied  with  wood, 
but  principally  from  the  Northern  States,  though  wood  lands  are  much 
scarcer  and  more  valuable  with  them  than  to  the  Southward.  The 
reason  is,  that  the  furnishing,  lumber,  the  preparing  it  for  the  market, 
the  mills  necessary  for  that  purpose,  all  require  the  labor  of  free  hands 
content  to  work  for  a  small  profit. 

Though  it  may  seem  paradoxical,  I  will  venture  to  say  that  it  is 
not  the  interest  of  France  to  supply  herself  with  wood,  even  if  she 
could  do  it  from  Louisiana:  and  that,  for  two  reasons.  The  lumber 
supplied  to  her  islands  by  the  Northern  States  is  paid  for  in  molasses, 
and  a  small  quantity  of  taffia.  The  first  costs  nothing  to  the  planter, 
being  an  otherwise  useless  product  of  his  sugar;  and  the  second  a 
trifling  expense  in  the  distillation.  If  these  were  not  consumed  in 
America,  the  molasses  would  absolutely  be  thrown  awa}^,  (as  it  was 
when  the  United  States  were  British  colonies.)  because  the  commerce 
of  France  offers  no  other  market  for  it.  The  islands  may  then  be 
truly  said  to  have  their  lumber  from  the  United  States  for  nothing. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  an  establishment  was  made  in  Louisiana  for  the 
purpose  of  furnishing  lumber,  all  the  expense  of  such  an  establish 
ment  to  the  nation,  together  with  all  the  labor  employed  in  cutting  the 
wood,  preparing  and  sending  it  to  market,  would  be  actual  loss  to  the 
nation,  even  supposing  the  woodcutter  content  to  be  paid  in  molasses 
and  rum,  because  his  labor  produces  nothing  to  the  nation.  But  it  is 
certain  that  Louisiana  would  afford  no  market  for  either  molasees  or 
rum.  The  consumption  of  those  is  found  only  in  the  Northern  States 
of  America:  the  Southern  prefer  spirits  made  from  grain,  apples,  and 
peaches,  to  that  distilled  from  molasses.  The  planters,  then,  sup 
posing  their  supply  of  lumber  to  be  exclusively  furnished  by  a  French 
colony  in  Louisiana,  would  be  compelled  to  pay  for  it  in  money,  or  in 
some  article  of  real  value.  If  it  was  not  exclusive!}^  furnished,  it 
would  not  be  furnished  at  all;  because  the  woodcutter  in  a  southern 
climate  could  never  work  so  cheap  as  to  compete  with  the  hardy  sons 
of  the  North.  It  may  be  thought  that  the  molasses  would  find  a 
market  in  the  Northern  States,  even  if  not  given  in  return  for  lumber: 
but  this  is  not  the  fact.  The  only  inducement  with  them  to  take  it  is 
that  they  get  it  in  return  for  another  commodity  for  which  they  have 
little  other  market.  Let  the  islands  refuse  to  take  the  wood  of  the 
Northern  States,  and  they  will  instantly  substitute  spirits  distilled 
from  grains  and  apples,  for  that  drawn  from  molasses:  (because,  in  this 
case,  the  price  of  rum  must  necessarily  rise,)  and  all  commerce  between 


42  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

the  islands  will  stop,  except  for  articles  of  provision,  in  return  for 
which  they  will  only  take  money,  or  what  will  produce  money  at  a 
foreign  market.  The  second  reason  why  France  should  not,  were  it 
even  in  her  power,  seek  her  supply  of  lumber  from  a  colony  in 
Louisiana,  is,  that,  in  case  of  a  war,  supposing  Britain  to  maintain  her 
naval  superiority,  those  supplies  would  be  rendered  extremely  pre 
carious.  Nor  would  the  want  of  them  be  easily  supplied  from  the 
United  States;  for  having,  during  peace,  given  up  that  branch  of  com 
merce,  (and  the  persons  employed  in  it  having  turned  their  attention 
to  other  objects,  and  the  mills  created  for  sawing  the  lumber  having 
gone  to  decay,)  it  would  not  be  easily  reestablished  on  the  breaking 
out  of  a  war;  the  calamities  of  which  would  by  this  means  fall  doubly 
hard  upon  the  islands. 

In  a  commercial  point  of  view,  then,  it  is  obvious  that  the  coloniza 
tion  of  Louisiana  would  be  injurious  to  France;  because  it  would 
divert  a  capital  that  might  be  more  usefully  employed  in  her  other 
colonies;  because  that  capital  would  be  unproductive  for  many  years; 
and  because,  when  it  became  productive  to  the  individual,  it  would 
add  nothing  to  the  mass  of  national  wealth,  but  merely  lower  the  price 
of  commodities  supplied  by  the  West  Indies,  and  lessen  the  profits  of 
labor.  It  may,  however,  be  supposed  that  the  possession  of  Louisiana 
would  afford  an  additional  market  to  French  manufactures,  and  so  far 
compensate  the  nation  for  the  expense  of  the  establishment.  This 
question  is  worthy  of  examination;  and  the  supply  or  consumption  of 
French  fabrics  must  have  a  reference  either  to  the  free  population,  or 
to  that  of  the  slaves.  If  the  free  population  is  to  be  supplied  by 
emigration  from  France,  it  will  consist  of  that  class  of  people  who 
could  not  only  maintain  themselves  in  France,  but  add  something  to 
its  wealth  by  their  labor;  for  France  is  not  overstocked  with  inhab 
itants;  and,  of  course,  none  can  emigrate  without  leaving  a  void  some 
where  or  some  useful  labor  unperformed.  The  actual  emigrant, 
then,  takes  something  from  the  general  stock  of  productive  labor  in 
the  parent  State.  He  also  carries  with  him  a  part  of  the  capital,  (for 
he  can  not  go  empty-handed,)  and  he  must  remain,  as  I  have  stated, 
ten  years  before  he  renders  his  new  establishment  more  than  sufficient 
to  support  himself.  In  the  meantime,  he  must  live  with  the  utmost 
economy;  for  having  nothing  to  give  in  exchange,  he  can  furnish 
little  from  the  parent  country;  and,  indeed,  the  nature  of  a  Southern 
climate  exacts  very  few  of  those  articles  which  are  necessaries  in 
Europe.  There  can  be  no  question,  then,  that,  so  far  as  relates  to 
the  actual  emigrant,  the  few  articles  he  will  require  from  French 
looms  will  not  compensate  the  nation  for  the  loss  of  his  labor:  nay, 
that  he  will  consume  so  much  less  in  America  than  he  would  have 
done  in  France,  that,  besides  his  labor,  the  manufacturer  that  supplied 
in  both  countries  will  be  an  actual  loser  by  his  removal.  Black  popu- 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  43 

lation  will  contribute  still  less  to  aid  the  manufactures  of  France, 
because  their  consumption  is  extremely  small  in  the  article  of  clothing. 
Even  in  South  Carolina  it  does  not  amount  to  more  than  forty  francs 
a  year  for  each  black.  In  Louisiana,  as  the  winter  is  less  severe,  it 
will  be  proportionably  less.  It  will  consist  of  cotton,  much  of  it 
made  at  home,  and  much  more  of  it  obtained  from  the  United  States 
by  an  illicit  commerce.  But  if  even  the  whole  were  brought  from 
France,  after  deducting  the  value  of  the  raw  material  which  France 
must  purchase,  the  whole  profit  of  the  French  manufacturer  and  mer 
chant  would  not  exceed  thirty  livres  a  head  for  each  slave. 

Now,  every  slave  sent  to  Louisiana  will  cost  the  nation  one  thousand 
francs;  and  as  this  capital  should  produce  at  least  ten  per  cent,  em 
ployed  in  any  species  of  commerce  or  manufacture,  the  whole  differ 
ence  between  one  hundred  francs,  the  product  in  France,  and  thirty 
francs,  drawn  from  the  advantage  of  clothing  him,  will  be  an  actual 
loss  to  France,  for  the  first  ten  years,  at  least,  in  which  they  can,  (as 
I  have  before  proved,)  at  the  utmost,  do  no  more  than  support  them 
selves.  As  numbers  will  die  in  the  seasoning,  and  many  will  elope, 
the  actual  loss  to  France  on  every  slave  imported  and  employed  in 
Louisiana  will  be  160  francs  per  annum.  But  if  the  profit  resulting 
from  the  labor  of  the  same  slave,  who  might  have  been  carried  to  one 
of  the  islands,  instead  of  Louisiana,  is  added  to  the  account,  (and  cer 
tain  it  is  that  all  carried  to  Louisiana  are  taken  from  the  islands,)  it 
will  be  found  that  the  actual  loss  to  the  nation,  in  the  mis-employment 
of  his  labor,  will  amount  to  upwards  of  600  francs  a  year,  so  that  the 
first  loss  to  the  nation,  on  the  introduction  of  one  thousand  slaves  into 
Louisiana,  beyond  the  first  cost  of  the  slaves,  will  be  six  hundred 
thousand  francs.  It  is  true,  that  if  peace  continues,  and  the  colony, 
contrary  to  every  reasonable  expectation,  should  flourish,  the  wealthy 
planters  would  consume  more  French  fabrics,  but  the  consumption  of 
the  slaves  will  always  be  trifling,  and  their  labor  absolutely  unprofit 
able;  because,  as  I  have  before  observed,  being  employed  in  raising 
articles  that  can  be  better  raised  in  quantities  equal  to  the  demand  in 
the  islands,  and  for  which  the  market  is  limited,  they  will  only,  by 
adding  to  the  quantity,  lower  the  price  of  those  commodities  which  it 
is  the  interest  of  France,  who  possesses  such  productive  islands,  to 
keep  up.  I  know  an  idea  prevails  that  the  commodities  of  France  can, 
by  means  of  the  Mississippi,  find  their  way  into  the  western  part  of 
the  United  States.  Nothing  could  give  birth  to  this  idea  but  the 
most  perfect  ignorance  of  the  navigation  of  that  river;  and  of  the 
wants  of  the  inhabitants. 

It  is  certain  that  the  wines  of  France  are  ill  calculated  for  so  warm 
a  climate  as  they  must  pass  through  to  arrive  in  the  Western  States, 
and  worse  suited  to  the  palates  or  purses  of  the  inhabitants;  both  of 
which  are  better  adapted  to  their  own  liquors,  cider,  beer,  whisky, 


44       PURCHASE  OF  THE  TERRITORY  OF 

and  peach  brandy;  the  last  of  which,  with  age,  is  superior  to  the  best 
brandy  of  France.  Instead,  then,  of  receiving  these  articles  from 
France,  through  Louisiana,  they  will  more  probably  supply  the  colony 
with  them.  Glass,  or  earthenware,  as  they  have  all  the  materials  on 
hand,  they  make  for  themselves,  in  all  the  back  countries  of  America. 
The  consumption  of  china  is  exceedingly  small,  and,  were  it  greater,  the 
French  china  is  too  dear  to  enter  into  competition  with  that  of  the 
East  Indies.  Bulky  articles  in  iron  are  also  made  among  themselves; 
and  the  hardware  of  England  has  such  an  acknowledged  superiority 
over  that  of  France,  that  none  of  the  latter  could  be  vended,  were  the 
market  open  to  both.  The  only  articles,  then,  that  could  be  possibly 
introduced,  would  be  silks,  cambrics,  and  other  light  articles  of  luxury. 
These,  however,  will  never  pass  by  the  way  of  the  Mississippi.  The 
dangerous  navigation  of  the  Gulf,  the  slow  and  expensive  passage  up 
the  river  against  the  current,  the  large  capital  of  the  American  and 
British  merchants  at  Philadelphia,  and  the  great  improvements  that 
are  daily  making  in  the  inland  canals  and  roads,  will  always  carry  these 
by  land  to  the  Ohio  and  other  rivers,  from  which  they  can  be  trans 
ported  to  every  other  settlement  on  cheap  and  eas}T  terms.  It  is  a 
well-known  fact  that  dry  goods  have  been  carried  from  Philadelphia 
to  New  Orleans  by  this  route,  in  preference  to  going  thither  directly 
by  water.  It  is  chimerical,  therefore,  to  expect  to  vend  the  commodi 
ties  of  France,  through  that  channel,  when  even  England,  with  all  her 
enterprise,  her  right  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the 
prejudice  of  Americans  in  favor  of  her  fabrics,  has  never  ventured  to 
send  her  commodities  by  that  channel,  well  knowing  that  through 
Baltimore  and  Philadelphia  they  will  find  an  easier  entrance. 

But  should  France  wish  to  introduce  more  bulky  articles  by  this 
channel,  and  habituate  the  inhabitants  of  the  Western  States  to  her 
wines  and  to  her  fabrics,  it  can  only  be  done  by  putting  New  Orleans 
into  their  hands,  stipulating,  at  the  same  time,  that  it  shall  ever  remain 
a  free  port  of  entry  to  French  ships  and  French  fabrics,  subject  to  no 
greater  duties  than  those  paid  by  American  ships.  This  will,  at  once, 
interest  the  American  merchants  settled  in  New  Orleans,  in  their  com 
merce,  turn  their  capital  from  England  to  France,  and  give  the  latter 
all  the  advantages  of  the  island,  without  the  expense  of  maintaining 
it;  and  the  money  acquired  by  the  activity  of  America  from  the  Span 
ish  Government  would  center  in  France,  because  England,  not  having 
the  same  facilities,  and  paying  higher  duties,  could  not  supply  them 
upon  the  same  terms.  Should  France,  on  the  other  hand,  determine  to 
keep  the  island,  a  great  part  of  the  commercial  capital  now  in 
Orleans  (which  is  principally  American  and  British)  will,  in  that  case, 
be  moved  to  such  other  place  as  the  United  States  shall  fix  upon,  and 
this  being  naturally  placed  in  a  state  of  rivalry  to  New  Orleans,  and 
freed  from  the  vexations  that  never  fail  to  attend  a  military  Govern- 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  45 

merit  at  a  distance  from  the  eye  of  the  sovereign,  will,  notwithstand 
ing  any  disadvantage  in  point  of  situation,  draw  after  it  the  commerce 
that  now  centers  there.  The  limits  settled  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States,  and  lately  between  the  latter  and  Britain,  preclude  the 
inhabitants  of  Louisiana  from  any  share  of  the  fur  trade,  which, 
indeed,  never  could  have  been  considerable,  as  the  southern  furs  are 
of  little  value;  the  few  deer  skins  they  receive  are  an  object  of  no 
moment  in  a  commercial  view,  as  will  be  found  from  a  view  of  the 
exports  of  New  Orleans,  even  now  that  the  United  States  Mississippi 
territory  transports  through  that  channel. 

In  these  reflections  I  have  not  taken  into  account  the  hardships, 
expenses,  and  loss  of  lives,  that  result  from  the  establishment  of  new 
colonies  in  a  marshy  country  and  warm  climate,  the  inroads  of  savages, 
the  insurrection  of  slaves,  the  insubordination  of  troops,  and  the  abuses 
of  officers  when  far  removed  from  the  superintending  eye  of  the  Sov 
ereign;  any  or  all  of  which  may  defeat  the  object,  and  ruin  the  estab 
lishment.  There  is,  however,  one  consideration,  and  that  a  very 
important  one,  that  ought  to  have  some  weight.  Many  who  carry 
their  families  and  their  capital  into  Louisiana,  finding  that  land  is 
equally  cheap  on  the  American  side  of  the  line,  will,  sometimes  from  a 
preference  for  their  form  of  government,  sometimes  from  caprice,  some 
times  from  pique,  or  to  get  rid  of  the  oppression  of  a  military  govern 
ment,  (for  such  that  of  Louisiana  must  necessarily  be,)  remove  to  the 
territory  of  the  United  States,  even  in  time  of  peace.  In  case  of  a  war 
between  France  and  Spain,  this  desire  will  be  general;  because,  sup 
posing  Britain  to  maintain  her  naval  superiority,  (which  I  have  upon 
a  former  occasion  shown  that  she  will,  unless  the  commercial  system 
of  France  shall  be  much  more  liberal  than  it  now  is.)  the  mouth  of  the 
Mississippi  will  be  blocked  up  and  the  planters  of  the  French  Colony 
be  reduced  to  the  utmost  distress,  while  those  of  the  United  States  will 
acquire  advantages  from  the  war.  In  this  case,  a  great  proportion  of 
the  capital  that  France  shall  place  in  Louisiana  will  be  transferred  to 
the  United  States,  where  farms,  readj^  cleared  may  be  purchased  at 
half  the  price  at  which  a  French  planter  can  clear  his,  owing  to  the 
dexterit}T  of  American  woodsmen,  who  have  been  educated  to  the  use 
of  the  ax,  and  acquired  that  strength  in  the  muscles  of  the  arm, 
which  is  unattainable  by  men  who  have  been  brought  up  to  other 
employments.  Past  experience  has  evinced  the  truth  of  these  obser 
vations.  Louisiana,  though  settled  near  a  century,  has  flourished 
neither  in  the  hands  of  Spain  nor  of  France;  and,  at  this  moment,  at 
least  half  the  trade  of  Orleans  is  carried  on  upon  the  capital  of  citi 
zens  of  the  United  States,  under  the  faith  of  their  treaty  with  Spain. 
When  France  shall  establish  a  rival  colony  there,  this  will  be  removed 
to  such  other  place  on  the  Mississippi  as  it  shall  be  the  policy  of  the 
United  States  to  encourage. 


46  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

If,  in  a  commercial  view,  the  .settlement  of  Louisiana  shall  not  he 
advantageous  to  France,  hut,  on  the  contrary,  really  injurious,  hy 
diverting-  her  capital  from  more  important  objects;  in  a  political  one, 
it  will  he  found  still  more  inconsistent  with  her  interests.  To  France, 
considered  either  as  a  maritime  or  a  commercial  nation,  the  United 
States  are  of  the  last  importance.  On  the  first  subject,  1  have,  upon 
a  former  occasion,  expressed  my  sentiments  fully.  On  the  latter, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  an  agricultural  nation,  whose  industry 
enables  them  to  purchase  with  the  product  of  their  raw  materials  the 
luxuries  and  fabrics  of  Europe,  and  whose  habits  and  pursuits  prevent 
them  from  manufacturing  for  themselves,  must  offer  an  important 
market  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Old  World.  In  this  view  the  trade  of 
the  United  States  is  considered  as  extremely  valuable  to  Britain.  But 
France,  when  her  manufactures  shall  attain  the  perfection  of  which 
they  are  susceptible,  and  her  trade  be  placed  upon  the  proper  founda 
tion,  presents  a  much  greater*  variety  of  subjects  for  the  support  of 
this  commerce  than  Britain.  From  the  last,  America  receives  only 
the  product  of  her  looms  and  her  forges.  From  the  first,  she  will  not 
only  take  these,  but  aid  her  agriculture  by  the  purchase  of  her  wines, 
her  oils,  and  her  brandies;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  France  affords  a 
better  market  than  Britain  to  many  of  the  products  of  the  United 
States.  These  circumstances,  and  the  relative  position  of  France, 
which  precludes  all  idea  of  danger  or  rivalship,  either  by  sea  or  by 
land,  between  her  and  the  United  States,  has  made  them  view  her  as  a 
natural  ally,  and  consider  the  measure  of  her  power  as  an  additional 
pledge  for  the  safety  of  their  commerce  and  their  future  tranquillity. 
They  have  done  homage  to  the  wisdom  of  those  statesmen  who,  at  the 
end  of  a  successful  war,  conceived  it  more  advantageous  to  France  to 
insure  the  lasting  friendship  of  the  United  States,  than  to  acquire  a 
territory  which  might  excite  their  jealousy,  and  throw  them  back  into 
the  hands  of  the  nation  f  rqin  whom  they  had  but  just  aided  to  liberate 
them. 

I  am  aware  of  the  delicacy  of  touching  upon  the  political  evils  that 
may  result  to  France  and  to  the  United  States  from  the  former  pos 
sessing  itself  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas,  lest,  on  the  one  hand,  I 
should  leave  unsaid  what  truth  requires  to  be  spoken,  and,  on  the 
other,  give  umbrage  by  freedom  which  haughty  spirits  may  construe 
into  menace.  Feeling  myself,  however,  a  citizen  of  one  of  these  States, 
and  warmly  attached  to  the  other,  I  trust  that  those  into  whose  hands 
this  shall  be  placed,  will  duly  appreciate  my  motives  in  endeavoring 
to  remove  all  ground  of  controversy  between  nations  formed  to  aid 
each  other;  and,  while  they  believe  me  sufficiently  acquainted  with  the 
resources  of  my  own  country,  not  to  dread  the  power  of  any  European 
nation,  they  will  think  me  equally  incapable  of  so  ridiculous  an  idea  as 
that  of  menacing  a  Government  before  whose  power  united  Europe 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  47 

has  bowed.  I  have  observed  that  France  and  the  United  States  are  so 
happily  placed  with  respect  to  each  other,  as  to  have  no  point  of  colli 
sion.  They  can  mutually  aid,  without  having  the  smallest  temptation 
to  injure,  each  other.  And  as  there  is  no  nation  at  present  on  the 
globe  whose  consumption  offers  such  encouragement  to  foreign  manu 
factures  as  that  of  the  United  States;  as  this  consumption  is  rapidly 
increasing;  as  they  have  the  means  of  establishing  a  navy  whenever 
their  situation  shall  render  it  necessary,  how  strong,  how  powerful, 
should  the  inducement  be  that  compels  France  to  lose  these  advan 
tages,  and  convert  a  natural  and  warm  ally  into  a  jealous  and  suspi 
cious  neighbor,  and,  perhaps,  in  the  progress  of  events,  into  an  open 
enemy ! 

Experience  has  evinced  that  no  two  nations  can  border  upon  each 
other,  without  having  the  spirit  of  rivalry  excited;  and  if  this  is  true 
with  respect  to  neighboring  nations,  it  will  be  found  to  apply  more 
forcibly  to  the  Colony,  of  a  great  and  powerful  nation  placed  at  a  dis 
tance  from  home,  and  a  Sovereign  adjoining  such  nation.  The  reason  is 
obvious.  Where  two  nations  join  each  other,  every  thing  passes  under 
the  eye  of  the  Sovereign;  and  differences  may  be  accommodated  as 
soon  as  they  arise;  but  when  the  Governor  of  a  Colony,  relying  for 
protection  from  home,  is  guilty  of  an  act  of  hostility,  the  wound  festers 
before  the  physician  can  bo  called  in.  The  offended  Sovereign,  (;>  , 
will  presume  that  the  officer  will  meet  with  support,  the  greater  a.sliis 
nation  is  more  powerful;  will  endeavor  to  anticipate  the  hostilities  it 
dreads;  it  will  recriminate;  arid  the  nations  will  be  plunged  into  a 
war  before  explanations  can  take  place.  If  there  is  a  situation  in  the 
world  that  would  lead  to  these  melancholy  consequences,  it  would  be 
that  of  France  in  possession  of  New  Orleans.  It  blocks  up  the  great 
outlet  to  a  great  number  of  the  American  States,  and  to  a  very  exten 
sive  and  growing  population.  On  this  island  a  military  government 
will  be  established.  The  commander  and  his  troops,  justly  elated  with 
the  glory  of  their  nation,  will  look  down  upon  surrounding  people. 
Commerce  will  be  despised,  and  those  who  practice  it  be  subjected  to 
the  despotism  of  men  who  will  seek  a  compensation  for  their  priva 
tions  in  being  sent  to  a  distant  country  and  unhealthy  climate,  in  the 
acquisition  of  wealth.  The  Colony  itself  affords  no  legitimate  sources 
for  this,  but  those  which  arise  gradually  from  commerce  and  agricul 
ture,  equally  ill  suited  to  the  military  character.  No  vigilance  on  the 
part  of  the  parent  country  can  control  the  oppressions  that  will  be 
practiced  by  mer>  at  such  a  distance;  nor  will  the  ardent  spirits  of  the 
new  settlers  in  States  that  border  on  the  Mississippi,  in  many  cases, 
be  sufficiently  controlled,  (even  by  their  own  Government,)  to  prevent 
their  endeavors  to  avenge  themselves,  rather  than  to  wait  the  tardy 
justice  that  they  may  hope  for  from  diplomatic  representations.  The 
resentments  of  the  people  will  be  sharpened  against  each  other;  the 


48  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

ties  of  friendship  will  be  broken,  and  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  which  always  partakes  of  the  feelings  of  the  people,  will  tind 
itself  unavoidably  placed  in  such  a  situation  as  to  change  its  connexion, 
and  to  guard  against  the  supposed  hostility  of  its  old  allv,  bv  forming 
cautionary  connexions  with  Britain,  who  will  court  their  alliance  and 
stimulate  their  resentments  against  France;  because  by  this  connexion 
she  will  hope  to  retain  the  commerce  of  America,  which  she  almost 
exclusively  possesses,  give  security  to  her  Colonies,  and,  in  case  of  war, 
facilitate  her  attempts  to  conquer  the  French  islands;  and,  above  all, 
prevent  that  commercial  and  maritime  union  between  France  and  the 
United  States,  on  which  alone  France  can  hope  to  engraft  a  naval 
superiority.  It  may  be  asked  why  these  jealousies,  that  I  appear  so 
greatly  to  apprehend  with  respect  to  France,  do  not  prevail  with  respect 
to  Britain  in  possession  of  Canada. 

First,  because  Britain  has,  very  prudently,  separated  her  territory 
by  a  natural  boundry,  which  keeps  the  inhabitants  of  the  respective 
nations  from  coming  into  contact.  While  she  held  posts  on  the  south 
side  of  the  lakes,  the  United  States  viewed  her  with  jealousy,  and  there 
is  no  sort  of  doubt  that  hostilities  and  national  hatred  would  have  been 
the  consequences  of  her  retaining  them,  when  the  American  population 
in  their  neighborhood  had  increased;  symptoms  of  which  had  frequently 
been  exhibited  before  they  were  relinquished.  Second,  because  the 
natural  export  of  the  United  States  being  by  their  own  rivers,  there 
is  no  communication  of  any  moment  between  them  and  Canada;  but, 
thirdly,  because  Upper  Canada  is  principally  settled  by  emigrants  from 
the  United  States,  who,  in  case  of  a  rupture,  would  probably  join  them 
if  the  spirit  of  the  American  Government  did  not  prohibit  an  exten 
sion  of  their  limits. 

And,  after  all,  what  advantages,  political  or  commercial,  can  France" 
obtain  by  the  possession  of  New  Orleans  and  the  east  side  of  the  Mks- 
sissippi,  that  can  compensate  for  the  losses  she  will  sustain  in  both 
respects,  by  placing  herself  in  a  state  of  rivalry  with  the  United  States? 
The  Floridas  are  a  narrow  slip  of  very  barren  lands,  absolutely  i 
fensible  in  case  of  a  rupture,  and  which  will  require  more  than  they 
are  worth  in  guards,  garrisons,  and  Indian  subsidies;  and  however  val 
uable  New  Orleans  may  be  to  the  United  States,  it  will  be  of  little  value 
to  France,  when  the  foreign  capital  shall  be  withdrawn  from  it,  or  a 
rival  city  established  by  the  United  States.  I  tind,  upon  the  most 
careful  inquiry,  that  one-third  of  the  mercantile  houses  now  employed 
in  New  Orleans  belongs  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States.  No 
sooner  shall  a  military  government  be  established  there,  than  these 
houses,  with  all  the  capital  that  gives  activity  to  the  commerce  of  New 
Orleans,  will  be  removed  either  to  such  other  place  as  the  United 
States  shall  receive  agreeably  to  the  terms  of  their  treaty  with  Spain, 
or  to  the  Natchez,  to  which  any  vessel  that  may  enter  at  New  Orleans 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  49 

can  he  received.  Large  vessels  have  already  gone  from  France  and 
unloaded  their  cargoes  there  without  any  difficulty.  As  the  market  is 
always  the  better  the  further  you  advance,  there  is  little  doubt  that 
this  will  become  a  rival  city  to  that  of  New  Orleans;  and  when  the 
American  capital  shall  be  withdrawn  from  the  latter,  when  the  Gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States  shall  declare  it  a  port  free  of  duties,  New 
Orleans  will  become  of  little  consequence  as  a  commercial  city,  and 
only  remain  a  useless  expense  to  France,  and  a  source  of  endless  jeal 
ousies  between  them  and  the  United  States. 

The  cession  of  Louisiana  is,  however,  very  important  to  France  if 
she  avails  herself  of  it  in  the  only  way  that  sound  policy  would  dictate. 
1  speak  of  Louisiana  proper;  in  which  I  do  not  include  the  Floridas, 
presuming  that  they  make  no  part  of  the  cession.  Since,  by  this 
cession,  she  may  acquire  a  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi,  and  a 
free  trade;  and  if  she  knows  how  to  avail  herself  of  this  circumstance, 
by  a  perfect  understanding  with  the  United  States,  she  will  find  a  vent 
through  it  for  a  vast  variety  of  her  commodities  when  she  has  given 
the  people  of  the  Western  States  the  habit  of  consuming  them,  in 
preference  to  those  they  receive  from  Britain.  This  can  only  be  done 
by  affording  them  cheaper.  She  can  only  afford  them  cheaper  by 
interesting  the  American  merchant  in  their  sale,  and  having  the  use  of 
his  capital,  and  by  engaging  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to 
give  them  a  preference.  These  objects  can  only  be  attained  b}^  a 
cession  of  New  Orleans  to  the  United  States,  with  a  reservation  of  a 
right  of  entry,  at  all  times,  free  of  any  other  duties  than  such  as  are 
exacted  from  the  vessels  of  the  United  States;  together  with  a  right 
to  navigate  the  Mississippi.  This  will  give  her  ships  an  advantage, 
over  those  of  every  other  nation,  will  retain  and  increase  the  capital \ 
of  New  Orleans,  from  which  her  supplies  for  her  islands  will  be  pur-  \ 
chased  on  the  easiest  terms,  will  carry  the  fabrics  of  France  into  all  the  \ 
Western  territory,  which  the  United  States  will  have  no  interest  in 
checking,  as  all  rivalry  between  the  two  nations  would  then  be  removed. 
France  will  then  command  the  respect,  without  exciting  the  fear  of 
the  two  nations  whose  friendship  is  most  important  to  her  commerce, 
and  to  the  preservation  of  her  islands;  and  all  this  without  the  expense 
of  establishments  that  would  drain  the  National  Treasury,  and  divert 
the  national  capital  from  its  proper  objects;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
should  France  retain  New  Orleans,  and  endeavor  to  colonize  Louisiana, 
she  will  render  herself  an  object  of  jealousy  to  Spain,  the  United  States 
and  Britain,  who  will  not  only  discourage  her  commerce,  but  compel 
her  to  make  expensive  establishments  for  the  security  of  her  rights. 

In  reasoning  upon  this  subject,  I  have  confined  myself  to  such  obser 
vations  as  obviously  presented  themselves,   without   seeking  any  of 
those  subtleties  which  might  serve  to  mislead  the  judgment.     I  have 
candidly  exposed  the  plainest  facts,  in  the  simplest  language.     If  ever 
H.  Doc.  431 4 


' 


50  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

they  are  opposed,  it  will  be  by  a  contrary  course.  Eloquence  and 
sophistry  may  reply  to  and  may  obscure  them;  but  time  and  experience 
will  evince  their  truth. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  Auyiust  10,  180%. 

I  informed  you  in  my  last  letter  that  I  found  some  relaxation  on 
the  subject  of  the  Floridas  in  my  last  conversation  with  the  Spanish 
Minister.  I  have  reason  to  think  that  within  these  few  days  they  have 
come  to  a  settlement  with  France  on  that  subject.  What  it  is  I  can 
not  precisely  say;  but  I  presume  it  is  whatever  France  wishes  it  to 
be.  I  find  all  the  old  French  maps  mark  the  river  Perdido  as  the 
boundary  between  Florida  and  Louisiana.  It  is  possible  that  this  may 
have  been  insisted  upon.  If  so,  the  remainder  was  hardly  worth  the 
keeping.  Whatever  it  is,  the  project  of  taking  possession  has  resumed 
a  certain  degree  of  activity.  General  Victor  is  appointed.  He  is  to 
have  under  him  a  General  of  Division,  two  Generals  of  Brigade,  and 
three  thousand  men  only.  No  more  than  two  millions  of  francs  are 
allowed  to  this  service;  so  that  they  must  starve  or  find  resources  in 
the  country.  Saturday  the  General  was  all  day  with  the  Minister  of 
Marine,  arranging  the  inferior  appointments  to  be  submitted  to  the 
First  Consul.  I  have  been  pressing,  for  some  time  past,  with  every 
body  that  I  thought  could  have  any  influence  in  this  business.  And, 
as  I  have  been  happy  enough  to  convince  most  of  them,  I  do  not  abso 
lute^  despair,  though  I  am  much  discouraged  from  this  last  arrange 
ment.  The  same  silence  is  observed  by  the  Minister.  I  can  get  him 
to  tell  me  nothing.  I  shall  see  him  this  morning  again,  and  if  I  can 
not  induce  him  to  speak  on  the  subject  more  plainly  than  he  has  done, 
I  will  put  in  a  note  insisting  on  our  claims  under  the  Spanish  Treaty, 
and  demanding  an  explicit  recognition  of  them.  On  this  I  believe 
there  will  be  little  difficulty,  as  they  have  always  agreed  that  the  ces 
sion  must  be  subject  to  the  restrictions  under  which  Spain  held  the 
territory.  There  are  obvious  symptoms  of  ill  humor  between  this 
country  and  Britain,  and  I  think  it  will  riot  be  long  before  they  assume 
a  serious  aspect.  Good  may  arise  out  of  this  evil,  if  it  should  happen. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  August  19,  1802 

SIR:  I  write  in  haste,  in  hopes  that  this  may  overtake  Mr.  Lyle,  and 
correct  an  error  in  my  last.  Notwithstanding  the  appointment  of 
General  Victor,  and  several  other  officers  for  Louisiana,  among  others 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  51 

a  comptroller  of  the  forests,  no  prefect  is  yet  appointed.  Nor  is  the 
difference  relative  to  the  Floridas  settled.  Spain  insists  that  they  are 
not  ceded;  and  I  have  certain  information  that  two  days  ago  the  Min 
ister  of  Marine  wrote  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  that  without 
the  Floridas  there  could  be  no  Louisiana.  Nothing  shall  be  neglected 
on  my  part  to  keep  up  this  difference;  for,  while  it  lasts,  there  will,  I 
believe,  be  no  expedition;  and  time  and  change  may  work  in  our  favor. 
I  am,  sir,  etc., 

R.  R.  L. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  September  1,  1808  (f). 


SIK:  Lvesterday  made  several  propositions  to  the  Minister  on  the 
subject  of  Louisiana.  He  told  me  frankly,  that  every  offer  was  pre 
mature;  that  the  French  Government  had  determined  to  take  posses 
sion  first;  sotfiat  you  must  consider  the  business  as  absolutely 
determined  ojjJ  Tiretrrmament  is  what  I  have  already  mentioned,  and 
will  be  read}r  in  about  six  weeks.  I  have  every  reason  to  believe  the 
Floridas  are  not  included.^  They  will,  for  the  present,  at  least,  remain 
in  the  hands  of  -£pain.  There  never  was  a  Government  in  which  less 
could  be  done  by  negotiation  than  here.  There  is  no  people,  no  Legis 
lature,  no  counsellors.  One  man  is  everything.  He  seldom  asks 
advice,  and  never  hears  it  unasked.  His  Ministers  are  mere  clerks; 
and  his  Legislature  and  counsellors  parade  officers.  Though  the  sense 
of  every  reflecting  man  about  him  is  against  this  wild  expedition, 
no  one  dares  to  tell  him  so.  Were  it  not  for  the  uneasiness  it  excites  at 
home,  it  would  give  me  none;  for  I  am  persuaded  that  the  whole  will 
end  in  a  relinquishment  of  the  country,  and  transfer  of  the  capital  to 
the  United  States.  Their  islands  call  for  much  more  than  France  can 
ever  furnish.  The  extreme  hauteur  of  this  Governrnjgnt  to  all  around 
them  will  not  suffer  peace  to  be  of  long  continuanceTjyho  French 
Minister  at  Lisbon,  it  is  said,  is  coming  home  without  taking  leave. 
England  is  very  sour;  the  debts  due. the  Northern  Powers  unpaid,  as 
well  as  ours,  though  their  justice  is  admitted.  Helvetia  is  still  in  arms; 
the  little  Cantons  not  acceding  to  the  new  form  of  Government. 

I  propose  to  make  an  excursion  of  about  fifteen  days  into  the  Low 
Countries,  as  I  find  nothing  pressing  at  this  moment  here  that  I  can 
forward  by  my  stay. 

1  am,  sir,  etc.,  R.  R.  L. 


W        '•        'Li' 

President  Jefferson  to  Mr.  Livingston. 


*>  f 


WASHINGTON,  October  10,  1802. 

DEAR  SIR, — The  departure  of  Madame  Brugnard  for  France  fur 
nishes  me  a  safe  conveyance  of  a  letter,  which  I  cannot  avoid  embrac- 


52  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

ing,  although  I  have  nothing  particular  for  the  subject  of  it.  It  is 
well,  however,  to  be  able  to  inform  you,  generally,  through  a  safe 
channel,  that  we  stand  completely  corrected  of  the  error,  that  either 
the  government  or  the  nation  of  France  has  any  remains  of  friendship 
for  us.  The  portion  of  that  country  which  forms  an  exception,  though 
respectable  in  weight,  is  weak  in  numbers.  On  the  contrary,  it 
appears  evident,  that  an  unfriendly  spirit  prevails  in  the  most  impor 
tant  individuals  of  the  government,  towards  us.  In  this  state  of 
things,  we  shall  so  take  our  distance  between  the  two  rival  nations,  as, 
remaining  disengaged  till  necessitj7  compels  us,  we  may  haul  finally 
to  the  enemy  of  that  which  shall  make  it  necessary.  We  see  all  the 
disadvantageous  consequences  of  taking  a  side,  and  shall  be  forced 
into  it  only  by  a  more  disagreeable  alternative;  in  which  event,  we 
must  countervail  the  disadvantages  by  measures  which  will  give  us 
splendor  and  power,  but  not  as  much  happiness  as  our  present  system. 
We  wish,  therefore,  to  remain  well  with  France.  But  we  see  that  no 
consequences,  however  ruinous  to  them,  can  secure  us  with  certainty 
against  the  extravagance  of  her  present  rulers.  I  think,  therefore, 
that  while  we  do  nothing  which  the  first  nation  on  earth  would  deem 
crouching,  we  had  better  give  to  all  our  communications  with  them  a 
very  mild,  complaisant,  and  even  friendLy  complexion,  but  always  inde 
pendent.  Ask  no  favors,  leave  small  and  irritating  things  to  be  con 
ducted  by  the  individuals  interested  in  them,  interfere  ourselves  but 
in  the  greatest  cases,  and  then  not  push  them  to  irritation.  No  matter 
at  present  existing  between  them  and  us  is  important  enough  to  risk 
a  breach  of  peace;  peace  being  indeed  the  most  important  of  all  things 
for  us,  except  the  preserving  an  erect  and  independent  attitude. 
Although  I  know  your  own  judgment  leads  you  to  pursue  this  line 
identically,  yet  I  thought  it  just  to  strengthen  it  by  the  concurrence 
of  my  own. 

\i- 

[Extract.] 

James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to 

France. 

ft.S.P.   1  f.  5"  1,5" 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  October  15,  1802. 

The  suspense  which  has  taken  place  in  relation  to  Louisiana  and  the 
Floridas  is  favorable  to  the  efforts  for  diverting  the  French  Govern 
ment  from  its  unwise  project.  Whether  we  regard  the  sentiments 
prevailing  in  this  country  on  the  subject,  or  the  striking  tendencies  of 
the  project  itself,  no  pains  ought  to  be  spared  for  putting  an  end  to  it: 
If  the  occasion  can  b6  so  improved  as  to  obtain  for  the  United  States, 
on  convenient  terms.  New  Orleans  and  Florida,  the  happiest  of  issues 
will  be  given  to  one  of  the  most  perplexing  of  occurrences.  I  post 
pone  more  particular  remarks  on  this  subject  until  the  President  shall 


PUKCHASE    OF    THE    TEEKITOEY    OF    LOUISIANA.  53 

know  the  impressions  on  the  French  Councils,  resulting  from  the 
views  of  it  to  which  you  will  be  led  by  the  despatches,  of  which  Mr. 
Dupont  was  the  bearer. 


President's  Message. 

GENTLEMEN  OF  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES: 

I  now  transmit  a  report  from  the  Secretary  o  State,  with  the  infor 
mation  requested  in  your  resolution  of  the  17th.  instant. 

In  making  this  communication  I  deem  it  proper  to  observe  that  I 
was  led  by  the  regard  due  to  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United 
States,  and  to  the  just  sensibility  of  the  portion  of  our  fellow-citizens 
more  immediately  affected  by  the  irregular  proceeding  at  New  Orleans, 
to  lose  not  a  moment  in  causing  every  step  to  be  taken  which  the  occa 
sion  claimed  from  me;  being  equally  aware  of  the  obligation  to  main 
tain,  in  all  cases,  the  rights  of  the  nation,  and  to  employ,  for  that 
purpose,  those  just  and  honorable  means  which  belong  to  the  character 
of  the  United  States. 

TH.  JEFFERSON. 

DECEMBER  22,  1802. 


Report  of  the  Secretary  of  State  to  the  President. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  December  21,  1802. 

The  Secretary  of  State,  to  whom  the  resolution  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  of  the  United  States  of  the  17th  instant  was  referred 
by  the  President,  has  the  honor  to  enclose  to  him  the  letters  and  com 
munications  annexed,  from  the  Governor  of  the  Mississippi  Territory, 
the  Governor  of  Kentucky,  and  from  William  E.  Hulings,  formerly 
appointed  Vice-Consul  of  the  United  States  at  New  Orleans.  In  addi 
tion  to  this  information  on  the  subject  of  the  resolution,  it  is  stated, 
from  other  sources,  that,  on  the  29th  of  October,  American  vessels 
from  sea  remained  under  the  prohibition  to  land  their  cargoes;  and 
that  the  American  produce  carried  down  the  Mississippi  could  be 
landed  only  on  paying  a  duty  of  6  per  cent;  with  an  intimation  that 
this  was  a  temporary  permission.  Whether,  in  these  violations  of 
treaty,  the  officer  of  Spain  at  New  Orleans  has  proceeded  with  or  without 
orders  from  his  Government,  can  not  as  }7et  be  decided  by  direct  and 
positive  testimony;  but  it  ought  not  to  be  omitted  in  the  statement 
here  made,  that  other  circumstances  concur  with  the  good  faith  and 
friendship  otherwise  observed  by  His  Catholic  Majesty,  in  favoring  a 
belief  that  no  such  orders  have  been  given. 

JAMES  MADISON. 


54  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

fa      ^     ''     3j    '  H  k^'    ~ 
Mr.  Hulings's  Statement. 

NEW  ORLEANS,  October  18,  180%. 

SIR:  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  you  an  extract  from  a  decree  this 
day  published  by  the  Intendant  of  the  Province  of  Louisiana,  b}T  which 
you  will  see  that  the  Americans  are  no  longer  permitted  to  deposit 
their  merchandise  in  this  city.  No  information  of  any  other  place 
being  appropriated  for  an  American  deposit  is  }^et  given;  nor  have  we 
any  reason  to  hope  that  the  Government  has  such  place  in  view.  The 
season  for  the  cotton  from  the  Natchez,  and  other  produce  from  the 
settlements  higher  up  to  come  down,  approaches.  The  difficulties  and 
risks  of  property  that  will  fall  on  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  if 
deprived  of  their  deposit,  are  incalculable;  their  boats  being  so  frail, 
and  so  subject  to  be  sunk  by  storms,  that  they  can  not  be  converted 
into  floating  stores,  to  wait  the  arrival  of  sea  vessels  to  carry  away 
their  cargoes. 

The  port  is  also  this  day  shut  against  foreign  commerce,  which  can 
only  be  carried  on  by  Spanish  subjects,  in  Spanish  bottoms. 
I  am,  sir,  with  greatest  respect, 

WM.  E.  HULINGS. 

Hon.  JAMES  MADISON,  Secretary  of  State. 


[Extract,]  @  (U     >  <• ,    I  ?  0  ^  <> 

Proclamation  of  Juan  Ventura  Morales,  Intendant  at  New  Orleans. 
t  '.  HID 

As  long  as  it  was  necessary  to  tolerate  the  commerce  of  neutrals 
which  is  now  abolished,  it  would  have  been  prejudicial  to  the  province 
had  the  Intendant,  in  compliance  with  his  duty,  prevented  the  deposit 
in  this  city,  of  the  property  of  the  Americans,  granted  to  them  by  the 
twenty-second  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Friendship,  Limits,  and  Navi 
gation,  of  the  27th  of  October,  1795,  during  the  limited  term  of  three 
years. 

With  the  publication  of  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Amiens 
and  the  reestablishment  of  the  communication  between  the  English 
and  Spanish  subjects,  that  inconvenience  has  ceased.  Considering 
that  the  twenty-second  article  of  the  said  treaty  takes  from  me  the 
power  pf  continuing  the  toleration  which  necessity  required;  since, 
after  the  fulfillment  of  the  said  term,  this  Ministry  can  no  longer  con- 
sent/xo  it  without  an  express  order  of  the  King;  therefore,  and  with 
out  prejudice  to  the  exportation  of  what  has  been  admitted  in  proper 
time,  1  order,  that  from  this  date,  the  privilege  which  the  Americans 
had  of  importing  and  depositing  their  merchandise  and  effects  in  this 
capital,  shall  be  interdicted:  and,  that  the  foregoing  may  be  publicly 
known,  and  that  nobody  may  allege  ignorance,  I  order  it  to  be  pub- 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TEERITORY    OF   LOUISIANA.  55 

lished  in  the  usual  places,  copies  to  be  posted  up  in  the  public  sitioes; 
and  that  the  necessary  notice  be  given  of  it  to  the  officers  of  finance, 
the  administrator  of  rents,  and  otherwise,  as  may  be  necessary. 

The  present  being  given  under  my  hand,  and  countersigned  by  the 
underwritten  notary  of  finance  pro  tempore,  in  the  office  of  Intendancy 
of  New  Orleans,  October  16,  1802. 

JUAN  VENTURA  MORALES. 
By  order  of  the  Intendant: 

PEDRO  PEDESCLAUX. 


Governor  Claiborne  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

NEAR  NATCHEZ,  October  18,  1802. 

SIR:  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  you  a  letter  which  I  last  evening 
received  from  Mr.  William  K.  Hulings,  together  with  a  translation  of 
an  extract  from  n  publication  made  by  Juan  Ventura  Morales,  Intend 
ant  of  the  Province  of  Louisiana,  etc.,  dated  October  lf>,  1802.  These 
dispatches  announce  that  the  port  of  New  Orleans  is  shut  against  for 
eign  commerce,  and  also  the  American  deposit. 

Not  understanding  from  the  Intendant's  proclamation  whether  or 
not  another  place  on  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi  had  been  assigned 
by  His  Catholic  Majesty,  (in  conformity  with  our  treat}r  with  Spain,) 
for  "an  equivalent  establishment,"  I  have,  by  letter,  (a  copy  of  which 
is  inclosed),  requested  information  upon  this  point,  from  the  Governor- 
General  of  the  Province  of  Louisiana:  when  his  answer  is  received  it 
shall  be  forwarded  to  you. 

The  late  act  of  the  Spanish  Government  at  New  Orleans  has  excited 
considerable  agitation  at  Natchez  and  its  vicinity.  It  has  inflicted  a 
severe  wound  oh  the  agricultural  and  commercial  interests  of  this 
Territory,  and  will  prove  no  less  injurious  to  all  the  Western  country. 

There  being  at  present  an  interruption  in  the  post  between  this 
Territor3T  and  Tennessee,  and  supposing  it  of  importance  that  the  Gov 
ernment  should  be  early  apprized  of  the  late  event  at  New  Orleans,  I 
have  forwarded  this  letter  by  express  to  Nashville,  where  it  will  be 
deposited  in  the  mail. 
I  am,  sir,  etc., 

WTM.  C.  C.  CLAIBORNE. 

Hon.  SECRETARY  OF  STATE,  U.  S. 


Mr.  Hulings  to  Governor  Claiborne. 

Of  X     /°    i     •      u  •  /  /\ 

NEW  ORLEANS,  October  18,  1802. 

SIR:  I  have  to  announce  to  you  that  this  day  the  port  is  shut  against 
foreign  commerce,  and  not  against  foreign  commerce  only,  but  against 


5G  PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF   LOUISIANA. 

the  American  deposit  in  this  city.     In  the  decree  posted  up  in  the  pub 
lic  places,  no   mention  is  made  of  an}^  other  place  appointed  for  a 
deposit.     You  will  use  this  information  as  you  may  think  proper. 
I  am,  with  great  respect,  etc., 

WM.  E.  HULINGS. 
WM.  C.  C.  CLAIBORNE, 

Governor  Mississippi  Territory. 


Governor  Claiborne  to  the  Governor-General  of  Louisiana. 

NATCHEZ,  October  28,  1802. 

SIR:  1  was  this  day  informed  that,  in  a  proclamation  issued  on  the 
16th  instant  by  the  Intendant  of  the  Province  of  Louisiana,  it  was 
announced,  "That  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  should  no  longer 
be  permitted  to  deposit  their  merchandises  and  effects  in  the  port  of 
New  Orleans." 

Information  of  an  event  so  immediately  interesting  to  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States  led  me  to  peruse  attentively  uthe  Treaty  of 
Friendship,  Limits,  and  Navigation  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  King  of  Spain,"  and,  upon  adverting  to  the  twenty- 
second  article,  I  found  it  expressly  declared  that,  "His  Catholic  Majesty 
will  permit  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  for  the  space  of  three 
years  from  this  time,  to  deposit  their  merchandises  and  effects  in  the 
port  of  New  Orleans,  and  to  export  them  from  thence,  without  pajnng 
any  other  duty  than  a  fair  price  for  the  hire  of  the  stores;  and  His 
Majesty  promises  either  to  continue  this  permission,  if  he  finds,  during 
that  time,  that  it  is  not  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  Spain,  or,  if  he 
should  not  agree  to  continue  it,  then  he  will  assign  to  them,  on  another 
part  of  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi,  an  equivalent  establishment."  I 
have  here  quoted  the  words  of  the  treaty,  and  find  them  too  explicit 
to  reqire  comment,  or  to  admit  of  a  doubtful  construction. 

If,  therefore,  His  Catholic  Majesty  has  discontinued  his  permission 
to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  to  deposit  their  merchandises  and 
effects  at  the  port  of  New  Orleans,  will  your  Excellency  be  good  enough 
to  inform  me  whether  any,  and  what,  other  place  on  the  banks  of  the 
Mississippi  has  been  assigned  (in  conformity  to  the  treaty)  for  "an 
equivalent  establishment  ?"  The  subject  of  this  inquiry  is  so  interesting 
to  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  and  to  the  welfare  of  her  citi 
zens,  that  I  must  request  your  excellency  to  favor  me  with  an  early 
answer. 

Accept  assurances  of  my  great  respect  and  high  consideration. 

WM.  C.  C.  CLAIBORNE. 

His  Excellency  MANUEL  DE  SALVADO, 

Governor-  General  of  Louisiana. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  57 

The  Governor  of  Kentucky  to  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

STATE  OF  KENTUCKY, 
Frankfort,  November  30,  1802. 

SIR:  Two  days  ago,  I  received  the  enclosed  letters  from  Dr.  James 
Speed,  and  Meeker  &  Co.,  from  New  Orleans,  together  with  a  copy  of 
a  proclamation  issued  by  Juan  Ventura  Morales,  Intendant  of  the  Span 
ish  Government  of  Louisiana,  and  which  I  do  myself  the  honor  to 
enclose  for  your  information.  The  citizens  of  this  State  are  very  much 
alarmed  and  agitated,  as  this  measure  of  the  Spanish  Government  will, 
if  not  altered,  at  one  blow,  cut  up  the  present  and  future  prosperity 
of  their  best  interests  by  the  roots.  To  you,  sir,  they  naturally  turn 
their  eyes,  and  on  your  attention  to  this  important  subject  their  best 
hopes  are  fixed.  Permit  me  to  request  you  will  give  me  information 
on  this  business  as  soon  as  you  can  say,  with  certainty,  what  we  may 
rely  on;  and  let  my  solicitude  on  this  occasion  be  my  apology  for  this 
request. 

With  sentiments  of  respect,  etc. ,  JAMES  GARRARD. 


Read  in  Senate  February  23,  1803,  by  Mr.  White,  of  Delaware. 

ADVERTISEMENT. 

Under  date  of  the  16th  instant  (December)  the  Intendant-Generarl 
of  these  provinces  tells  me  that  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  of 
America  can  have  no  commerce  with  His  Majesty's  subjects — they  only 
having  the  free  navigation  of  the  river  for  the  exportation  of  the  fruits 
and  produce  of  their  establishments  to  foreign  countries,  and  the 
importation  of  what  the}7  may  want  from  them.  As  such  I  charge  }TOU, 
so  far  as  respects  you,  to  be  zealous  and  vigilant,  with  particular  care, 
that  the  inhabitants  neither  purchase  nor  sell  anything  to  the  shipping, 
flat-bottomed  boats,  barges,  or  any  other  smaller  vessels  that  may  go 
along  the  river,  destined  for  the  American  possessions,  or  proceeding 
from  them,  that  they  shall  be  informed  of  it,  for  their  due  compliance 
of  the  same. 

CARLOS  DE  GRANDPREE. 

BATON  ROUGE,  December  22,  1802. 

The  foregoing  is  a  translation  of  the  original,  directed  to  me  by  his 
Lordship  Carlos  de  Grandpree,  Colonel  of  the  Royal  Armies,  and 
Governor  of  Baton  Rouge. 

J.  O.  CONNER, 
Cyndic  of  Fourth  District. 
BATON  ROUGE,  December  27,  1802. 


58  PURCHASE    OF    TH^    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

Mr.  Livingston  to  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

PARIS,  October  28, 1802. 

DEAR  SIR:  Nothing  very  important  having  occurred  for  some  time 
past,  I  have  not  thought  it  necessary  to  trouble  you,  particularly  as  I 
concluded  that  you  would,  for  a  time,  have  quitted  the  seat  of  Gov 
ernment,  and  sought  repose  from  the  fatigues  of  politics. 

While  the  union  between  France  and  Russia  subsists,  the  discontents 
which  almost  every  nation  in  Europe  feels  at  the  extreme  loftiness  of 
the  first  will  be  suppressed.  But  as  fear  and  not  affection  occasions 
the  suppression,  they  are  ready  to  break  out  on  the  first  favorable 
moment.  Many  think  that  moment  not  very  distant.  Great  changes 
have  taken  place  in  the  Administration:  Wormzoff  is  known  to  be 
inclined  to  Britain;  and  I  find  that  the  change  occasions  considerable 
sensation  here,  not  only  among  the  foreign  Ministers,  but  among  those 
of  France.  One  effect  of  it  has  been  to  send  off'  Andriotte,  who  has 
hitherto  been  retained  till  Lord  Whitworth  arrived,  even  though 
formal  notice  had  long  since  been  given  that  he  was  to  go  in  eight 
days.  Britain  is  seriously  dissatisfied;  and,  indeed,  has  some  reason  to 
complain;  several  of  her  vessels  which  put  in  here,  (as  is  said  by  stress 
of  weather,'*  having  been  detained,  and  Mr.  Murray's  representations 
treated  with  neglect. 

The  affairs  of  Helvetia  have  also  excited  great  uneasiness  in  Eng 
land,  where  all  parties  seem  to  concur  in  wishing  to  oppose  some 
barriers  to  the  power  of  France.  The  British  republicans  are  dis 
gusted  with  the  changes  which  have  taken  place  here;  while  the  royal 
ists  dread  the  stability  that  the  Government  has  assumed  in  the  hands 
of  the  First  Consul.  The  mercantile  and  manufacturing  interests, 
who  looked  to  peace  for  the  renewal  of  the  Treaty  of  Commerce,  from 
which  they  derived  such  advantages,  are  sore  at  the  severity  with 
which  their  commerce  is  interdicted  here.  You  will  accordingly  find, 
by  the  British  papers,  that  both  those  of  the  majority  and  minority 
teem  with  abuse  on  France,  and  blow  aloud  the  trumpet  of  discord. 

By  the  Treaty  of  Madrid,  you  recollect  that  the  reigning  Duke  of 
Parma  and  Placentia  was  to  renounce  them  in  favor  of  France;  in  con 
sideration  of  which,  his  heir  was  to  have  the  kingdom  of  Etruria. 
This  he  has  constantly  refused  to  do,  and  has  lately  died  without  mak 
ing  any  renunciation.  The  Spanish  Ambassador  here  has  been  called 
upon  to  complete  the  treaty.  He  replied  that  he  had  no  powers.  And 
General  Bournonville  has  gone  express  to  Spain  to  effect  this  object— 
the  King  of  Etruria  being  now  Duke  of  Parma.  Whether  he  will 
prefer  the  Crown  he  now  holds  to  his  hereditary  dominions  I  know 
not;  but  1  think  he  must  submit  to  what  is  dictated  here,  or  risk  the 
loss  of  both. 

The  Mississippi  business,  though  all  the  officers  are  appointed,  and 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  59 

the  army  under  orders,  has  met  with  a  check.  The  army  under  orders 
is  obstructed  for  the  moment.  Events  may  possibly  arise,  of  which 
we  may  avail  ourselves. 

I  had,  two  days  ago,  a  very  interesting  conversation  with  Joseph 
Bonaparte,  having  put  into  his  hands  a  copy  of  the  memoir  on  Louisi 
ana,  which  I  sent  the  Secretary  of  State.  I  took  occasion  to  tell  him 
that  the  interest  he  had  taken  in  settling  the  differences  between  our 
respective  countries  had  entitled  him  to  our  confidence,  and  that  I 
should  take  the  liberty  to  ask  his  advice  in  matters  that  were  likely  to 
disturb  the  harmony  that  subsisted  between  our  respective  Republics. 
He  seemed  pleased  at  the  compliment,  and  told  me  that  he  would 
receive  with  pleasure  any  communication  1  could  make;  but  as  he 
would  not  wish  to  appear  to  interfere  with  the  Minister,  he  begged 
my  communication  might  be  informal  and  unsigned- — exactly  what  I 
wished,  because  I  should  act  with  less  danger  of  committing  myself, 
and  of  course  with  more  freedom.  He  added,  you  must  not,  however, 
suppose  my  power  to  serve  you  greater  than  it  actually  is;  my  brother 
is  his  own  counsellor;  but  we  are  good  brothers,  he  hears  me  with 
pleasure,  and  as  I  have  access  to  him  at  all  times,  I  have  an  oppor 
tunity  of  turning  his  attention  to  a  particular  subject  that  might 
otherwise  be  passed  over.  I  then  asked  him  whether  he  had  read  my 
notes  on  Louisiana.  He  told  me  that  he  had,  and  that  he  had  conversed 
upon  the  subject  with  the  First  Consul,  who,  he  found,  had  read  them 
with  attention;  that  his  brother  had  told  him  that  he  had  nothing  more 
at  heart  than  to  be  upon  the  best  terms  with  the  United  States.  1 
expressed  to  him  my  apprehensions  of  the  jealousies  that  would  natur 
ally  be  excited  from  their  vicinity,  and  the  impossibility  of  prevent 
ing  abuses  in  a  military  government  established  at  so  great  a  distance 
from  home. 

Wishing  to  know  with  certainty  whether  the  Floridas  were  included, 
(which,  however,  I  had  pretty  well  ascertained  before,)  I  told  him  that 
the  only  cause  of  difference  that  might  arise  between  us,  being  the  debt 
and  Louisiana,  I  conceived  that  both  might  be  happily  and  easily 
removed  by  making  an  exchange  with  Spain,  returning  them  Lousiana, 
retaining  New  Orleans,  and  giving  the  latter  and  the  Floridas  for  our 
debt. 

He  asked  me  whether  we  should  prefer  the  Floridas  or  Louisiana? 
I  told  him  that  there  was  no  comparison  in  their  value,  but  that  we 
had  no  wish  to  extend  our  boundary  across  the  Mississippi,  or  give 
color  to  the  doubts  that  had  been  entertained  of  the  moderation  of  our 
views;  that  all  we  sought  was  security,  and  not  extension  of  territory. 
He  replied,  that  he  believed  any  new  cession  on  the  part  of  Spain 
would  be  extremely  difficult;  that  Spain  had  parted  with  Trinidad  and 
Louisiana  with  great  reluctance.  1  have,  however,  reason  to  think 
that  Bournonville  is  instructed  to  effect  this  object,  not,  however,  with 


60  PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

a  view  to  my  project,  but  with  intention  to  procure  for  France  some 
port  in  the  Gulf,  from  which  they  think  they  may  secure  their  own 
and  annoy  the  British  commerce;  so  that,  if  we  should,  contrary,  to 
our  hopes,  make  any  bargain  with  them,  I  fear  that  East  Florida  will 
not  be  included.  However,  everything  is  yet  in  air;  and  I  doubt 
much,  considering  the  present  state  of  things  in  Europe,  whether 
Spain  will  make  any  exchange  that  will  give  France  a  command  of  the 
Gulf.  Though  this  is  a  favorite  object  with  France,  she  may  not,  in 
the  present  state  of  things  in  Europe,  think  it  prudent  to  press  too 
hard.  It  is  time  that  she  should  acquire  some  character  for  moderation. 

The  First  Consul  is  gone  to  Rouen,  and  is  to  be  back  by  the  18th 
Brumaire.  The  British  fear  he  means  to  examine  the  coast.  The 
prospect  of  a  rupture  grows  more  serious.  I  can  tell  you,  with  cer 
tainty,  that  a  remonstrance,  in  pretty  strong  terms,  has  been  presented 
by  her  Minister,  on  the  subject  of  the  Consul's  interference  in  the 
affairs  of  Helvetia.  How  it  will  be  received  I  know  not;  but  I  think 
it  would  not  have  been  made  if  it  had  not  been  the  intention  of  Britain 
to  seek  a  quarrel. 

I  refer  you  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  information  on  our  partic 
ular  affairs. 

Lafayette's  situation  demands  the  aid  of  our  country.  *  *  *  He 
was  ready  to  sacrifice  everything  for  us,  and  we  owe  him  something 
effectual,  I  must  pray  you  to  get  Mr.  Randolph,  or  some  other  leading 
member  of  Congress,  to  patronize  him.  Our  gratitude  will  do  us 
honor  abroad,  and  not  be  unpopular  at  home. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

TH.  JEFFERSON,  Esq., 

President  of  the  United  States. 


[Extract.] 

Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to  France,  to  James  Madison,  Secretary 

of  State. 

PARIS,  November  2,  ISO?.. 

My  letter  to  the  President,  sent  by  the  way  of  England,  will  show 
you  that  the  business  of  Louisiana  has  met  with  a  check,  though  I  fear  it 
will  soon  be  resumed;  and  that  troops  will  go  out  this  Autumn,  as  every 
thing  was  arranged,  and  they  were  under  marching  orders.  Florida  is 
not,  as  I  before  told  you,  included  in  the  cession.  You  will  see  in  the 
President's  letter  my  conversation  with  Joseph  Bonaparte;  this  I  shall 
have  a  convenient  opportunity  to  renew,  as  he  has  promised  to  give 
me  a  shooting  party  at  his  country  house  in  a  few  days.  Time  may 
afford  circumstances  of  which  we  may  avail  ourselves.  I  therefore 


PUECHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  61 

pray  you  to  bo  explicit  in  your  instructions,  and  in  your  replies  to  some 
questions  that  I  haye  asked  you  relative  to  this  subject  in  my  former 
letters,  since  I  am  at  present  wholly  unauthorized  as  to  any  offers  that 
it  would  be  proper  to  make;  and  we  certainly  do  not  expect  to  receive 
this  country,  or  any  interest  in  it,  as  a  free  gift. 


Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to  France,  to  James  Madison,  Secretary 

of  State. 

PARIS,  November  11,  180°2. 

France  has  cut  the  knot.  The  difficulty  relative  to  Parma  and 
Placentia,  that  stopped  the  expedition  to  Louisiana,  has  ended  by  their 
taking  possession  of  the  first,  as  you  see  by  the  enclosed  paper.  Orders 
are  given  for  the  immediate  embarkation  of  troops  (two  demibrigades) 
for  Louisiana;  they  will  sail  in  about  twenty  days  from  Holland. 
The  Government  here  will  give  no  answer  to  my  notes  on  the  subject. 
They  will  say  nothing  on  that  of  our  limits,  or  of  our  right  under  the 
Spanish  Treaty.  Clarke  has  been  presented  to  General  Victor  as  a 
merchant  from  Louisiana.  The  General  did  not  probably  conceal  his 
views,  which  are  nothing  short  of  taking  exactly  what  they  find  con 
venient.  When  asked  what  they  meant  to  do  as  to  our  right  of  entre- 
pbt,  he  spoke  of  the  treaty  as  waste  paper;  and  the  prefect  did  not 
know  that  we  had  such  right,  though  it  had  been  the  subject  of  many 
conversations  with  the  Minister,  and  of  three  different  notes.  The 
sum  voted  for  this  service  is  two  millions  and  a  half;  as  to  the  rest, 
they  expect  to  compel  the  people  to  support  the  expenses  of  the  Gov 
ernment,  which  will  be  very  heavy,  as  the  number  of  the  officers,  civil 
and  military,  with  their  suits,  is  great;  and  they  are  empowered  to 
draw:  so  that  the  first  act  of  the  new  Government  will  be  the  oppres 
sion  of  their  people  and  our  commerce.  I  believe  you  may  add  to  this 
an  early  attempt  to  corrupt  our  people,  and,  if  I  may  judge  by  the 
temper  that  the  General  will  carry  with  him,  an  early  attempt  upon 
the  Nachez,  which  they  consider  as  the  rival  of  New  Orleans.  If  you 
look  back  to  some  of  my  letters  on  this  subject,  3^011  will  see  my  opinion 
of  the  necessity  of  strengthening  ourselves  by  force  and  ships  at  home, 
and  by  alliance  abroad.  No  prudence  will,  I  fear,  prevent  hostilities 
ere  long;  and  perhaps  the  sooner  their  plans  develop  themselves  the 
better.  In  a  letter  to  the  President,  sent  by  way  of  England,  I  men 
tion  a  conversation  with  Joseph  Bonaparte,  from  which  I  derive  some 
small  hopes;  but  they  are  of  no  avail  now  that  the  expedition  is  deter 
mined  upon.  I  had  yesterday  written  you  a  long  letter  upon  the 
general  state  of  our  affairs,  but,  having  no  one  to  copy  it,  and  being 
anxious  to  give  you  this  intelligence  as  early  as  possible.  I  confine 
myself  to  this  single  object,  lest  I  should  miss  the  ship  which  is  about 
to  sail  from  Havre. 


62  PUBCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

1  am,  dear  sir,  with  the  most  respectful  consideration,  your  most 
obedient  servant, 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 
el  AMES  MADISON,  Secretary  of  /State. 


Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to  France,  to  James  Madison,  Secretary 

'     ofstate- 


PARIS,  November  11, 
SIR:  After  writing  mine  of  this  date,  I  called  on  the  Minister  and 
insisted  on  some  positive  answer  to  my  notes.  He  told  me  that  he  was 
expressly  instructed  by  the  First  Consul  to  give  me  the  most  positive 
assurances  that  the  treaties  we  had  entered  into  with  Spain  or  them, 
relative  to  Louisiana,  should  be  strictly  observed.  When  I  expressed 
my  surprise  that  their  officers  should  not  be  informed  on  that  head, 
though  on  the  eve  of  departing,  he  assured  me  that  they  would  be  fur 
nished  with  copies  of  the  treaties,  and  directed  to  conform  strictly  to 
them.  I  asked  why  these  assurances  were  not  given  to  me  in  the  usual 
form,  by  replying  to  1113^  notes?  He  said  that  he  hoped  that  there 
would  be  no  difficulty  on  that  head,  when  the  Consul  should  arrive 
(he  is  now  absent).  I  have  stated  this  that  you  might,  by  comparing 
this  conversation  with  the  contents  of  the  letter,  and  the  information 
derived  from  Clarke's  conversation  with  the  General,  draw  your  own 
inferences.  I  shall  endeavor  to-day  to  see  J.  Bonaparte,  though  he 
has  all  along  assured  me  that  it  was  the  Consul's  intention  to  cultivate 
our  friendship,  and  by  no  means  to  do  anything  that  would  endanger 
it.  It  will,  however,  be  well  to  be  on  our  guard,  and,  above  all,  to 
re-enforce  the  Natchez,  and  to  give  it  every  possible  commercial  advan 
tage.  If  we  can  put  ourselves  in  the  situation  to  prevent  the  danger 
of  hostility,  I  think  we  may  hope  that  the  dissatisfaction  of  inhabitants, 
the  disappointment  of  officers,  and  the  drain  of  money  which  the 
establishment  will  occasion,  will  facilitate  our  views  after  a  very  short 
time. 

I  am,  dear  sir,  with  the  most  respectful  consideration,  your  most 
obedient  servant, 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

Hon.  JAMES  MADISON, 

Secretary  of  Stale. 

P.  S.—  In  my  letter  to  the  President,  I  informed  him  that  General 
Bournonville  had  gone  post  to  Spain,  and  that  I  had  reason  to  think 
he  had  it  in  charge  to  obtain  the  Floridas.  I  know  that  he  went  with 
the  greatest  speed;  accordingly,  on  his  very  first  conference,  he 
proposed  to  Spain  to  relinquish  Parma  and  Placentia  for  the  Flori- 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  63 

das.  *  *  *  But  Spain  may  be  forced  to  give  them,  though  she 
should  not  like  the  exchange.  You  see  by  this  how  much  it  is  a  favorite 
object  with  the  First  Consul,  and  judge  from  thence  of  our  prospects. 

What  effect  the  news  from  St.  Domingo  may  have  I  know  not.  The 
army  there  is  reduced  to  1,200  effectives.  Other  particulars  you  will 
have  more  correctly  than  we  have  here. 

The  Consul  is  still  absent,  but  daily  expected.  Lord  Whitworth  is 
on  his  way  from  Calais,  and  will  be  here  to-morrow.  . 

V 

Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to  France,  to  James  Madison,  Secretary  of 

t> .         '  f  a  -]         state> 

PARIS,  November  14,  180%. 

In  addition  to  my  last,  (duplicates  enclosed,)  I  have  obtained  accurate 
information  of  the  offer  to  Spain.  It  is  either  to  sell  them  Parma  for 
forty-eight  millions  of  livres,  or  to  exchange  it  for  Florida.  You  see 
by  this  the  value  they  put  on  Florida.  I  fear  Spain  will  accede  to 
their  proposition.  Lord  Whitworth  has  arrived.  The  affairs  of  Switz 
erland  are  in  a  train  to  be  settled  as  France  thinks  proper;  the  Diet 
being  dissolved  and  deputies  appointed  to  come  to  Paris.  Sweden  has 
made  a  peace  with  Tripoli,  for  which  she  pays  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  dollars.  The  Emperor  is  not  yet  satisfied  with  the  indemni 
ties,  and  there  are  many  symptoms  of  change  in  the  politics  of  Russia. 


Mr.  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Charles  Pinckney,  Minister  to  Spain. 

tf  •£ .  <°.  ;;  :  s~2»*i 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  November  #7,  1802. 

A  letter  from  a  confidential  citizen  at  New  Orleans,  a  copy  of  which 
is  enclosed,  has  just  informed  us  that  the  Intendant,  at  that  place,  by 
a  proclamation,  from  which  an  extract  is  also  enclosed,  had  prohibited 
the  deposit  of  American  effects  stipulated  by  the  Treaty  of  1795;  and, 
as  the  letter  is  interpreted,  that  the  river  was  also  shut  against  the 
external  commerce  of  the  United  States  from  that  port.  Whether  it 
be  the  fact  or  not  that  this  latter  prohibition  has  also  taken  place,  it  is 
evident  that  the  useful  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  so  essentially 
depends  on  a  suitable  depository  for  the  articles  of  commerce,  that  a 
privation  of  the  latter  is  equivalent  to  a  privation  of  both. 

This  proceeding  is  so  direct  and  palpable  a  violation  of  the  Treaty  of 
1795,  that,  in  candor,  it  is  to  be  imputed  rather  to  the  Intendant  solely 
than  to  instructions  of  his  Government.  The  Spanish  Minister  takes 
pains  to  impress  this  belief,  and  it  is  favored  by  private  accounts  from 
New  Orleans,  mentioning  that  the  Governor  did  not  concur  with  the 
Intendant.  But,  from  whatever  source  the  measure  may  have  pro 
ceeded,  the  President  expects  that  the  Spanish  Government  will  neither 


64  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

lose  a  moment  in  countermanding  it,  nor  hesitate  to  repair  every  dam 
age  which  may  result  from  it.  You  are  aware  of  the  sensibility  of  our 
Western  citizens  to  such  an  occurrence.  This  sensibility  is  justified 
by  the"'  interest  they  have  at  stake.  The  Mississippi  is  to  them  every 
thing.  It  is  the  Hudson,  the  Delaware,  the  Potomac,  and  all  the  navi 
gable  rivers  of  the  Atlantic  States,  formed  into  one  stream.  The 
produce  exported  through  that  channel  last  year  amounted  to  one  mil 
lion  six  hundred  and  twenty-two  thousand  six  hundred  and  seventy- 
two  dollars  from  the  districts  of  Kentucky  and  Mississippi  only,  and  will 
probabty  be  fifty  per  cent,  more  this  year,  (from  the  whole  Western 
country.  Kentucky  alone  has  exported,  for  the  first  half  of  this  year, 
five  hundred  and  ninety-one  thousand  four  hundred  and  thirty-two 
dollars  in  value,)  a  great  part  of  which  is  now,  or  shortly  will  be, 
afloat  for  New  Orleans,  and  consequently  exposed  to  the  effects  of 
this  extraordinary  exercise  of  power.  *"  Whilst  you  presume,  therefore, 
in  your  representations  to  the  Spanish  Government  that  the  conduct 
of  its  officer  is  no  less  contrary  to  its  intentions  than  it  is  to  its  good 
faith,  you  will  take  care  to  express  the  strongest  confidence  that  the 
breach  of  the  treaty  will  be  repaired  in  every  way  which  justice  and  a 
regard  for  a  friendly  neighborhood  may  require. 

I  have  communicated  the  information  received  from  New  Orleans 
to  the  Chevalier  d'Yrujo,  with  a  view  to  obtain  his  immediate  interpo 
sition,  as  you  will  find  by  the  enclosed  copy  of  a  letter  to  him.  He 
readily  undertakes  to  use  it  with  all  the  effect  he  can  give  it  by  writ 
ing  immediately  on  the  subject  to  the  local  authority  at  New  Orleans. 
I  shall  write  at  the  same  time  to  Mr.  Hulings,  who  will  enforce,  as  far 
as  he  may  have  an  opportunity,  the  motives  for  recalling  the  unwar 
rantable  prohibitions.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  Intcntlant  will  be  led 
to  see  the  error  which  he  has  committed,  and  to  correct  it  before  a 
very  great  share  of  its  mischief  will  have  happened.  Should  he  prove 
as  obstinate  as  he  has  been  ignorant  or  wicked,  nothing  can  temper 
the  irritation  and  indignation  of  the  Western  country,  but  a  persuasion 
that  the  energy  of  their  own  Government  will  obtain  from  the  justice 
of  that  of  Spain  the  most  ample  redress. 

It  has  long  been  manifest  that,  whilst  the  injuries  to  the  United 
States,  so  frequently  occurring  from  the  colonial  officers  scattered 
over  our  hemisphere,  and  in  our  neighborhood,  can  only  be  repaired 
by  a  resort  to  their  respective  Sovereigns  in  Europe,  that  it  will  be 
impossible  to  guard  against  most  serious  inconveniences.  The  i  nstancc 
before  us  strikes  with  peculiar  force,  and  presents  an  occasion  on 
which  you  may  advantageously  suggest  to  the  Spanish  Government 
the  expediency  of  placing  in  their  Minister  on  the  spot,  an  authority  to 
control  or  correct  the  mischievous  proceedings  of  their  colonial  offi 
cers  towards  our  citizens;  without  which  any  one  of  fifteen  or  twenty 
individuals,  not  always  among  either  the  wisest  or  best  of  men,  may. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  65 

at  any  time,  threaten  the  good  understanding-  of  the  two  countries. 
The  distance  between  the  United  States  and  the  old  continent,  and  the 
mortifying  delays  of  explanations  and  negotiations  across  the  Atlantic 
on  emergencies  in  our  neighborhood,  render  such  a  provision  indis 
pensable,  and  it  can  not  be  long  before  all  the  Governments  of  Europe, 
having  American  colonies,  must  see  the  policy  of  making  it. 


*H«JL 


Extract  from  the  Message  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  Congress.  • 

DECEMBER  15,  1802. 

The  cession  of  the  Spanish  province  of  Louisiana  to  France,  which 
took  place  in  the  course  of  the  late  war,  will,  if  carried  into  effect, 
make  a  change  in  the  aspect  of  our  foreign  relations,  which  will 
doubtless  have  just  weight  in  any  deliberations  of  the  Legislature 
connected  with  that  subject. 


Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to  France,  to  James  Madison,  Secretary  of 

i—  -  State. 

PARIS,  December  00,  1802. 

SIR:  I  have  received  your  favor  by  Mde.  Broniau,  and  had,  as  you 
will  find,  anticipated  your  wishes  in  finding  another  manual  to  the  First 
Consul.  The  consequence  of  which  is,  that  I  have,  at  this  moment, 
a  very  strong  memorial  under  his  eye,  and  some  projects  which  appear 
to  be  well  received.  But  the  subject  is  too  delicate  to  treat  here; 
when  a  safe  conveyance  offers  I  shall  write  to  you  more  at  large. 
The  Minister  has  changed  his  conduct  much  for  the  better,  either 
because  of  our  late  difference,  or  because  he  suspects  that  I  have 
another  passage  to  the  First  Consul.  France  has  not  yet  got  Florida; 
but  there  is  not  much  doubt  that  her  negotiations  on  this  subject  will 
succeed,  as  Parma  is  a  favorite  object  with  Spain.  Pray  be  explicit 
in  the  amount  of  what  I  may  offer,  and  consider  the  value  of  the 
country — its  importance  to  peace — the  expensive  establishment  it  will 
save,  and  its  intrinsic  worth,  from  the  price  of  the  land  and  actual 
revenue.  I  do  not,  however,  mean  that  you  should  infer  from  this 
that  my  prospects  of  obtaining  the  object  are  great,  because  I  find,  as 
Mr.  Talleyrand  told  me  yesterday,  the  First  Consul  entete  with  this 
project.  But  I  have  made  so  many  converts,  that  I  would  wish,  in  case 
favorable  circumstances  should  arise,  to  know  how  to  act.  If  left  to 
myself  I  may  go  beyond  the  mark.  General  politics  you  will  collect 
from  the  papers  I  send.  I  have  mentioned  that  the  storm  in  England 
will  blow  over  for  the  present;  and  the  peace  will  not  be  lasting.  The 
armament  for  Louisiana  has  not  yet  sailed;  the  civil  officers  are  yet 
here,  if  I  am  rightly  informed  by  the  Minister  from  whom  1  had  it 
yesterday. 

H.  Doc.  431 5 


66  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

The  necessity  of  my  sending  this  immediately  prevents  my  adding 
anything  but  the  assurance  of  the  highest  esteem. 

1  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your  most  obedient  and  humble  servant, 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

P.  S.  December  23. — The  armament  has  not  yet  sailed;  Florida  not 
ceded;  more  hesitation  and  doubt  on  the  subject  than  I  have  yet 
observed.  I  have,  in  a  private  memoir  under  the  Consul's  eye, 
touched  a  string  that  has  alarmed  them.  I  can  not  now  explain.  The 
Minister  knows  nothing  of  this.  Set  on  foot  negotiation  fixing  our 
bound  with  Britain,  but  by  no  means  conclude  until  you  hear  from  me 
that  all  hope  here  is  lost.  It  is  an  important  card  in  my  hands,  and 
must,  for  the  present,  at  least,  be  somewhat  under  my  control.  Do 
not  absolutely  despair,  though  you  may  have  no  great  reason  to  hope 
should  New  Orleans  be  possessed  by  a  small  force. 

This  letter  goes  by  the  way  of  England  by  Mr.  Murray,  who  has  not 
allowed  me  time  to  give  it  you  in  any  better  dress.  I  must  wait  for 
some  more  direct  conveyance  to  write  fully  to  you. 


James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to 

France. 

DEPARTMENT  or  STATE, 

fo  .  o  December  23,  1809.. 

SIR:  In  the  latter  end  of  last  month  we  received  information  from 
New  Orleans  of  the  interdiction  of  the  deposit  there  for  our  merchan 
dise,  stipulated  by  the  treaty  with  Spain,  without  an  equivalent  estab 
lishment  being  assigned.  A  copy  of  the  Intendant's  proclamation  to 
that  effect  is  enclosed.  Private  accounts  render  it  probable  that  the 
Governor1  of  the  province  openly  dissented  from  that  act;  but  private 
letters,  of  so  late  a  date  as  the  29th  of  October,  inform  us  that  it  is  still 
enforced.  The  Legislature  of  Kentucky  have  voted  a  memorial  to  Con 
gress  complaining  of  it,  and  they  will,  probably,  be  followed  by  other 
portions  of  the  Western  people.  Should  it  not  be  revoked  before  the 
time  for  the  descent  of  the  boats  in  the  Spring,  both  the  injury  and  irri 
tation  proceeding  from  it  will  be  greatly  increased.  The  House  of 
Representatives  passed  a  resolution  on  the  17th  of  this  month,  calling 
for  information  upon  this  subject,  a  copy  of  which,  if  it  should  be 
printed  early  enough,  will  be  enclosed.  The  result  of  their  delibera 
tions  can  not  be  anticipated;  but  I  may  hazard  the  remark  that,  whilst 
we  have  no  clear  foundation  on  which  to  impute  this  infraction  to 
orders  from  the  Spanish  Government,  it  would  be  contrary  to  the  duty, 
policy,  and  character  of  our  own  to  resort  for  redress  in  the  first 
instance  to  the  use  of  force. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  67 


JANUARY  3,  1803. 

The  delay  in  the  sailing  of  the  British  packet,  by.  which  this  is  for 
warded,  gives  an  opportunity  of  adding  that,  since  the  date  of  the  above, 
a  letter  has  been  received  from  Governor  Claiborne,  of  the  Mississippi 
Territory,  inclosing  one  from  the  Governor  of  Louisiana,  which  says 
that  the  suspension  of  the  deposit  by  the  Intendant  was  without  orders 
from  the  Spanish  Government,  and  that  the  measure  did  not  accord 
with  his  judgment.  He  observes,  also,  that  he  had  communicated  the 
proceeding  to  the  Governor  of  the  Havana,  who  has  some  kind  of  super 
intendence  over  the  authorities  at  New  Orleans.  This  information 
strengthens  the  hope  that  the  irregularity  may  be  corrected  before  it 
can  have  wrought  extensive  injury  to  our  Mississippi  commerce.  The 
occurrence  has  drawn  forth  the  clearest  indications,  not  only  of  the 
sensibility  of  the  Western  country  with  respect  to  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi,  but  of  the  sympathy  of  their  Atlantic  fellow-citizens  on 
the  subject. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc.,  JAMES  MADISON. 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON,  Esq. 


James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Charles  Pinckney,  Minister  to  Spain. 

W  i  o,  '  •  <2  ',  c&j  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  January  10,  1803. 
SIR:  Since  my  letter  of  November  27th,  on  the  subject  of  what  had 
taken  place  at  New  Orleans,  a  letter  has  been  received  from  the  Gov 
ernor  of  Louisiana  to  Governor  Claiborne,  in  which  it  is  stated  that 
the  measure  of  the  Intendant  was  without  instructions  from  his  Gov 
ernment,  and  admitted  that  his  own  judgment  did  not  concur  with  that 
of  the  Intendant.  You  will  find,  by  the  printed  documents  herewith 
transmitted,  that  the  subject  engaged  the  earty  and  earnest  attention 
of  the  House  of  Representatives;  and  that  all  the  information  relating 
to  it  possessed  by  the  Executive  prior  to  the  receipt  of  that  letter, 
was  reported,  in  consequence  of  a  call  for  it.  The  letter  itself  has  been 
added  to  that  report;  but  being  confidentially  communicated,  it  does  not 
appear  in  print;  a  translation  of  it,  however,  is  herewith  enclosed. 
You  will  find,  also,  that  the  House  has  passed  a  resolution  explicitly 
declaring  that  the  stipulated  rights  of  the  United  States  on  the  Missis-  \ 
sippi  will  be  inviolably  maintained.  The  disposition  of  many  members 
was  to  give  to  the  resolution  a  tone  and  complexion  still  stronger.  To 
these  proofs  of  the  sensation  which  has  been  produced,  it  is  to  be  added, 
that  representations,  expressing  the  peculiar  sensibility  of  the  Western 
country,  are  on  the  way  from  every  quarter  of  it  to  the  Government. 
There  is,  in  fact,  but  one  sentiment  throughout  the  Union  with  respect 
to  the  duty  of  maintaining  our  rights  of  navigation  and  boundary. 
The  only  existing  difference  relates  to  the  degree  of  patience  which 
ought  to  be  exercised  during  the  appeal  to  friendly  modes  of  redress. 


68  PUECHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

In  this  state  of  things,  it  is  to  he  presumed  that  the  Spanish  Govern 
ment  will  accelerate,  by  every  possible  means,  its  interposition  for  that 
purpose;  and  the  President  charges  you  to  urge  the  necessity  of  so 
doing  with  as  much  amicable  decision  as  you  can  employ.  We  are  not 
without  hopes  that  the  Intendant  will  yield  to  the  demands  which  have 
been  made  on  him:  and  to  the  advice  which  he  will  have  received  from 
the  Spanish  Minister  here.  But  it  will  be  expected  from  the  justice 
and  good  faith  of  the  Spanish  Government,  that  its  precise  orders  to 
that  effect  will  be  forwarded  by  the  quickest  conveyance  possible.  The 
President  wishes,  also,  that  the  expedient  suggested  in  the  letter  above 
referred  to,  for  preventing  similar  occurrences  and  delays,  may  also  be 
duly  pressed  on  that  Government. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc.,  JAMES  MADISON. 

CHARLES  PINCKNEY,  Esq. 


President  Jefferson  to  Mr.  Monroe.  (i}X 

WASHINGTON,  January  13,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR, — 1  dropped  you  a  line  on  the  10th,  informing  you  of  a 
nomination  I  had  made  of  you  to  the  Senate,  and  yesterday  I  enclosed 
you  their  approbation,  not  then  having  time  to  write.  The  agitation 
of  the  public  mind  on  occasion  of  the  late  suspension  of  our  right  of 
deposit  at  New  Orleans  is  extreme.  In  the  western  country  it  is 
natural,  and  grounded  on  honest  motives.  In  the  seaports  it  proceeds 
'from  a  desire  for  war,  which  increases  the  mercantile  lottery:  in  the 
federalists,  generally,  and  especially  those  of  Congress,  the  object  is 
to  force  us  into  war  if  possible,  in  order  to  derange  our  finances,  or  if 
this  cannot  be  done,  to  attach  the  western  country  to  them,  as  their 
best  friend,  and  thus  get  again  into  power.  Remonstrances,  memorials, 
&c.,  are  now  circulating  through  the  whole  of  the  western  country, 
and  signed  by  the  body  of  the  people.  The  measures  we  have  been  pur- 
uing,  being  invisible,  do  not  satisfy  their  minds.  Something  sensible, 
therefore,  has  become  necessary;  and  indeed  our  object  of  purchasing 
New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas  is  a  measure  liable  to  assume  so  many 
shapes,  that  no  instructions  could  be  squared  to  fit  them.  It  was 
essential  then,  to  send  a  minister  extraordinary,  to  be  joined  with  the 
ordinary  one,  with  discretionary  powers;  first,  however,  well  impressed 
with  all  our  views,  and  therefore  qualified  to  meet  and  modify  to  these 
every  form  of  proposition  which  could  come  from  the  other  party. 
This  could  be  done  onry  in  full  and  frequent  oral  communications. 
Having  determined  on  this,  there  could  not  be  two  opinions  among 
the  republicans  as  to  the  person.  You  possessed  the  unlimited  confi 
dence  of  the  administration  and  of  the  western  people;  and  generally 
of  the  republicans  everywhere;  and  were  you  to  refuse  to  go,  no  other 
man  can  be  found  who  does  this,  The  measure  has  already  silenced 


PUKCHASE    OF    THE    TEKKITOKY    OF    LOUISIANA.  69 

the  federalists  here.  Congress  will  no  longer  be  agitated  by  them; 
and  the  country  will  become  calm  fast  as  the  information  extends  over 
it.  All  eyes,  all  hopes  are  now  fixed  on  you;  and  were  you  to  decline, 
the  chagrin  would  be  universal,  and  would  shake  under  your  feet  the 
high  ground  on  which  you  stand  with  the  public.  Indeed,  I  know 
nothing  which  would  produce  such  a  shock.  For  on  the  event  of  this 
mission  depend  the  future  destinies  of  this  republic.  If  we  cannot 
by  a  purchase  of  the  country;  insure  to  ourselves  a  course  of  perpetual 
peace  and  friendship  with  all  nations,  then  as  war  cannot  be  distant, 
it  behooves  us  immediately  to  be  preparing  for  that  course,  without, 
however,  hastening  it;  and  it  may  be  necessary  (on  your  failure  on 
the  continent)  to  cross  the  channel.  We  shall  get  entangled  in  Euro 
pean  politics,  and  figuring  more,  be  much  less  happy  and  prosperous. 
This  can  only  be  prevented  by  a  successful  issue  to  your  present 
mission.  I  am  sensible  after  the  measures  you  have  taken  for  getting 
into  a  different  line  of  business,  that  it  will  be  a  great  sacrifice  on 
your  part,  and  presents  from  the  season  and  other  circumstances 
serious  difficulties.  But  some  men  are  born  for  the  public.  Nature 
by  fitting  them  for  the  service  of  the  human  race  on  a  broad  scale, 
has  stamped  them  with  the  evidences  of  her  destination  and  their  duty. 


James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to 

#  ,  $> ,  fl.  d  '.  r  France. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  January  IS,  1803. 

SIR:  My  letters  of  December  23d  and  January  3d,  communicated  the 
information  which  had  been  received  at  those  dates,  relating  to  the 
violation,  at  New  Orleans,  of  our  treaty  with  Spain;  together  with  what 
had  then  passed  between  the  House  of  Representatives  and  the  Execu 
tive  on  the  subject.  I  now  enclose  a  subsequent  resolution  of  that 
branch  of  the  Legislature.  Such  of  the  debates  connected  with  it  as 
took  place  with  open  doors  will  be  seen  in  the  newspapers;  which  it  is 
expected  will  be  forwarded  by  the  Collector  at  New  York  by  the  pre 
sent  opportunity.  In  these  debates,  as  well  as  in  indications  from  the 
press,  you  will  perceive,  as  you  would  readily  suppose,  that  the  ces 
sion  of  Louisiana  to  France  has  been  associated  as  a  ground  of  much 
solicitude  with  the  affair  at  New  Orleans.  Such,  indeed,  has  been  the 
impulse  given  to  the  public  mind  by  these  events,  that  every  branch 
of  the  Government  has  felt  the  obligation  of  taking  the  measures  most 
likely,  not  only  to  re-establish  our  present  rights,  but  to  promote 
arrangements  by  which  they  may  be  enlarged,  and  more  effectually 
secured.  In  deliberating  on  this  subject,  it  has  appeared  to  the  Presi 
dent  that  the  importance  of  the  crisis  called  for  the  experiment  of  an 


70  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

extraordinary  mission;  carrying  with  it  the  weight  attached  to  such  a 
measure,  as  well  as  the  advantage  of  a  more  thorough  knowledge  of 
the  views  of  the  Government,  and  the  sensibility  of  the  people  than 
could  be  otherwise  conveyed. 

He  has,  accordingly,  selected  for  this  service,  with  the  approbation 
of  the  Senate,  Mr.  Monroe,  formerly  our  Minister  Plenipotentiary  at 
Paris,  and  lately  Governor  of  the  State  of  Virginia;  who  will  be  joined 
with  yourself  in  commission  extraordinary  to  treat  with  the  French 
Republic;  and  with  Mr.  Pinckney  in  a  like  commission  to  treat,  if 
neb^sary,  with  the  Spanish  Government.  The  President  has  been 
careful,  on  this  occasion,  to  guard  effectually  against  any  possible  mis 
constructions  in  relation  to  yourself,  by  expressing,  in  his  Message  to 
the  Senate,  his  undiminished  confidence  in  the  ordinary  representation 
of  the  United  States,  and  by  referring  the  advantages  of  the  addi 
tional  mission  to  considerations  perfectly  consistent  therewith. 

Mr.  Monroe  will  be  the  bearer  of  the  instructions  under  which  you 
are  jointly  to  negotiate.  The  object  of  them  will  be  to  procure  a  ces 
sion  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas  to  the  United  States;  and  con 
sequently  the  establishment  of  the  Mississippi  as  the  boundary  between 
the  United  States  and  Louisiana,  In  order  to  draw  the  French  Gov 
ernment  into  the  measure,  a  sum  of  money  will  mark  part  of  our 
propositions;  to  which  will  be  added,  such  regulations  of  the  commerce 
of  that  river,  and  of  the  others  entering  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  as  ought 
to  be  satisfactory  to  France.  From  a  letter,  received  by  the  President 
from  the  respectable  person  alluded  to  in  my  last,  it  is  inferred,  with 
probability,  that  the  French  Government  is  not  averse  to  treat  on 
those  grounds.  And  such  a  disposition  must  be  strengthened  by  the 
circumstances  of  the  present  moment. 

1  have  thought  it  proper  to  communicate  thus  much  to  you,  without 
waiting  for  the  departure  of  Mr.  Monroe,  who  will  not  be  able  to  sail 
for  two  weeks,  or  perhaps  more.  1  need  not  suggest  to  you  that,  in 
disclosing  this  diplomatic  arrangement  to  the  French  Government, 
and  preparing  the  way  for  the  object  of  it,  the  utmost  care  is  to  be 
used  in  repressing  extravagant  anticipations  of  the  terms  to  be  offered 
by  the  United  Stales,  particularly  the  sum  of  money  to  be  thrown  into 
the  transaction.  The  ultimatum  on  this  point  will  be  settled  before 
the  departure  of  Mr.  Monroe,  and  will  be  communicated  by  him.  The 
sum  hinted  at  in  the  letter  to  the  President  above  referred  to,  is  — 
livres.  If  less  will  not  do,  we  are  prepared  to  meet  it;  but  it  is  hoped 
that  less  will  do,  and  the  prospect  of  accommodation  will  concur  with 
other  motives  in  postponing  the  expedition  to  Louisiana.  For  the 
present  I  barely  remark,  that  a  proposition  made  to  Congress  with 
closed  doors  is  under  consideration,  which,  if  agreed  to,  will  authorize 
the  payment  of  about  ten  millions  of  livres,  under  arrangement  of 
time  and  place  that  may  be  so  convenient  to  the  French  Government 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 


71 


as  to  invite  a  prompt  as  well  as  favorable  decision  of  the  case.     The 
sum  to  which  the  proposition  is  limited,  and  which  will  probably  not 
be  effectually  concealed,  may,  at  the  same  time,  assist  in  keeping  down 
the  pecuniary  expectations  of  the  French  Cabinet. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc. 

JAMES  MADISON. 


1  (The  following  is  one  of  the  memoirs,  or  essays,  referred  to  in  the 
preceding  letter  from  Mr.  Livingston  to  the  President,  dated  March  12, 
and  in  Mr.  Madison's  letter  to  Mr.  Livingston  of  May  25,  1803.) 

fi  i:  fiS   -tf  J 

Thoughts  on  the  relative  situation  of  France,  Britain,  and  America,  as 
commercial  and  maritime  nations. 

The  power  of  France  having  reached  a  height  that  leaves  her  nothing 
to  wish  or  to  fear  from  the  continental  sovereignties  of  Europe,  she 
might  be  considered  as  invulnerable  if  she  could  either  divide  the 
empire  of  the  sea,  or  place  it  in  so  many  hands  as  to  command,  by  her 
influence,  or  the  advantages  of  her  commerce,  such  a  portion  of  it  as 
would,  with  her  own  maritime  exertion,  reduce  her  rival  to  terms  of 
equality. 

It  is  certain  that,  for  the  last  century,  she  has  not  been  able  to  effect 
this;  although  she  has  generally  had  the  aid  of  Spain,  and  sometimes 
that  of  Holland.  Spain  and  Holland  are  diminishing  in  naval  impor 
tance.  Holland,  by  the  shallowness  of  her  harbors,  which  do  not,  with 
out  great  difficulty,  admit  ships  of  the  great  size  which  are  every  day 
found  more  necessary  in  battle;  by  the  ruin  of  her  colonies;  by  the 
cession  of  the  island  of  Ceylon;  by  the  derangement  of  the  affairs  of 
her  commercial  companies;  and,  above  all,  by  the  great  comparative 
advantages  enjoyed  by  Britain  in  the  East  Indies:  add  to  these  cir 
cumstances  the  loss  of  seamen  which  she  has  sustained  by  the  war,  and 
the  disaffection  which  has  led  many  of  them  into  foreign  service, 
together  with  the  accumulated  debt  of  the  nation,  and  it  will  appear 
that  little  aid  can  be  expected  from  her  in  case  of  a  maritime  war.  It 
must,  at  least,  be  doubtful,  if  she  quits  that  system  of  neutrality  so 
congenial  to  her  own  situation,  whether  she  will  take  part  with  Britain 
or  France.  The  neighborhood  and  force  of  France  must,  indeed,  make 
her  tremble  for  her  possessions  in  Europe;  but  still  she  may  lind 
resources  against  them  in  the  aid  of  the  neighboring  nations.  But 
where  is  she  to  look  for  support  against  the  power  of  Britain,  who, 
in  the  very  commencement  of  a  war,  will  strip  her  of  every  foreign 
possession,  and  cut  off  all  her  resources? 

Spain  is  much  in  the  same  situation;  her  wealth  and  credit  depend 
upon  her  colonies.  One  of  the  most  valuable  of  these  (part  of  His- 
paniola)  has  been  ceded  to  France;  and  the  possession  of  Trinidad. 


72  PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

which  the  great  capital  of  England  will  soon  render  very  important, 
will  afford  her  such  a  point  of  support,  in  America,  as  must  render 
the  situation  of  the  remaining  islands  very  precarious,  and  always 
keep  Spain  in  pain  for  her  colonies;  this  will  lead  her  to  seek  for 
safety,  as  far  as  possible,  in  neutrality.  But  at  all  events,  the  mari 
time  power  of  Spain  must  diminish  by  the  circumstances  I  have  men 
tioned,  and  by  the  illicit  trade  which  the  possession  of  the  Mosquito 
shore,  the  bay  of  Honduras,  and  the  island  of  Trinidad,  will  enable 
the  British  to  carry  on  in  spite  of  the  vigilance  of  Spain — a  vigilance, 
too,  which  will  be,  in  some  sort,  relaxed  from  the  apprehension  of 
provoking  a  war  by  too  much  rigor. 

The  naval  power  of  Britain  has,  on  the  other  hand,  acquired  an 
immense  accession,  during  the  last  war,  by  that  maritime  superiority 
which  gave  protection  to  her  commerce  in  every  part  of  the  world;  by 
her  conquests  in  the  East  Indies;  and  by  the  cession  of  Trinidad. 
But,  besides  the  extent  of  her  -olonies;  she  has,  in  her  peculiar  posi 
tion,  an  advantage  unattainable  by  France.  The  fuel  for  all  the  great 
cities  of  England  and  Scotland  is  coal.  Not  less  than  three  thousand 
and  six  hundred  ships  enter  the  port  of  London  yearly,  charged  with 
this  article  alone.  This,  together  with  similar  exports  to  other  cities, 
and  the  situation  of  the  capitals  of  England  and  Ireland,  is  a  great 
nursery  for  seamen,  which  France  wants;  and  makes  a  coasting  trade, 
which  is  more  than  four-fold  of  all  the  coasting  trade  of  France  taken 
together,  and  is  not  less  than  the  whole  colonial  trade  of  Britain, 
including  the  East  Indies.  It  also  has  this  peculiar  advantage,  that,  in 
time  of  war.  all  the  seamen  employed  in  this  commerce  may  be  engaged 
in  the  navy  with  very  little  inconvenience,  only  by  permitting  (which 
is  not  done  in  peace)  the  coal  to  be  brought  to  London  by  inland 
navigation. 

It  becomes,  then,  a  serious  question  with  France,  how  she  is  to 
counterbalance  the  advantages  enjoyed  by  her  rival.  Shall  she  estab 
lish  foreign  colonies? 

Unless  she  has  a  naval  force  capable  of  protecting  them,  these  col 
onies  must  soon  change  their  masters;  and  the  whole  expense  emplo}Ted 
in  their  support  redound  to  the  benefit  of  her  rival.  But  admit  that 
they  could  be  secured  by  land  forces.  How  trifling  will  all  the  sea 
men  afforded  by  the  commerce  of  those  colonies  be,  compared  to  the 
number  produced  by  the  colonies  of  Britain  in  the  East  and  West 
Indies,  America,  Africa,  and  the  Southern  Ocean.  But  supposing 
them  equal,  still  the  seamen  Britain  derives  from  her  coasting  trade 
alone  more  than  equal  those  drawn  from  all  these  sources. 

Will  France  create  a  marine  by  becoming  the  carrier  of  other 
nations?  This  is  impossible.  Except  Britain,  there  is  no  nation  in 
Europe  which  can  not  navigate  their  ships  as  cheap  a,s  France.  The 
materials  for  shipbuilding,  and  more  especially  naval  stores  and  pro- 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  73 

• 

visions,  are  dearer  in  France  than  in  the  Northern  States,  and  labor  is 
equally  high. 

Will  she  be  her  own  carrier?  If  she  will  it  must  be  by  restrictions 
on  the  trade  of  other  nations,  who  will  certainly  not  submit  to  them 
without  imposing  similar  restrictions  on  France.  Suppose,  for  instance, 
she  should  say  (as  indeed  she  has  said)  that  tobacco  brought  to  France 
in  foreign  vessels  shall  pay  an  extra  duty.  How  easy  will  it  be  for 
the  country  which  grows  tobacco  to  say  that  that  article,  exported  in 
French  ships,  shall  pay  a  similar  duty?  And  what  will  be  the  end  of 
this  commercial  warfare,  but  that  every  nation  shall  carry  its  own  pro 
duce,  and  let  their  ships  return  home  empty,  if  the  partial  duties  are 
high?  Thus,  if  France  imposes  a  high  duty  on  tobacco,  and  America 
a  high  duty  on  wines  and  other  articles  of  France  in  foreign  bottoms, 
the  tobacco  must  be  brought  in  French  ships,  and  charged  with  a  double 
expense  of  freight,  because  they  can  carry  out  no  cargo  to  pay  the 
expense  and  insurance  of  the  ships  i/jn  their  outward-bound  voyage. 
Of  course,  this  expense  must  fall  on  the  consumer  of  tobacco;  and  for 
what?  Why,  in  order  that  ten  French  seamen  may  be  employed  rather 
than  ten  foreigners.  A  ship  of  three  hundred  tons  must  make,  in 
order  to  clear  herself,  seventy  thousand  francs  a  year.  The  whole  of 
this,  with  insurance  out  and  home,  must  be  charged  on  the  tobacco 
imported,  in  the  case  I  mention;  whereas  only  the  one-half  would  be 
paid  if  she  could  take  out  a  cargo.  Thus,  then,  the  consumer  of 
tobacco  in  France,  pays,  annualty,  to  the  maintenance  of  ten  seamen, 
thirty  live  thousand  francs,  or  three  thousand  five  hundred  for  every 
seaman;  and  this,  too,  without  being  of  the  smallest  advantage  to  that 
class  of  people  whose  wages  are  not  thereby  at  all  increased.  This  is 
purchasing  sailors  at  such  a  rate  as  I  believe  no  nation  in  the  world  would 
ever  long  submit  to.  But  should  the  same  reasoning  be  applied  to  the 
manufactures  and  wines  of  France,  and  she,  by  attempting  to  be  her  own 
carrier,  charge  them  with  a  double  freight,  it  must  necessarily  follow  that, 
with  respect  to  every  article  which  other  nations  can  supply,  she  would 
soon  lose  the  carriage  by  losing  the  sale;  for  if  a  foreign  ship  can  carry 
out  a  cargo  to  Lisbon,  and  take  back  one  from  thence,  charged  with  no 
extra  duty,  the  wine  and  oil  of  Lisbon  will  be  preferred,  though  of 
inferior  quality,  to  those  of  France.  Thus,  whatever  she  gives  to  her 
seamen  by  discouraging  a  free  trade,  she  takes  from  her  agriculture 
and  manufactures:  and  yet  her  agriculture  and  manufactures  can  alone 
form  the  basis  of  her  commerce.  In  time  of  war,  unless  this  operation 
can  really  create  a  naval  power,  sufficient  to  protect  her  commerce,  (of 
which  there  is  not  the  smallest  prospect,)  foreigners  having  been 
driven  from  her  ports  by  this  operation,  she  must  cease  to  trade  alto 
gether.  Thus  the  sources  of  her  wealth  will  be  cut  off  at  the  moment 
she  most  needs  them. 

What,  the*    is  to  be  done?     Is  France  to  abandon  her  colonies  as 


74  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

• 

weak  points  in  her  system,  which  she  can  not  maintain  ?  Is  she  to 
suffer  a  tyranny  to  be  established  upon  the  ocean,  which  shall  forever 
hold  her  in  check  ?  Is  she  to  allow  such  an  accumulation  of  wealth  as 
will  forever  enable  her  rival  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  the  Conti 
nent  and  provoke  new  combinations  against  her  2  I  answer  these 
questions  by  returning  to  my  first  position. 

She  must  place  the  empire  of  the  sea  in  more  hands,  without  attempt 
ing  to  grasp  it  alone.  She  must  make  it  the  interest  of  those  who  aid 
her  in  the  attainment  of  a  considerable  portion  of  it  to  maintain  her 
superiority.  Spain  and  Holland  are  not  to  be  neglected;  though,  as  I 
have  stated,  they  will,  in  the  situation  in  which  their  colonies  are  now 
placed,  incline  to  neutrality;  and  if  otherwise,  their  aid  would  be 
insufficient  during  a  war.  The  United  States  have  physical  advan 
tages  which,  like  those  of  Britain,  must  necessarily  lead  them  to  be  a 
considerable  maritime  nation.  The  mass  of  their  population  lies 
upon  the  ocean,  and  upon  large  rivers  that  are  navigable  for  sea  ves 
sels  to  the  interior  of  the  country,  which  is  generally  rough  and  hilly 
between  the  rivers.  Hence  it  happens  that  there  is  little  land  carriage 
in  America.  If  merchandises  are  to  be  transported  from  one  State  to 
another,  it  is  by  water;  and  that  not  solely  by  rivers  or  canals,  but  b}^ 
descending  one  river,  passing  out  into  the  ocean,  and  ascending  another. 
This  circumstance,  together  with  the  variance  between  the  productions 
of  the  Southern  and  Northern  States,  which  promotes  much  inter 
course,  must  give  to  them  a  nursery  of  seamen  in  their  coasting  trade, 
equal  to  that  which  Britain  enjoys  in  her  coal  trade:  to  which  a  grow 
ing  coal  trade,  from  mines  found  in  the  banks  of  the  James  river,  and 
in  other  places,  will  be  added,  when  wood  diminishes,  or  when  the 
policy  of  the  country  shall  charge  the  importation  of  British  coal 
with  heavier  duties.  Our  large  cities  consume,  even  now,  very  consid 
erable  quantities  of  this  article.  The  advantage  also  that  the  United 
States  enjoy  in  the  cheapness  of  the  articles  for  building,  and,  above 
all,  for  victualling  their  ships,  more  than  counterbalances  the  high 
price  given  to  their  seamen.  Their  situation  relative  to  the  cod  and 
whale  fisheries  also  calls  numbers  to  a  maritime  life. 

The  islands,  to  whomsoever  they  may  belong,  from  the  various 
incidents  to  which  they  are  liable,  and  the  difficulty  of  supplying  them 
from  Europe,  must  receive  their  provision  and  timber  from  the  United 
States;  and,  if  they  choose,  they  can  compel  them  to  receive  only  in 
American  bottoms.  Were  the  Powers  of  Europe,  therefore,  to  lay 
the  severest  restrictions  on  her  commerce,  the  United  States  would 
still  be  a  very  important  commercial  nation. 

But  who  is  interested  in  preventing  their  rapid  rise  to  the  height  to 
which  their  position  and  their  destinies  lead  them'*  No  nation  upon 
earth;  unless  Britain  should  one  day  fear  them  more  as  rivals  than  she 
will  value  them  as  customers.  While  thev  confine  themselves  to  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  75 

production  of  raw  materials,  they  must  prove  the  best  market  for 
such  nations  as  can  afford  them  manufactures,  wine,  oil,  and  fruit,  in 
return.  Weak,  indeed,  would  that  nation  be  who  should  treat  them 
with  neglect,  or  drive  them,  by  ill-judged  laws,  from  their  harbors. 
Britain  is  so  sensible  of  this,  that  she  has  never  attempted  to  prevent, 
by  partial  duties,  the  American  vessels  from  carrying:  their  own  prod 
uce  to  them,  or  their  fabrics  back  in  return.  She  well  knows  that 
every  such  measure  would  have  a  tendency  to  drive  them  from  her 
harbors,  to  which  she  so  much  wishes  to  invite  them,  that  she  even 
grants  them  a  right,  by  treaty,  to  enter  all  her  ports  in  the  East 
Indies. 

While  Britain  refuses  to  naturalize  American  ships  she  never  will 
be  able  to  navigate  (because  she  can  not  build,  lit,  or  victual)  her  ships 
so  cheap  as  those  of  America.  It  must  follow,  therefore,  that  the 
trade  of  Britain  to  and  from  the  United  States  will  be  chiefly  carried 
on  by  American  ships;  and,  as  her  articles  are  very  bulky,  a  great 
number  will  be  employed.  There  exists,  indeed,  at  this  moment  a 
circumstance  which  will  give  them  considerable  advantages,  unless 
France  should  instantly  step  in  and  prevent  its  operation. 

The  advanced  price  of  living  in  Britain,  owing  to  the  debt  con 
tracted  by  the  war,  has  naturally  raised  the  price  of  labor;  while  the 
peace,  which  gives  more  activity  to  her  commerce,  will  make  this 
operate  upon  seamen's  wages,  and  thus  give  some  check  to  her  carry 
ing  trade.  On  the  other  hand,  this  diminution  of  the  trade  of  the 
United  States  will  throw  at  least  twenty -five  thousand  seamen  out  of 
employ.  These  will,  from  their  habits  and  manners,  naturally  pass 
into  the  service  of  Britain,  and  thus  enable  her  to  keep  down  wages 
and  maintain  her  advantages. 

It  is  obvious  that  it  is  much  the  interest  of  France  to  prevent  this; 
and  more  particularly  when  it  is  considered  that  all  these  men  are 
skillful  mariners,  and  many  of  them  experienced  fishermen;  who  may 
transplant  the  whale  fishery  to  Britain,  and  thus  add  a  new  source  to 
her  naval  power.  The  efforts  of  France  to  establish  a  fishery  will  be 
of  little  avail  against  this;  nor  will  it  ever  be  found  practicable  to 
render  this  a  flourishing  branch  of  business,  except  by  the  aid  of 
American  fishermen;  and  even  then  by  a  charge  upon  a  material  useful 
in  their  manufactures  more  than  equivalent  to  the  value  of  the 
fishery. 

I  shall  be  asked  how  long  it  will  take  to  make  the  United  States  a 
naval  Power  equal  to  Great  Britain  ?  I  answer,  that  a  country  which 
possesses  timber,  naval  stores,  provisions,  and  men  accustomed,  by  an 
active  commerce,  to  a  sea  life;  a  country  whose  credit  is  unblemished, 
and  who  has  no  debt  but  what  she  can  instantly  discharge;  is  certainly 
so  far  equal  as  her  numbers  are  equal  to  one  who  has  no  advantages 
over  her  in  any  of  these  circumstances,  and  is  inferior  in  others.  It 


70  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

will  be  allowed,  too,  that,  according  to  every  rational  probability,  their 
numbers  will  be  equal  to  those  of  the  British  isles  in  twenty  years,  and 
their  wealth  not  inferior.  But  it  is  by  no  means  necessary  to  carry 
the  navy  of  America  to  the  extent  of  that  of  Britain,  in  order  to  ren 
der  her  a  useful  ally,  or  a  respectable  enemy.  The  trade  of  Britain 
with  her  islands,  and  the  Indies,  must  approach  the  coast  of  America. 
Her  privateers  could,  even  without  protection  from  a  navv,  destroy  a 
great  proportion  of  this.  With  a  navy  of  thirty  ships  of  the  line,  and 
a  proportionate  number  of  frigates,  which  need  never  be  more  than 
one  week\s  sail  from  their  own  shores,  such  protection  would  be  given 
to  smaller  vessels  as  would  enable  them  to  capture  a  great  part  of  their 
trade,  unless  protected  by  large  fleets.  For  this  purpose  one-half  of 
the  British  navy  must  be  kept  at  a  vast  expense,  at  a  great  distance 
from  home,  and  in  an  unhealthy  climate;  while  all  the  expenditures  of 
the  American  navy  would  be  made  in  their  own  ports.  It  will  cer 
tainly  admit  of  little  doubt,  that  a  nation  who  has  no  frontier  to  defend, 
who  has  six  hundred  thousand  armed  men  at  home,  and  who  has  no 
debts,  need  only  will  it  to  have  a  fleet  of  the  size  I  mention.  And  it 
is  very  certain  that  such  a  fleet  by  acting  always  together,  would  com 
pel  any  European  nation  greatly  to  weaken  her  naval  force  in  her  own 
seas.  No  convoy  could  be  less  than  the  whole  of  the  American  fleet; 
nor  could  a  smaller  force  be  left  in  the  islands;  so  that  thirty  ships 
in  America,  would  demand  for  convoys,  out  and  in,  and  the  stations 
in  the  islands,  not  less  than  ninety  ships  of  equal  force.  What  power 
could  Britain  oppose  to  this  f  3rce,  combined  with  an  equal  number  of 
French  ships,  with  the  advantage  of  all  the  harbors  of  the  United 
States?  What  refuge  would  she  have  against  storms  and  accidental 
separation  when  on  the  coast  of  America?  And  how,  under  these  dis 
advantages,  would  she  maintain  her  superiority  in  Europe?  I  infer, 
from  this  reasoning,  that  it  is  the  true  interest  of  France  to  promote 
the  commerce  and  maritime  force  of  America;  and,  at  the  same 
time,  to  interest  her  in  the  extension  of  the  commerce  of  France?  I 
do  not  mean  to  say  that  this  force  will  always  operate  directly  in  favor 
of  France.  This  will  depend  upon  a  variety  of  political  circumstances 
that  can  not  be  foreseen  or  controlled.  The  first  interest  of  America 
will  doubtless  lead  her  to  a  state  of  neutrality.  But  such  has  always 
been  the  overbearing  spirit  of  Britain  at  sea,  that  it  is  highly  probable 
occurrences  will  arise,  which  may  compel  America,  when  she  feels  her 
strength,  to  enter  into  a  war  to  preserve  her  commercial  rights  from 
violation.  But  should  she  maintain  her  neutrality,  she  will  indirectly 
serve  France  if  the  plan  I  suggest  is  adopted: 

1st.  By  carrying  on  her  commerce  for  her  during  a  war;  2d.  By 
employing  a  great  number  of  seamen  who  would  otherwise  go 
into  the  service  of  Britain;  3d.  By  seizing  upon  many  branches  of 
trade  from  which  Britain  derives  her  wealth,  and  which,  when  once 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  77 

diverted,  may  never  return.  But  my  plan  embraces  not  only  an 
extension  of  the  American  maritime  force,  but  that  of  France,  by  an 
easy  and  natural  operation,  without  imposing  a  burden  upon,  but  in 
fact  giving  the  highest  encouragement  to,  her  manufactures  and  agri 
culture.  It  consists  in  a  treaty  of  commerce  which  shall  put  the  trade 
and  shipping  of  both  countries  on  the  most  perfect  equality.  That  is 
to  say,  the  ships  of  France  shall  be  admitted  into  the  ports  of  America, 
paying  a  duty  of  six  per  cent,  ad  valorem  only  on  all  articles,  and  the 
same  tonnage  duty  as  the  American  ships  pay.  The  American  ships 
shall  be  admitted  into  all  the  ports  of  France  and  her  colonies  upon 
the  same  terms,  provided  that  they  should  never  carry  to  the  colonies 
anything  but  the  produce  of  their  own  country  or  of  France;  that  the 
colonial  products  in  American  ships  should  be  subject  to  every  regu 
lation  as  to  their  being  landed  in  France,  as  they  are  in  French  ships. 
The  first  advantage  of  this  treaty  would  be,  if  immediately  entered 
into,  the  saving  to  America  of  twenty-five  thousand  seamen,  who  will, 
without  this  encouragement  go  into  the  British  service ;  and  thus  increase 
not  only  her  relative  but  her  actual  force:  2d.  The  sale  of  a  num 
ber  of  her  ships  to  France,  which  will  now  become  a  dead  capital 
in  her  hands:  3d.  The  preserving  to  the  United  States  their  fish 
eries,  which  may  be  otherwise  greatly  affected  by  the  removal  of  their 
seamen  to  Britain.  In  these  objects  France  has  a  mutual  advantage; 
and  I  will  venture  to  say,  that  she  never  acts  more  inconsistently  with 
her  own  interest,  or  more  conformably  with  that  of  Britain,  than  when, 
under  the  idea  of  raising  a  fishery  at  home,  while  she  has  not  seamen  or 
shipping  for  her  other  branches  of  commerce,  she  endeavors  to  dis 
courage  the  fisheries  of  America,  which,  from  a  variety  of  physical 
causes,  can  alone  keep  them  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  English. 
France  should  bear  in  mind,  that,  were  her  colonies  as  extensive  as 
those  of  Britain;  were  her  trade  in  Europe  and  America  equal  to  hers; 
yet,  from  the  reasons  I  have  mentioned,  arising  from  the  geographical 
and  physical  situation  of  England  and  Ireland,  she  would  not  possess 
more  than  two-thirds  of  the  number  of  seamen,  these  circumstances 
alone  producing  nearly  as  many  as  all  the  other  trade  of  Britain. 
France  can  only  increase  her  relative  strength  by  diminishing  that  of 
her  rival,  and  keeping  her  from  drawing  from  other  sources  new  means 
of  power. 

France  may  inj,ure,  and  perhaps  ruin,  the  whale  fishery  in  America; 
but  England  only  will  profit  by  it.  The  first  war  will  break  up  her 
establishments;  and  the  Americans  in  her  service  will  return  with 
their  wealth  into  their  own  country. 

The  interest  that  France  will  have  in  this  treaty  will  be  much  more 
extensive:  1st,  The  raising  up  a  new  marine  Power;  2d,  Giving  that 
Power  such  an  interest  in  her  prosperity,  as  must  not  only  keep  it 
from  being  inimical  to,  but,  on  the  contrary,  frequently  connected 


78  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

with  her  in  hostile  operations;  3d,  The  transfer  of  ships  to  France; 
4th,  The  increase  of  French  seamen:  for,  as  the  wages  of  seamen 
are  lower  in  France  than  in  America,  and  must  continue  to  be  so, 
on  account  of  the  demand  for  men  in  a  new  country,  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  ships,  and  the  provisions  for  their  outfit,  are  cheaper  in 
America,  French  merchants,  by  fitting  many  of  these  vessels,  and 
navigating  them  with  French  seamen,  will  be  able  to  sail  cheaper  than 
the  Americans  themselves,  and  thus  increase  the  number  of  their  sea 
men.  These  seamen  in  case,  of  a  war,  will  be  drawn  into  the  navy; 
while  their  places  will  be  supplied,  during  the  war,  at  somewhat  more 
expense,  by  Americans,  without  injuring  their  commerce.  In  the 
cod  fishery,  France  will  derive  clear  and  obvious  advantages  from  the 
American  ports  for  her  outfits,  &c. 

But  even  these  advantages  will  be  inferior  to  that  derived  from  the 
increase  of  the  commerce  of  exchange,  by  that  removal  of  restrictions; 
an  operation  which,  I  will  venture  to  say,  will  at  least  double  the 
whole  commerce  and  number  of  seamen  employed  by  France,  and 
quadruple  it  with  respect  to  her  navigation  with  America.  It  should 
also  be  considered  that  this  works  doubly  in  favor  of  France,  1st, 
So  far  as  it  is  a  direct  advantage  to  her  maritime  power;  2nd,  So 
far  as  it  subtracts  from  the  navigation  of  England. 

The  benefits  that  will  result  to  the  manufactures  of  France  from 
this  operation  are  incalculable:  1st,  The  raw  materials  will  be  pur 
chased  on  easy  terms  to  the  manufacturer;  ^nd,  The  intercourse 
that  this  system  will  establish  between  the  two  nations  will  make  their 
fabrics  known,  and  render  them  fashionable  in  America;  will  draw  off 
their  custom  from  Fngland,  whose  fabrics  will  continue  to  be  charged 
with  a  heavy  duty,  unless,  receding  from  her  navigation  act,  she  pur 
chases  an  exemption. 

Useful  as  this  act  may  have  been  in  its  commencement,  when  the 
Dutch  were  the  general  carriers  and  rivals  of  Britain,  and  while 
the  nations  of  Europe  were  ignorant  of  commercial  principles,  very 
enlightened  statesmen  now  see  many  inconveniences  in  it  to  the  gen 
eral  commerce  of  England;  nor  is  there  anything  necessary  to  its 
entire  overthrow,  but  for  other  nations  to  pass  similar  laws,  so  far  as 
respect  Britain,  while  their  trade  is  put  upon  a  liberal  footing  with 
regard  to  other  nations.  This,  by  promoting  their  own  commerce  of 
exchange,  while  that  of  Britain  is  restricted,  will  place  her  flag  under 
such  disadvantages,  that  her  own  merchants  will  seek  a  foreign  bottom 
uhrii  they  have  an  operation  that  requires  a  circuitous  voyage.  This 
must  ultimately,  in  spite  of  all  her  prejudices,  compel  her  to  repeal 
this  selfish  law,  after  having  some  time  suffered  under  it.  But  while 
the  navigation  act  exists  in  Britain,  it  will,  under  the  circumstances  of 
the  treaty  1  suggest,  operate  as  a  bounty  on  the  navigation  and  fabrics  of 
France;  because  it  is  obvious  that  the  freight  and  charge  on  any  spe- 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TEERITOEY    OF   LOUISIANA.  79 

cific  article  carried  in  a  ship  that  may  make  a  circuitous  voyage,  is 
much  less  than  they  would  be  if  part  of  the  voyage  was  made  in  bal 
last.  Thus,  a  French  ship  carrying-  a  cargo  of  wine  to  America,  tak 
ing  in  a  load  of  tobacco,  and  returning  from  thence  to  Bordeaux, 
could  take  the  wine  on  a  much  smaller  freight  than  if  the  duties 
imposed  in  America  on  the  importation  of  wine  in  a  French  ship 
should  be  equivalent  to  the  duties  upon  tobacco  imported  in  an  Ameri 
can  ship  into  France;  because,  in  that  case,  the  French  ship  would 
go  out  empty  for  the  tobacco,  and  the  American  ship  empty  for  the 
wine;  and  the  double  freight  and  insurance  must  be  charged  on  each 
of  these  articles.  It  should  always  be  remembered,  that  whatever 
is  saved  in  freight  is  a  bounty  upon  agriculture  and  manufactures. 
But  even  this  is  a  small  advantage  compared  to  that  derived  from  the 
increase  of  adventures  that  will  be  occasioned  by  the  very  circumstance 
of  freight  for  the  whole  outward  and  homeward  voyage,  and  the  con 
sequent  consumption  of  the  commodities  of  the  country  that  encour 
ages  it. 

In  this  plan,  Spain,  (under  some  restrictions  with  regard  to  South 
America,)  the  Italian  States,  and  any  others  who  should  incline  to 
engage  in  it,  should  be  associated;  without,  however,  delaying  the 
project  between  France  and  the  United  States,  lest  they  should  lose, 
and  Britain  acquire,  at  this  critical  moment,  that  great  body  of  sea 
men,  who  will,  by  the  peace,  be  thrown  out  of  employment. 

Were  France  to  declare  her  determination  to  support  this  liberal 
system,  such  is  her  advantage  in  point  of  product  and  manufactures, 
that  she  could  not  fail  to  command  the  greatest  foreign  commerce  of 
any  nation  in  the  world. 

The  wealth  arising  from  this  source  would  be  unbounded.  But 
while  her  great  capital  is  in  the  center  of  the  Republic,  she  never  can 
have  an  extensive  coasting  trade;  and  she  can  only  make  up  this  defi 
ciency,  in  a  contest  with  Britain,  by  the  increase  of  her  wealth  and 
credit;  by  nursing  up  new  maritime  nations;  by  which,  if  she  adds 
little  to  her  positive  power,  she  adds  much  to  her  relative  strength,  in 
diminishing  that  of  her  rival. 

To  cite  a  single  instance:  America  can  build  and  victual  her  whaling 
vessels  much  cheaper  than  either  France  or  England,  and  of  course 
afford  oil  cheaper;  but  if  France  excludes  American  oil  from  her 
market,  she  throws  such  a  discouragement  upon  this  fishery  as  will 
compel  the  whalers  to  seek  another  place  of  residence.  In  this  case, 
though  a  few  may  be  invited  to  France,  the  great  bulk  of  them  will 
go  to  England:  First,  because  of  their  language,  religion,  and  habits; 
and  next,  because  they  know  that  a  war  will  ruin  their  establishments 
in  France,  and  thus  it  will  encourage  those  of  Britain.  The  very  com 
panies  established  in  France,  at  great  national  expense,  Avill  receive 
thoir  oil  at  sea  from  English  fishermen.  Thus  fifteen  thousand  men 


80  PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

will  be  thrown  into  the  scale  of  Britain,  to  support  one  thousand  in  the 
vain  attempt  to  establish  a  fishery  in  France.  This,  however,  is  a 
small  part  of  the  loss.  By^  the  encouragement  which  France  might 
give  to  the  fisheries  of  the  United  States,  she  could  destroy  those  of 
Britain;  and,  as  the  French  ships  that  brought  oil,  or  the  American 
that  brought  French  goods,  would  not  go  or  return  empty,  a  greater 
market  would  be  created  for  French  wines,  brandies,  &c.  Let  the 
loss  upon  this  be  calculated.  The  additional  expense  upon  the  first 
price  to  the  inhabitants  of  France,  and  the  countries  given,  they  will 
find  that  they  purchase  their  oil  at  a  ruinous  rate. 

Let  the  difference  between  fifteen  thousand  men,  added  to  those 
employed  in  the  British  fishery,  and  eight  thousand  taken  from  them 
by  the  encouragement  given  to  the  American  fishery  by  France,  mak 
ing  together  the  loss  or  gain  of  twenty-three  thousand  to  Britain,  be 
put  in  the  scale  with  the  comparatively  few  fishermen  France  can  make, 
and  she  will  form  a  fail'  estimate  of  the  attempt,  considering  her  as  a 
rival  power  to  Britain. 

Great  as  are  the  advantages  proposed  by  this  system  to  the  com 
merce  and  navigation  of  France,  they  are  small  compared  to  those 
which  she  will  derive  from  having  opened  a  way  to  the  establishment 
of  free  and  liberal  principles,  that  can  not  fail  to  give  room  for  the 
exertion  of  those  talents  and  that  industry  for  which  her  citizens  are 
distinguished.  Kvery  nation,  except  one,  will  eagerly  embrace  them; 
and  their  mutual  interest  will  lead  them  to  protect  them  against  the 
power  of  any  maritime  despot.  The  advantage  that  the  vessels  of  this 
association  would  have  over  all  others,  could  not  fail  to  produce  such 
a  revolution  in  the  principles  and  practice  of  commerce  and  naviga 
tion  as  would  be  highly  interesting  to  humanity,  honorable  to  the 
nations  who  should  first  adopt  the  system,  and  not  unworthy  of  the 
enlarged  views  of  that  distinguished  statesman  to  whom  Europe  is 
already  so  much  indebted,  and  who,  alone,  has  sufficient  power  to 
carry  it  into  effect. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  C.  PincKney,  American  Minister 

at  Madrid. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  January  18,  1803. 

[After  informing  Mr.  Pinckney,  as  well  as  Mr.  Livingston,  of  the 
reasons  which  had  induced  the  mission  of  Mr.  Monroe,  the  letter  pro 
ceeds  as  follows:] 

The  President  has  been  careful,  on  this  occasion,  to  guard  effectually 
against  any  misconstruction  in  relation  to  yourself,  by  expressing,  in 
his  Message  to  the  Senate,  his  undiuiinished  confidence  in  the  ordinary 


PUECHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  81 

representation  of  the  United  States,  and  by  referring  the  advantages 
of  the  additional  mission  to  considerations  perfectly  consistent  there 
with. 

Mr.  Monroe  will  be  the  bearer  of  instructions  under  which  you  are 
to  negotiate.     The  object  of  them  will  be,  to  procure  a  cession  of  New 
Orleans  and  the  Floridas  to  the  United  States,  and  consequently,  the 
establishment  of  the  Mississippi  as  the  boundary  between  the  United 
States  and  Louisiana.     In  order  to  draw  the  French  Government  into    ) 
the  measure,  a  sum  of  money  will  make  part  of  our  propositions;  to  / 
which  will  be  added  such  regulations  of  the  commerce  of  that  river, 
and  of  the  others  entering  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  as  ought  to  be  satisfac 
tory  to  France.     From  a  letter  received   b}^  the  President  from  a 
respectable  person,  it  is  inferred,  with  probability,  that  the  French  ^ 
Government  is  not  averse  to  treat  on  those  grounds;  and  such  a  dispo 
sition  must  be  strengthened  by  circumstances  of  the  present  moment. 

Though  it  is  probable  that  this  mission  will  be  completed  at  Paris, 
if  its  objects  are  at  all  attainable,  yet  it  was  necessary  to  apprize  you 
thus  far  of  what  is  contemplated,  both  for  your  own  satisfaction,  and 
that  you  may  be  prepared  to  co-operate  on  the  occasion,  as  circum 
stances  may  demand.  Mr.  Monroe  will  not  be  able  to  sail  for  two 
weeks. 


Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to  France,  to  James  Madison,  Secretary 

of  State. 

PARIS,  January^,  1803. 

SIR:  I  have  just  now  heard  of  an  opportunity  from  Havre.  I  am 
doubtful  whether  my  letter  will  arrive  in  time  for  it.  I  therefore 
confine  myself  to  inform  you  that  General  Bernadotte  is  named  Minister 
to  the  United  States,  in  the  place  of  Otto,  who  will  be  employed  here. 
General  Bernadotte  is  brother-in-law  to  Joseph  Bonaparte,  is  a  very 
respectable  man,  and  has  the  character  of  a  decided  republican.  I 
have  endeavored  to  impress  upon  him  the  necessity  of  making  some 
arrangements  relative  to  the  debt  previous  to  his  departure,  which  he 
has  much  at  heart.  But  neither  he  nor  anybody  else  can  influence  the 
councils  of  the  First  Consul.  You  can  hardly  conceive  anything  more 
timid  than  all  about  him  are;  they  dare  not  be  known  to  have  a  senti 
ment  of  their  own,  or  to  have  expressed  one  to  anybody.  But  I  must 
defer  writing  to  you  more  at  large  on  this  subject,  as  well  as  a  full 
communication  of  a  very  delicate  step  that  I  have  hazarded,  which 
promised  success  for  some  time,  "but  from  which  I,  at  present,  hope  for 
no  important  result.  The  Minister  informs  me  that  the  expedition  to 
Louisiana  will  sail  shortly.  General  Bernadotte  will  go  in  about  three 
weeks.  He  will  have  full  powers  to  settle  everything.  I  asked  the 
Minister,  what  confidence  you  can  have  in  any  new  offer  to  treat,  when 
H,  Doc.  431 6 


82  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

the  last  treat}?-  is  unexecuted;  and  if  he  had  not  better  send  out  Gen 
eral  Bernadotte  with  a  treaty  in  his  hand,  than  only  with  powers  that 
will  be  suspected ;» and  how  he  can  make  arrangements  upon  the  debts, 
which  must  depend  upon  the  Legislature  ?  He  answers  this  by  saying, 
they  want  information  as  to  right  of  deposit,  &c.  As  to  the  debt,  I 
have  no  hope  that  they  have  any  intention  to  pay  it,  or  even  to  fund 
it.  From  the  disposition  which  I  know  to  be  entertained  by  some  that 
go  out  with  Victor,  I  have  no  doubt  that  they  will  provoke  an  Indian 
war,  by  paying  them  nothing;  and  that,  in  their  solicitude  to  acquire 
wealth,  they  will  act  over  again  the  tyranny  of  St.  Domingo.  It  will 
be  necessary,  therefore,  to  take  the  position  that  will  best  guard  vou 
against  the  effects  of  these  evils.  As  to  myself,  I  am  left  wholly  with 
out  any  precise  instruction  how  to  act,  or  what  to  offer.  Enclosed  are 
two  memoirs  lately  sent  in,  with  as  little  effect  as  those  that  have  gone 
before  them;  though  I  have  reason  to  think  that  the  Minister  wishes 
well  to  my  project  for  Louisiana,  but  the  First  Consul  is  immovable.  I 
confess  to  you  I  see  very  little  use  for  a  Minister  here,  where  there  is 
but  one  will;  and  that  will  governed  by  no  object  but  personal  security 
and  personal  ambition:  were  it  left  to  my  discretion,  I  should  bring 
matters  to  some  positive  issue,  or  leave  them,  which  would  be  the  only 
means  of  bringing  them  to  an  issue. 
I  am,  &c., 

ROBERT  K.  LIVINGSTON. 
Hon.  JAMES  MADISON,  &c. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  -  — . 

&  &+^<  ^  \ v: 

No.  4.]  DECEMBER  24,  1802. « 

SIR:  I  can  not  but  feel  the  utmost  anxiety  to  know  whether  my 
project,  which  you  had  the  goodness  to  submit  to  the  inspection  of 
the  First  Consul,  is  likely  to  meet  with  his  concurrence.  Upon  ordi 
nary  occasions  I  should  consider  the  delay  of  a  few  weeks  as  of  little 
moment;  but  there  are  circumstances  which  render  every  day  impor 
tant  in  what  relates  to  the  United  States  and  France.  In  the  twelve 
months  that  I  have  been  here,  I  have  not  been  so  happy  as  to  receive 
a  conclusive  answer  to  any  one  business  that  1  have  had  to  transact 
with  the  Minister.  Congress  are  now  in  session;  they  will  infer  from 
every  paper  submitted  to  them  by  the  President,  that  the  French 
Government  are  disposed  to  show  them  but  little  attention.  The 
obscurity  that  covers  the  designs  of  France  in  Louisiana  (for  not  the 
least  light  can  I,  officially,  obtain  on  the  subject)  will  double  their 
apprehensions;  this,  added  to  the  clamors  of  ruined  creditors,  and  the 
extreme  severity  with  which  some  of  their  citizens  have  been  treated 

«It  does  not  appear  with  certainty  by  what  dispatch  this  memoir  was  communicated. 


PUKCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  83 

in  St.  Domingo,  and  the  extraordinary  decisions  of  the  Council  of 
Prizes,  &c.,  will  leave  a  fair  field  for  the  intrigues  of  the  enemies  of 
France,  and  even  enlist  the  best  patriots  of  America  on  their  'side. 
At  this  moment  Britain  comes  forward  and  pays,  with  the  most  scrupu 
lous  attention,  every  demand,  and  proposes  to  settle  her  Southwestern 
line  with  the  United  States.  In  doing  this,  she  is  anxious  to  come 
down  to  a  navigable  part  of  the  Mississippi,  so  as  to  communicate 
with  Canada  by  that  channel.  It  is  obvious  that  she  can  have  no  inter 
est  in  this,  but  such  as  looks  to  the  future  possession  of  the  mouth  of 
that  river;  a  project  that  she  would  naturally  form  the  moment  she 
saw  Louisiana  pass  into  the  hands  of  her  rival.  1  am  sorry  to  say  it  is 
one  that  she  will  find  no  difficulty  in  executing,  unless  prevented  by  the 
United  States;  for  France  is  too  far  to  protect  a  young  Colony  from 
an  established  one,  and  the  numerous  savages,  provincial  troops,  and 
others,  that  Canada  will  afford.  While  the  conduct  of  France  speaks 
a  language  so  painful  to  the  feelings  of  the  American  Government, 
there  is  too  much  reason  to  believe  that  there  will  be  little  solicitude 
in  so  forming  their  limits  as  to  cover  her  possessions.  I  am  anxious, 
sir,  to  know  our  prospects.  If  they  should  be  such  as  I  flatter  myself 
the  mutual  interests  of  France  and  the  United  States  would  lead  to,  I 
would  wish  to  have  it  in  my  power  to  arrest  in  Mr.  King's  hands  any 
conclusion  on  the  subject  of  our  Western  bounds.  In  case  my  project 
should  l)e  honored  with  the  approbation  of  the  First  Consul,  it  will  be 
essential  to  the  security  of  the  possessions  of  France  and  the  peace  of 
that  country,  to  remove  the  British  boundary  as  high  up  the  river  as 
possible,  so  as  to  prevent  any  communication  with  Canada,  by  the 
rivers  that  fall  on  the  one  side  into  the  lakes,  and,  on  the  other,  into  the 
Mississippi.  If  this  business  is  obstructed  only  by  the  non-conclusion 
of  the  treaty  with  Spain  for  the  Floridas,  one  may  still  go  between  us 
for  New  Orleans  and  the  territory  above  the  Arkansas  river,  with  a 
condition  annexed,  in  case  .the  treaty  with  the  Floridas  should  succeed 
agreeably  to  the  wishes  of  France.  Should  the  treaty  with  Spain  fall 
through,  every  reason  of  policy  should  induce  France,  either  to  relin 
quish  her  designs  on  Louisiana  altogether,  or  to  cover  her  frontier  by 
a  cession  to  the  United  States;  since,  without  a  single  port  in  the 
Gulf,  it  will  be  impossible  to  protect  their  Colony;  and  all  the  expense 
incurred  by  the  attempt  will  ultimate^  redound  to  the  advantage  of 
Britain,  who  will  not  fail  to  attack  them  with  advantage  both  by  sea 
and  land. 

The  treaty  I  propose  might  also  form  a  basis  for  the  immediate  dis 
charge  of  the  debts  due  to  our  citizens;  in  the  doing  of  which,  advan 
tageous  arrangements  may  be  made,  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  funds  of 
France  be  considerably  raised:  provided  such  secrecy  is  observed  in 
the  whole  of  this  transaction  as  will  prevent  the  debts  being  the  object 
of  speculation.  I  know,  sir,  a  distinction  has  been  taken  between 


84  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

debts  due  from  the  former  Government  and  that  which  now  happily 
prevails  in  France.  But,  sir,  if  this  distinction  is  just,  it  does  not 
apply  to  the  demands  of  the  United  States.  They  are  specifically 
assumed  by  the  new  Government,  when  they  made  the  object  of  the 
treaty,  and  an  equivalent  has  already  been  paid  the  present  Govern 
ment  by  that  of  the  United  States;  so  that  they  stand  upon  a  different 
ground  from  that  of  the  debts  of  other  nations  having  demands  on 
France;  and  they  not  only  have  to  plead  their  justice,  and  the  circum 
stance  under  which  they  were  contracted,  but  the  pledged  faith  of 
the  existing  Government. 

I  can  not,  sir,  but  be  solicitous  to  know  that  what  I  have  hitherto 
taken  the  liberty  to  write  to  you  has  passed  into  no  hands  but  those  of 
the  First  Consul,  or  some  other  member  of  your  own  family,  as  I  fear  my 
communications  out  of  the  ordinary  channel  might  be  ill  taken  where 
I  am  solicitous  to  stand  well. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  with  the  most  profound  consideration, 
your  most  obedient  servant, 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


Beport  of  committee  to  whom  was  referred  a  resolution  providing  for  an 
additional  appropriation  of  two  millions  of  dollars  for  the  purpose  of 
intercourse  with  foreign  nations. 

JANUARY  12,  1803. 

The  object  of  this  resolution  _s  to  enable  the  Executive  to  commence, 
with  more  effect,  a  negotiation  with  the  French  and  Spanish  Govern 
ments  relative  to  the  purchase  from  them  of  the  island  of  New  Orleans, 
and  the  provinces  of  East  and  West  Florida.  This  object  is  deemed 
highly  important  and  has  received  the  attentive  consideration  of  the 
committee.  The  free  and  unmolested  navigation  of  the  river  Missis 
sippi  is  a  point  to  which  the  attention  of  the  General  Government  has 
been  directed,  ever  since  the  peace  of  1783,  by  which  our  independence 
as  a  nation  was  finally  acknowledged.  The  immense  tract  of  country 
owned  by  the  United  States,  which  lies  immediately  on  the  Mississippi, 
or  communicates  with  it  by  means  of  large  navigable  rivers  rising 
within  our  boundaries,  renders  its  free  navigation  an  object,  not  only 
of  inestimable  advantage,  but  of  the  very  first  necessity.  The  Missis- 
sissipi  forms  the  western  boundary  of  the  United  States,  from  its 
source  to  the  thirty-first  degree  of  north  latitude,  and  empties  itself 
into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  about  the  twent37-ninth  degree  of  north  lati 
tude.  It  furnishes  the  only  outlet  through  which  the  produce  of  the 
Indiana  Territory,  the  States  of  Ohio,  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  of 
the  western  parts  of  Pennsylvania  and  Virginia,  and  a  portion  of  the 
Mississippi  Territory,  can  be  transported  to  a  foreign  market,  or  to 
ports  of  the  Atlantic  States.  From  the  thirty-first  degree  of  north  lati 
tude,  which  is  the  southern  boundary  of  the  United  States,  to  the  mouth 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  85 

of  the  river,  the  territory  on  each  side  has  heretofore  been  in  possession 
of  the  Spanish  Government;  the  province  of  Louisiana  lying  to  the 
West,  and  those  of  East  Florida,  with  the  island  of  New  Orleans,  to  the 
East. 

Although  the  United  States  have  insisted  on  an  uncontrollable  right 
to  pass  up  and  down  the  river,  from  its  source  to  the  sea,  yet  this 
right,  if  admitted  in  its  most  ample  latitude,  will  not  secure  to  them 
the  full  advantages  of  navigation.  The  strength  and  rapidity  of  the 
current  of  the  Mississippi  are  known  to  render  ascent  so  extremely 
difficult,  that  few  vessels  of  burden  have  attempted  to  go  as  far  as  our 
boundary.  This  circumstance  obliges  the  citizens  of  the  Western 
country  to  carry  their  produce  down  the  river  in  boats,  from  which  it 
is  put  on  board  ships  capable  of  sustaining  a  sea  voyage.  It  follows, 
therefore,  that  to  enjoy  the  full  benefits  of  navigation,  some  place 
should  be  fixed  which  sea  vessels  can  approach  without  great  incon 
venience,  where  the  American  produce  may  be  deposited  until  it  is 
again  shipped  to  be  carried  abroad.  This  great  point  was  secured  to 
us  in  the  year  1795,  by  the  Spanish  Government,  who  agreed,  in  the 
Treaty  of  San  Lorenzo  el  Real,  that  Americans  should  have  the  right 
of  deposit  at  New  Orleans.  This  right  has  been  used  from  that  time 
till  a  late  period;  but  the  conduct  of  the  Intendant  at  that  place  shows 
'low  liable  the  advantageous  navigation  of  the  river  is  to  interruption, 
tnd  strongly  points  out  the  impolicy  of  relying  on  a  foreign  nation  for 
benefits,  which  our  citizens  have  a  right  to  expect  should  be  secured 
to  them  by  their  own  Government.  It  is  hoped  that  the  port  of  New 
Orleans  may  again  be  opened  before  any  very  material  injuries  arise; 
but  should  this  be  the  case,  or  if,  as  the  treaty  provides,  a  new  place 
of  deposit  should  be  assigned,  the  late  occurrence  shows  the  uncer 
tainty  of  its  continuance.  Experience  proves  that  the  caprice  or  the 
interested  views  of  a  single  officer  may  perpetually  subject  us  to  the 
alternative  of  submitting  to  injury,  or  of  resorting  to  war. 

The  late  violation  of  our  treaty  with  Spain  necessarily  leads  to  the 
inquiry,  how  far  the  Western  country  may  be  affected  in  other  points, 
not  connected  with  New  Orleans?  The  Mississippi  Territory  extends 
from  the  confines  of  Georgia  to  the  river  Mississippi,  and  from  the 
thirty-first  to  the  thirty-fifth  degree  of  north  latitude.  It  is  estimated 
to  contain  more  than  fifty  millions  of  acres,  and,  from  its  numerous 
advantages,  must  one  day  or  other  possess  an  immense  population. 
The'variety,  richness,  and  abundance  of  its  productions,  hold  out  to 
settlers  the  strongest  inducements  to  resort  thither,  and  the  United 
Spates  may  safely  calculate  on  drawing  a  considerable  revenue  from 
the  sale  of  lands  in  this,  as  well  as  in  other  quarters  of  the  Western 
country.  The  value  of  these,  however,  may  be  diminished  or  increased, 
and  the  sale  impeded  or  advanced  by  the  impression  made  on  the 


86  PUBCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

public  mind,  by  shutting  the  port  of  New  Orleans,  and  by  eventual 
measures  which  may  be  adopted  to  guard  against  similar  injuries. 

West  Florida  is  bounded  on  the  north  by  the  Mississippi  Territory, 
from  which  it  is  separated  by  no  natural  boundary;  on  the  east  by  the 
river  Apalachicola,  which  divides  it  from  East  Florida;  on  the  west  by 
the  river  Mississippi,  and  on  the  south  by  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The 
Mississippi  Territory  is  intersected  by  many  large  and  valuable  rivers, 
which  rise  within  its  own  boundaries,  and  meander  through  it  in  a 
general  direction  from  north  to  south,  but  empty  themselves  into  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  through  the  province  of  West  Florida.  In  fact,  with 
the  exception  of  that  part  of  the  Territory  which  lies  immediately  on 
the  Mississippi,  the  whole  must  depend  on  the  Mobile  and  the  Apa 
lachicola,  with  their  numerous  branches,  and  on  some  other  rivers  of 
inferior  note,  for  the  means  of  sending  its  produce  to  market,  and  of 
returning  to  itself  such  foreign  supplies  as  the  necessities  or  conven 
ience  of  its  inhabitants  may  require.  In  these  rivers,  too,  the  eastern 
parts  of  the  State  of  Tennessee  are  deeply  interested,  as  some  of  the 
great  branches  of  the  Mobile  approach  very  near  to  some  of  those 
branches  of  the  Tennessee  River,  which  lie  above  the  great  Muscle 
Shoals.  Even  if  it  should  prove  difficult  to  connect  them,  yet  the  land 
carriage  will  be  shorter,  and  the  route  to  the  sea  more  direct  than  the 
river  Tennessee  furnishes.  These  rivers  possess,  likewise,  an  advan 
tage  which  is  denied  to  the  Mississippi.  As  their  sources  are  not  in 
the  mountains,  and  their  course  is  through  a  level  country,  their  cur 
rents  are  gentle,  and  the  tide  flows  considerably  above  our  boundary. 
This  circumstance,  together  with  the  depth  of  water  which  many  of 
them  afford,  render  them  accessible  to  sea  vessels,  and  ships  of  two 
hundred  tons  burden  may  ascend  for  several  hundred  miles  into  the 
heart  of  the  Mississippi  Territory.  These  rivers,  however,  which  run 
almost  exclusively  within  our  own  limits,  and  which  it  would  seem  as 
if  nature  had  intended  for  our  own  benefit,  we  must  be  indebted  to 
others  for  the  beneficial  use  of,  so  long  as  the  province  of  West  Florida 
shall  continue  in  possession  of  a  foreign  nation.  If  the  province  of 
West  Florida  were  itself  an  independent  empire,  it  would  be  the 
interest  of  its  Government  to  promote  the  freedom  of  trade,  by  laying 
open  the  mouths  of  the  rivers  to  all  nations;  this  having  been  the 
policy  of  those  Powers  who  possess  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine,  the 
Danube,  the  Po,  and  the  Tagus,  with  some  others.  But  the  system  of 
colonization  which  has  always  heretofore  prevailed,  proves  that  the 
mother  country  is  ever  anxious  to  engross  to  itself  the  trade  of  its 
colonies,  and  affords  us  every  reason  to  apprehend  that  Spain  will  not 
readily  admit  us  to  pass  through  her  territory  to  carry  on  a  trade 
either  with  each  other  or  with  foreign  nations.  This  right  we  may 
insist  on,  and  perhaps  it  may  be  conceded  to  us;  but  it  is  possible 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  87 

that  it  may  be  denied.  At  all  events,  it  may  prove  the  source  of  end 
less  disagreement  and  perpetual  hostility. 

In  this  respect  East  Florida  may  not  perhaps  be  so  important,  but 
its  acquisition  is  nevertheless  deemed  desirable.  From  its  junction 
with  the  State  of  Georgia,  at  the  river  St.  Marys,  it  stretches  nearly 
four  hundred  miles  into  the  sea,  forming  a  large  peninsula,  and  has 
some  very  fine  harbors.  The  southern  point,  Cape  Florida,  is  not 
more  than  one  hundred  miles  distant  from  the  Havana,  and  the  possession 
of  it  may  be  beneficial  to  us  in  relation  to  our  trade  with  the  West 
Indies.  It  would  likewise  make  our  whole  territory  compact,  would 
add  considerably  to  our  seacoast,  and  by  giving  us  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
for  our  southern  boundary,  would  render  us  less  liable  to  attack,  in 
what  is  now  deemed  the  most  vulnerable  part  of  the  Union. 

From  the  aforegoing  view  of  facts,  it  must  be  seen  that  the  pos 
session  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas  will  not  only  be  required  for 
the  convenience  of  the  United  States,  but  will  be  demanded  by  their 
most  imperious  necessities.  The  Mississippi  and  its  branches,  with 
those  other  rivers  above  referred  to,  drain  an  extent  of  country,  not 
less,  perhaps,  than  one-half  of  our  whole  territory,  containing  at  this 
time  one-eighth  of  our  population  and  progressing  with  a  rapidity 
beyond  the  experience  of  any  former  time,  or  of  any  other  nation. 
The  Floridas  and  New  Orleans  command  the  only  outlets  to  the  sea, 
and  our  best  interests  require  that  we  should  get  possession  of  them. 
This  requisition,  however,  arises  not  from  a  disposition  to  increase  our 
territory;  for  neither  the  Floridas  nor  New  Orleans  offer  any  other 
inducements  than  their  mere  geographical  relation  to  the  United  States. 
But  if  we  look  forward  to  the  free  use  of  the  Mississippi,  the  Mobile, 
the  Apalachicola,  and  the  other  rivers  of  the  West,  by  ourselves  and 
our  posterity,  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas  must  become  a  part  of 
the  United  States,  either  by  purchase  or  by  conquest. 

The  great  question,  then,  which  presents  itself  is,  shall  we  at  this  time 
lay  the  foundation  for  future  peace  by  offering  a  fair  and  equivalent 
consideration;  or  shall  we  hereafter  incur  the  hazards  and  the  horrors 
of  war?  The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  differently  organized 
from  any  other  in  the  world.  Its  object  is  the  happiness  of  man;  its 
policy  and  its  interest,  to  pursue  right  by  right  means.  War  is  the 
great  scourge  of  the  human  race,  and  should  never  be  resorted  to  but 
in  cases  of  the  most  imperious  necessity.  A  wise  government  will 
avoid  it,  when  its  views  can  be  attained  by  peaceful  measures.  Princes 
fight  for  glory,  and  the  blood  and  treasure  of  their  subjects  is  the 
price  they  pay.  In  all  nations  the  people  bear  the  burden  of  war,  and 
in  the  United  States  the  people  rule.  Their  Representatives  are  the 
guardians  of  their  rights,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  those  Representatives 
to  provide  against  any  event  which  ma}^  even  at  a  distant  day,  involve 
the  interest  and  the  happiness  of  the  nation.  We  may,  indeed,  have 


88  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

our  rights  restored  to  us  by  treaty,  but  there  is  a  want  of  fortitude  in 
applying  temporary  remedies  to  permanent  evils;  thereby  imposing  on 
our  posterity  a  burden  which  we  ourselves  ought  to  bear.  If  the  pur 
chase  can  be  made,  we  ought  not  to  hesitate.  If  the  attempt  shall  fail, 
we  shall  have  discharged  an  important  duty. 

War  may  be  the  result,  but  the  American  nation,  satisfied  with  our 
conduct,  will  be  animated  by  one  soul,  and  will  unite  all  its  energies  in 
the  contest.  Foreign  powers  will  be,  convinced  that  it  is  not  a  war  of 
aggrandizement  on  our  part,  and  will  feel  no  unreasonable  jealousies 
toward  us.  We  shall  have  proved  that  our  object  was  justice;  it  will 
be  seen  that  our  propositions  were  fair;  and  it  will  be  acknowledged 
that  our  cause  is  honorable.  Should  alliances  be  necessary  they  may 
be  advantageously  formed.  We  shall  have  merited,  and  shall  there 
fore  possess,  general  confidence.  Our  measures  will  stand  justified 
not  only  to  ourselves  and  our  country,  but  to  the  world. 

In  another  point  of  view,  perhaps,  it  would  be  preferable  to  make 
the  purchase,  as  it  is  believed  that  a  smaller  sum  would  be  required 
for  this  subject,  than  would  necessarily  be  expended,  if  we  should 
attempt  to  take  possession  by  force;  the  expenses  of  a  war  being,  indeed, 
almost  incalculable.  The  Committee  hav^e  no  information  before  them, 
to  ascertain  the  amount  for  which  the  purchase  can  be  made,  but  it  is 
hoped  that,  with  the  assistance  of  two  millions  of  dollars  in  hand,  this 
will  not  be  unreasonable.  A  similar  course  was  pursued  for  the  pur 
pose  of  settling  our  differences  with  the  Regency  of  Algiers,  by  an 
appropriation  of  one  million  of  dollars,  prior  to  the  commencement  of 
the  negotiation,  and  we  have  since  experienced  its  beneficial  effects. 


A     <^  p    i   ,     ^r-  Livingston  to  the  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations. 

(A  ,     •     »  «o    •  ST  ^  o  —  V  V 

SIR:  I  have  so  often  had  occasion  to  mention  to  you  the  claims  of 
American  citizens  upon  the  French  Government,  and,  with  so  little 
effect,  that  I  feel  pain  whenever  I  am  compelled  to  touch  upon  that 
subject.  But,  sir,  I  never  had  reason  to  doubt,  both  from  the  tenor 
of  your  note,  and  conversations,  that  it  would  become  a  question 
whether  these  debts,  just  in  themselves,  and  solemnly  confirmed  by  a 
treaty,  should  become  the  subject  of  liquidation.  The  Board  of 
Accounts  accordingly  proceeded  to  liquidate  and  give  certificates  for 
about  one-quarter  of  the  whole  amount.  Upon  the  debt  so  liquidated 
the  American  merchant  was  enabled  to  raise  the  small  sums  necessary 
for  his  support,  till  arrangements  were  made  (which  they  never  per 
mitted  themselves  to  doubt  would  be  finally  done)  for  their  discharge. 
But,  sir,  even  of  this  support  they  are  now  deprived;  for  though  the 
board  has  proceeded  to  liquidate  more  of  their  claims,  the  gentleman 
at  the  head  of  the  Department  refuses  to  give  the  usual  certificates; 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  89 

under  what  pretense  I  am  at  loss  to  conceive.  I  am  told  he  considers 
the  treaty  as  applying-  to  debts  contracted  during  the  present  Govern 
ment,  when,  in  fact,  no  such  debts  existed  at  the  time  of  the  treaty, 
nor  is  there  a  word  in  the  treaty  which  authorizes  such  construction; 
the  whole  treaty  referring  to  matters  that  had  passed,  not  only  under 
the  Government  that  had  preceded  the  present,  but  under  that  which 
preceded  the  Revolution.  Upon  what  other  principle  has  the  United 
States,  with  the  strictest  good  faith,  paid  the  debt  contracted  under 
Louis  XVI,  and  those  which  the  existing1  Government  demanded  under 
the  late  Convention  for  injuries  sustained  under  the  late  Directors? 

It  is  time,  sir,  that  matters  should  be  brought  to  some  issue;  that 
the  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  their  Government  should  know 
how  far  the  treaty  is  binding-  upon  France,  and  what  construction 
ought  to  be  given  to  it;  for  hitherto,  it  has  only  served  as  a  means  to 
surprise  their  good  faith,  and  to  involve  both  the  Government  and  the 
people  of  the  United  States  in  fresh  expenses. 

I  have  the  honor  to  renew  to  your  excellency  the  assurances  of  my 
high  consideration. 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  to  the  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations. 

PARIS,  January  10,  1803. 

SIR:  I  have  just  learned  through  a  channel,  which,  though  not  offi 
cial,  is  such  as  leaves  me  no  doubt  of  its  authenticity,  that  the  Governor 
of  New  Orleans  has  denied  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  a  right  of 
depot  there,  under  the  pretense  that  the  provision  for  that  purpose  ) 
in  the  treaty  has  expired.  You  are  not  ignorant,  sir,  of  the  value  that 
the  Western  inhabitants  of  the  United  States  place  upon  that  right,  j 
nor  of  the  spirit  with  which  they  will  defend  it;  a  spirit  to  which  the  \ 
Government  must  yield,  even  if  they  could  themselves  be  indifferent """ 
to  the  object.  It  is  peculiarly  unhappy,  sir,  that  this  circumstance 
should  have  happened  at  the  very  moment  that  France  is  about  to  pos 
sess  that  country;  since,  taken  in  connexion  with  the  silence  of  the 
French  Government,  as  to  its  intention,  it  will  (I  very  much  fear)  give 
room  to  jealous  and  suspicious  persons  to  suppose  that  the  Court  of 
Spain  has,  in  this  instance,  acted  in  concurrence  with  that  of  France; 
though,  sir,  I  do  too  much  justice  to  the  integrity  of  France  to  believe 
that  she  would  approve  of  a  breach  of  treaty  and  render  their  first 
entrance  into  our  vicinity  an  act  of  hostility;  }^et  it  certainly  is  of  a 
nature  to  call  the  immediate  attention  of  France  to  the  several  matters 
which  I  had  the  honor  to  mention  to  you,  the  neglect  of  which  has 
excited  the  liveliest  sensation  in  the  United  States.  I  therefore  avail 
myself  of  this  opportunity  and  the  permission  you  gave  me  to  offer 


90  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

you  the  outline  of  a  treaty  that  I  presume  will  afford  the  most  obvious 
benefits  to  France,  and  strengthen  the  connexion  which  every  enlight 
ened  American  wishes  to  subsist  between  her  and  the  United  States. 

Presuming  that  the  Floridas  are  in  the  hands  of  France,  and 
unless  they  are  Louisiana  can  never  be  worth  her  possessing,  because 
it  affords  no  ports  for  its  own  protection,  I  shall  predicate  what  I  have 
to  offer  upon  that  presumption. 

France  can  have  but  three  objects  in  the  possession  of  Louisiana 
and  Florida:  the  first  is  the  command  of  the  Gulf;  second,  the  supply 
of  her  islands;  third,  an  outlet  for  her  people,  if  (which  however 
appears  to  me  a  very  distant  expectation)  her  European  population 
should  be  too  great  for  her  territory.  The  first  of  these  will  be 
effectually  secured  by  the  possession  of  West  Florida,  which  includes 
the  bay  of  St.  Esprit  and  Pensacola,  together  with  the  town  and  har 
bor  of  St.  Augustine.  There  are  no  other  ports  of  the  smallest 
importance  east  of  the  Mississippi.  The  second  will  be  better  effected 
by  confining  their  establishment  to  some  reasonable  limits  on  the  sea- 
coast,  or  within  a  moderate  distance  from  it,  than  by  scattering  their 
capital  and  inhabitants  over  an  extensive  territory,  which  will  have  a 
tendency  to  render  them  savage  and  independent,  and  compel  France 
to  keep  up  a  very  expensive  establishment  to  protect  them  from  the 
incursions  of  savages. 

This  country  must  either  be  settled  by  foreigners,  or  by  emigrants 
from  France.  In  the  first  case,  no  nation  in  Europe  can  retain  them 
in  a  state  of  dependence,  because  they  will,  when  settled  some  hundred 
miles  from  the  sea,  be  absolutely  inaccessible  to  their  power.  In  the 
second,  the  emigration  will  be  such  a  drain  to  the  wealth  and  popula 
tion  of  France  as  will  inflict  as  deep  a  wound  to  her  agriculture  and 
manufactures  as  that  felt  by  her  on  the  revocation  of  the  Edict  of 
Nantes,  or  by  Spain,  on  the  expulsion  of  the  Moors;  and,  after  all,  the 
day  on  which  they  will  be  independent  will  arrive  whenever  they 
shall  have  sufficient  wealth  and  strength  no  longer  to  need  her  aid. 

Having  treated  this  subject  more  at  large  in  a  paper  which  you  have 
had  the  goodness  to  read,  I  will  not  dwell  upon  it  here,  but  propose 
what  it  appears  to  be  the  true  policy  of  France  to  adopt,  as  affecting 
all  her  objects,  and  at  the  same  time  conciliating  the  affections  of  the 
United  States,  giving  permanency  to  her  establishments,  which  she 
can  in  no  other  way  hope  for.  First,  let  France  cede  to  the  United 
States  so  much  of  Louisiana  as  lays  above  the  mouth  of  the  river 
Arkansas.  By  this,  a  barrier  will  be  placed  between  the  colony  of 
France  and  Canada,  from  which  she  may  otherwise  be  attacked  with 
the  greatest  facility,  and  driven  out  before  she  can  derive  any  aid 
from  Europe.  Let  her  retain  the  country  lying  on  the  west  of  the 
Mississippi  and  below  the  Arkansas  River — a  country  capable  of  sup 
porting  fifteen  millions  of  inhabitants.  By  this,  she  will  place  a  barrier 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  91 

between  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  if  (which  I  hope  will  never  be 
the  case)  they  should  have  the  wild  idea  of  carrying  their  arms  into 
that  country,  and  at  the  same  time  be  at  hand  to  protect  the  Spanish 
establishments  against  the  ambitious  views  of  any  European  Power. 
Let  her  possess  East  Florida  as  far  as  the  river  Perdido,  with  all  the 
ports  on  the  Gulf,  and  cede  West  Florida,  New  Orleans,  and  the  terri 
tory  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  to  the  United  States.  This 
cession  will  be  only  valuable  to  the  latter  from  its  giving  them  the 
mouths  of  the  river  Mobile  and  other  small  rivers  which  penetrate 
their  territory,  and  in  calming  their  apprehensions  relative  to  the 
Mississippi.  The  land  ceded  (if  we  except  a  narrow  strip  on  the  bank 
of  the  river)  will,  for  the  most  part,  consist  of  barren  sands  and  sunken 
marshes;  while  that  retained  by  France,  on  the  west  side  of  the 
Mississippi,  includes  the  great  bulk  of  the  settlements  arid  a  rich  and 
fertile  country.  It  may  be  supposed  that  New  Orleans  is  a  place  of 
some  moment;  it  will  be  so  to  the  United  States,  but  not  to  France, 
because  Fort  Leon,  on  the  opposite  bank,  affords  a  much  more  advan 
tageous  station;  has  equal  advantages  as  a  harbor;  is  higher,  healthier, 
and  more  defensible;  sind,  as  the  great  bulk  of  the  settlements  must 
necessarily  be  on  that  side,  the  capital  must  be  transplanted  there, 
even  if  France  continued  in  possession  of  New  Orleans,  which  is  a 
small  town,  built  of  wood,  and  upon  which  all  the  expenses  that  France 
should  make  in  public  buildings,  &c.,  would  ultimately  be  thrown 
away  when  the  capital  was  removed. 

The  right  of  depot  which  the  United  States  claim,  and  will  never 
relinquish,  must  be  the  source  of  continual  disputes  and  animosities 
between  the  two  nations,  and  ultimately  lead  the  United  States  to  aid 
any  foreign  Power  in  the  expulsion  of  France  from  that  colony.  Inde 
pendent  of  this,  as  the  present  commercial  capital  of  New  Orleans  is 
mostly  American,  it  will  be  instantly  removed  to  Natchez,  to  which 
the  United  States  can  give  such  advantages  as  to  render  New  Orleans 
of  little  importance. 

Upon  any  other  plan,  sir,  it  needs  but  little  foresight  to  predict  that 
the  whole  of  this  establishment  must  pass  into  the  hands  of  Great 
Britain,  who  has,  at  the  same  time,  the  command  of  the  sea,  and  a 
martial  colony  containing  every  means  of  attack.  While  the  fleets 
block  up  the  seaports,  she  can,  without  the  smallest  difficulty,  attack 
New  Orleans  from  Canada  with  fifteen  or  twenty  thousand  men,  and  a 
host  of  savages. 

France,  by  grasping  at  a  desert  and  insignificant  town,  and  thereby 
throwing  the  weight  of  the  United  States  into  the  scale  of  Britain,  will 
render  her  mistress  of  the  New  W7orld.  By  the  possession  of  Louisiana 
and  Trinidad,  the  colonies  of  Spain  will  lie  at  her  mercy.  By  expel 
ling  France  from  Florida,  and  possessing  the  ports  on  the  Gulf,  she 
will  command  the  islands.  The  East  and  the  West  Indies  will  pour 


92  PUKCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

their  commodities  into  her  ports;  and  the  precious  metals  of  Mexico, 
combined  with  the  treasures  of  Hindostan,  enable  her  to  purchase 
nations  whose  aid  she  may  require  in  confirming  her  power. 

Though  it  would  comport  with  the  true  policy,  and  the  magnanimity 
of  France,  gratuitously  to  offer  these  terms  to  the  United  States,  yet 
they  are  not  unwilling  to  purchase  them  at  a  price  suited  to  their 
value,  and  to  their  own  circumstances;  in  the  hope  that  France  will  at 
the  same  time  satisfy  her  distressed  citizens  the  debts  which  they  have 
a  right  by  so  many  titles  to  demand. 

These  short  hints,  I  flatter  myself,  will  serve  to  draw  your  attention 
to  the  subject;  in  which  case  I  am  satisfied  that  many  other  reasons 
for  the  adoption  of  this  plan  will  suggest  themselves  to  your  reflec 
tion;  reasons  on  which  I  do  not,  from  a  respect  to  your  time,  think  it 
necessary  to  enlarge.  I  would  only  observe  that  Congress  are  now 
in  session;  that  if  no  treaty  is  concluded  before  they  rise,  or  if  a 
Minister  should  go  only  with  powers  to  treat,  without  being  the 
bearer  of  anything  conclusive,  he  will  have  to  encounter  unnumbered 
suspicions  and  jealousies,  and  when  he  opens  the  negotiation,  he  will 
have  to  contend  with  all  the  intrigues  of  the  Court  that  is  most  inter 
ested  in  preventing  the  completion  of  objects  so  hostile  to  its  views. 
Many  things  are  ratified  when  a  treaty  is  formed,  that  would  be 
obstacles  to  the  formation  of  one  in  a  popular  Government. 
Accept,  sir,  the  assurances  of  my  high  consideration, 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Rufus  King,  Minister  to  England. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  Jan  wiry  29,  1803. 

SIR:  My  letter  of  the  23d  ult.,  with  a  postscript  of  the  3d  of  this 
month,  communicated  the  information  which  had  been  received  at 
those  dates  relating  to  the  violation  at  New  Orleans  of  our  treaty  with 
Spain,  together  with  what  had  then  passed  between  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives  and  the  Executive  on  the  subject.  I  now  enclose  a  subse 
quent  resolution  of  that  branch  of  the  Legislature.  Such  of  the 
debates  connected  with  it  as  took  place  with  open  doors  will  be  seen 
in  the  newspapers.  In  those  debates,  as  well  as  in  indications  from 
the  press,  you  will  perceive,  as  you  would  readily  suppose,  that  the 
cession  of  Louisiana  to  France  has  been  associated  as  a  ground  of 
much  solicitude  with  the  affair  at  New  Orleans.  Such,  indeed,  has 
been  the  impulse  given  to  the  public  mind  by  these  events  that  every 
branch  of  the  Government  has  felt  the  obligation  of  taking  the  meas 
ures  most  likely,  not  only  to  re-establish  our  present  rights,  but  to 
promote  arrangements  by  which  they  may  be  enlarged  and  more 
effectually  secured.  In  deliberating  on  this  subject,  it  has  appeared 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  93 

to  the  President  that  the  importance  of  the  crisis  called  for  the  experi 
ment  of  an  extraordinary  mission,  carrying  with  it  the  weight  attached 
to  such  a  measure,  as  well  as  the  advantage  of  a  more  thorough  knowl 
edge  of  the  views  of  the  Government  and  of  the  sensibility  of  the 
public,  than  could  be  otherwise  conveyed.  He  has  accordingly  selected 
for  this  service,  with  the  approbation  of  the  Senate,  Mr.  Monroe, 
formerly  our  Minister  Plenipotentiary  at  Paris,  and  lately  Governor  of 
Virginia,  who  will  be  joined  with  Mr.  Livingston  in  a  commission 
extraordinary  to  treat  with  the  French  Republic;  and  with  Mr.  Pinck- 
ney  in  a  like  commission  to  treat,  if  necessary,  with  the  Spanish 
Government. 

Mr.  Monroe  is  expected  here  to-morrow,  and  he  will  probably  sail 
shortly  afterwards  to  New  York. 

These  communications  will  enable  you  to  meet  the  British  Minister 
in  conversation  on  the  subject  stated  in  your  letter  of  May  7th,  1802. 
The  United  States  are  disposed  to  live  in  amity  with  their  neighbors, 
whoever  they  may  be,  as  long  as  their  neighbors  shall  duly  respect 
their  rights;  but  it  is  equally  their  determination  to  maintain  their 
rights  against  those  who  may  riot  respect  them;  premising,  where 
the  occasion  may  require,  the  peaceable  modes  of  obtain  ing  satisfaction 
for  wrongs,  and  endeavoring,  by  friendly  arrangements  and  provident 
stipulations,  to  guard  against  the  controversies  most  likely  to  occur. 

Whatever  may  be  the  result  of  the  present  mission  extraordinary, 
nothing  certainly  will  be  admitted  into  it  not  consistent  with  our 
prior  engagements.  The  United  States  and  Great  Britain  have  agreed, 
each  for  itself,  to  the  free  and  common  navigation  by  the  other  of  the 
river  Mississippi — each  being  left,  at  the  same  time,  to  a  separate  adjust 
ment  with  other  nations  of  questions  between  them  relative  to  the 
same  subject.  This  being  the  necessary  meaning  of  our  treaties  with 
Great  Britain,  and  the  course  pursued  under  them,  a  difference  of  opin 
ion  seems  to  be  precluded.  Any  such  difference  would  be  matter  of 
real  regret;  for  it  is  not  only  our  purpose  to  maintain  the  best  faith 
with  that  nation,  but  our  desire  to  cherish  a  mutual  confidence  and 
cordiality,  which  events  may  render  highly  important  to  both  nations. 

Your  successor  has  not  yet  been  named,  and  it  is  now  possible  that 
the  time  you  may  have  fixed  for  leaving  England  will  arrive  before 
any  arrangements  for  the  vacancy  can  have  their  effect.  Should  this 
be  the  case,  the  President,  sensible  of  the  inconvenience  to  which  you 
might  be  subjected  by  an  unexpected  detention,  thinks  it  would  not  be 
reasonable  to  claim  it  of  you.  It  may  be  hoped  that  the  endeavors  to 
prevent  an  interval  in  the  legation  be  successful;  and  as  it  can  not  be 
more  than  a  very  short  one,  no  great  evil  can  well  happen  from  it. 
I  have  the  honor,  &c. , 

JAMES  MADISON. 


94  PUECHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

J  ^  •>  *  • 
f  f    i    c  \  JL>o    . 

President  Jefferson  to  M.  Dupont. 

'      "~<'  ' 


WASHINGTON,  February  1,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  favors  of 
August  the  16th  and  October  the  4th.  The  latter  I  received  with 
peculiar  satisfaction;  because,  while  it  holds  up  terms  which  cannot 
be  entirely  yielded,  it  proposes  such  as  a  mutual  spirit  of  accommo 
dation  and  sacrifice  of  opinion  may  bring  to  some  point  of  union. 
While  we  were  preparing  on  this  subject  such  modifications  of  the 
propositions  of  your  letter  of  October  the  4th,  as  we  could  assent  to, 
an  event  happened  which  obliged  us  to  adopt  measures  of  urgency. 
The  suspension  of  the  right  of  deposit  at  New  Orleans,  ceded  to  us  by 
treaty  with  Spain,  threw  our  whole  country  into  such  a  ferment  as 
imminently  threatened  its  peace.  This,  however,  was  believed  to  be 
the  act  of  the  Intendant,  unauthorized  by  his  government.  But  it 
showed  the  necessity  of  making  effectual  arrangements  to  secure  the 
peace  of  the  two  countries  against  the  indiscreet  acts  of  subordinate 
agents.  The  urgency  of  the  case,  as  well  as  the  public  spirit,  there 
fore  induced  us  to  make  a  more  solemn  appeal  to  the  justice  and  judg 
ment  of  our  neighbors,  by  sending  a  minister  extraordinary  to  impress 
them  with  the  necessity  of  some  arrangement.  Mr.  Monroe  has  been 
selected.  His  good  dispositions  cannot  be  doubted.  Multiplied  con 
versations  with  him,  and  views  of  the  subject  taken  in  all  the  shapes 
in  which  it  can  present  itself,  have  possessed  him  with  our  estimates 
of  everything  relating  to  it,  with  a  minuteness  Avhich  no  written  com 
munication  to  Mr.  Livingston  could  ever  have  attained.  These  will 
prepare  them  to  meet  and  decide  on  every  form  of  proposition  which 
can  occur,  without  awaiting  new  instructions  from  hence,  which  might 
draw  to  an  indefinite  length  a  discussion  where  circumstances  imperi 
ously  obliged  us  to  a  prompt  decision.  For  the  occlusion  of  the 
Mississippi  is  a  state  of  things  in  which  we  cannot  exist.  He  goes, 
therefore,  joined  with  Chancellor  Livingston,  to  aid  in  the  issue  of  a 
crisis  the  most  important  the  United  States  have  ever  met  since  their 
independence,  and  which  is  to  decide  their  future  character  and  career. 
The  confidence  which  the  government  of  France  reposes  in  you,  will 
undoubtedly  give  great  weight  to  your  information.  An  equal  confi 
dence  on  our  part,  founded  on  your  knowledge  of  the  subject,  your 
just  views  of  it,  your  good  dispositions  toward  this  country,  and  my 
long  experience  of  your  personal  faith  and  friendship,  assures  me 
that  you  will  render  between  us  all  the  good  offices  in  your  power.  The 
interests  of  the  two  countries  being  absolutely  the  same  as  to  this 
matter,  your  aid  may  be  conscientious^  given.  It  will  often  perhaps, 
be  possible  for  you,  having  a  freedom  of  communication,  omnibus 
horis,  which  diplomatic  gentlemen  will  be  excluded  from  by  forms,  to 
smooth  difficulties  by  representations  and  reasonings,  which  would  be 
received  with  more  suspicion  from  them.  You  will  thereby  render 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  95 

great  good  to  both  countries.  For  our  circumstances  are  so  imperious 
as  to  admit  of  no  delay  as  to  our  course;  and  the  use  of  the  Mississippi 
so  indispensable,  that  we  cannot  hesitate  one  moment  to  hazard  our 
existence  for  its  maintenance.  If  we  fail  in  this  effort  to  put  it  beyond 
the  reach  of  accident,  we  see  the  destinies  we  have  to  run,  and  prepare 
at  once  for  them.  Not  but  that  we  shall  still  endeavor  to  go  on  in 
peace  and  friendship  with  our  neighbors  as  long  as  we  can,  if  OUT 
r  lg  hts  of  navigation  and  d eposit  are  r  expect  ed,  h\ik  as  we  foresee  that 
the  caprices  of  the  local  officers,  and  the  abuse  of  those  rights  by  our 
boatmen  and  navigators,  which  neither  government  can  prevent,  will 
keep  up  a  state  of  irritation  which  cannot  long  be  kept  inactive,  we 
should  be  criminally  improvident  not  to  take  at  once  eventual  meas 
ures  for  strengthening  ourselves  for  the  contest.  It  may  be  said,  if 
this  object  be  so  all-important  to  us,  why  do  we  not  offer  such  a  sum 
as  to  insure  its  purchase?  The  answer  is  simple.  We  are  an  agri 
cultural  people,  poor  in  money,  and  owing  great  debts.  These  will  be 
falling  due  by  installments  for  fifteen  years  to  come,  and  require  from 
us  the  practice  of  rigorous  economy  to  accomplish  their  payment;  and 
it  is  our  principle  to  pay  to  a  moment  whatever  we  have  engaged,  and 
never  to  engage  what  we  cannot,  and  mean  not  faithfully  to  pay. 
We  have  calculated  our  resources,  and  find  the  sum  to  be  moderate 
which  they  would  enable  us  to  pay,  and  we  know  from  late  trials  that 
little  can  be  added  to  it  by  borrowing.  The  country,  too,  which  we 
wish  to  purchase,  except  the  portion  already  granted,  and  which  must 
be  confirmed  to  the  private  holders,  is  a  barren  sand,  six  hundred 
miles  from  east  to  west,  and  from  thirty  to  forty  and  fifty  miles  from 
north  to  south,  formed  by  deposition  of  the  sands  by  the  Gulf  Stream 
in  its  circular  course  round  the  Mexican  Gulf,  and  Avhich  being  spent 
after  performing  a  semicircle,  has  made  from  its  last  depositions  the 
sand  bank  of  East  Florida.  In  West  Florida,  indeed,  there  are  on  the 
borders  of  the  rivers  some  rich  bottoms,  formed  by  the  mud  brought 
from  the  upper  country.  These  bottoms  are  all  possessed  by  individ 
uals.  But  the  spaces  between  river  and  river  are  mere  banks  of  sand; 
and  in  East  Florida  there  are  neither  rivers,  nor  consequently  any 
bottoms.  We  can  not  then  make  anything  by  a  sale  of  the  lands  to 
individuals.  So  that  it  is  peace  alone  which  makes  it  an  object  with 
us,  and  which  ought  to  make  the  cession  of  it  desirable  to  France. 
Whatever  power,  other  than  ourselves,  holds  the  country  east  of  the 
Mississippi  becomes  our  natural  enemy.  Will  such  a  possession  do  V 
France  as  much  good,  as  such  an  enemy  may  do  her  harm?  And  how 
long  would  it  be  hers,  were  such  an  enemy,  situated  at  its  door,  added 
to  Great  Britain  ?  I  confess,  it  appears  to  me  as  essential  to  France 
to  keep  at  peace  with  us,  as  it  is  to  us  to  keep  at  peace  with  her;  and 
that,  if  this  cannot  be  secured  without  some  compromise  as  to  the  ter 
ritory  in  question,  it  will  be  useful  for  both  to  make  some  sacrifices 
to  effect  the  compromise. 


96  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

You  see,  my  good  friend,  with  what  frankness  I  communicate  with 
you  on  this  subject;  that  I  hide  nothing-  from  you,  and  that  I  am 
endeavoring-  to  turn  our  private  friendship  to  the  good  of  our  respec 
tive  countries.  And  can  private  friendship  ever  answer  a  nobler  end 
than  by  keeping  two  nations  at  peace,  who,  if  this  new  position  which 
one  of  them  is  taking  were  rendered  innocent,  have  more  points  of 
common  interest,  and  fewer  of  collision,  than  any  two  on  earth;  who 
become  natural  friends,  instead  of  natural  enemies,  which  this  change 
of  position  would  make  them.  My  letters  of  April  the  25th,  May  the 
5th,  and  this  present  one  have  been  written,  without  any  disguise,  in 
this  view;  and  while  safe  in  your  hands  they  can  never  do  anything 
but  good.  But  you  and  I  are  now  at  the  time  of  life  when  our  call  to 
another  state  of  being  cannot  be  distant,  and  may  be  near.  Besides, 
your  government  is  in  the  habit  of  seizing  papers  without  notice. 
These  letters  might  thus  get  into  hands,  which,  like  the  hornet  which 
extracts  poison  from  the  same  flower  that  yields  honey  to  the  bee, 
might  make  them  the  ground  of  blowing  up  a  flame  between  our  two 
countries,  and  make  our  friendship  and  confidence  in  each  other  effect 
exactly  the  reverse  of  what  we  are  aiming  at.  Being  yourself  thor 
oughly  possessed  of  every  idea  in  them,  let  me  ask  from  your  friend 
ship  an  immediate  consignment  of  them  to  the  flames.  That  alone  can 
make  all  safe,  and  ourselves  secure.  ,  - 


President  Jefferson  to  Mr.  Livingston. 


WASHINGTON,  February  3,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  My  last  to  you  was  by  Mr.  Dupont.  Since  that  I 
received  yours  of  May  22d.  Mr.  Madison  supposes  you  have  writ 
ten  a  subsequent  one  which  has  never  come  to  hand.  A  late  suspen 
sion  by  the  Intendant  of  New  Orleans  of  our  right  of  deposit  there, 
without  which  the  right  of  navigation  is  impracticable,  has  thrown 
this  country  into  such  a  flame  of  hostile  disposition  as  can  scarcely  be 
described.  The  western  country  was  peculiarly  sensible  to  it  as  you 
may  suppose.  Our  business  was  to  take  the  most  effectual  pacific 
measures  in  our  power  to  remove  the  suspension,  and  at  the  same  time 
to  persuade  our  countrymen  that  pacific  measures  would  be  the  most 
effectual  and  the  most  speedily  so.  The  opposition  caught  it  as  a 
plank  in  a  shipwreck,  hoping  it  would  enable  them  to  tack  the  West 
ern  people  to  them.  They  raised  the  cry  of  war,  were  intriguing  in 
all  quarters  to  exasperate  the  Western  inhabitants  to  arm  and  go  down 
on  their  own  authority  and  possess  them  selves  of  New  Orleans,  and  in 
the  meantime  were  daily  reiterating,  in  new  shapes,  inflammatory 
resolutions  for  the  adoption  of  the  House.  As  a  remedy  to  all  this 
we  determined  to  name  a  minister  extraordinary  to  go  immediately  to 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  97 

Paris  and  Madrid  to  settle  this  matter.  This  measure  being  a  visible 
one,  and  the  person  named  peculiarly  proper  with  the  Western  coun 
try,  crushed  at  once  and  put  an  end  to  all  further  attempts  on  the 
Legislature.  From  that  moment  all  has  become  quiet;  and  the  more 
readily  in  the  Western  country,  as  the  sudden  alliance  of  these  new 
federal  friends  had  of  itself  already  began  to  make  them  suspect  the 
wisdom  of  their  own  course.  The  measure  was  moreover  proposed 
from  another  cause.  We  must  know  at  once  whether  we  can  acquire 
New  Orleans  or  not.  We  are  satisfied  nothing  else  will  secure  us 
against  a  war  at  no  distant  period;  and  we  cannot  press  this  reason 
without  beginning  those  arrangements  which  will  be  necessary  if  war 
is  hereafter  to  result.  For  this  purpose  it  was  -  necessary  that  the 
negotiators  should  be  fully  possessed  of  every  idea  we  have  on  the 
subject,  so  as  to  meet  the  propositions  of  the  opposite  party,  in  what 
ever  form  they  may  be  offered;  and  give  them  a  shape  admissible  by 
us  without  being  obliged  to  await  new  instructions  hence.  With  this 
view,  we  have  joined  Mr.  Monroe  with  yourself  at  Paris,  and  to 
Mr.  Pinckney  at  Madrid,  although  we  believe  it  will  be  hardly  neces 
sary  for  him  to  go  to  this  last  place.  Should  we  fail  in  this  object  of 
the  mission,  a  further  one  will  be  superadded  for  the  other  side  of  the 
channel.  On  this  subject  you  will  be  informed  b}7  the  Secretary  of 
State,  and  Mr.  Monroe  will  be  able  also  to  inform  you  of  all  our  views 
and  purposes.  By  him  I  send  another  letter  to  Dupont,  whose  aid 
may  be  of  the  greatest  service,  as  it  will  be  divested  of  the  shackles  of 
form.  The  letter  is  left  open  for  your  perusal,  after  which  1  wish  a 
wafer  stuck  in  it  before  it  be  delivered.  The  official  and  the  verbal 
communications  to  you  by  Mr.  Monroe  will  be  so  full  and  minute,  that 
I  need  not  trouble  you  with  an  inofficial  repetition  of  them.  The 
future  destinies  of  our  country  hang  on  the  event  of  this  negotiation, 
and  I  am  sure  they  could  not  be  placed  in  more  able  or  more  zealous 
hands.  On  our  parts  we  shall  be  satisfied  that  what  you  do  not  effect, 
connot  be  effected.  Accept  therefore  assurances  of  my  sincere  and 
constant  affection  and  high  respect.  ,  (7°  9 


R.  R.  Livingston  to  James  Madison. 

Q     fp      9    .  '   r  o    .  o 

PARIS,  February  5,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR:  Not  knowing  where  to  direct  the  enclosed,  I  submit  it  to 
your  care.  The  bearer  of  this  to  Nantz  waits,  so  that  I  can  write  you 
nothing  but  that  the  Louisiana  armament  is  still  icebound.  The 
Floridas  are  not  yet  ceded,  owing,  I  believe,  to  some  difficulty  about 
Parma,  and  the  solicitude  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia  to  provide  for  the 
King  of  Sardinia.  Spain  is  however  prepared  to  make  the  cession, 
and  I  presume  it  will  be  done.  I  have  precise  answers  from  }TOU  to 
H.  Doc.  431 7 


98  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

none  of  my  inquiries,  and  am  much  at  a  loss  how  to  act.  I  have  much 
to  say,  but  am  not  allowed  to  enlarge.  You  shall  hear  from  me  by  the 
first  safe  conveyance. 

I  am,  etc.,  R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

Hon.  JAMES  MADISON, 

Secretary  of  State. 


James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Charles  Pinckney  and  James  Monroe. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE, 

February  17,  1803. 

SIR:  You  will  be  herewith  furnished  with  a  joint  commission  to  treat 
with  His  Catholic  Majesty,  and  with  a  letter  of  credence  to  him.  For 
the  object  of  the  commission,  and  as  a  guide  to  your  negotiations,  I 
refer  you  to  the  instructions  given  in  relation  to  the  French  Govern 
ment.  Whatever  portion  of  the  arrangements  contemplated  may  be 
found  to  depend  not  on  the  French,  but  on  the  Spanish  Government, 
is  to  be  sought  from  the  latter,  on  the  like  terms  as  if  they  had 
depended  on  the  former. 

The  scale  of  value  applied  to  the  distinct  territories  in  question  will 
deserve  particular  attention;  so  will  the  provision  for  paying  our  citi 
zens  who  have  claims  on  Spain  out  of  the  sums  stipulated  as  the  price 
of  her  territorial  possessions.  Among  these  claims  it  will  be  important 
to  include,  not  only  those  within  the  description  contained  in  the  con 
vention  signed  by  Mr.  Pinckney  in  August  last,  but  such  as  may  be 
founded  on  unlawful  acts  committed  within  Spanish  responsibility  by 
other  than  Spanish  subjects,  and  on  acts  committed  by  Spanish  sub 
jects,  within  the  Spanish  colonies,  inconsistent  with  true  equity,  though 
not  with  the  forms  of  law. 

Your  particular  attention  will  also  be  due,  in  case  a  cession  should 
not  be  attained,  to  an  enlargement  of  our  right  of  deposit  at  New 
Orleans,  to  the  establishment  of  suitable  deposits  at  the  mouths  of  the 
rivers,  passing  from  the  United  States  through  the  Floridas,  as  well  as 
to  the  free  navigation  of  those  rivers  by  citizens  of  the  United  States. 
Useful  hints  on  these  subjects  may  be  found  in  the  letter  of  which  a 
copy  is  annexed  from  the  Consul  of  the  United  States  at  New  Orleans. 

I  refer  for  another  object  which  will  deserve  your  attention,  to  the 
letter  from  the  Department  of  State  of  the  27th  of  November,  to  the 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States,  which  urges  the  neces- 
sit}f  of  some  provision  by  the  Governments  of  Europe  having  Ameri 
can  Colonies,  by  which  the  irregular  and  injurious  proceedings  of 
colonial  officers  towards  the  United  States  may  be  more  effectually 
controlled,  or  more  expeditiously  corrected,  than  by  crossing  the 
Atlantic  with  representations  on  such  occasions.  Such  a  provision  is 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  99 

not  more  due  to  our  just  expectations  than  to  the  interests  which  those 
Governments  have  in  maintaining  the  amicable  relations  which  subsist 
with  the  United  States.  In  the  same  letter,  notice  was  given  that  the 
Spanish  Government  would  be  held  responsible  for  whatever  damages 
might  be  sustained  by  our  citizens  in  consequence  of  the  violation  of 
the  treaty  by  the  Intendant  at  New  Orleans.  It  will  be  proper  to 
obtain  from  that  Government  a  stipulation  that  will  provide  for  such 
contingent  damages.  In  case  the  convention,  already  on  foot,  should 
be  open  for  such  an  article,  it  may  be  therein  inserted.  Should  that 
opportunity  not  exist,  it  will  be  necessary  to  authorize,  by  a  supple 
mental  article,  the  Commissioners  appointed  under  that  convention  to 
award  the  indemnifications. 

I  have  the  honor,  &c.,  JAMES  MADISON. 


R.  R.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  February  18,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR:  I  have  been  honored  by  yours  of  the  —  November.  I 
am  pleased  to  find  that  you  are  satisfied  with  my  applications  to  the 
Government  on  the  subject  of  the  debt;  I  am  only  sorry  that  those 
applications  have  hitherto  been  unsuccessful,  and,  as  far  as  appears, 
will  continue  to  be,  unless  some  motive  more  efficacious  than  that  of 
justice,  or  national  faith  or  credit,  is  held  out.  To  enter  into  the  finan 
cial  arrangements  of  people  in  power  here  would  lead  me  into  very 
delicate  discussion,  which  would  not  tend  to  any  advantage  propor 
tioned  to  the  risk  it  might  subject  me  to.  I  still  think  that  if  anything 
is  done  to  satisfy  our  citizens,  it  must  be  by  some  advantageous  offer 
on  the  part  of  our  Government.  You  will  find  some  of  my  ideas  on 
that  subject  sketched  in  my  former  letters. 

As  you  have  intimated  the  propriety  of  opening  some  other  channel 
of  communication  w'ith  the  First  Consul  than  through  the  Minister, 
this  I  have  effectually  done,  so  as  to  have  got  several  unofficial  com 
munications  under  his  eye,  and  to  have  learnt  his  sentiments  thereon. 
1  can  have  a  personal  conference  with  him  when  1  choose,  having 
made  arrangements  for  the  purpose;  but  I  defer  it  for  two  reasons: 
First,  I  have  never  yet  had  any  specific  instructions  from  you  how 
to  act  or  what  to  offer.  To  meet  him  merely  to  talk  of  the  justice  of 
our  claims,  and  of  our  rights  on  the  Mississippi,  would  be  onl}T  to  say 
ungracious  truths,  and  excite  prejudices  which  may  render  a  future 
conference  more  difficult;  and,  second,  because  it  is  one  of  the  traits  of 
his  character  when  he  has  once  fully  avowed  a  sentiment  not  easily 
to  change  it.  I  have,  therefore,  thought  it  best  to  address  myself 
officially  to  the  Minister,  and  unofficially  to  the  only  man  supposed 
to  have  any  sort  of  influence  over  him.  I  have  accordingly  put  into 


100  PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

his  hands  some  notes  containing-  plain  truth  mixed  with  that  species 
of  personal  attention  which  I  know  to  be  most  pleasing.  The  deli 
cate  subject  of  these  notes  makes  me  unwilling  to  send  them  unless 
I  can  rind  time  to  put  them  in  cipher,  which  1  fear  will  not  be 
the  case  by  this  conveyance;  you  will,  however,  have  them  in  the 
tirst  letter  I  write  to  the  President,  which  will  be  by  this  or  the 
next  conveyance.  I  do  not  mention  the  channel  I  allude  to,  because 
I  wish  it  only  to  be  known  to  yourself  and  the  President,  and  my 
last  letter  to  him  has  sufficiently  explained  it.  The  only  basis  on 
which  I  think  it  possible  to  do  anything  here  is  to  connect  our  claims 
with  our  offers  to  purchase  the  Floridas.  Upon  this  subject  my  notes 
turn.  I  have  first  endeavored  to  show  how  little  advantage  France  is 
likely  to  make  from  these  colonies;  the  temptation  they  offer  to  Britain 
to  attack  them  by  sea  and  from  Canada;  the  effect  the  conquest  of  them 
by  Britain  would  have  upon  the  islands;  and  the  monopoly  which  that 
conquest  would  give  to  a  rival  Power  of  the  trade  of  the  West  as  well 
as  of  the  East  Indies.  I  have  dwelt  upon  the  importance  of  a  friendly 
intercourse  between  them  and  us,  both  as  it  respects  their  commerce 
and  the  security  of  their  islands;  and  I  have  proposed  to  them  the  relin- 
quishment  of  New  Orleans  and  West  Florida,  as  far  as  the  river  Per- 
dido,  together  with  all  the  territory  lying  to  the  north  of  the  Arkan 
sas,  under  an  idea  that  it  was  necessary  to  interpose  us  between  them 
and  Canada,  as  the  only  means  of  preventing  an  attack  from  that 
quarter. 

I  did  not  speak  of  East  Florida  because  I  found  they  consider  the 
navigation  of  the  Gulf  as  very  important;  for  this  I  proposed  an 
indefinite  sum,  not  wishing  to  mention  any  till  I  should  receive  your 
instructions,  that  it  should  be  a  condition  of  this  treaty  that  the  Amer 
ican  debt  should  be  inscribed  on  their  5  per  cent,  stock.  I  knew  it 
would  be  vain  to  render  them  our  creditors  by  deducting  this  out  of 
our  payment,  because  actual  money  would  alone  have  any  effect  in 
carrying  the  plan  through;  and  even  that  must  be  managed  with  some 
circumspection,  or  no  plan  will  succeed.  These  propositions,  with  cer 
tain  accompaniments,  were  well  received,  and  were  some  days  under 
the  First  Consul's  consideration;  when  it  was  thought  a  better  bargain 
might  be  made  on  the  spot;  and  I  was  told  that  General  Bernadotte 
would  have  full  power  to  treat  on  this  subject  in  America  on  the  basis 
on  which  I  had  placed  it.  My  answer  to  this  information  you  will 
find  in  the  enclosed  note.  I  am  now  lying  on  my  oars  in  hopes  of 
something  explicit  from  yov..  I  consider  the  object  of  immense  impor 
tance;  and  this,  perhaps,  the  favorable  moment  to  press  it,  because  the 
affairs  of  the  islands  are  yet  very  doubtful,  and  the  armament  is  still 
blocked  up  by  the  ice  in  Holland;  though  as  we  now  have  a  thaw  here 
I  fear  they  will  not  be  so  much  longer.  My  plan  is  much  relished  by 
the  person  through  whom  it  was  proposed.  General  Bernadotte  sees 


PURCHASE  OF  THE  TERRITORY,,  OF  ^6UlfSI'Al*A.      101 


the  awkward  situation  in  which  he  will  be  placed  if  he  goes  out  while 
our  demands  remain  unsatisfied.  But  nobody  dares  to  offer  an  opinion 
when  that  of  the  First  Consul  has  been  expressed.  And,  at  present,  a 
very  unexpected  difficulty  has  arisen.  1  told  }^ou  that  Parma  would 
be  offered  for  the  Floridas,  and  that  General  Bournonville  was  sent  to 
negotiate  the  business.  It  was  never  doubted  a  moment  here  that  it 
would  be  effected;  this  I  learned  from  Talleyrand  and  the  Spanish 
Ambassador.  They  intimated  that  the  treaty  would  be  signed  the  day 
the  King  returned  from  Barcelona;  and  their  information  accorded 
with  that  which  Lord  Whitworth  had  received.  I  learn  now  from  the 
Spanish  Ambassador  that  the  thing  has  met  with  some  difficulty,  as  he 
says,  not  because  of  any  aversion  in  the  Court  to  make  the  cession,  but 
of  some  difference  between  the  Prince  of  Peace  and  General  Bournon 
ville.  I  believe,  however,  that  this  is  not  the  sole  cause;  but  that 
Spain  begins  to  see  that,  in  receiving  Parma,  she  will  receive  nothing; 
as  it  will  be  rendered  subservient  to  another  arrangement,  as  I  hinted 
in  my  last.  You  will  consider  this  rather  as  a  conjecture  than  as  any 
thing  I  am  perfectly  founded  in  relating.  The  essential  fact  for  us  is 
that  the  Floridas  are  not  yet  ceded. 

Mr.  Dazara,  yesterday,  told  me  that  he  began  to  have  his  doubts 
whether  they  would  be;  but  France  is  fully  impressed  with  the  nullity 
of  her  possession  in  Louisiana  unless  she  has  some  port  in  the  Gulf. 
Indeed,  the  Minister  told  me  yesterday  that  there  were  no  difficulties 
of  any  moment.  I  presume  that  she  will,  ultimately,  find  some  way  to 
cut  the  Gordian  knot;  and  I  can  not  but  sincerely  wish  that  you  may 
have  availed  yourselves  of  the  pretense  Spain  has  given  you  to  take 
possession.  It  will  be  best  to  treat  with  the  subject  in  our  hands;  but, 
at  all  events,  tell  me  what  to  do  if  they  should  go  into  the  hands  of 
France:  and  fix  the  sum  you  are  willing  to  give  in  case  they  should 
listen  anew  to  my  proposition;  for  as  to  Bernadotte  doing  anything 
with  you  I  have  no  great  faith.  I  pray  you  again  to  give  me  some 
instructions,  for  I  may  be  acting  contrary  to  your  intentions;  and  I 
should  be  very  sorry  to  do  anything  that  you  may  find  it  proper  to 
disavow.  I  am  not  satisfied,  from  examining  nry  instructions  and  com 
mission,  that  I  am  empowered  to  do  anything  but  the  common  routine 
of  business.  As  I  did  not  receive  this  till  I  was  going  off  I  had  no 
opportunity  of  objecting  to  them.  I  find  that  I  have  no  precise  diplo 
matic  character,  not  even  an  envoy  ordinary  or  extraordinary,  though 
it  had  been  usual  for  the  United  States  to  grant  this  latter  grade  to 
gentlemen  of  less  standing  than  myself.  But  this  by  the  bye,  which  I 
should  not  have  mentioned  if  I  did  not  find  that  it  is  not  quite  so  agree 
able  here,  as  Bernadotte  is  a  man  of  high  rank,  and  would  have  wished, 
like  his  brother  Generals,  to  have  gone  out  with  a  more  elevated  rank, 
but  which  the}r  can  not  give  while  the  United  States  only  retain  a  Min 
ister  Plenipotentiary  here.  It  is  proper  that  I  should  say  a  few  words 


102  PURCHASE  OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

on  General  Bernadotte;  he  is  one  of  the  old  Jacobin  party,  and  has 
been  much  looked  up  to  by  them;  but  being  brother-in-law  to  Joseph 
Bonaparte,  he  is  favorably  connected;  but  has  not  ceased  to  be  an  object 
of  some  jealousy.  And  I  believe  you  may  consider  his  present  mission 
as  an  honorable  banishment.  He  proposes  only  to  stay  a  few  months 
in  America.  I  have  had  many  conversations  with  him.  His  disposi 
tions  are  just  such  as  I  would  wish  with  respect  to  us;  but  his  temper 
is  warm  and  fiery,  and  you  will  have  to  natter  his  pride  and  that  of  his 
nation,  if  you  would  stand  well  with  him. 

In  several  conversations  that  I  have  had  w^ith  Lord  Whitworth  I  find 
that  Britain  is  very  averse  to  the  projected  exchange  for  the  Floridas; 
and  he  thinks  that,  if  effected,  it  will  be  taken  up  very  warmly  by  the 
nation.  Mr.  King,  however,  in  an  answer  this  day  received  to  some 
questions  I  have  put  on  that  subject,  thinks  differently.  I  find  that 
the  sentiments  of  the  two  nations,  with  respect  to  each  other,  have 
totally  changed  from  what  they  were  a  year  ago;  they  at  present 
mortally  hate  each  other;  and  nothing  but  the  want  of  allies  keeps 
Britain  from  breaking  out.  You  will  find  in  one  of  the  Moniteurs  I 
have  sent  you,  a  curious  journal  of  Sebastiana,  which  has  been  evi 
dently  published  to  prepare  this  nation  for  some  new  operation  in 
Egypt;  it  is  extremely  offensive  to  the  British.  I  have  a  letter  from 
Mr.  Graham,  who  is  far  from  being  satisfied  with  the  conduct  of  the 
Spanish  court;  who  act  like  this  in  saying  nothing  on  the  subject  of 
their  treaty  with  France,  and  who  have  passed  a  law  prohibiting  any 
American  vessel  to  enter  their  ports  till  they  have  performed  a  quar 
antine  in  some  foreign  port. 

1  mentioned  to  you  my  wish  to  be  empowered  to  recognize  the 
Italian  Republic;  to  be  accredited  to  the  Consul,  as  has  been  done  by 
most  of  those  Powers  who  wish  to  please  him;  and  as  this  is  a  compli 
ment  without  expense,  it  might  not  be  amiss  to  pay  it,  particularly  as 
we  shall  have  some  commercial  connection  with  the  Italian  States. 

From  the  best  accounts  I  can  receive  from  Holland  the  armament 
will  be  detained  there  till  about  the  last  of  March,  so  that  you  will  not 
have  them  in  New  Orleans  till  June;  a  precious  interval,  of  which  you 
may  think  it  prudent  to  avail  yourselves. 

I  broke  off  here  that  I  might  have  an  explicit  conversation  with  the 
Minister,  founded  upon  the  newspaper  intelligence  from  our  countr}7; 
for  I  have  had  no  other  since  the  date  of  your  letter  of  —  November. 
I  endeavored  to  impress  him  strongly  with  the  idea  of  our  determina 
tion  never  to  suffer  our  rights  on  the  Mississippi  to  be  impeded;  and 
of  the  little  value  that  that  country  would  be  to  them  in  the  production 
of  a  revenue;  of  the  almost  certainty  of  war  between  them  and  the 
savages  in  case  their  stipends  were  withheld;  the  pain  it  must  give  the 
First  Consul  to  be  the  means  of  the  destruction  of  the  white  inhabit 
ants,  whom  it  would  be  impossible  to  defend;  and  upon  the  benefits 


PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  103 

that  would  result  to  the  commerce  and  manufactures  of  France  from  a 
friendly  connection  with  us.  These  seemed  to  make  an  impression 
upon  him;  and  he  promised  to  represent  them  strongly  to  the  First 
Consul  to-morrow;  but  added,  that  however  my  other  plans  might  be 
received,  I  must  consider  the  purchase  of  the  country  as  out  of  the 
question;  intimating  that  a  sale  was  below  their  dignity;  so  that  I  fear 
my  hopes,  founded  on  their  necessities,  are  frustrated. 

I  am,  sir,  with  the  most  respectful  consideration,  your  obedient, 
humble  servant. 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

Hon.  JAMES  MADISON,  Secretary  of  State. 


(The  following,  Nos.  2  and  3,  are  supposed  to  be  the  memoirs  referred 
to  in  Mr.  Livingston's  despatch  of  the  18th  February.) 

a  ,--f .  A  a,  •;  s  3 « -  No.  2. 


I  am  sensible,  sir,  that  I  have  already  taxed  your  patience  in  the 
memoirs  that  I  have  submitted  to  your  attention;  but,  sir,  (pardon  the 
frankness  with  which  I  speak,)  the  critical  moment  is  arrived  which 
rivets  the  connection  of  the  United  States  to  France,  or  binds  a  young 
and  growing  people  for  ages  hereafter  to  her  mortal  and  inveterate 
enemy. 

How  highly  I  estimate  the  alliance  of  France,  and  how  much  I 
believe  the  happiness  of  both  nations  may  be  promoted  by  it,  not  only 
appears  from  the  whole  of  my  political  conduct,  but  has  been  stated 
in  an  essay  upon  the  relative  maritime  power  of  France  and  Britain, 
which,  as  I  have  learned,  has  been  honored  by  the  First  Consul's 
attention. 

The  United  States  have  at  present  but  two  possible  causes  of  differ 
ence  with  France — the  debt  due  to  her  citizens,  and  the  possession  of 
Louisiana.  The  first  of  these  France  is  not  only  bound  to  pay  by  the 
laws  of  justice,  but  by  the  solemn  stipulations  of  a  treaty  which  has 
been  observed  with  the  utmost  good  faith  by  the  United  States,  who 
have  advanced  large  sums  in  consequence,  without  suffering  them 
selves  to  doubt  that  it  would  meet  with  equal  attention  on  the  part  of 
France.  Give  me  leave  to  add,  sir,  that  your  signature  was  considered 
as  a  guarantee  of  that  treaty  by  the  people  of  the  United  States,  who 
had  long  since  learned  to  estimate  the  candor  and  integrity  of  your 
character. 

My  present  object,  sir,  is  to  show,  in  a  very  few  words,  that  Lou 
isiana  affords  France  not  only  the  means  of  discharging  their  debt,  and 
promoting  the  other  object  which  I  took  the  liberty  to  hint  at  before, 
but  even  of  placing  her  colony  of  Louisiana  in  a  better  situation, 


104  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

should  it  be  her  wish  to  retain  that  colony,  than  she  would  do  by 
listening  to  no  compromise  with  the  United  States. 

The  object  of  France  in  forming  this  colony  is  to  supply  her  islands; 
to  afford  an  outlet  for  such  of  her  population  as  she  thinks  she  can 
spare  from  home.  But  not  to  scatter  her  people  over  an  immense  wil 
derness,  where  they  will  be  lost  for  her  and  to  the  world;  or  to  fill  her 
territory  with  inhabitants  that  would  withdraw  their  allegiance  the 
moment  they  found  themselves  in  a  situation  so  to  do;  which  will  cer 
tainly  be  the  case  if  these,  or  if  any  but  the  natives  of  France  are 
permitted  to  settle  it. 

It  is,  then,  the  interest  of  France  to  limit  her  territory,  and  to  render 
it  as  compact  as  possible,  without  placing  it  at  such  a  distance  from  the 
sea  as  to  put  it  totally  out  of  her  control.  While  with  the  remainder  of 
the  territory,  she  fulfills  other  important  objects,  and,  above  all,  builds 
her  future  connection  with  the  United  States  upon  mutual  interests, 
and  that  strict  and  solemn  regard  for  treaties  which  can  alone  lull  the 
apprehensions  that  her  power  excites,  and  to  which,  more  than  the 
force  of  her  arms,  Rome  was  indebted  for  the  dominion  of  the  world. 

The  produce  of  Louisiana  must  be  conveyed  by  the  Mississippi,  and 
there  are  no  ports  for  her  marine  to  the  west  of  Perisacola.  If,  there 
fore,  France  should  possess  Pensacola,  and  all  the  ports  to  the  east  of 
it,  she  will  have  the  complete  command  of  the  Gulf.  And  if  she  pos 
sesses  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  all  Louisiana  lying  to 
the  west  of  that  river,  and  south  of  the  river  Arkansas,  comprehending 
a  tract  nearly  as  large  as  the  ancient  Government  of  France,  she  will 
have  more  territory  than  will  suffice  to  supply  all  the  wants  of  her 
marine,  and  West  India  colonies,  with  such  articles  as  that  country  can 
produce. 

Louisiana,  within  these  limits,  can  support  a  population  of  15,000,000 
of  people.  You  will  judge,  sir,  whether  it  would  be  possible  for 
France  to  retain  more  than  that  number  in  subjection;  or  whether  it 
would  be  good  policy  to  extend  her  population  beyond  the  number  she 
can  govern. 

The  settlers  to  the  north  of  the  river  Arkansas  would  be  too  far 
from  the  sea  to  fear  any  force  from  France.  A  distant  colony  must 
be  of  moderate  size,  compactly  settled,  and  not  remote  from  the  sea, 
or  the  parent  State  will  soon  lose  all  control  over  it.  The  interest  of 
France,  then,  requires  that  her  colony  in  Louisiana  should  not  exceed 
the  limits  I  mention,  and  the  separation  of  this  territory  from  that 
lying  to  the  east  of  the  river  Perdido  would  afford  an  additional  secu 
rity  to  France  for  the  possession  of  -  both,  not  only  as  it  would  break 
the  connection  of  the  colonies,  but  as  their  interest  would  be  totally 
different,  the  last  possessing  little  valuable  land,  (for  both  East  and 
West  Florida  are  barren  tracts,)  would  be  military  posts  and  commer 
cial  entrepots;  from  which  the  trade  would  be  carried  on  to  and  from 


PUECHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  105 

the  Mississippi  in  small  vessels;  while  that  with  France  would,  on 
account  of  her  safe  and  commodious  harbors,  center  in  East  Florida. 

The  inhabitants  of  this  country  would  be  deeply  interested  in  a  con 
tinuance  of  their  connection  with  the  mother  country.  While  the 
interposition  of  West  Florida,  in  the  hands  of  the  United  States,  would 
prevent  any  coercion  on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  of  Louisiana,  if 
they  should  at  any  time  be  disposed  to  revolt;  east  Florida,  on  the 
contrary,  while  loyal  to  France,  would,  by  means  of  her  navy,  have  a 
powerful  control  on  the  colony  of  Louisiana. 

The  example  of  England  should  have  some  weight.  The  Dutch 
possessed  New  York;  England,  for  the  sake  of  uniting  her  colonies, 
purchased  it  from  Holland.  Had  it  been  left  in  the  hands  of  the 
Dutch,  that  union,  which  has  lost  the  whole  to  Britain,  would  have 
been  prevented. 

The  Colonies  of  Louisiana  and  East  Florida,  within  the  limits  pro 
posed,  being  thus  secured,  the  remainder  of  the  Spanish  cession  is 
only  valuable  as  it  enables  France  to  pursue  other  great  objects,  to 
wit:  the  payment  of  the  debt  in  conformity  to  her  treaty;  and  the  con 
ciliation  of  an  ally  which  may  on  so  many  important  occasions  be  use 
ful  to  her;  and  the  one  of  no  less  magnitude  to  which  I  have  in  my 
last  the  honor  to  allude. 

The  United  States  possess  the  east  side  of  the  Mississippi,  from  its 
source  to  the  thirty-first  degree  of  north  latitude.  It  would  be  very 
interesting  to  them  to  acquire  the  possession  of  the  remainder  of  the  east 
bank  of  that  river  to  its  mouth,  and  that  narrow  strip  of  land  which 
lies  between  the  thirty-first  degree  of  latitude  and  the  sea,  as  far  as 
the  river  Perdido;  not  on  account  of  the  value  of  the  land,  for,  except 
a  small  quantity  on  the  banks  of  the  river,  it  is  for  the  most  part  a 
sandy  barren,  or  a  sunken  marsh;  but  because  it  w^ould  give  them  the 
mouths  of  those  rivers  which  run  through  their  territory,  and  afford 
an  outlet  to  the  sea. 

To  the  cession  of  this  country  but  one  possible  objection  can  be 
raised  on  the  part  of  France;  it  may  attach  a  value  to  New  Orleans 
which  it  by  no  means  merits.  The  fact  is,  that  to  France,  who  has  the 
choice  of  fixing  her  capital  on  either  side  of  the  river,  New  Orleans 
has  no  circumstance  to  recommend  it.  It  is  placed  on  the  naked  bank; 
it  has  no  port,  basin,  or  quay,  for  shipping;  has  no  fortification  of  any 
strength;  and  is  incapable  of  being  rendered  a  good  military  position; 
and  the  houses  are  only  of  wood,  subject  to  continual  accidents.  The 
situation  was  fixed  first  by  France  on  account  of  its  being  on  the 
Florida  side  of  the  river  where  the  settlements  commenced;  but  as  it 
was  soon  found  that  the  lands  of  the  west  side  of  the  river  were  much 
richer,  the  principal  part  of  the  population  is  now  there.  The  bank 
opposite  to  New  Orleans  is  higher  and  better  calculated  for  a  town: 
it  already  has  a  strong  post  in  Fort  Leon,  the  most  commanding  posi- 


106  PUECHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

tion  in  that  eountiy;  and  the  harbor,  or  rather  the  road,  is  in  all 
things  equal  to  that  of  New  Orleans.  As  a  Government  house  and 
barracks,  stores,  &c. ,  must  be  built  either  at  New  Orleans  or  at  Fort 
Leon,  there  can  be  no  doubt,  even  if  France  retains  both,  that  the 
latter  ought  to  have  the  preference,  since  a  regular  and  handsome 
capital  could  be  laid  out  there,  and  in  a  healthier  and  stronger 
situation  than  at  New  Orleans. 

It  is  highly  probable  that,  in  this  case,  the  superiority  it  would  have 
in  point  of  health,  the  advantages  of  the  Government,  and,  above  all, 
the  free  trade  with  France  and  her  islands,  would  render  it  in  three 
years  more  populous  than  New  Orleans  now  is.  The  French  merchants 
would  sell  their  houses  in  the  one  to  the  Americans,  and  establish  them 
selves  in  the  other.  Should  France  retain  the  whole  of  the  Spanish 
cession  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  she  will  find  it  absolutely  necessary 
to  remove  her  capital  to  the  west  side.  The  river  for  three  months  is 
impassable  from  the  violence  of  the  inundation,  and  the  trees  that  it 
brings  down  with  it.  As  the  bulk  of  the  colony  is  on  the  west  wide  of 
the  river,  it  must  necessarily  draw  its  capital  after  it,  or  submit  to  be 
cut  off  from  it  during  this  period.  A  town  will,  therefore,  rise 
at  Fort  Leon,  where  the  richest  establishments  are  already  formed, 
which  must  increase  with  the  population  of  the  country. 

The  difficulty  of  removing  the  capital  from  New  Orleans  will  increase 
as  its  buildings  become  more  numerous,  and  its  population  greater. 
It  is,  therefore,  in  every  event  the  true  interest  of  France  to  commence 
the  establishment  of  a  capital  on  a  regular  plan  on  the  west  side  of  the 
river,  where  it  must  ultimately  be,  rather  than  expend  money  upon  the 
old  town  of  New  Orleans,  which  they  will  find  too  much  insulated  for 
the  capital  of  Louisiana. 

Permit  me,  sir,  to  examine  the  subject  in  a  point  of  view  which  I 
conceive  is  important  not  only  to  France  and  the  United  States,  but  to 
every  maritime  power.  It  can  not  be  doubted  that  the  peace  between 
France  and  Britain  has  been  too  disadvantageous  to  the  latter  to  be  of 
long  duration.  Strong  symptoms  of  an  approaching  rupture  have 
already  appeared;  and  the  statesmen  of  both  countries  will  begin  to 
examine  the  points  of  attack  and  defense,  and  the  acquisitions  that 
afford  the  most  permanent  advantages.  The  Cape,  Malta,  and  Egypt, 
have  already  awakened  the  cupidity  of  Great  Britain.  Should  she 
extend  her  views  across  the  Atlantic,  (and  what  is  to  limit  them?)  the 
cession  of  Louisiana  to  France  offers  her  the  fairest  pretense  to  invade 
that  country,  either  from  Canada  or  by  the  Atlantic. 

She  felt  no  reluctance  in  leaving  them  to  Spain;  but  she  will  not 
quietly  see  them  in  the  hands  of  France.  She  will  strain  every  nerve 
to  acquire  them.  By  uniting  them  with  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia  she 
encircles  the  United  States;  and,  having  the  same  manners,  the  same 
religion,  the  same  language,  and  a  number  of  partisans  among  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF   LOUISIANA.  107 

commercial  inhabitants  of  the  United  States;  having-  carefully  removed 
every  conflicting  question,  and  even  conciliated,  by  the  liberality  of 
her  restitutions,  those  whom  her  conduct  during  the  war  had  irri 
tated;  it  will  be  difficult  to  say  what  will  be  the  extent  of  her  influence. 
But,  independently  of  this  circumstance,  if  Britain  should  unite  Loui 
siana  and  West  Florida  to  her  other  American  possessions,  no  power 
in  Europe  will  be  able  to  oppose  her  force.  The  bay  of  St.  Esprit  will 
become  another  Gibraltar,  from  which  she  will  ravage  every  island 
and  continental  possession  of  France,  Spain,  and  Holland;  she  will 
monopolize  the  commodities  of  the  West  as  she  has  already  done  those 
of  the  East  Indies.  Not  a  moment,  sir,  should  be  lost  for  placing  a 
barrier  between  the  settlements  that  France  may  wish  to  retain  in 
Louisiana  and  Canada,  by  ceding  to  the  United  States  the  portion  I 
have  proposed  above  the  Arkansas;  and  by  the  cession  of  New  Orleans 
and  West  Florida,  to  take  from  them  the  first  inducement  to  attack 
that  country.  France  should  exert  all  her  resources  and  all  her 
strength  in  the  immediate  fortification  of  Pensacola  and  the  bay  of  St. 
Esprit;  or,  if  she  has  not  the  means  of  doing  it,  she  should  leave  them 
in  the  hands  of  Spain  (if  she  can  consent  to  leave  her  at  peace)  or  to 
some  other  neutral  nation.  For  1  will  venture  to  say  that  the  acquisi 
tion  of  that  country,  by  a  nation  who  possesses  Newfoundland,  Nova 
Scotia,  and  Canada,  with  a  powerful  maritime  force,  will  annihilate 
the  external  trade  of  every  other  nation  in  Europe;  and  that  it  would 
be  the  true  interest  even  of  Spain  herself,  rather  to  see  her  ports  in 
Florida  in  the  hands  of  the  United  States,  who  alone  can  defend  them, 
than  to  keep  them  in  her  own,  at  the  risk  of  having  them  wrested  from 
her  by  Britain.  Perhaps,  in  the  present  state  of  things,  considering 
the  superiority  of  the  British  navy  at  this  moment,  the  great  capital 
that  it  will  require  to  reinstate  the  French  islands,  and  her  continental 
possessions  in  the  East  Indies  and  in  America,  the  wisest  measure 
would  be,  not  only  to  make  the  cession  I  have  asked,  but  to  hypothe 
cate  the  whole  of  East  Florida  for  a  term  of  years,  for  such  part  of 
the  American  debt  as  may  remain  unsatisfied. 

But  as  this  is  a  mere  hasty,  undigested  idea,  rather  intended  to  turn 
your  attention  to  this  subject,  than  as  a  matter  sufficiently  matured  to 
take  the  form  of  a  proposition.  I  can  not,  sir,  conclude  this  note, 
without  turning  your  attention  to  the  present  feelings  of  the  people 
of  all  parties  in  the  United  States  with  respect  to  France.  The 
total  silence  of  the  French  Government  on  the  subject  of  their  inten 
tion  as  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  their  rights  of  entrepot 
at  New  Orleans,  secured  to  them  by  the  most  solemn  treaty  with 
Spain ;  the  mystery  with  which  all  the  arrangements  of  France  for 
taking  possession  of  that  country  are  concealed  from  the  Minister  of 
the  United  States,  notwithstanding  his  repeated  notes  to  the  Minister 
of  Exterior  Relations  on  the  subject;  have  excited  the  most  lively 


108  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

apprehensions  of  designs  unfriendly  to  their  commerce  and  their  rights. 
The  total  neglect  of  every  measure  that  leads  to  a  security  for  their 
debt,  notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  the  treaty,  and  the  ruin  of 
numbers  of  their  citizens  by  this;  and  the  very  extraordinary  decisions 
which  have,  in  several  instances,  taken  place  in  the  Council  of  Prizes, 
for  which  I  have  been  able  to  receive  not  merely  no  redress  but  even 
no  answer;  contrasted  with  the  good  faith  displayed  by  their  own 
Government  with  respect  to  France,  with  the  scrupulous  attention  that 
Great  Britain  has  paid  to  repair,  by  the  most  liberal  conduct,  the 
abuses  she  has  permitted  herself  to  commit  during  the  war,  leads  to  a 
belief  that  France  limits  her  rights  by  her  power;  and  insensibly  dis 
poses  them  to  alliances,  both  offensive  and  defensive,  which  it  has 
heretofore  been  her  policy  to  avoid.  Can  it  possibly  be  the  interest 
of  France,  sir,  to  drive  the  United  States  into  these  alliances,  while 
she  forms  colonies,  and  retains  islands  in  their  neighborhood  2  Can 
she  look  with  contempt  upon  an  enterprising  and  hardy  nation  who 
possesses  means  of  defense  at  home,  and  for  a  maritime  force  which 
will  render  her  respectable  abroad  ?  The  immense  power  of  France 
has  rendered  her  an  object  of  jealousy  to  the  Old  World;  while  the 
inhabitants  of  the  New  felt  no  other  sensations  than  those  of  admiration 
and  respect. 

In  Europe,  France  only  knows  secret  enemies  and  hollow  friends. 
In  America,  she  has  grateful  allies.  Let  her  not,  sir,  for  the  bubble 
of  the  day,  cast  them  off;  but  let  her  avail  herself  of  the  advantages 
she  has  acquired,  to  bind  them  to  her.  Should  she,  relying  on  her 
own  strength,  never  need  their  aid,  she  still  will  tind  a  consolation  in 
reflecting  that  the  sacrifices  (if  such  they  may  be  called)  she  makes, 
are  sacrifices  at  the  altar  of  justice  and  national  faith.  She  will  cheaply 
purchase  the  esteem  of  men  and  the  favor  of  Heaven  by  the  surrender 
of  a  distant  wilderness,  which  can  neither  add  to  her  wealth  nor  to 
her  strength. 

K.  R.  L. 


R^-1  No.  3. 

JANUARY  7,  IS02.   (?)  v 
To- 

In  a  conversation  which  I  yesterday  had  with  General  Bernadotto,  1 
find  that  some  idea  is  at  present  entertained  by  the  First  Consul  of 
treating  at  Washington  of  the  several  matters  I  had  the  honor  to  men 
tion  to  you.  I  should  be  extremely  pleased  at  this  arrangement,  because 
I  should  see  in  it  those  advantages  to.  my  country  which  are  always 
derived  from  carrying  on  a  negotiation  at  home,  where  the  views  of 
the  Government  are  clearly  known,  where  they  can  avail  themselves 
of  every  light  and  information,  while  the  Minister  with  whom  they 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  109 

treat  is  isolated,  and  must  rely  on  his  own  resources  and  those  he 
draws  from  suspicious  channels.  But,  sir,  there  are  circumstances 
which,  in  the  present  instance,  appeair  to  me  to  counterbalance  those 
advantages,  and  which  render  it  peculiarly  the  interest  of  France  and 
the  United  States  to  come  to  a  more  immediate  arrangement  of  several 
matters  that  interest  them  in  this  negotiation. 

I  can  not  conceal  from  you,  sir,  that  both  the  Government  and  the 
people  of  the  United  States  are  at  present  in  such  a  state  of  mind  as  to 
be  rilled  with  doubts  and  jealousies  with  respect  to  the  views  and  dis 
positions  of  France.  Many  among  her  firmest  friends  are  ruined  by^ 
the  inexecution  of  that  article  of  the  treaty  which  provides  for  the 
payment  of  their  debts;  many  by  hast}^  measures  at  Santo  Domingo, 
and  the  disregard,  in  some  instances,  of  the  common  principles  of  the 
law  of  nations  in  the  decisions  of  the  Council  of  Prizes.  The  silence  of 
the  French  and  Spanish  Governments  on  the  subject  of  their  intentions 
relative  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  right  of  entrepot 
at  New  Orleans,  has  given  just  grounds  of  alarm.  But,  sir,  a  circum 
stance  has  just  come  to  my  knowledge,  though  not  officially,  yet  in 
such  a  way  as  leaves  me  little  room  to  doubt  of  its  authenticity,  which 
can  not  fail  to  drive  the  United  States  into  some  violent  measure. 

"On  the  20th  of  October,  the  Governor  of  New  Orleans  issued  a 
proclamation,  in  which,  speaking  of  the  Americans,  he  says  they  will 
not  in  future  be  permitted  to  make  a  deposit  of  their  cargo  in  New 
Orleans,  in  conformit}^  to  the  twent}^-second  article  of  their  Treaty  of 
27th  October,  1795,  which  has  expired."  1  have  examined  the  treaty: 
there  is  no  pretense  for  this  construction  of  it;  and,  as  the  right  has 
been  regularly  exercised  till  now,  it  will  be  generally  believed  in  the 
United  States  that  this  construction  could  only  have  been  suggested 
by  a  wish  on  the  part  of  France  to  get  rid  of  the  provisions  of  the 
treat}^  before  she  took  possession.  Now,  sir,  I  will  frankly  confess  to 
you  that  the  United  States  will  rather  hazard  their  very  existence  than 
suffer  the  Mississippi  to  be  shut  against  them.  Of  this  you  will  easily 
be  convinced  when  you  learn  that,  when  their  numbers  were  but  half 
of  what  they  now  are,  and  their  means  of  defense  infinitely  less,  their 
instructions  to  their  Ministers  that  made  the  first  treaty  with  Great 
Britain  were,  by  no  means  to  sign  a  treaty  without  securing  the  free 
navigation  of  that  river.  You  will  not,  therefore,  be  surprised  if  this 
step  of  Spain  should  wind  up  the  American  people  and  Government 
to  so  high  a  pitch  of  resentment  as  shall  lead  them  to  a  close  and 
intimate  connection  with  Britain,  and  perhaps  to  an  immediate  rupture 
with  Spain. 

If,  under  these  circumstances,  an  Ambassador  should  arrive  in 
America  without  being  the  bearer  of  a  treaty  which  terminates  their 
differences,  and  should  propose  to  enter  upon  a  treaty  with  the  Amer 
ican  Government,  they  will  naturally  ask,  why  has  our  Minister  been 


110  PtJKCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

able  to  effect  nothing  in  fourteen  months?  Why  have  our  debts 
remained  unpaid  ?  Why  has  he  received  no  sort  of  satisfaction  on  any 
subject  on  which  he  has  addressed  himself  to  the  Government?  And 
why  does  France  now,  at  this  late  day,  prefer  making  a  treaty  in 
America  to  concluding  one  at  home  ?  While,  at  the  same  time,  she  is 
sending  out  large  armies  to  the  islands,  and  possessing  herself  of 
Louisiana  and  the  Floridas  ?  Is  it  not  to  paralyze  those  measures  of 
security  that  common  prudence  would  suggest  to  the  United  States  ? 
Is  it  not  to  stop  the  treaty  which  we  are  about  to  make  relative  to  our 
Wrestern  boundary  with  Great  Britain  ?  Is  it  not  to  give  France  time 
to  arrange  her  affairs  in  the  islands,  to  strengthen  her  ports  in  Amer 
ica?  Some  months  will  elapse  before  the  treaty  is  made,  and  many 
before  it  is  ratified.  What  security  have  we  that  this  treaty,  when 
made,  will  meet  the  approbation  of  the  First  Consul,  when  time  has 
made  a  change  in  circumstances?  These,  sir,  and  a  thousand  other 
doubts,  will  arise  in  the  minds  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and 
they  will  be  blown  into  certainties  by  the  agents  of  Britain,  who  are  to 
be  found  in  all  our  commercial  towns. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  will 
receive  with  attention  the  French  Ambassador;  that  they  will  listen  to 
his  propositions;  and  will  treat  with  him  with  pleasure  upon  the  basis 
I  have  mentioned.  But  they  will  not,  on  that  account,  cease  to  con 
sider  the  conclusion  as  very  distant,  or  relinquish  any  measure  that 
they  may  deem  it  wise  to  pursue,  in  case  no  treaty  was  proposed. 
Treating  under  these  circumstances,  I  fear  there  will  be  much  less 
ground  to  hope  a  cordial  and  friendly  intercourse  than  if  the  earliest 
moment  was  embraced,  and  the  Ambassador  of  France  was  the  bearer 
of  a  treaty  already  completed. 

There  are  other  considerations,  sir,  which  I  believe  will  have  some 
weight  with  the  First  Consul,  if  suggested  to  him.  The  terms  I  have 
proposed  as  a  basis  of  a  treaty,  are  precisely  those  which  would  be 
most  remignant  to  the  interests  of  Britain.  By  interposing  the  United 
States  betwi&e«-(^iTada  and  the  French  establishments  on  the  Missis 
sippi,  her  views  upon  a  communication  with  the  sea  by  that  channel 
are  completely  cut  off.  By  giving  France  the  ports  on  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  the  British  islands  are  held  in  check.  By  interposing  the 
establishments  of  France  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  by 
the  only  practicable  route,  the  jealousies  of  Spain,  with  respect  to  the 
United  States,  will  be  calmed,  and  she  will  have  in  France  an  ally  at 
hand  to  protect  her  from  the  ambitious  views  of  Britain.  At  present, 
Britain  feels  little  uneasiness  about  the  possessions  of  France  in  Lou 
isiana,  because,  believing  that  they  will  operate  to  render  the  United 
States  enemies  of  France,  they  count  upon  their  aid  in  dispossessing 
them,  and  in  reaping  the  fruits  of  their  labor.  It  will  be  extremely 
difficult,  if  a  negotiation  is  set  on  foot  in  the  United  States  to  conduct 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  11 

it  with  such  secrecy  as  to  escape  the  vigilance  of  Britain.  In  a  pop 
ular  Government,  where  she  has  many  friends,  it  may  not  be  difficult 
to  prevent  success.  Nor  will  she  hesitate  to  make  important  sacrifices 
to  defeat  this  object. 

There  are  other  matters  which,  though  less  important,  deserve  con 
sideration.  France  apprehends  that  the  rebels  in  the  islands  are 
supplied  with  arms,  &c.,  from  the  United  States.  I  trust  that  appre 
hension  has  hitherto  been  unfounded.  She  may  wish  for  laws  pointed 
to  this  object.  The  party  hostile  to  France,  the  person  jealous  and 
suspicious  of  her  views  in  their  present  state  of  irritation,  may  con 
sider  her  islands  as  the  point  in  which  she  is  most  vulnerable;  and, 
while  they  decline  any  active  part  in  support  of  the  revolters,  they 
may  be  unwilling  to  see  them  reduced  to  submission.  The  British 
influence  will  have  room  to  operate  on  this  subject.  Laws  pass  very 
slowly,  and  there  are  many  means  of  obstructing  their  passage.  But 
a  treaty  is,  in  the  United  States,  the  most  solemn  of  all  laws.  Any 
provision  that  we  agree  upon  here  must  be  binding.  If,  then,  a  treaty 
is  formed  here,  the  Minister,  instead  of  having  a  law  to  solicit,  in  the 
face  of  a  thousand  intrigues  and  jealousies,  will  carry  the  law  out  with 
him,  and  will  have  only  to  watch  over  its  execution. 

All  these,  and  many  other  reasons,  which  I  will  spare  you  the 
trouble  reading,  suggest  the  propriety  of  finishing  the  treaty  here, 
and  that  as  speedily  as  possible.  It  is  certain  that  more  light  can  be 
acquired  relative  to  that  country  at  Paris,  (if  doubt  should  be  enter 
tained  as  to  my  assertions,)  than  any  foreign  Minister  could  obtain  at 
Washington. 

I  speak,  sir,  perhaps  with  too  much  freedom  on  the  views  of  }-our 
country  and  my  own.  But  I  speak  with  freedom,  from  a  conviction  of 
the  integrity  of  'my  own  intentions,  and  the  absolute  certainty  that 
the  measures  I  suggest  are  not  less  the  interest  of  the  one  than  of  the 
other.  As  no  chicanery,  no  crooked  policy,  will  mingle  itself  in  our 
treaty,  one  may  be  concluded  in  a  week,  if  the  Consul  shall  be  pleased 
to  name  yourself  or  General  Bernadotte,  in  whose  candor  and  infor 
mation  I  have  great  confidence.  It  would  certainly  be  very  grateful 
to  him  to  be  the  bearer  of  a  treaty  which  insures  him  the  cordial  and 
friendly  reception  in  the  United  States  that  his  mission  and  his  merits 
entitle  him  to. 

1  am,  sir,  &c.,  ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to 

c\,$.P,  $  ',  <r  3  -i  France- 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  February  23,  1803. 

SIR:  Since  my  last,   which  was  of   the  18th  of  January,  I  have 
received  your  several  letters  of  the  llth  and  14th  of  November,  1802. 


112  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

As  you  will  receive  this  from  the  hands  of  Mr.  Monroe,  I  refer  to 
him  for  full  information  relative  to  our  internal  affairs  generally,  and, 
in  particular,  to  the  violation  to  our  right  of  deposit  at  New  Orleans, 
with  the  impressions  and  proceedings  which  have  resulted  from  it. 

In  his  hands  also,  are  the  commission  and  instructions  in  which  he  is 
joined  with  yourself,  to  treat  with  the  French  Government  for  an 
enlargement  of  our  rights  and  our  security  in  the  southwestern  neigh 
borhood  of  the  United  States.  These  documents,  with  the  communi 
cations  and  explanations  which  Mr.  Monroe  will  be  able  to  add,  will 
put  you  in  full  possession  of  the  subject. 

The  negotiation  to  be  opened  will  bring  the  disposition  and  views 
of  the  French  Government  to  a  test.  If  it  should  meet  the  negotia 
tion  in  a  proper  spirit,  and  with  a  just  estimate  of  the  real  interests 
of  France,  not  only  a  favorable  issue  may  be  expected,  but  it  will  be 
proper  for  you  to  avail  yourself  of  the  occasion,  to  insist  on  a  prompt 
anti  complete  fulfillment  of  the  convention,  so  long  delayed  on  that 
side,  but  which  was  so  readily  and  so  liberally  executed  on  ours;  and 
on  a  fair  discharge  of  the  pecuniary  engagements  of  every  description, 
to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

The  occasion  may  be  proper,  also,  for  obtaining  satisfaction  to  Cap 
tains  Koclgers  and  Davidson  for  the  outrages  committed  on  them  in 
St.  Domingo.  The  death  of  General  Le  Clerc  will  have  lessened  the 
influence  of  his  connection  with  the  subject,  in  obstructing  a  just  con 
sideration  of  it. 

A  return  to  your  representations  on  the  subject  of  the  French  navi 
gation  laws,  may  be  equally  recommended  by  the  occasion.  Although 
the  present  session  of  Congress,  like  the  last,  will  pass  over  without 
any  countervailing  regulations  here,  it  can  not  be  doubted  that  the  dis 
criminations  made  by  France,  with  a  view  to  exclude  our  shipping 
from  a  fair  share  in  the  freight  of  our  own  productions,  will,  and  can 
be  effectually  counteracted  by  the  United  States,  if  not  corrected  by 
herself.  Should  a  disposition  appear  to  take  up  the  whole  subject  of 
commerce  between  the  two  countries,  with  a  view  to  conventional 
regulations  on  just  principles,  the  President  authorizes  you  to  express 
a  like  disposition  in  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  But  he 
prefers  for  the  discussions,  this  place  to  Paris,  for  the  double  reason 
that  the  requisite  commercial  information  could  be  more  readily 
gained  here  than  there,  and  that  a  French  negotiator  might  here  be 
more  easily  and  fully  impressed  with  the  importance  of  our  commerce 
to  France,  than  could  be  done  at  Paris.  Mr.  Otto,  it  is  presumed, 
would  not  be  an  unfavorable  Minister  for  such  a  business;  and  may,  if 
the  French  Government  incline,  bring  with  him  the  necessary  author 
ities  and  instructions  for  entering  upon  it. 

If,  instead  of  these  friendly  sentiments  and  purposes,  which  may  be 
improved  into  a  solid  and  satisfactory  adjustment  of  the  mutual  inter- 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA,  113 

ests  of  the  two  nations,  the  French  Government  should  betray  a 
settled  repugnance  to  just  arrangements  with  the  United  States;  and, 
above  all,  if  it  should  manifest  or  betray  a  hostile  spirit  towards  them, 
or  be  found  to  meditate  projects  inconsistent  with  their  rights,  and, 
consequently,  leading  to  a  rupture,  not  a  moment  is  to  be  lost  in  for 
warding  the  information,  in  order  that  the  measures,  both  external 
and  internal,  adapted  to  such  a  state  of  things,  may  be  seasonably 
taken. 

I  have  the  honor,  &c. ,  JAMES  MADISON. 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON,  Esq.,  &c. 


Mr.  Madison  to  Mr.  Monroe. 

WASHINGTON,  March  1,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR, — Since  you  left  us  we  have  no  further  intelligence  from 
New  Orleans,  except  a  letter  dated  January  20th  from  the  Vice  Con 
sular  agent  there,  from  which  it  appears  that  the  letters  to  the  Gover 
nor  and  Intendant  from  the  Spanish  Minister  here  had  arrived  about 
the  13th,  and  had  not,  on  the  20th,  produced  the  desired  change  in  the 
state  of  things.  The  delay,  however,  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
viewed  by  the  Consul  as  any  proof  that  the  Intendant  would  not  con 
form  to  the  interposition.  The  idea  continued  that  he  had  taken  his 
measures  without  orders  from  his  Government.  There  are  letters 
(according  to  that  from  the  Consul)  for  the  Marquis  Yrujo  now  on  the 
way  by  land.  These  will  probably  shew  whether  the  Intendant  will 
yield  or  not.  The  despatch  vessel  which  carried  the  Marquis's  letters 
is  not  yet  returned.  The  detention  of  her  beyond  the  allotted  time  is 
favorably  interpreted  by  him,  on  the  presumption  that  she  waits  for  a 
satisfactory  answer,  which  the  pride  of  the  Intendant  postpones  as  long 
as  possible. 

The  newspapers  will  have  informed  you  of  the  turn  given  to  the 
proceedings  of  Congress  on  the  subject  of  New  Orleans,  &c.  The 
propositions  of  Mr.  Ross  in  the  Senate,  which  drove  at  war  thro1  a 
delegation  of  unconstitutional  power  to  the  Executive,  were  discussed 
very  elaborately,  and  vnth  open  doors.  The  adversaries  of  them  tri 
umphed  in  the  debate,  and  threw  them  out  by  15  votes  against  11.  On 
the  motion  of  Mr.  Breckenridge,  measures  of  expenseless  or  cheap 
preparation,  in  the  style  of  those  which  attended  Mr.  Jay's  mission  to 
G.  Britain,  have  been  agreed  on  in  the  Senate.  It  is  uncertain  whether 
even  these  will  pass  the  House  of  Representatives.  If  they  should,  as 
is,  perhaps,  not  improper,  they  will  not  be  understood  as  indicating 
views  that  ought  to  excite  suspicions  or  unfriendly  sensations  in  either 
of  the  Governments  to  which  your  Mission  is  addressed.  The  truth  is, 
that  justice  and  peace  prevail. not  only  in  the  public  councils,  but  in 
H.  Doc.  431 8 


114  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

the  body  of  the  community;  and  will  continue  to  do  so  as  long  as  the 
conduct  of  other  nations  will  permit.  But  France  and  Spain  cannot  be 
too  deeply  impressed  with  the  necessity  of  revising  their  relations  to 
us  thro'  the  Mississippi,  if  they  wish  to  enjoy  our  friendship,  or  pre 
clude  a  state  of  things  which  will  be  more  formidable  than  any  that 
either  of  those  powers  has  yet  experienced.  Some  adjustments,  such 
as  those  which  you  have  to  propose,  have  become  indispensable.  The 
whole  of  what  we  wish  is  not  too  much  to  secure  permanent  harmony 
between  the  parties.  Something  much  better  than  has  hitherto  been 
enjoyed  by  the  States  is  essential  to  any  tolerable  degree  of  it,  even 
for  the  present.  *  *  * 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  James  Monroe. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  March  %,  1803. 

SIR:  You  will  herewith  receive  two  commissions  with  the  corre 
spondent  instructions,  in  which  }TOU  are  associated  as  Minister  Plenipo 
tentiary  and  Extraordinary  to  the  French  Republic  and  to  His  Catholic 
Majesty;  together  with  the  respective  letters  of  credence  to  those 
Governments. 

Your  mission  to  Madrid  will  depend  on  the  event  of  that  to  Paris, 
and  on  the  information  there  to  be  acquired.  Should  the  entire  cession 
in  view  be  obtained  from  the  French  Republic,  as  the  assignees  of 
Spain,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  resort  to  the  Spanish  Government. 
Should  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  cession  be  found  to  depend,  not 
on  the  French,  but  on  the  Spanish  Government,  you  will  proceed  to  join 
Mr.  Pinckney  in  the  requisite  negotiations  with  the  latter.  Although 
the  United  States  are  deeply  interested  in  the  complete  success  of 
your  mission,  the  Floridas,  or  even  either  of  them,  without  the  island 
of  New  Orleans,  on  proportionate  terms,  will  be  a  valuable  acquisition. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  &c. , 

JAMES  MADISON. 

JAMES  MONROE,  Esq.,  &c. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  Mr.  Madison. 

PARIS,  March  3,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR:  You  will  receive,  with  this,  duplicates  of  two  letters 
which  contain  a  general  statement  of  our  affairs  here.  This  is  merely 
to  inform  }^ou  that  I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  18th  of  January, 
in  which  you  notify  me  of  Mr.  Monroe's  appointment.  I  shall  do 
everything  in  my  power  to  pave  the  way  for  him;  and  sincerely  wish 


PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  115 

his  mission  may  be  attended  with  the  desired  effect.  It  will,  however, 
cut  off  one  resource  on  which  I  greatly  relied;  because  I  had  estab 
lished  a  confidence  which  it  will  take  Mr.  Monroe  some  time  to  inspire. 
Enclosed  is  a  letter  addressed  to  the  First  Consul  himself,  and  sent 
him  before  I  heard  of  Mr.  Monroe's  appointment.  The  Minister  told 
me  yesterday  that  1  should  have  an  answer  to  it  in  a  few  days.  What 
that  answer  will  be  1  know  not:  but  1  have  been  indefatigable  in  my 
applications  to  everybody  who  will  probably  be  consulted  on  this 
subject.  When  I  arrived  here  I  found  Louisiana  a  very  favorite 
object.  Some  books  were  published  representing  it  as  a  paradise.  I 
think  1  have  greatly  aided  in  dispelling  this  mania;  and,  had  the  Flori- 
das  been  granted,  and  the  necessary  powers  given  me,  I  believe  that 
something  might  have  been  effected;  because  at  this  moment  there  is 
not  a  man  about  the  Court  but  inclines  to  our  ideas  upon  the  subject. 
The  Floridas  are  still  in  the  hands  of  Spain.  I  have  explained  the 
cause  in  my  last:  and  not  knowing  how  far  we  might  succeed  in  our 
negotiations,  or  what  sacrifices  you  would  make,  I  have  thought  it 
best  to  use  every  exertion  with  the  Spanish  Ambassador  and  the  British 
Minister  to  obstruct  that  negotiation. 

The  person  of  whom  you  speak  may  be  able  to  give  you  information 
as  to  the  expedition;  because  he  had  passed  as  an  important  inhabitant 
of  the  island,  and  the  General,  &c.,  relied  upon  his  aid  in  their  money- 
making  plans.  I  am  much  surprised,  however,  that  he  should  talk  of 
the  designs  of  this  Court,  the  price,  &c. ;  because  these  he  must  have 
derived  from  his  imagination  only;  as  he  had  no  means  of  seeing  any 
body  here  that  could  give  him  the  least  information  on  those  subjects. 
1  mention  this  that  the  President  may  not  place  any  sort  of  reliance 
upon  what  he  receives  through  that  channel,  except  as  it  respects  Gen 
eral  Victor  personally;  who,  I  will  venture  to  say,  knows  himself  less 
about  what  passes  here  than  you  do:  and  even  this  information  he 
must  receive  with  some  grains  of  allowance,  as  the  gentleman  has  a 
pretty  warm  imagination,  and  is  liable  to  be  deceived. 

The  armament  is  still  icebound  in  Holland. 
I  am,  sir,  &c. , 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

Hon.  JAMES  MADISON, 

Secretary  of  State. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  Citizen  Bonaparte,  First  Consul  of  France  and  Presi 
dent  of  the  Italian  Republic. 

PARIS,  February  07,  1803. 

CITIZEN  FIRST  CONSUL  AND  PRESIDENT:  Though  I  am  satisfied  that 
my  notes  to  the  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations  have  been  truly  repre 
sented  to  you,  yet  as,  in  the  immense  variety  of  important  objects  that 


116  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

occupy  your  time  and  attention,  they  may  have  escaped  }rour  memory, 
1  can  not  justify  myself  to  my  Government  without  making  every 
effort  to  bring  them  under  your  view;  since  I  consider  the  object  of 
them  as  too  closely  connected  with  that  harmony  which  can  not  be  indif 
ferent  to  two  countries  whose  physical  and  political  relations  enable 
them  to  be  mutually  serviceable  to  each  other.  And  1  find  that  it  has 
not  been  unusual,  upon  great  occasions,  for  the  Ministers  of  foreign 
Powers  to  address  themselves  directly  to  you.  This  1  prefer  to  do  by 
letter,  rather  than  by  personal  conference;  as  well  because  I  consider  it 
as  more  saving  of  your  time,  as  because  I  feared  that  my  imperfect 
knowledge  of  the  French  language  would  have  prevented  me  from 
expressing  myself  with  the  clearness  I  might  wish. 

I  pass  over,  citizen  First  Consul,  a  variety  of  circumstances  of  minor 
importance,  and,  which,  without  being  useful  to  France,  serve  to  dis 
tress  the  commerce  and  the  mercantile  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
which  have,  at  different  times,  been  represented  to  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  and  others  of  your  Ministers,  without  having  hitherto 
met  with  the  attention  they  merited.  I  presume,  when  a  negotiation 
shall  be  set  on  foot  for  the  arrangements  on  great  points,  smaller  ones 
will  meet  with  little  difficulty. 

The  claims  of  the  American  citizens  against  the  Government  of 
France,  are  so  well  founded  that  no  administration  that  ever  prevailed 
in  France  has  refused  to  recognize  them;  and  even  after  the  debts  of 
the  citizens  of  France  were  reduced  by  the  law  of  24th  Frimaire,  year 
-6,  the  Government  declared  that  those  due  to  foreigners  were  not 
comprised  in  the  regulation;  for  this  obvious  reason,  doubtless,  that 
they  were  not  to  be  benefited  by  the  revolution,  and  that  those  only 
would  be  justly  charged  with  the  expenses  to  whom  the  advantages 
were  to  result;  and  they  accordingly  reported,  that  a  large  sum  should 
be  applied  to  the  discharge  of  the  demands  of  foreigners;  who  were 
only  deprived  of  the  benefit  of  the  report  by  the  change  that  was  after 
wards  effected  in  the  constitution.  In  this  report  France  pursued 
the  example  of  good  faith  set  by  the  United  States  of  America,  who, 
in  the  fiscal  arrangements,  which  necessity  compelled  them  to  adopt, 
respected  the  rights  of  foreigners,  and  paid  their  contracts,  with  the 
most  scrupulous  exactitude,  in  specie,  while  their  own  citizens  were 
compelled  to  acquiesce  in  those  arrangements  which  the  general 
interest  of  their  country  (in  whose  prosperity  they  were  benefited) 
rendered  necessary. 

If,  sir,  the  validity  of  claims  could  be  tested  either  by  the  advan 
tages  received  by  the  debtor,  or  the  loss  sustained  by  the  creditor, 
none  can  stand  upon  stronger  ground  than  those  of  American  citizens 
against  France.  They  are  chiefly  founded  upon  contracts,  for  articles 
of  the  first  necessity,  furnished  when  they  were  most  needed,  and 
when  the  want  of  them  would  have  plunged  France  in  the  utmost 


PUKCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  117 

distress.  They  were  furnished,  too,  at  the  greatest  risk  to  the  pro 
prietor,  and  to  so  little  comparative  advantage  to  the  furnisher,  that 
those  who  either  from  political  motives,  or  from  juster  combination, 
carried  similar  commodities  to  Britain  or  neutral  ports,  have  been 
enriched,  while  those  whose  enthusiasm  in  the  cause  of  France  led 
them  to  seek  her  harbors  will,  if  strictly  paid  their  capital  and  interest, 
be  barely  snatched  from  ruin.  It  was  this  predilection,  too,  in  favor 
of  France,  that  furnished  Britain  with  a  pretense  to  commit  those 
depredations  on  our  commerce,  by  which  it  so  materially  suffered,  but 
which,  indeed,  ever  attentive  to  the  preservation  of  her  interests  in 
the  United  States,  she  is,  of  late,  very  amply  compensating1  b}r  full 
payment  of  principal,  interest,  and  damages,  for  any  illegal  capture 
made  during  the  war;  while  compensation  for  those  which  fell  under 
that  description  in  France  have,  in  a  great  measure,  been  given  up  by 
the  late  convention;  and  that  due  for  the  remaining  few,  which  ought 
to  have  been  satisfied  by  that  treaty,  have  been  eluded  by  some  very 
extraordinary  decisions  of  the  Council  of  Prizes,  or  by  that  delay 
which  all  the  claims  of  American  citizens  have  hitherto  met  with. 

But,  citizen  First  Consul,  it  is  not  now  necessary  to  state  the  jus 
tice  of  American  claims :  this  has  been  solemnly  recognized  by  a  treaty 
which  expressly  stipulates  for  their  payment,  and  distinguishes  the 
claims  of  American  citizens  from  those  of  ever}'-  other  nation.  This 
treaty  had  been  carried  into  effect  in  the  United  States,  the  Govern 
ment  of  which,  not  allowing  themselves  to  doubt  the  good  faith  of 
France,  paid  into  the  hands  of  the  agent  of  France,  and  upon  his  appli 
cation,  a  very  considerable  sum  of  money,  even  before  it  could  be 
strictly  claimed  under  the  treaty,  and  at  the  moment  when  her  own 
citizens  were  entitled  to  a  considerable  balance  to  France;  listening, 
in  this  transaction,  only  to  those  sentiments  of  good  will  which 
influence  the  conduct  of  the  present  Government  of  the  United  States 
toward  France,  and  to  her  wish  to  aid  her  military  operations. 

There  may  be  cases,  citizen  First  Consul,  in  which  the  necessities 
of  a  nation  may  compel  her  to  leave  the  obligations  of  a  treaty  unful 
filled;  but,  after  the  flattering  picture  which  is  daily  exhibited  of  the 
prosperity  of  France,  I  trust  that  no  such  necessity  exists  here;  but, 
were  it  otherwise,  I  am  persuaded  that  you  will  think  that  the  nation 
who  pleads  her  necessities  for  the  breach  of  her  treaties  can  not,  with 
honor,  avail  herself  of  advantages  to  be  drawn  from  those  treaties. 

France  would  never  have  permitted  her  Minister  to  claim  a  payment 
under  the  treaty,  if  she  had  not  determined  also,  on  her  part,  to  pay 
all  that  was  due  from  her  in  virtue  of  it. 

Your  signature,  citizen  First  Consul,  the  attention  yon  manifested 
to  remove  ambiguities,  by  the  form  under  which  you  were  pleased  to 
ratify  it,  gave  a  peculiar  weight  to  the  treaty,  because  they  show  that 
it  was  naturally  examined  by  you,  and  not  passed  over  in  the  hurry  of 


118  PUECHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF   LOUISIANA. 

other  business.  But,  sir,  the  receiving  money  under  it  is  such  a  con 
summation  of  the  act,  as  would  make  it  criminal  in  me  to  doubt  your 
ultimate  intention  to  fulfill  it. 

If,  sir,  justice,  if  good  faith,  and  those  considerations  of  magna 
nimity  which  influence  great  nations,  urge  the  immediate  fulfillment 
of  the  treaty,  the  wisdom  of  the  provision  which  stipulates  for  the  dis 
charge  of  the  debt  is  evinced  by  its  being  more  consistent  even  with 
the  pecuniary  interest  of  France  to  make  the  fullest  payment  under  it, 
than  it  would  have  been  to  have  canceled  the  debt  by  the  treaty. 
How  early,  and  how  happily  soever  the  war  may  terminate  in  the 
islands,  it  will  take  many  years  before  this  capital  is  restored,  and  the 
waste  of  war  repaired. 

During  the  whole  of  this  period  considerable  supplies  must  be 
obtained  from  the  United  States.  Let  them  stand  at  the  moderate 
sum  of  twenty  millions  annualty.  This  must  be  paid  either  in  specie 
shipped  from  France,  or  by  credits  obtained  in  the  United  States.  The 
interest  of  mone}7,  as  applied  to  any  improvement  in  agriculture  or 
manufactures  in  France,  is  at  least  worth  eight  per  cent. ;  the  loss  upon 
the  French  coin  shipped  to  the  United  States,  is  not  less  than  two  and 
one-half  per  cent.,  the  risk  or  insurance  two. and  one-half,  the  time  the 
money  must  be  unemployed  before  it  is  shipped  in  its  transit  and  in 
America,  will  average  about  six  months;  which  makes,  at  the  rate  of 
eight  per  cent,  interest,  four  per  cent. :  these  different  sums  make  the 
loss  upon  the  shipment  of  money  to  America  not  less  than  nine  per 
cent.  This,  upon  twenty  millions,  is  one  million  eight  hundred  thou 
sand,  whereas,  the  American  debt,  principal  and  interest,  computing  it 
at  twent}^  millions,  if  funded,  would  only  require  one  million  to  dis 
charge  the  interest;  and  in  case  this  debt  was  funded,  it  would  be 
unnecessary  to  ship  any  money:  for,  in  that  case,  the  credit  of  France 
would  be  so  firmly  established,  that  money  might  be  obtained  in  any 
part  of  America  for  Government  bills,  at  the  current  rate  of  exchange, 
which  is  generally  in  favor  of  the  commercial  nations  of  Europe,  but 
would,  in  no  event,  amount  to  more  than  three  per  cent.;  upon  which, 
supposing  the  bills  were  drawn  at  sixty  days,  France  would  receive  an 
actual  profit  to  more  than  this  amount  in  the  use  of  money  in  America, 
many  months  before  it  became  payable  in  France. 

But  this  consideration,  citizen  First  Consul,  is  trifling  when  com 
pared  to  the  advantage  France  would  derive  from  keeping  her  money 
at  home,  where  it  is  so  much  needed  to  invigorate  her  commerce  and 
manufactures,  and  from  the  facilities  that  payments  made  here  to 
American  merchants  would  afford,  in  the  extension  of  their  commerce 
with  France;  notwithstanding  the  loss  that  the  American  creditor 
would  sustain  by  receiving  stock  instead  of  money,  after  so  many 
years  of  delay,  yet,  accommodating  themselves  to  the  circumstances  of 
the  nation,  they  would  readily  acquiesce  in  accepting  that  species  of 


PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERKITOBY    OF    LOUISIANA.  119 

payment,  if  none  more  advantageous  can  be  conveniently  offered  by 
the  Government.  Nor  can  I,  citizen  First  Consul,  see  but  one  possible 
objection  to  placing  the  American  debt  upon  the  five  per  cent  stock; 
the  trifling  interest  can  certainly  be  no  consideration,  unless  the  Gov 
ernment  should  apprehend  a  depression  of  the  stock  by  the  quantity 
of  American  debt  that  their  necessities  may  induce  them  to  throw  into 
the  market.  But,  sir,  this  may  be  easity  guarded  against,  if  some  plan 
should  be  adopted,  which,  having  a  reference  to  Louisiana,  may  render 
the  United  States  debtor  to  France  for  a  greater  amount  than  what  is 
due  to  their  citizens;  in  which  case,  I  am  prepared  to  enter  into  stipu 
lations  for  such  provisions  as  will  prevent  any  possible  depression  of 
the  French  funds.  Or  if,  citizen  First  Consul,  you  should  not  think 
it  proper  to  treat  upon  the  affairs  of  Louisiana,  as  having  any  reference 
to  this  object,  still  it  will  be  easy  (by  compelling  the  American 
creditors  to  subscribe,  in  the  name  of  some  trustee  that  shall  be 
appointed  by  their  minister,)  to  prevent  any  sale  of  the  stock  they  hold, 
under  a  limited  price,  or  within  a  limited  time. 

The  next  object  that  has  awakened  the  sensibilities  of  the  United 
States  is,  the  change  that  is  about  to  take  place  in  the  situation  of 
Louisiana,  heightened,  as  they  are,  by  the  silence  which  the  Govern 
ments  of  France  and  Spain  have  observed,  and  still  observe,  with 
respect  to  their  treaty,  and  the  rights  that  the  United  States  claim,  and 
have  long  exercised,  at  New  Orleans.  1  have  pressed  the  Minister  to 
some  pointed  declaration  on  the  subject  of  our  right  of  depot  at  New 
Orleans,  on  the  limits  as  settled  with  Spain,  and  on  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi ;  for  though  it  necessarily  follows  that  those  rights  can 
not  be  injured  by  a  change  of  jurisdiction,  yet  it  would  have  been 
highly  satisfactory  to  the  United  States  to  have  received  some  such 
assurances  upon  these  subjects  as  wTould  have  shown  that  the  treaty 
between  them  and  Spain  was  clearty  understood,  and  served  to  over 
awe  such  of  the  officers  of  Government,  as,  emboldened  by  their  dis 
tance  from  the  Sovereign,  might  act  from  their  own  impressions.  A 
recent  event,  citizen  First  Consul,  has  demonstrated  the  extreme  sensi 
bility  of  the  United  States  on  this  subject.  The  Intendant  of  New 
Orleans  having  thought  it  proper  to  withdraw  the  right  of  depot, 
secured  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  by  the  Treaty  of  Madrid, 
a  spirit  of  resentment  has  been  manifested  from  one  end  of  the  Union 
to  the  other,  and  nothing  but  the  interposition  of  the  Spanish  Minis 
ter,  the  disavowal  of  the  act  by  the  Governor  of  New  Orleans,  and  the 
extreme  solicitude  of  the  American  .Government  to  avoid  everything 
which  might  have  a  tendency  to  interrupt  the  harmony  which  at  pres 
ent  so  happily  subsists  between  the  United  States  and  every  Power  in 
Europe,  could  have  prevented  an  immediate  recurrence  to  arms;  nor 
am  I  now  without  apprehension  that,  if  nothing  is  done  to  calm  their 
anxiety  before  the  season  for  bringing  down  the  produce  of  the  coun- 


120  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

try  occurs,  the  Government  will  be  compelled  to  follow  the  impulse  of 
the  people.  Under  these  circumstances,  citizen  First  Consul,  it  can 
not  appear  improper,  prizing,  as  I  do,  the  connextion  between  our 
respective  countries,  to  press  for  some  such  explicit  and  early  declara 
tion  on  the  subject  of  our  rights  as  will  serve  to  calm  the  anxiety  of  the 
United  States.  Should  the  agents  of  France,  who  are  to  take  posses 
sion  of  the  Colony,  continue  the  regulations  in  the  face  of  the  treaty 
which  they  may  find  established  by  the  Spanish  Intendant,  a  fatal 
blow  will  be  struck  at  the  future  peace  and  harmony  of  both  countries. 
That  1  may  not  intrude  too  far  upon  your  patience,  I  will  merely  take 
the  liberty  to  transport  such  loose  hints  as  you  may  possibly  think 
might  be  improved  into  some  arrangements,  alike  useful  to  France 
and  the  United  States,  should  you  deem  it  proper  to  appoint  some  per 
son  to  treat  with  me  on  this  subject.  But,  in  the  meantime,  as  the 
moments  are  precious,  and  the  United  States  will  suffer  extremely  in 
their  commerce,  if  the  officers  of  France,  who  are  directed  to  take 
possession,  should  not  be  explicitly  instructed  to  respect  the  right  of 
navigation  and  depot  claimed  by  the  United  States,  I  must  earnestly 
solicit  some  treaty;  explanatory  of  the  terms  on  which  France  has 
received  the  cession  of  Louisiana  from  Spain,  and  recognizing  the 
rights  of  the  United  States.  Should  you,  citizen  First  Consul,  vol 
untarily  add,  as  an  expression  of  your  good  will,  provisionally,  in  case 
the  cession  of  the  Floridas  should  be  completed,  a  grant  to  the  United 
States  of  the  free  passage  through  the  rivers  Mobile  and  Pensacola, 
together  with  a  right  of  depot  at  their  mouths,  you  would,  while  you 
were  serving  the  commerce  of  France,  confer  an  obligation  on  the 
United  States  that  would  greatly  tend  to  strengthen  the  bands  of 
friendship  between  the  allied  nations.  For  though  the  commerce 
of  these  rivers  is,  at  present,  very  insignificant,  yet,  at  some  future 
period,  when  the  country  settles,  it  may  become  more  important;  and, 
in  the  meantime,  the  cession  would  derive  considerable  value  from 
the  evidence  it  would  afford  to  the  United  States  of  your  friendly 
disposition. 

That  France  will  never  derive  any  advantage  from  the  colonization 
of  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas,  is  fairly  to  be  presumed,  from  their 
having  been  possessed,  for  more  than  a  century  past,  by  three  differ 
ent  nations.  While  the  other  colonies  of  these  nations  were  increasing 
rapidly,  these  have  alwa}7s  remained  weak  and  languid  and  an  expen 
sive  burden  to  the  possessor.  Even  at  this  moment,  with  all  the 
advantages  that  New  Orleans  has  derived  from  foreign  capital,  and  an 
accession  of  inhabitants  from  the  United  States,  which  has  brought  its 
free  population  to  about  7,000  souls,  the  whole  of  the  inhabitants  east 
of  the  Mississippi  does  not  more  than  double  that  number;  and  those, 
too,  are,  for  the  most  part,  poor  and  miserable;  and  there  are  physical 
reasons  that  must  forever  render  them  inadequate  to  their  own  sup- 


PUECHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  121 

port,  in  the  hands  of  any  European  nation.  They  are,  however, 
important  to  the  United  States,  because  they  contain  the  mouths  of 
some  of  their  rivers,  which  must  make  them  the  source  of  continual 
disputes.  The  interest  that  the  United  States  attach,  citizen  First 
Consul,  to  your  friendship,  and  the  alliance  of  France,  is  the  principal 
cause  of  their  anxiety  to  procure  your  consent  to  their  accession  of 
that  country,  and  of  the  sacrifices  that  they  are  willing  to  make  to 
attain  it.  They  consider  it  as  the  only  possible  ground  of  collision 
between  nations  whom  so  many  other  interests  unite.  I  can  not,  then, 
citizen  First  Consul,  but  express  my  doubt  of  any  advantage  to  be 
derived  to  France  from  the  retaining  of  that  country  in  its  whole 
extent;  and  I  think  I  could  show  that  her  true  interest  would  lead  her 
to  make  such  cessions  out  of  them  to  the  United  States  as  would  at 
once  afford  supplies  to  her  islands,  without  draining  the  money  of 
France,  and  rivet  the  friendship  of  the  United  States,  by  removing  all 
ground  of  jealousy  relative  to  a  country  of  little  value  in  itself,  and 
which  will  be  perpetually  exposed  to  the  attacks  of  her  natural  enemy, 
as  well  from  Canada  as  by  sea. 

Should  this  idea  not  be  so  fortunate  as  to  meet  your  approbation, 
there  are  still  a  variety  of  views  in  which,  by  a  partial  cession,  perma 
nent  commercial  advantages  may  be  acquired;  but  it  would  be  to 
intrude  too  much  upon  your  time  to  detail  them  here,  deeming  them 
more  proper  subjects  for  discussion,  if  you  should  think  it  proper  to 
render  them  the  objects  of  a  treaty. 

Permit  me,  citizen  First  Consul,  before  1  conclude,  to  mention  a 
circumstance  which  embraces  the  interest  both  of  France  and  the 
United  States,  and  of  humanity.  The  savages  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Mississippi  are  numerous  and  brave;  considerable  sums  of  money  are 
annually  expended  by  Spain  in  purchasing  their  friendship.  Should 
these  supplies  be  withheld,  through  neglect  or  misapplication,  a  uni 
versal  massacre  of  all  the  planters  will  ensue.  Their  detached  situation 
renders  it  impossible  to  protect  them.  I  am  the  more  emboldened  in 
making  this  observation,  from  the  interest  the  United  States  have  in 
turning  your  attention  to  this  object,  since,  should  this  melancholy 
event  take  place,  malignity,  or  those  whose  negligence  or  infidelity 
may  have  occasioned  it,  will  not  fail  to  impute  it  to  the  intrigues  of 
the  United  States. 

I  pray  you,  citizen  First  Consul,  to  pardon  the  length  of  this  letter, 
which  you  will  have  the  goodness  to  attribute  to  my  extreme  anxiety 
to  remove  all  causes  of  dispute  between  France  and  the  country  I 
represent,  and  to  my  conviction  that  some  early  and  effectual  arrange 
ments  are  necessaiy  to  prevent  those  that  already  exist  from  growing 
to  an  alarming  height.  No  evil  can  possibly  arise  from  empowering 
the  Minister,  01  such  other  person  as  you  shall  please,  to  treat  with 
me  on  the  subject  of  New  Orleans;  since  even  the  appointment  itself 


122  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

will  have  a  conciliatory  appearance,  and  you,  citizen  First  Consul, 
will  govern  the  negotiation,  in  which,  I  trust,  nothing  will  be  proposed 
on  my  part,  that  will  not  be  equally  beneficial  to  both  France  and  the 
United  States. 

I  have  the  honor,  citizen  First  Consul,  to  remain,  with  the  most 
profound  respect  and  the  highest  consideration,  your  most  obedient, 
humble  servant, 

ROBERT  It.  LIVINGSTON. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Messrs.  Livingston  and  Monroe. 

C  k^^  -*~^-  k*J\A>*xX*-*T**     ) . 

j  •,  5       -  If  \f-  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  March  2,  1803. 

GENTLEMEN:  You  will  herewith  receive  a  commission  and  letters  of 
credence,  one  of  you  as  Minister  Plenipotentiary,  the  other  as  Minister 
Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary,  to  treat  with  the  Government  of 
the  French  Republic  on  the  subject  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the  terri 
tories  eastward  thereof,  and  without  the  limits  of  the  United  States. 
The  object  in  view  is  to  procure,  by  just  and  satisfactory  arrangements, 
a  cession  to  the  United  States  of  New  Orleans,  and  of  West  and  East 
Florida,  or  as  much  thereof  as  the  actual  proprietor  can  be  prevailed 
on  to  part  with. 

The  French  Republic  is  understood  to  have  become  the  proprietor, 
by  a  cession  from  Spain,  in  the  year  —  — ,  of  New  Orleans,  as  part  of 
Louisiana,  if  not  of  the  Floridas  also.  If  the  Floridas  should  not  have 
been  then  included  in  the  cession,  it  is  not  improbable  that  they  will 
have  been  since  added  to  it. 

It  is  foreseen  that  you  may  have  considerable  difficulty  in  overcom 
ing  the  repugnance  and  the  prejudices  of  the  French  Government 
against  a  transfer  to  the  United  States  of  so  important  a  part  of  the 
acquisition.  The  apparent  solicitude  and  exertions,  amidst  many  em 
barrassing  circumstances,  to  carry  into  effect  the  cession  made  to  the 
French  Republic;  the  reserve  so  long  used  on  this  subject  by  the  French 
Government,  in  its  communications  with  the  Minister  of  the  United 
States  at  Paris,  and  the  declaration  finally  made  by  the  French  Minister 
of  Foreign  Relations,  that  it  was  meant  to  take  possession  before  any 
overtures  from  the  United  States  would  be  discussed,  show  the  import 
ance  which  is  attached  to  the  territories  in  question.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  the  United  States  Have  the  strongest  motives  of  interest,  and 
of  a  pacific  policy,  to  seek  by  just  means  the  establishment  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  down  to  its  mouth,  as  their  boundary,  so  there  are  considera 
tions  which  urge  on  France  a  concurrence  in  so  natural  and  so  con 
venient  an  arrangement. 

Notwithstanding  the  circumstances  which  have  been  thought  to 
indicate,  in  the  French  Government,  designs  of  unjust  encroachment, 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  123 

and  even  direct  hostility,  on  the  United  States,  it  is  scarcely  possible 
to  reconcile  a  policy'  of  that  sort  with  any  motives  which  can  be  pre 
sumed  to  sway  either  the  Government  or  the  nation.  To  say  nothing 
of  the  assurances  given  both  by  the  French  Minister  at  Paris,  and  by 
the  Spanish  Minister  at  Madrid,  that  the  cession  by  Spain  to  France 
was  understood  to  carry  with  it  all  the  conditions  stipulated  by  the 
former  to  the  United  States,  the  manifest  tendency  of  hostile  measures 
against  the  United  States  to  connect  their  councils *and  their  colossal 
growth  Avith  the  great  and  formidable  rival  of  France,  can  neither 
escape  her  discernment,  nor  be  disregarded  by  her  prudence,  and 
might  alone  be  expected  to  produce  very  different  views  in  the 
Government. 

On  the  supposition  that  the  French  Government  does  not  mean  to 
force  or  to  court  war  with  the  United  States,  but,  on  the  contrary,  that 
it  sees  the  interest  which  France  has  in  cultivating  their  neutrality  and 
amity,  the  dangers  to  so  desirable  a  relation  between  the  tAvo  countries 
which  lurk  under  a  neighborhood  modified  as  is  that  of  Spain  at  pres 
ent,  must  have  great  weight  in  recommending  the  change  which  you 
Avill  have  to  propose.  These  dangers  haAre  been  always  sufficiently 
evident;  and  have,  moreover,  been  repeatedly  suggested  by  collisions 
between  the  stipulated  rights  or  reasonable  expectations  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Spanish  jurisdiction  at  New  Orleans.  But  they  have 
been  brought  more  strikingly  into  view  by  the  late  proceeding  of  the 
Intendant  at  that  place.  The  sensibility  and  unanimity  in  our  nation, 
Avhich  have  appeared  on  this  occasion,  must  convince  France  that 
friendship  and  peace  Avith  us  must  be  precarious  until  the  Mississippi 
shall  be  made  the  boundary  between  the  United  States  and  Louisiana; 
and  consequently  render  the  present  moment  favorable  to  the  object 
with  which  you  are  charged. 

The  time  chosen  for  the  experiment  is  pointed  out  also  by  other 
important  considerations.  The  instability  of  the  peace  of  Europe,  the 
attitude  taken  by  Great  Britain,  the  languishing  state  of  the  French 
finances,  and  the  absolute  necessity  of  either  abandoning  the  West 
India  islands,  or  of  sending  thither  large  armaments  at  great  expepse, 
all  contribute  at  the  present  crisis  to  prepare  in  the  French  Govern 
ment  a  disposition  to  listen  to  an  arrangement  which  will  at  once  dry- 
up  one  source  of  foreign  controvers}7,  and  furnish  some  aid  in  strug 
gling  with  internal  embarrassments.  It  is  to  be  added,  that  the  over 
tures  committed  to  you  coincide  in  great  measure  with  the  ideas  of  the 
person  through  whom  the  letter  of  the  President  of  April  30,  1802, 
Avas  conveyed  to  Mr.  LiA^ingston,  and  who  is  presumed  to  have  gained 
some  insight  into  the  present  sentiments  of  the  French  Cabinet. 

Among  the  considerations  Avhich  haAre  led  the  French  GoA^ernment 
into  the  project  of  regaining  from  Spain  the  province  of  Louisiana, 


124  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

and  which  you  may  find  it  necessary  to  meet  in  your  discussions,  the 
following  suggest  themselves  as  highly  probable: 

First.  A  jealousy  of  the  Atlantic  States,  as  leaning  to  a  coalition  with 
Great  Britain  not  consistent  with  neutrality  and  amity  toward  France, 
and  a  belief  that,  by  holding  the  key  to  the  commerce  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  she  will  be  able  to  command  the  interests  and  attachments  of  the 
western  portion  of  the  United  States,  and  thereby  either  control  the 
Atlantic  portion  also,  or,  if  that  can  not  be  done,  to  seduce  the  former 
into  a  separate  Government  and  a  close  alliance  with  herself. 

In  each  of  these  particulars  the  calculation  is  founded  in  error. 

It  is  not  true  that  the  Atlantic  States  lean  toward  any  connexion 
with  Great  Britain  inconsistent  with  their  amicable  relations  to  France. 
Their  dispositions  and  their  interests  equally  prescribe  to  them  amity 
and  impartiality  to  both  of  those  nations.  If  a  departure  from  this 
simple  and  salutary  line  of  policy  should  take  place,  the  causes  of  it 
will  be  found  in  the  unjust  or  unfriendly  conduct  experienced  from 
one  or  other  of  them.  In  general,  it  may  be  remarked,  that  there  are 
many  points  on  which  the  interests  and  views  of  the  United  States  and 
of  Great  Britain  may  not  be  thought  to  coincide,  as  can  be  discovered  in 
relation  to  France.  If  less  harmony  and  confidence  should,  therefore, 
prevail  between  France  and  the  United  States  than  may  be  maintained 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  the  difference  will  lie, 
not  in  the  want  of  motives,  drawn  from  the  mutual  advantage  of  the 
two  nations,  but  in  the  want  of  favorable  dispositions  in  the  Govern 
ment  of  one  or  other  of  them.  That  the  blame,  in  this  respect,  will 
not  justly  fall  on  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  is  sufficiently 
demonstrated  by  the  mission,  and  the  objects  with  which  you  are  now 
charged. 

The  French  Government  is  not  less  mistaken,  if  it  supposes  that  the 
Western  part  of  the  United  States  can  be  withdrawn  from  their  pres 
ent  union  with  the  Atlantic  part  into  a  separate  Government,  closely 
allied  with  France. 

Our  V\7estern  fellow-citizens  are  bound  to  the  Union,  not  only  by 
the  ties  of  kindred  and  affection,  which  for  a  long  time  will  derive 
strength  from  the  stream  of  emigration  peopling  that  region,  but  by 
two  considerations  which  flow  from  clear  and  essential  interests. 

One  of  these  considerations  is,  the  passage  through  the  Atlantic 
ports  of  the  foreign  merchandise  consumed  by  the  Western  inhabitants, 
and  the  payment  thence  made  to  a  treasury,  in  which  they  would  lose 
their  participation  by  erecting  a  separate  Government.  The  bulky 
productions  of  the  Western  country  maj  continue  to  pass  down  the 
Mississippi;  but  the  difficulties  of  the  ascending  navigation  of  that 
river,  however  free  it  may  be  made,  will  cause  the  imports  for  con 
sumption  to  pass  through  the  Atlantic  States.  This  is  the  course 
through  which  they  are  now  received;  nor  will  the  impost  to  which 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  125 

they  will  be  subject  change  the  course,  even  if  the  passage  up  the 
Mississippi  should  be  duty  free.  It  will  not  equal  the  difference  in 
the  freight  through  the  latter  channels.  It  is  true  that  mechanical 
and  other  improvements  in  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  may 
lessen  the  labor  and  expense  of  ascending  the  stream;  but  it  is  not  the 
least  probable,  that  savings  of  this  sort  will  keep  pace  with  the  improve 
ments  in  canals  and  roads,  by  which  the  present  course  of  impost  will 
be  favored.  Let  it  be  added,  that  the  loss  of  the  contributions  thus 
made  to  a  foreign  treasury  would  be  accompanied  with  the  necessity 
of  providing,  by  less  convenient  revenues,  for  the  expense  of  a  sepa 
rate  Government,  and  of  the  defensive  precautions  required  by  the 
change  of  situation. 

The  other  of  these  considerations  results  from  the  insecurity  to 
which  the  trade  from  the  Mississippi  would  be  exposed  by  such  a  revo 
lution  in  the  western  part  of  the  United  States.  A  connection  of  the 
Western  people,  as  a  separate  State,  with  France,  implies  a  connexion 
between  the  Atlantic  States  and  Great  Britain.  It  is  found,  from  long 
experience,  that  France  and  Great  Britain  are  nearly  half  their  time 
at  war.  The  case  would  be  the  same  with  their  allies.  During  nearly 
one-half  the  time,  therefore,  the  trade  of  the  Western  country 
from  the  Mississippi  would  have  no  protection  but  that  of  France, 
and  would  suffer  all  the  interruptions  which  nations  having  the  com 
mand  of  the  sea  could  inflict  on  it. 

It  will  be  the  more  impossible  for  France  to  draw  the  Western 
country  under  her  influence,  by  conciliatory  regulations  of  the  trade 
through  the  Mississippi;  because  regulations  which  would  be  regarded 
by  her  as  liberal,  and  claiming  returns  of  gratitude,  would  be  viewed 
on  the  other  side  as  falling  short  of  justice.  If  this  should  not  be 
at  first  the  case,  it  soon  would  be  so.  The  Western  people  believe,  as 
do  their  Atlantic  brethren,  that  they  have  a  natural  and  indefeasible 
right  to  trade  freely  through  the  Mississippi.  They  are  conscious  of 
their  power  to  enforce  this  right  against  any  nation  whatever.  With 
these  ideas  in  their  minds,  it  is  evident  that  France  will  not  be  able  to 
excite  either  a  sense  of  favor,  or  of  fear,  that  would  establish  an  ascend 
ency  over  them.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  more  than  probable,  that  the 
different  views  of  their  respective  rights  would  quickly  lead  to  disap 
pointments  and  disgusts  on  both  sides,  and  thence  to  collisions  and 
controversies  fatal  to  the  harmony  of  the  two  nations.  To  guard 
against  these  consequences  is  a  primary  motive  with  the  United  States 
in  wishing  the  arrangement  proposed.  As  France  has  equal  reasons 
to  guard  against  them,  she  ought  to  feel  an  equal  motive  to  concur  in 
the  arrangement. 

Secondly.  The  advancement  of  the  commerce  of  France,  by&u  estab 
lishment  on  the  Mississippi,  has,  doubtless,  great  weight  with  the 
Government  in  espousing  this  project. 


126  PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

The  commerce  through  the  Mississippi  will  consist,  first,  of  that  of 
the  United  States;  second,  of  that  of  the  adjacent  territories  to  be 
acquired  by  France. 

The  first  is  now,  and  must  for  ages  continue,  the  principal  com 
merce.  As  far  as  the  faculties  of  France  will  enable  her  to  share  in 
it,  the  article  to  be  proposed  to  her,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
on  that  subject,  promises  every  advantage  she  can  desire.  It  is  a  fair 
calculation  that,  under  the  proposed  arrangement,  her  commercial 
opportunities  would  be  extended  rather  than  diminished;  inasmuch  as 
our  present  right  of  deposit  gives  her  the  same  competitors  as  she 
would  then  have,  and  the  effect  of  the  more  rapid  settlement  of  the 
Western  country,  consequent  on  that  arrangement,  would  proportion 
ally  augment  the  mass  of  commerce  to  be  shared  by  her. 

The  other  portion  of  commerce,  with  the  exception  of  the  island  of 
New  Orleans,  and  the  contiguous  ports  of  West  Florida,  depends  on 
the  territory  westward  of  the  Mississippi.  With  respect  to  this  por 
tion,  it  will  be  little  affected  by  the  cession  desired  by  the  United 
States.  The  footing  proposed  for  her  commerce,  on  the  shore  to  be 
ceded,  gives  it  every  advantage  she  could  reasonably  wish,  during  a 
period  Avithin  which  she  will  be  able  to  provide  every  requisite  estab 
lishment  on  the  right  shore,  which,  according  to  the  best  information, 
possesses  the  same  facilities  for  such  establishments  as  are  found  on 
the  island  of  New  Orleans  itself.  These  circumstances  essentially 
distinguish  the  situation  of  the  French  commerce  in  the  Mississippi, 
after  a  cession  of  New  Orleans  to  the  United  States,  from  the  situation 
of  the  commerce  of  the  United  States,  without  such  a  cession;  their 
right  of  deposit  being  so  much  more  circumscribed,  and  their  territory 
on  the  Mississippi  not  reaching  low  enough  for  a  commercial  estab 
lishment  on  the  shore,  within  their  present  limits. 

There  remain  to  be  considered  the  commerce  of  the  ports  in  the 
Floridas.  With  respect  to  this  branch  the  advantages  which  will  be 
secured  to  France  by  the  proposed  arrangement  ought  to  be  satisfac 
tory.  She  will  here  also  derive  a  greater  share  from  the  increase 
which  will  be  given,  by  a  more  rapid  settlement  of  a  fertile  territory, 
to  the  exports  and  imports  through  those  ports,  than  she  would  obtain 
from  any  restrictive  use  she  could  make  of  those  ports  as  her  own 
property.  But  this  is  not  all.  The  United  States  have  a  just  claim  to 
the  use  of  the  rivers  which  pass  from  their  territories  through  the 
Floridas.  They  found  their  claim  on  like  principles  with  those  which 
supported  their  claim  to  the  use  of  the  Mississippi.  If  the  length  of 
these  rivers  be  not  in  the  same  proportion  with  that  of  the  Mississippi, 
the  difference  is  balanced  by  the  circumstance  that  both  banks,  in  the 
former  case,  belong  to  the  United  States. 

With  a  view  to  permanent  harmony  between  the  two  nations,  a  ces 
sion  of  the  Floridas  is  particularly  to  be  desired,  as  obviating  serious 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  127 

controversies  that  might  otherwise  grow  even  out  of  the  regulations, 
however  liberal  in  the  opinion  of  France,  which  she  may  establish  at 
the  mouths  of  those  rivers.  One  of  the  rivers,  the  Mobile,  is  said 
to  be  at  present  navigable  for  four  hundred  miles  above  the  thirty- 
first  degree  of  north  latitude,  and  the  navigation  may  no  doubt  be 
opened  still  further.  On  all  of  them,  the  country  within  the  boundary 
of  the  United  States,  though  otherwise  between  that  and  the  sea,  is 
fertile.  Settlements  on  it  are  beginning;  and  the  people  have  already 
called  on  the  Government  to  procure  the  proper  outlets  to  foreign 
markets.  The  President,  accordingly,  gave,  some  time  ago,  the  proper 
instructions  to  the  Minister  of  the  United  States  at  Madrid.  In  fact, 
our  free  communication  with  the  sea  through  those  channels  is  so 
natural,  so  reasonable,  and  so  essential,  that,  eventually,  it  must  take 
place:  and  in  prudence,  therefore,  ought  to  be  amicably  and  effectually 
adjusted  without  delay. 

Third.  A  further  object  with  France  may  be,  to  form  a  colonial 
establishment  having  a  convenient  relation  to  her  West  India  islands, 
and  forming  an  independent  source  of  supplies  for  them. 

This  object  ought  to  weigh  but  little  against  the  cession  we  wish  to 
obtain,  for  two  reasons:  first,  because  the  country  which  the  cession 
will  leave  in  her  hands  on  the  right  side  of  the  Mississippi  is  capable 
of  employing  more  than  all  the  faculties  she  can  spare  for  such  an 
object,  and  of  yielding  all  the  supplies  which  she  could  expect  or  wish 
from  such  an  establishment:  second,  because  in  times  of  general  peace 
she  will  be  sure  of  receiving  whatever  supplies  her  islands  may  want, 
from  the  United  States,  and  even  through  the  Mississippi,  if  more 
convenient  to  her;  because  in  time  of  peace  with  the  United  States, 
though  of  war  with  Great  Britain,  the  same  sources  will  be  open  to  her, 
whilst  her  own  would  be  interrupted;  and  because  in  case  of  a  war  with 
the  United  States,  which  is  not  likely  to  happen  without  a  concurrent 
war  with  Great  Britain,  (the  only  case  in  which  she  could  need  a  dis 
tinct  fund  of  supplies,)  the  entire  command  of  the  sea,  and  of  the  trade 
through  the  Mississippi,  would  be  against  her,  and  would  cut  off  the 
source  in  question.  She  would  consequently  never  need  the  aid  of  her 
new  colony,  but  when  she  could  make  little  or  no  use  of  it. 

There  may  be  other  objects  with  France  in  the  projected  acquisition; 
but  they  are  probably  such  as  would  be  either  satisfied  by  a  reservation 
to  herself  of  the  country  on  the  right  side  of  the  Mississippi,  or  are  of 
too  subordinate  a  character  to  prevail  against  the  plan  of  adjustment 
we  have  in  view,  in  case  other  difficulties  in  the  way  of  it  can  be  over 
come.  The  principles  and  outlines  of  this  plan  are  as  follows,  viz: 

ARTICLE  1.  France  cedes  to  the  United  States  forever  the  territory 
east  of  the  river  Mississippi,  comprehending  the  two  Floridas,  the 
island  of  New  Orleans,  and  the  islands  lying  to  the  north  and  east  of 
that  channel  of  the  said  river,  which  is  commonly  called  the  South  Pass, 


128  PUECHASE    OF    THE    TEEEITOEY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

together  with  all  such  other  islands  as  appertain  to  either  West  or  East 
Florida;  France  reserving  to  herself  all  her  territory  on  the  west  side 
of  the  Mississippi. 

ART.  2.  The  boundary  between  the  territory  ceded  and  reserved  by 
France,  shall  be  a  continuation  of  that  alread}^  defined  above  the  thirty- 
first  degree  of  north  latitude,  viz:  the  middle  of  the  channel  or  bed  of 
the  river  through  the  said  South  Pass  to  the  sea.  The  navigation  of 
the  river  Mississippi  in  its  whole  breadth  from  its  source  to  the  ocean, 
and  in  all  its  passages  to  and  from  the  same  shall  be  equally  free  and 
common  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  French  Republic. 

ART.  3.  The  vessels  and  citizens  of  the  French  Republic  may  exer 
cise  commerce  to  and  at  such  places  on  their  respective  shores  below 
the  said  thirty-first  degree  of  north  latitude  as  may  be  allowed  for 
that  use  by  the  parties  to  their  respective  citizens  and  vessels.  And 
it  is  agreed  that  no  other  nation  shall  be  allowed  to  exercise  commerce 
to  or  at  the  same  or  any  other  place  on  either  shore,  below  the  said 
thirty-first  degree  of  latitude.  For  the  term  of  ten  years,  to  be  com 
puted  from  the  exchange  of  ratifications  hereof,  the  citizens,  vessels, 
and  merchandises  of  the  United  States,  and  of  France,  shall  be  subject 
to  no  other  duties  on  their  respective  shores,  below  the  said  thirty -first 
degree  of  latitude,  than  are  imposed  on  their  own  citizens,  vessels,  and 
merchandises.  No  duty  whatever  shall,  after  the  expiration  of  ten 
years,  be  laid  on  articles  the  growth  or  manufacture  of  the  United 
States,  or  of  the  ceded  territory,  exported  through  the  Mississippi  in 
French  vessels;  so  long  as  such  articles  so  exported  in  vessels  of  the 
United  States  shall  be  exempt  from  duty:  nor  shall  French  vessels 
exporting  such  articles  ever  afterwards  be  subject  to  pay  a  higher 
duty  than  vessels  of  the  United  States. 

AKT.  4.  The  citizens  of  France  may,  for  the  term  of  ten  years, 
deposit  their  effects  at  New  Orleans,  and  at  such  other  places  on  the 
ceded  shore  of  the  Mississippi,  as  are  allowed  for  the  commerce  of  the 
United  States,  without  paying  any  other  duty  than  a  fair -price  for 
the  hire  of  stores. 

ART.  5.  In  ports  of  commerce  of  West  and  East  Florida,  France 
shall  never  be  on  a  worse  footing  than  the  most  favored  nation;  and 
for  the  term  of  ten  years  her  vessels  and  merchandise  shall  be  subject 
therein  to  no  higher  duties  than  are  paid  by  those  of  the  United 
States.  Articles  of  the  growth  or  manufacture  of  the  United  States, 
and  of  the  ceded  territory,  exported  in  French  vessels  from  any  port 
in  West  or  East  Florida,  shall  be  exempt  from  duty  as  long  as  vessels 
of  the  United  States  shall  enjoy  this  exemption. 

ART.  6.  The  United  States,  in  consideration  of  the  cession  of  terri 
tory  made  by  this  treaty,  shall  pay  to  France  -  -  millions  of  livres 
tournois,  in  the  manner  following,  viz:  They  shall  pay  -  -  millions 
of  livres  tournois  immediately  on  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  129 

hereof;  they  shall  assume,  in  such  order  of  priority  as  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  may  approve,  the  payment  of  claims  which 
have  been  or  may  be  acknowledged  by  the  French  Republic  to  be  due 
to  American  citizens,  or  so  much  thereof  as,  with  the  payment  to  be 
made  on  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  will  not  exceed  the  sum  of 

— ;  and  in  case  a  balance  should  remain  due  after  such  payment  and 
assumption,  the  same  shall  be  paid  at  the  end  of  one  year  from  the 
final  liquidation  of  the  claim  hereby  assumed,  which  shall  be  payable 
in  three  equal  annual  payments,  the  first  of  which  is  to  take  place  one 
year  after  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  or  they  shall  bear  interest,  at 
the  rate  of  6  per  cent,  per  annum,  from  the  dates  of  such  intended  pay 
ments,  until  they  shall  be  discharged.  All  the  above-mentioned  pay 
ments  shall  be  made  at  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States,  and  at  the 
rate  of  one  dollar  and  ten  cents  for  every  six  livres  tournois. 

ART.  7.  To  incorporate  the  inhabitants  of  the  hereby  ceded  territory 
with  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  on  an  equal  footing,  being  a 
provision  which  can  not  now  be  made,  it  is  to  be  expected,  from  the 
character  and  policy  of  the  United  States,  that  such  incorporation  will 
take  place  without  unnecessary  delay.  In  the  meantime  they  shall  be 
secure  in  their  persons  and  property,  and  in  the  free  enjoyment  of  their 
religion. 

OBSERVATIONS    ON    THE    PLAN. 

1st.  As  the  cession  to  be  made  by  France  in  this  case  must  rest 
on  the  cession  made  to  her  by  Spain,  it  might  be  proper  that  Spain 
should  be  a  party  to  the  transaction.  The  objections,  however,  to 
delay,  require  that  nothing  more  be  asked  on  our  part  than  either  an 
exhibition  and  recital  of  the  treaty  between  France  and  Spain,  or  an 
engagement  on  the  part  of  France,  that  the  accession  of  Spain  will  be 
given.  Nor  will  it  be  advisable  to  insist  even  on  this  much,  if  attended 
with  difficulty  or  delay,  unless  there  be  ground  to  suppose  that  Spain 
will  contest  the  validity  of  the  transaction. 

2d.  The  plan  takes  for  granted,  also,  that  the  Treaty  of  1795, 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  is  to  lose  none  of  its  force  in 
behalf  of  the  former,  by  any  transactions  whatever  between  the  latter 
and  France.  No  change,  it  is  evident,  will  be,  or  can  be  admitted  to 
be  produced  in  that  treat}-,  or  in  the  arrangements  carried  into  effect 
under  it,  further  than  it  may  be  superceded  by  stipulations  between 
the  United  States  and  France,  who  will  stand  in  the  place  of  Spain. 
It  will  not  be  amiss  to  insist  on  an  express  recognition  of  this  by 
France  as  an  effectual  bar  against  pretexts  of  any  sort,  not  compatible 
with  the  stipulations  of  Spain. 

3d.  The  first  of  the  articles  proposed,  in  defining  the  cession,  refers 
to  the  south  pass  of  the  Mississippi,  and  to  the  islands  north  and  east 
of  that  channel.  As  this  is  the  most  navigable  of  the  several  chan- 
H.  Doc.  431 9 


130  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

nels,  as  well  as  the  most  direct  course  to  the  sea,  it  is  expected  that 
it  will  not  be  objected  to.  It  is  of  the  greater  importance  to  make  it 
the  boundary,  because  several  islands  will  be  thereby  acquired,  one  of 
which  is  said  to  command  this  channel,  and  to  be  already  fortified. 
The  article  expressly  includes  also  the  islands  appertaining  to  the 
Floridas.  To  this  there  can  be  no  objection.  The  islands  within  six 
leagues  of  the  shore  are  the  subject  of  a  British  proclamation  in  the 
year  1763,  subsequent  to  the  cession  of  the  Floridas  to  Great  Britain 
by  France,  which  is  not  known  to  have  ever  been  called  in  question 
by  either  France  or  Spain. 

The  second  article  requires  no  particular  observations. 

Article  three  is  one  whose  import  may  be  expected  to  undergo  the 
severest  scrutiny.  The  modification  to  be  desired  is  that  which,  whilst 
it  provides  for  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  will  be  acceptable 
to  France,  and  will  give  no  just  ground  of  complaint  and  the  least  of 
discontent  to  Great  Britain. 

The  present  form  of  the  article  ought,  and  probably  will  be,  satis 
factory  to  France:  first,  because  it  secures  to  her  all  the  commercial 
advantages  in  the  river  which  she  can  well  desire;  secondly,  because  it 
leaves  her  free  to  contest  the  mere  navigation  of  the  river  by  Great 
Britain,  without  the  consent  of  France. 

The  article,  also,  in  its  present  form,  violates  no  right  of  Great  Brit 
ain,  nor  can  she  reasonably  expect  of  the  United  -States  that  they  will 
contend,  beyond  their  obligation,  for  her  interest,  at  the  expense  of 
their  own.  As  far  as  Great  Britain  can  claim  the  use  of  the  river  under 
her  treaties  with  us,  or  by  virtue  of  contiguous  territory,  the  silence 
of  the  article  on  that  subject  leaves  the  claim  unaffected.  As  far  again 
as  she  is  entitled  under  the  treaty  of  1794,  to  the  use  of  our  bank  of 
the  Mississippi  above  the  thirty-first  degree  of  north  latitude,  her  title 
will  be  equally  entire.  The  article  stipulates  against  her  only  in  its 
exclusion  of  her  commerce  from  the  bank  to  be  ceded  below  our 
present  limits.  To  this  she  can  not  of  right  object.  First,  because, 
the  territory  not  belonging  to  the  United  States  at  the  date  of  our 
treaty  with  her,  is  not  included  in  its  stipulations.  Secondly,  because 
the  privileges  to  be  enjoyed  by  France  are  for  a  consideration  which 
Great  Britain  has  not  given  and  can  not  give.  Thirdly,  because  the 
exclusion  in  this  case  being  a  condition  on  which  the  territory  will  be 
ceded  and  accepted,  the  right  to  communicate  the  privilege  to  Great 
Britain  will  never  have  been  vested  in  the  United  States.  But  although 
these  reasons  fully  justify  the  article  in  its  relation  to  Great  Britain, 
it  will  be  advisable,  before  it  be  proposed,  to  feel  the  pulse  of  the  French 
Government  with  respect  to  a  stipulation,  that  each  of  the  parties  may, 
without  the  consent  of  the  other,  admit  whomsoever  it  pleases  to  navi 
gate  the  river  and  trade  with  their  respective  shores,  on  the  same  terms 
as  in  other  parts  of  France  and  the  United  States,  and  as  far  as  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  131 

disposition  of  that  Government  will  concur,  to  vary  the  proposition 
accordingly.  It  is  not  probable  that  this  concurrence  will  be  given, 
but  the  trial  to  obtain  it  will  not  only  manifest  a  friendly  regard  to  the 
wishes  of  Great  Britain,  and,  if  successful,  furnish  a  future  price  for 
privileges  within  her  grant,  but  is  a  just  attention  to  the  interests  of 
our  Western  fellow-citizens,  whose  commerce  will  not  otherwise  be 
on  an  equal  footing  with  that  of  the  Atlantic  States. 

Should  France  not  only  refuse  any  such  change  in  the  article,  but 
insist  on  a  recognition  of  her  right  to  exclude  all  nations  other  than 
the  United  States  from  navigating  the  Mississippi,  it  may  be  observed 
to  her  that  a  positive  stipulation  to  that  effect  might  subject  us  to  the 
charge  of  intermeddling  with  and  prejudging  questions  merely  exist 
ing  between  her  and  Great  Britain;  that  the  silence  of  the  article  is 
sufficient;  that,  as  Great  Britain  never  asserted  a  claim  on  this  subject 
against  Spain,  it  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  she  will  assert  it  against 
France,  on  her  taking  the  place  of  Spain;  that,  if  the  claim  should  be 
asserted,  the  treaties  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  will 
have  no  connexion  with  it,  the  United  States  having,  in  those  treaties, 
given  their  separate  consent  only  to  the  use  of  the  river  by  Great 
Britain,  leaving  her  to  seek  whatever  other  consent  may  be  necessary. 

If,  notwithstanding  such  expostulations  as  these,  France  shall 
Inflexibly  insist  on  an  express  recognition  to  the  above  effect,  it  will  be 
better  to  acquiesce  in  it,  than  to  lose  the  opportunity  of  fixing  an 
arrangement  in  other  respects  satisfactory;  taking  care  to  put  the 
recognition  into  a  form  not  inconsistent  with  our  treaties  with  Great 
Britain,  or  with  an  explanatory  article  that  may  not  improbably  be 
desired  by  her. 

In  truth,  it  must  be  admitted,  that  France,  holding  one  bank,  may 
exclude  from  the  use  of  the  river  any  nation  not  more  connected  with 
it  by  territory  than  Great  Britain  is  understood  to  be.  As  a  river 
where  both  its  banks  are  owned  by  one  nation  belongs  exclusively  to 
that  nation,  it  is  clear  that,  when  the  territory  on  one  side  is  owned  by 
one  nation,  and  on  the  other  side  by  another  nation,  the  river  belongs 
equally  to  both,  in  exclusion  of  all  others.  There  are  two  modes  by 
which  an  equal  right  may  be  exercised;  the  one  by  a  negative  in  each 
on  the  use  of  the  river  by  any  other  nation,  except  the  joint  propri 
etor:  the  other  by  allowing  each  to  grant  the  use  of  the  river  to  other 
nations,  with  the  consent  of  the  joint  proprietor.  The  latter  mode 
would  be  preferable  to  the  United  States.  But  if  it  be  found  abso 
lutely  inadmissible  to  France,  the  former  must,  in  point  of  expediency, 
since  it  may  in  point  of  right,  be  admitted  by  the  United  States.  Great 
Britain  will  have  less  reason  to  be  dissatisfied  on  this  account,  as  she 
has  never  asserted  against  Spain  a  right  of  entering  and  navigating  the 
Mississippi,  nor  has  either  she  or  the  United  States  ever  founded  on  the 
treaties  between  them  a  claim  to  the  interposition  of  the  other  party 


132  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

in  any  respect,  although  the  river  has  been  constantly  shut  against 
Great  Britain  from  the  year  1783  to  the  present  moment,  and  was  not 
opened  to  the  United  States  until  1795,  the  j ear  of  their  treaty  with 
Spain. 

It  is  possible,  also,  that  France  may  refuse  to  the  United  States  the 
same  commercial  use  of  her  shores,  as  she  will  require  for  herself  on 
those  ceded  to  the  United  States.  In  this  case,  it  will  be  better  to 
relinquish  a  reciprocity  than  to  frustrate  the  negotiation.  If  the 
United  States  held  in  their  own  right  the  shore  to  be  ceded  to  them, 
the  commercial  use  of  it  allowed  to  France  would  render  a  reciprocal 
use  of  her  shore  by  the  United  States  an  indispensable  condition.  But 
as  France  may,  if  she  chooses,  reserve  to  herself  the  commercial  use 
of  the  ceded  shore  as  a  condition  of  the  cession,  the  claim  of  the  United 
States  to  the  like  use  of  her  shore  would  not  be  supported  by  the 
principle  of  reciprocity,  and  may,  therefore,  without  violating  that 
principle,  be  waived  in  the  transaction. 

The  article  limits  to  ten  years  the  equality  of  French  citizens,  ves 
sels,  and  merchandises,  with  those  of  the  United  States:  should  a 
longer  period  be  insisted  on,  it  may  be  yielded.  The  limitation  may 
even  be  struck  out,  if  made  essential  by  France;  but  a  limitation  in  this 
case  is  so  desirable,  that  it  is  to  be  particular!}7  pressed,  and  the 
shorter  the  period  the  better. 

ART.  4.  The  right  of  deposit,  provided  for  in  this  article,  will  accom 
modate  the  commerce  of  France  to  and  from  her  own  side  of  the  river, 
until  an  emporium  shall  be  established  on  that  side,  which  it  is  well 
known  will  admit  of  a  convenient  one.  The  right  is  limited  to  ten 
years,  because  such  an  establishment  may  within  that  period  be  formed 
by  her;  should  a  longer  period  be  required,  it  may  be  allowed, 
especialhT  as  the  use  of  such  a  deposit  would  probably  fall  within  the 
general  regulations  of  our  commerce  there.  At  the  same  time,  as  it 
will  be  better  that  it  should  rest  on  our  own  regulations  than  on  a 
stipulation,  it  will  be  proper  to  insert  a  limitation  of  time,  if  France 
can  be  induced  to  acquiesce  in  it. 

ART.  5.  This  article  makes  a  reasonable  provision  for  the  commerce 
of  France  in  the  ports  of  West  and  East  Florida.  If  the  limitation  to 
ten  years  of  its  being  on  the  same  footing  with  that  of  the  United 
States  should  form  an  insuperable  objection,  the  term  may  be  enlarged; 
but  it  is  much  to  be  wished  that  the  privilege  may  not  in  this  case  be 
made  perpetual. 

ART.  6.  The  pecuniary  consideration  to  be  offered  for  the  territories 
in  question  is  stated  in  the  sixth  article:  you  will  of  course  favor  the 
United  States  as  much  as  possible,  both  in  the  amount  and  modifications 
of  the  payments.  There  is  some  reason  to  believe  thtft  the  gross  sum 
expressed  in  the  article  has  occurred  to  the  French  Government,  and  is 
as  much  as  will  be  finally  insisted  on:  it  is  possible  that  less  may  be 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF   LOUISIANA.  133 

accepted,  and  the  negotiation  ought  to  be  adapted  to  that  supposition. 
Should  a  greater  sum  be  made  an  ultimatum  on  the  part  of  France,  the 
President  has  made  up  his  mind  to  go  as  far  as  fifty  millions  of  livres 
tournois,  rather  than  lose  the  main  object.  Every  struggle,  however, 
is  to  be  made  against  such  an  augmentation  of  the  price,  that  will 
consist  with  ultimate  acquiescence  in  it. 

The  payment  to  be  made  immediately  on  the  exchange  of  ratifica 
tions  is  left  blank;  because  it  can  not  be  foreseen  either  what  the  gross 
sum  or  the  assumed  debts  will  be,  or  how  far  a  reduction  of  the  gross 
sum  m&y  be  influenced  by  the  anticipated  payments  provided  for  by 
the  act  of  Congress  herewith  communicated,  and  by  the  authorization 
of  the  President  and  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  indorsed  thereon.  This 
provision  has  been  made  with  a  view  to  enable  you  to  take  advantage 
of  the  urgency  of  the  French  Government  for  money,  which  may  be 
such  as  to  overcome  their  repugnance  to  part  with  what  we  want,  and 
to  induce  them  to  part  with  it  on  lower  terms,  in  case  a  payment  can  be 
made  before  the  exchange  of  ratifications.  The  letter  from  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  of  which  a  copy  is  here 
with  inclosed,  will  explain  the  manner  in  which  this  advance  of  the  ten 
millions  of  livres,  or  so  much  thereof  as  may  be  necessary,  will  be 
raised  most  conveniently  for  the  United  States.  It  only  remains  here 
to  point  out  the  condition  or  event  on  which  the  advance  may  be  made. 
It  will  be  essential  that  the  convention  be  ratified  b}^  the  French  Gov 
ernment  before  any  such  advance  be  made;  and  it  may  be  further 
required,  in  addition  to  the  stipulation  to  transfer  possession  of  the 
ceded  territory  as  soon  as  possible,  that  the  orders  for  the  purpose, 
from  the  competent  source,  may  be  actually  and  immediately  put  into 
your  hands.  It  will  be  proper,  also,  to  provide  for  the  payment  of  the 
advances,  in  the  event  of  a  refusal  of  the  United  States  to  ratify  the 
convention. 

It  is  apprehended  that  the  French  Government  will  feel  no  repug 
nance  to  our  designating  the  classes  of  claims  and  debts,  which,  embrac 
ing  more  equitable  considerations  than  the  rest,  we  may  believe  entitled 
to  a  priority  of  payment.  It  is  probable,  therefore,  that  the  clause  of 
the  sixth  article,  referring  it  to  our  discretion,  may  be  safely  insisted 
upon.  We  think  the  following  classification  such  as  ought  to  be 
adopted  by  ourselves: 

First.  Claims  under  the  fourth  article  of  the  Convention  of  Septem 
ber,  1800; 

Secondly.  Forced  contracts  or  sales  imposed  upon  our  citizens  by 
French  authorities;  and, 

Thirdly.  Voluntary  contracts  which  have  been  suffered  to  remain 
unfulfilled  by  them. 

Where  our  citizens  have  become  creditors  of  the  French  Govern 
ment  in  consequence  of  agencies  or  appointments  derived  from  it,  the 


134  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

United  States  are  under  no  particular  obligation  to  patronize  their 
claims,  and,  therefore,  no  sacrifice  of  any  sort,  in  their  behalf,  ought  to 
be  made  in  the  arrangement.  As  far  as  this  class  of  claimants  can  be 
embraced  without  embarrassing  the  negotiation,  or  influencing  in  any- 
respect  the  demands  or  expectations  of  the  French  Government,  it 
will  not  be  improper  to  admit  them  into  the  provision.  It  is  not 
probable,  however,  that  such  a  deduction,  from  the  sum  ultimately  to 
be  received  by  the  French  Government,  will  be  permitted,  without 
some  equivalent  accommodation  to  its  interests,  at  the  expense  of  the 
United  States. 

The  claim  of  Mr.  Beaumarchais,  and  several  other  French  individu 
als,  on  our  Government,  founded  upon  antiquated  or  irrelevant  grounds, 
although  they  may  be  attempted  to  be  included  in  this  negotiation, 
have  no  connexion  with  it.  The  American  Government  is  distin 
guished  for  its  just  regard  to  the  rights  of  foreigners,  and  does  not 
require  those  of  individuals  to  become  subjects  of  treaty  in  order  to  be 
admitted.  Besides,  their  discussion  involves  a  variety  of  minute  top 
ics,  with  which  you  may  fairly  declare  yourselves  to  be  unacquainted. 
Should  it  appear,  however,  in  the  course  of  the  negotiation,  that  so 
much  stress  is  laid  on  this  point,  that,  without  some  accommodation, 
your  success  will  be  endangered,  it  will  be  allowed  to  bind  the  United 
States  for  the  payment  of  one  million  of  livres  tournois  to  the  repre 
sentatives  of  Beaumarchais,  heretofore  deducted  from  his  accounts 
against  them;  the  French  Government  declaring  the  same  never  to 
have  been  advanced  to  him  on  account  of  the  United  States. 

Article  7  is  suggested  by  the  respect  due  to  the  rights  of  the  people 
inhabiting  the  ceded  territory,  and  by  the  delay  which  ma}T  be  found 
in  constituting  them  a  regular  and  integral  portion  of  the  Union. 
A  full  respect  for  their  rights  might  require  their  consent  to  the  act  of 
cession;  and  if  the  French  Government  should  be  disposed  to  concur  in 
any  proper  mode  of  obtaining  it,  the  provision  would  be  honorable  to 
both  nations.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  inhabitants  would  readily 
agree  to  the  proposed  transfer  of  their  allegiance. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  idea  of  a  guaranty  of  the  country  reserved  to 
France  may  not  be  brought  into  the  negotiation.  Should  France  pro 
pose  such  a  stipulation,  it  will  be  expedient  to  evade  it,  if  possible,  as 
more  likety  to  be  a  source  of  disagreeable  questions  between  the  parties, 
concerning  the  actual  casus  foederis,  than  of  real  advantage  to  France. 
It  is  not  in  the  least  probable  that  Louisiana,  in  the  hands  of  that 
nation,  will  be  attacked  by  any  other,  whilst  it  is  in  the  relations  to 
United  States  on  which  the  guaranty  would  be  founded;  whereas, 
nothing  is  more  probable  than  some  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the 
circumstances  and  the  degree  of  danger  necessary  to  put  the  stipula 
tions  in  force.  There  will  be  less  reason  in  the  demand  of  "such  an 
article,  as  the  United  States  would  set  little  value  on  a  guaranty  of 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  135 

any  part  of  this  territoiy;  and,  consequently,  there  would  be  no  just 
reciprocity  in  it.  Should  France,  notwithstanding-  these  considera 
tions,  make  a  guaranty  an  essential  point,  it  will  be  better  to  accede 
to  it  than  to  abandon  the  object  of  the  negotiation;  mitigating  the  evil 
as  much  as  possible,  by  requiring,  for  the  casus  foederis,  a  great  and 
manifest  danger  threatened  to  the  territory  guaranteed,.. and  by  sub 
stituting  for  an  indefinite  succor,  or  even  a  definite  succor,  in  military 
force,  a  fixed  sum  of  money  pa}Table  at  the  Treasury  of  the  United 
States.  It  is  difficult  to  name  the  proper  sum  which  is  in  no  posture 
of  the  business  to  be  exceeded,  but  it  can  scarcely  be  presumed  that 
more  than  about  —  —  dollars,  to  be  paid  annually  during  the  existence  of 
the  danger,  will  be  insisted  on.  Should  it  be  unavoidable  to  stipulate 
troops  in  place  of  money,  it  will  be  prudent  to  settle  the  details  with  as 
much  precision  as  possible,  that  there  may  be  no  room  for  controversy, 
either  with  France  or  with  her  enemy,  on  the  fulfillment  of  the 
stipulation. 

The  instructions,  thus  far  given,  suppose  that  France  may  be  willing 
to  cede  to  the  United  States  the  whole  of  the  island  of  New  Orleans, 
and  both  the  Floridas.  As  she  may  be  inclined  to  dispose  of  a  part 
or  parts,  and  of  such  only,  it  is  proper  for  you  to  know  that  the 
Floridas,  together,  are  estimated  at  one-fourth  the  value  of  the  whole 
island  of  New  Orleans,  and  East  Florida  at  one -half  that  of  West 
Florida.  In  case  of  a  partial  cession,  it  is  expected  that  the  regula 
tions  of  every  other  kind,  so  far  as  they  are  onerous  to  the  United 
States,  will  be  more  favorably  modified. 

Should  France  refuse  to  cede  the  whole  of  the  island,  as  large  a 
portion  as  she  can  be  prevailed  on  to  part  with  may  be  accepted; 
should  no  considerable  portion  of  it  be  attainable,  it  will  still  be  of 
vast  importance  to  get  a  jurisdiction  over  space  enough  for  a  large 
commercial  town,  and  its  appurtenances,  on  the  back  of  the  river,  and 
as  little  remote  from  the  mouth  of  the  river  as  may  be.  A  right  to 
choose  the  place  would  be  better  than  a  designation  of  it  in  the  treaty. 
Should  it  be  impossible  to  procure  a  complete  jurisdiction  over  any 
convenient  spot  whatever,  it  will  only  remain  to  explain  and  improve 
the  present  right  of  deposit,  by  adding-  thereto  the  express  privilege 
of  holding  real  estate  for  commercial  purposes,  of  providing  hospitals, 
of  having  consuls  residing  there,  and  other  agents  who  may  be  author 
ized  to  authenticate  and  deliver  all  documents  requisite  for  vessels 
belonging  to,  and  engaged  in,  the  trade  of  the  United  States,  to  and 
from  the  place  of  deposit.  The  United  States  can  not  remain  satis 
fied,  nor  the  Western  people  be  kept  patient,  under  the  restrictions 
which  the  existing  treaty  with  Spain  authorizes. 

Should  a  cession  of  the  Floridas  not  be  attainable,  your  attention 
will  also  be  due  to  the  establishment  of  suitable  deposits  at  the  mouth 
of  the  rivers  passing  from  the  United  States  through  the  Floridas, 


136  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

as  well  as  of  the  free  navigation  of  those  rivers  by  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  What  has  been  above  suggested  in  relation  to  the 
Mississippi,  and  the  deposit  on  its  banks,  is  applicable  to  the  other 
rivers;  and  additional  hints  relative  to  them  all  may  be  derived  from 
the  letter,  of  which  a  copy  is  enclosed,  from  the  Consul  at  New  Orleans 

It  has  been  long  manifest  that,  whilst  the  injuries  to  the  United 
States,  so  frequently  occurring  from  the  colonial  officers  scattered 
over  our  hemisphere  and  in  our  neighborhood,  can  onhr  be  repaired 
by  a  resort  to  their  respective  Governments  in  Europe,  it  will  be 
impossible  to  guard  against  the  most  serious  inconveniences.  The  late 
events  at  New  Orleans  strongly  manifest  the  necessity  of  placing  a 
power  somewhere  nearer  to  us  capable  of  correcting  and  controlling 
the  mischievous  proceedings  of  such  officers  toward  our  citizens;  with 
out  which,  a  few  individuals,  not  always  among  the  wisest  or  best  of 
men,  may  at  any  time  threaten  the  good  understanding  of  the  two 
nations.  The  distance  between  the  United  States  and  the  old  continent, 
and  the  mortifying  delays  of  explanations  and  negotiations  across  the 
Atlantic  on  emergencies  in  our  neighborhood,  render  such  a  provision 
indispensable;  and  it  can  not  be  long  before  all  the  Governments  of 
Europe,  having  American  Colonies,  must  see  the  necessity  of  making  it. 
This  object,  will  likewise  claim  your  special  attention. 

It  only  remains  to  suggest,  that,  considering  the  possibility  of  some 
intermediate  violences  between  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  the 
French  or  Spaniards,  in  consequence  of  the  interruption  of  our  right 
of  deposit,  and  the  probability  that  considerable  damages  will  have 
been  occasioned  by  that  measure  to  citizens  of  the  United  States,  it 
will  be  proper  that  indemnification  in  the  latter  case  be  provided  for, 
and  that  in  the  former  it  shall  not  be  taken  on  either  sides  as  a  ground 
or  pretext  for  hostilities. 

These  instructions,  though  as  full  as  they  could  be  conveniently 
made,  will  necessaril}T  leave  much  to  your  discretion.  For  the  proper 
exercise  of  it,  the  President  relies  on  your  information,  your  judg 
ment,  and  your  fidelity  to  the  interests  of  your  country. 

JAMES  MADISON. 


Mr.  Monroe  to  Mr.  Jefferson. 

-t-  /3     |  C\  o  6 

NEW  YORK  March  7.  1803. 

DEAR  VSiR, — I  recd.  yours  of  the  25.  ulto.  with  one  to  Mr.  Cepeda 
this  morning,  when  1  also  recd.  my  instructions  from  the  department 
of  State,  with  all  the  other  documents  connected  with  my  mission  to 
France  &  Spn.  The  ship.  Richmond,  of  ah*.  400  tons  burden,  whose 
cabbin  I  have  taken,  cleared  at  the  custom  house  on  Saturday,  my 
baggage  was  put  on  board,  in  expectation  of  sailing  yesterday  as  Mr. 
Madison  informed  me  my  instructions  ought  to  arrive  by  8  in  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  137 

morning;  but  it  being  Sunday,  they  were  delayed  till  to-day.  We 
are  now  detained  by  a  snowstorm  and  contrary  wind,  but  I  shall  sail 
as  soon  as  it  clears  up,  &  the  wind  shifts. 

The  resolutions  of  Mr.  Ross  proved  that  the  federal  party  will  stick 
at  nothing  to  embarrass  the  adm11.,  and  recover  its  lost  power.  They 
nevertheless  produce  a  great  effect  on  the  publick  mind  and  I  presume 
more  especially  in  the  western  country.  The  unanimity  in  the  pub- 
lick  councils  respecting  our  right  to  the  free  navigation  of  the  river, 
and  its  importance  to  every  part  of  the  U  States,  the  dissatisfaction  at 
the  interference  of  Spn.  which  will  not  be  appeased  while  the  power 
of  a  similar  one  exists,  are  calculated  to  inspire  the  hope  of  a  result 
which  may  put  us  at  ease  forever  on  those  points.  If  the  negotiation 
secures  all  the  objects  sought,  or  a  deposit  with  the  sovereignty  over 
it,  the  federalists  will  be  overwhelmed  completely:  the  union  of  the 
western  with  the  Eastern  people  will  be  consolidated,  republican 
principles  confirmed,  and  a  fair  prospect  of  peace  and  happiness  pre 
sented  to  our  country.  But  if  the  negotiation  compromises  short  of 
that,  and  leaves  the  management  of  our  great  concerns  in  that  river, 
which  comprise  everything  appertaining  to  the  western  parts  of  the 
U  States,  in  the  hands  of  a  foreign  power,  may  we  not  expect  that 
the  publick  will  be  disappointed  and  disapprove  of  the  result.  So  far 
as  I  can  judge,  I  think  much  would  be  hazarded  by  any  adjustment 
which  did  not  put  us  in  complete  security  for  the  future.  It  is  doubt 
ful  whether  an  adjustment  short  of  that  would  be  approved  in  any 
part  of  the  union;  1  am  thoroughly  persuaded  it  would  not  to  the 
westward.  If  they  were  discontented,  there  would  grow  up  an  union 
of  councils  and  measures  between  them  and  the  Eastern  people  which 
might  lead  to  other  measures  &  be  perverted  to  bad  purposes. 
The  Eastern  towns,  which  govern  the  country  wish  war  for  the  sake 
of  privateering:  the  western  would  not  dislike  it  especially  if  they 
were  withheld  from  a  just  right,  or  the  enjoyment  of  a  privilege  nec- 
essaiy  to  their  Avelfare,  the  pursuit  of  which  by  force  would  create  a 
vast  expenditure  of  money  among  them.  Their  confidence  is  now 
reposed  in  the  adm11.  from  the  best  of  motives, — a  knowledge  that  it  is 
sincerely  friendly  to  their  interests:  it  is  strengthened  by  a  distrust 
of  these  new  friends;  but  an  inquietude  has  been  created  by  the  late 
event,  an  inquiry  has  taken  place  which  has  shown  that  every  part  of 
the  union  especially  the  Eastern,  is  deeply  interested  in  opening  the 
river;  that  the  attempt  to  occlude  it  on  a  former  occasion  was  a  base 
perhaps  a  corrupt  intrigue  of  a  few;  their  hopes  and  expectations  have 
been  raised,  and  it  is  probable  they  expect  from  the  mission  by  a 
peaceful  course  everything  which  their  enemies  promised  by  war. 
The  consequences  of  a  disappointment  are  not  easily  calculated.  If  it 
restored  the  federal  party  to  power  and  involved  us  in  war,  the  result 
might  be  fatal.  It  therefore  highly  merits  consideration  whether  we 


138  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

should  not  take  that  ground  as  the  ultimatum  in  the  negotiation  which 
must  in  every  possible  event  preserve  the  confidence  &  affection  of  the 
western  people.  While  we  stand  well  with  them  we  shall  prosper. 
We  shall  be  most  apt  to  avoid  war,  taking  ten  years  ensuing  together; 
and  if  we  are  driven  by  necessity  into  it,  it  is  much  better  that  it  be 
under  the  auspices  of  a  republican  than  a  monarchial  admn.  These 
ideas  are  expressed  in  haste  for  yr.  consideration  for  I  have  not  time  to 
give  them  method  or  form.  I  shall  most  certainly  labor  to  obtain  the 
best  terms  possible,  but  it  is  for  you  to  say,  what  are  the  least  favor 
able  we  must  accept.  You  will  have  time  to  weigh  the  subject  &  feel 
the  publick  pulse  on  it  before  anything  conclusive  may  be  done.  1 
hope  the  French  gov*.  will  have  wisdom  enough  to  see  that  we  will 
never  suffer  France  or  any  other  power  to  tamper  with  our  interior; 
if  that  is  not  the  object  there  can  be  no  reason  for  declining  an  accom 
modation  to  the  whole  of  our  demands.  *  *  * 


[Extract.] 

James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Charles  Pinckney,  Minister  to  Spain. 
>f  ,   -    5  H  U  -  f  b 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  March  8,  1803. 

SIR:  My  last  letter  was  of  January  18.  Yours  since  received  are  of 
the  6th  and  28th  of  November. 

Our  latest  authentic  information  from  New  Orleans  is  of  January 
20.  At  that  date  the  edict  of  the  Intendant  against  our  right  of  deposit 
had  not  been  revoked,  although  the  letters  to  him  and  the  Governor 
from  the  Spanish  Minister  here  had  been  previously  received.  And  it 
appears  that  the  first  outrage  had  been. followed  by  orders  of  the  most 
rigid  tenor  against  every  hospitable  intercourse  between  our  citizens 
navigating  the  river  and  the  Spanish  inhabitants. 

This  continuation  of  the  obstruction  to  our  trade,  and  the  approach 
of  the  season  for  carrying  down  the  Mississippi  the  exports  of  the 
Western  country,  have  had  the  natural  effect  of  increasing  the  Western 
irritation,  and  imboldening  the  advocates  for  immediate  redress  by 
arms.  Among  the  papers  enclosed,  you  will  find  the  propositions  moved 
in  the  Senate  by  Mr.  Ross,  of  Pennsylvania.  The}r  were  debated  at 
considerable  length,  and  with  much  ardor,  and,  on  the  question,  had 
11  votes  in  their  favor  against  14.  The  resolutions  moved  by  Mr. 
Breckinridge,  and  which  have  passed  into  a  law,  will,  with  the  law 
itself,  be  also  found  among  the  enclosed  papers. 

These  proceedings  ought  more  and  more  to  convince  the  Spanish 
Government  that  it  must  not  only  maintain  good  faith  with  the  United 
States,  but  must  add,  to  this  pledge  of  peace,  some  provident  and 
effectual  arrangement,  as  heretofore  urged,  for  controlling  or  correct 
ing  the  wrongs  of  Spanish  officers  in  America,  without  the  necessity  of 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  139 

crossing  the  Atlantic  for  the  purpose.  The  same  proceeding,  will 
show,  at  the  same  time,  that,  with  proper  dispositions  and  arrangements 
on  the  part  of  Spain,  she  may  reckon  with  confidence  on  harmony  and 
friendship  with  this  county.  Notwithstanding  the  deep  stroke  made 
at  our  rights  and  our  interests,  and  the  opportunity  given  for  self- 
redress,  in  a  summary  manner,  a  love  of  peace,  a  respect  for  the  just 
usages  of  nations,  and  a  reliance  on  the  voluntary  justice  of  the  Span 
ish  Government,  have  given  a  preference  to  remonstrance,  as  the  first 
appeal  on  the  occasion,  and  to  negotiation  as  a  source  of  adequate  pro 
visions  for  perpetuating  the  good  understanding  between  the  two 
nations;  the  measures  taken  on  the  proposition  of  Mr.  Breckinridge 
being  merely  those  of  ordinary  precaution,  and  precisely  similar  to 
those  which  accompanied  the  mission  of  Mr.  Jay  to  Great  Britian  in 
1794.  Should  the  deposit,  however,  not  be  restored  in  time  for  the 
arrival  of  the  Spring  craft,  a  new  crisis  will  occur,  which  it  is  presumed 
that  the  Spanish  Government  will  have  been  stimulated  to  prevent,  by 
the  very  heavy  claims  of  indemnification  to  which  it  would  be  other 
wise  fairly  subjected.  The  Marquis  de  Casa  Yrujo  does  not  yet 
despair  of  receiving  from  New  Orleans  favorable  answers  to  his  letters; 
but  the  remedy  seems  now  to  be  no  more  reasonably  expected  from 
Madrid.  If  the  attention  of  the  Spanish  Government  should  not  have 
been  sufficiently  quickened  by  the  first  notice  of  the  proceeding,  from 
its  own  officers,  we  hope  that  the  energy  of  your  interpositions  will 
have  overcome  its  tardy  habits,  and  have  produced  an  instant  despatch 
of  the  necessary  orders. 

Mr.  Monroe  was  to  sail  from  New  York  to  Havre  de  Grace  yesterday. 
He  carries  with  him  the  instructions  in  which  you  are  joined  with  him, 
as  well  as  those  which  include  Mr.  Livingston. 

The  convention  signed  with  Spain  in  August,  though  laid  before 
the  Senate  at  an  early  day,  had  no  question  taken  on  it  till  the  close  of 
the  session.  It  wras  then  postponed  till  the  next  session,  which  is  to 
commence  in  November.  More  than  a  majority,  but  less  than  two- 
thirds,  which  the  Constitution  requires,  would  have  acquiesced  in  the 
instrument  in  its  present  form;  trusting  to  the  success  of  further  nego 
tiations  for  supplying  its  defects,  particularly  the  omission  of  the 
claims  founded  on  French  irregularities.  But  it  is  understood  that  it 
would  have  been  a  mere  acquiescence;  no  doubt  being  entertained  that 
Spain  is  bound  to  satisfy  the  omitted  as  well  as  the  included  claims. 
In  explaining,  therefore,  the  course  taken  by  the  Senate,  which  mingles 
respect  for  the  Spanish  Government  with  a  cautious  regard  to  our  own 
rights,  you  will  avail  yourself  of  the  opportunity  of  pressing  the 
reasonableness  and  the  sound  policy  of  remodeling  the  convention  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  do  full  justice.  I  need  not  repeat  the  observa 
tions  heretofore  made  on  the  Spanish  responsibilit}r  for  the  conduct 
of  French  citizens  within  Spanish  jurisdiction;  but  it  may  be  of  use 


140  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

to  refer  you  to  the  enclosed  copy  of  a  royal  order,  issued  by  the  Spanish 
Government,  in  1799,  which  will  enable  you  to  remind  them  of  their 
own  view  of  the  subject  at  that  time.  In  this  document  it  is  expressly 
declared  that  the  French  consular  jurisdiction  was  not  admitted,  and 
that  French  Consuls,  in  Spanish  ports,  were  in  the  same  condition  as 
those  of  every  other  nation.  After  such  a  declaration  against  the 
authority  of  French  Consuls  the  Spanish  Government  would  be  charge 
able  with  no  less  disrespect  to  the  French  Republic  than  to  itself,  in 
saying  that  Spain  was  not  left  at  liberty  to  prevent  an  exercise  of  the 
usurped  authority;  and,  if  at  liberty,  she  is  indisputably  answerable 
for  the  consequences  of  not  preventing  it. 
With  sentiments,  &c., 

JAMES  MADISON. 
CHARLES  PINCKNEY,  Esq. 


R.  R.  Livingston  to  James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  March  11,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR:  1  have  a  few  days  since  written  to  you,  transmitting  a 
letter  addressed  to  the  First  Consul:  for  though  I  had  numerous  notes 
and  observations  under  his  eye,  in  an  informal  way,  yet  I  have  reason 
to  fear  that  what  I  wrote  to  the  Minister,  particularly  on  the  subject 
of  the  debt,  had  not  reached  him;  besides  that,  I  believed  that  he  could 
not  pass  over  a  more  direct  address  to  him  personally.  I  found,  upon 
conversing  with  some  of  the  Ministers  here,  that  they  considered  my 
direct  address  as  improper,  and  likely  to  offend  the  Minister,  if  not  the 
Consul.  But  our  situation  was  such  as  to  require  something  decisive; 
and  as  I  daily  found  the  dispositions  of  M.  Talleyrand  were  friendly 
to  our  views,  I  promised  the  Minister  to  write,  and  offered  to  submit 
my  letter  to  him  before  I  sent  it.  He  was  pleased  with  this  mark  of 
confidence,  and  promised  not  only  to  deliver  it,  but  to  support  my 
application.  When  I  showed  him  the  letter,  he  seemed  to  think  that 
all  relating  to  the  debt  was  hopeless.  I,  however,  could  not  abandon 
this  important  object,  but  immediately  upon  sending  it,  took  care  to 
have  that  part  of  it  supported  by  Consul  Le  Brun,  who  has  the  prin 
cipal  direction  of  the  affairs  of  finances,  with  whom  I  am  upon  a  very 
friendly  footing,  and  between  whom  and  my  friend  Marbois,  there  is  a 
family  connexion,  strengthened  by  the  marriage  of  their  children.  I 
have  the  pleasure  to  enclose  you  an  answer  to  that  letter;  you  will  find 
in  it  such  strong  and  such  satisfactory  assurances  on  the  subject  of  the 
debt,  as  I  think  gives  us  the  firmest  prospects  of  its  speedy  payment. 
I  have  thought  it  necessary  to  communicate  this  to  the  Americans 
here,  in  order  to  prevent  their  parting  with  their  claims  at  an  insig 
nificant  price.  I  have,  also,  as  I  know  that  this  account  would  reach 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  141 

America  by  private  conversances,  before  you  could  communicate  it, 
thought  it  proper  to  mention  it  generally  to  one  of  my  friends,  with 
directions  to  speak  of  it  publicly,  in  order  to  prevent  the  creditors 
from  suffering  by  the  speculations  of  those  who  were  in  the  secret. 

I  told  you  that  M.  Talleyrand  had  assured  me  that  no  sale  would  be 
heard  of.  You  will  find  a  passage  in  the  note  which  was  doubtless 
intended  to  convey  that  idea  in  very  strong  terms.  As  I  know  it  to 
be  the  fixed  determinatian  of  this  Government  to  treat  only  in  Amer 
ica,  I  have  nothing  more  to  do  on  this  subject  than  to  endeavor  to  get 
the  right  of  depot  left  upon  the  footing  it  was  till  }^our  negotiations 
are  concluded.  This  1  shall  endeavor  to  effect.  If,  upon  the  arrival 
of  Mr.  Monroe,  he  can  suggest  anything  better,  1  shall  heartily  concur 
with  him.  In  treating  with  General  Bernadotte,  you  will  have  every 
possible  advantage.  The  nearer  he  views  the  object,  the  less  he  will 
value  it.  His  dispositions  are  as  friendly  as  possible  to  our  Govern 
ment  and  country;  and  his  ideas  relative  to  our  connexion,  and  the 
little  importance  of  Louisiana,  exactly  such  as  I  would  wish.  My 
conversations  with  him  on  that  subject  were  frequent  and  interesting; 
as  well  with  Mr.  Adet,  who  is  much  in  his  confidence,  and  who  thinks 
exactly  as  I  do.  The  great  object  that  he  will  be  instructed  to  keep 
in  view  will  be,  I  think,  from  what  I  learn  here,  to  keep  the  British 
out  of  the  river,  and  to  secure  as  much  as  possible  of  the  carrying 
trade  to  France.  Dupont  de  Nemours  has  shown  me  a  plan  that  he 
gave  to  Consul  Le  Brun,  of  which  I  send  you  a  copy.  I  have  endeav 
ored  to  convince  those  who  may  be  consulted  of  its  impracticability. 
The  reasons  are  too  obvious  to  make  it  necessary  for  me  to  state  them 
to  you.  I  have  hinted  at  making  the  island  of  New  Orleans  an  inde 
pendent  State,  under  the  Government  of  Spain,  France,  and  the  United 
States,  with  a  right  of  depot  to  each,  subject  to  a  duty  on  imports  of 
one  and  a  half  per  cent,  in  lieu  of  storage,  wharfage,  &c. ,  suggesting 
the  advantage  that  France  would  derive  from  being  the  only  manufac 
turing  nation  of  the  three.  The  advantages  of  this  to  our  carrying 
trade  (while  it  left  our  revenue  untouched)  are  obvious.  And  in  such 
a  treaty,  arrangements  might  be  made  extremely  advantageous  to  the 
Western  people.  The  new  nation  must  always  feel  its  dependence  upon 
us,  and,  of  course,  respect  our  rights.  I  should  not  have  thought  it 
worth  while  to  mention  this,  had  it  not  been  that  I  gave  an  unsigned 
and  informal  sketch  of  it  to  Joseph  Bonaparte :  it  may  possibly  be 
given  to  General  Bernadotte.  If,  as  I  begin  to  believe,  they  do  not 
get  the  Floridas,  they  will  put  the  less  value  on  New  Orleans. 

Things  every  day  look  more  towards  a  rupture  between  this  country 
and  Britain;  and  though  the  politicians  think  otherwise,  I  believe  a 
war  not  very  distant.  The  stocks  here  have  been  sixty -five;  they  are 
now  sixty-one.  This,  however,  is  an  artificial  operation;  money  being 


142  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

employed  by  the  Government  to  keep  them  up.     Their  real  price 
would  be  about  fifty-seven. 

I  am,  dear  sir,  with  the  highest  consideration,  your  most  obedient 
humble  servant, 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

JAMES  MADISON,  Secretary  of  State. 


Mr.  Talleyrand  to  Mr.  Livingston. 

PARIS,   Vmtose,  an  11,  (February  10],  1803. 

SIR:  The  First  Consul,  in  placing  in  my  hands  the  memoir  which  you 
have  presented  to  him,  has  ordered  me  to  assure  you  that  he  has  taken 
into  serious  consideration  the  objects  }Tou  have  had  in  view,  and  the 
various  demands  which  you  have  presented. 

He  has,  at  the  same  time,  caused  a  report  to  be  made  on  all  the  sub 
jects  which  may  arise  in  consequence  of  these  demands,  and  on  the 
clauses  of  the  convention  between  France  and  the  United  States,  to 
which  you  refer.  It  is  the  intention  of  the  First  Consul  (and  he  has 
charged  me  to  make  it  known  to  you)  that  this  convention  shall  be 
executed,  in  every  particular,  with  scrupulous  exactness. 

The  reflections  contained  in  your  memoir,  in  relation  to  the  difficul 
ties  which,  on  the  part  of  France,  may  attend  its  execution,  do  not 
apply,  with  the  least  foundation,  either  to  the  dispositions  of  the 
Government  of  the  French  Republic,  or  to  the  state  'of  her  finances. 
The  First  Consul  is  persuaded  that  the  impressions  by  which  you  have 
on  this  point  been  misled,  have  been  occasioned  by  your  friendly  solici 
tude;  but  these  impressions  are  not  supported  by  facts.  No  embar 
rassment  exists  in  the  finances  of  France.  The  French  Government 
has  the  means,  as  well  as  the  inclination,  to  be  just;  and  if  it  should  be 
placed  in  a  position  in  which  the  discharge  of  its  obligations  would  be 
attended  with  difficulties,  it  will  know  how  to  surmount  those  obstacles, 
and  satisfy  every  claim  that  can  be  justly  demanded. 

As  to  the  American  debts,  of  which  you  have  given  an  estimate,  in 
the  memoir  addressed  to  the  First  Consul,  I  ought  to  apprize  you  that 
it  is  entirely  new  to  us  that  they  can  be  raised,  by  any  valuation  what 
ever,  to  the  sum  of  twenty  millions.  The  First  Consul  charges  me  to 
request  of  you  an  exact,  full,  certain,  and  verified  statement  of  these 
debts.  The  perfect  confidence  with  which  you  have  inspired  him  will 
not  permit  him  to  doubt  that  in  the  examination  of  the  particulars, 
which  will  form  this  statement,  you  will  exercise  your  accustomed 
acuteness  of  mind  and  frankness  of  character.  You  may  rest  assured, 
sir,  that,  upon  being  furnished  with  such  a  statement,  every  claim  will 
be  promptly  and  fully  discharged. 

As  to  the  second  question  in  your  memoir,  which  relates  to  Loui- 


-     r  -  H  0» 

.  ^  <y-  ^ 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  143 

siana,  the  First  Consul  would  have  preferred  its  having  been  the  sub 
ject  of  a  separate  note.  Affairs  so  different  in  their  nature  ought  to 
be  kept  as  much  as  possible  apart,  and  should  certain  \y  not  be  united. 
It  is  entirely  opposed  to  the  maxims  of  Government,  adopted  by  the 
Republic,  to  mingle  important  and  delicate  political  relations  with  cal 
culations  of  account  and  mere  pecuniary  interests. 

The  First  Consul,  always  appreciating  the  motives  which  have 
induced  you  to  insist  on  an  explanation  of  the  new  relations  which 
ought  to  exist  between  the  two  Republics,  has  charged  me  to  inform 
you,  that,  aware  of  the  solicitude,  perhaps  premature,  but,  in  reality, 
natural  and  plausible,  which  the  United  States  have  manifested  in  this 
discussion,  has  come  to  the  determination  to  send  immediately  to  the 
United  States  a  Minister  Plenipotentiary,  who  will  communicate  on 
every  point  the  information  necessary  to  a  final  decision. 

Under  these  circumstances,  as  well  as  in  all  others  presenting  topics 
for  discussion  between  the  two  Governments,  the  First  Consul  desires 
that  you  shall  give,  on  the  subject  of  his  dispositions  towards  the  United 
States,  the  most  positive  and  formal  assurances,  that  attachment  for 
your  Republic,  and  esteem  and  personal  consideration  for  its  present 
Chief  Magistrate,  are  national  sentiments  which,  as  a  Frenchman,  and 
as  the  chief *of  a  people,  the  ancient  and  uniform  friend  of  the  Ameri 
can  nation,  he  loves  to  profess,  and  of  which  he  will  always  be  under 
the  pleasing  obligation  to  furnish  unequivocal  proofs. 

While  I  felicitate  myself  upon  being,  at  this  time,  the  medium  by 
which  these  sentiments  of  the  First  Consul  are  expressed,  allow  me, 
sir,  to  renew  the  assurance  of  my  high  consideration. 

CH.  MAU.  TALLEYKAND. 

His  Excellency  R.  R.  LIVINGSTON, 

Minister  plenipotentiary,  dec. 


Extract  of  a  note  from  Mr.  Dupont  de  Nemours  to  the  Consul  Le  Brun. 
l°-  A,  -.  s-w. 

"  I  see  many  ways  of  terminating  this  contest,  and  I  desire  that, 
whatever  it  may  be,  while  favoring  our  commerce,  it  may  exclude  as 
much  as  possible  the  commerce  of  the  five  States  of  the  West  which 
are  most  interested  in  this  question.  The  first,  and  most  simple, 
appears  to  be  this:  to  declare  New  Orleans  a  free  port  for  the  two 
nations,  France  and  Spain,  whose  commerce  shall  enter  and  depart 
through  the  delta  of  the  Mississippi;  and  that  the  United  States  shall 
only  enter  from  above,  and  depart  by  the  same  embouchure  of  the 
river.  The  navigation  remaining  free  to  the  three  nations  throughout 
its  whole  course,  on  the  express  condition  that  the  United  States  shall 
exempt  from  every  species  of  duty  French  or  Spanish  merchandise 
entering  their  territory  by  the  Mississippi  or  Ohio. 


144  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

"In  this  manner  we  shall  have  conquered,  for  the  benefit  of  our 
manufactures,  our  silks,  ironmongery,  and  glass  of  every  description, 
and  for  the  consumption  of  our  wines,  vinegar,  oil,  and  dried  fruits, 
all  the  commerce  of  the  five  States  of  the  West,  as  well  as  of  the  new 
States,  which,  in  this  country,  multiply  so  rapidly. 

"The  products  of  the  English  manufactories  not  being  admitted, 
except  by  land,  and  then  burdened  with  a  duty  of  twelve  or  fifteen 
per  cent.,  will,  in  reality,  be  excluded  from  competition  with  those  of 
France.  Thus  will  our  enemies  be  struck  in  the  part  most  susceptible 
of  injury,  while  the  good  will  of  our  friends  will  be  advantageously 
confirmed.  This  will  give  us  the  assurance  that  the  interior  of 
America,  from  the  Allegheny  on  the  one  side,  to  the  elevated  moun 
tains  beyond  the  Lakes  on  the  other,  will  only  be  populated  and  sup 
plied  by  means  of  the  manufacturing  industry,  the  agricultural  pros 
perity,  and  the  commercial  riches  of  France." 


[Extract.] 

Robert  R.  Livingston  to  the  President  of  the  "United  States. 

PARIS,  March  1(2,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR:  1  have  delayed  replying  to  your  friendly  letter  by 
Madame  Brougniart,  in  the  hope  of  having  something  important  to 
communicate;  but,  in  the  meantime,  have  been  so  full  in  my  letter  to 
the  Secretary  of  State,  that  I  have  left  myself  little  to  say  on  the  sub 
ject  of  my  public  affairs.  I  can  only  tell  you,  generally,  that  we  have 
been  gaining  ground  here  for  some  time  past;  and  although  some  prop 
ositions  which  I  had  an  opportunity  to  make  to  Joseph  Bonaparte  to 
be  submitted  to  the  Consul's  inspection  were  not  agreed  to,  yet  the 
matter  and  the  manner  left  a  favorable  impression,  and  1  meant  to 
renew  the  subject  on  the  same  grounds. 

My  letter  to  the  First  Consul,  which  you  will  find  couched  in  pretty 
strong  terms,  and  such  as  are  not  usual  here,  and,  so  far  as  it  related 
to  the  claims,  repugnant  to  the  Minister's  sentiments,  has  been  attended 
with  happy  effects,  as  you  will  find  by  the  answer  transmitted  here 
with  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  i  think  it  impossible,  after  this,  for 
him  to  go  back;  and  I  have  accordingly  given  information  to  the 
American  creditors  of  the  state  of  their  affairs,  that  they  may  not  be 
speculated  upon. 

With  respect  to  a  negotiation  for  Louisiana,  I  think  nothing  will  be 
effected  here.  I  have  done  everything  I  can,  through  the  Spanish 
Ambassador,  to  obstruct  the  bargain  for  the  Floridas,  and  I  have  great 
hope  that  it  will  not  be  soon  concluded.  The  Ambassador  tells  me  that 
the  Consul  often  complains  to  him  of  the  delay  that  business  meets 
with:  and,  while  Spain  keeps  the  Floridas,  Louisiana  will  be  considered 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  145 

here  as  an  object  of  little  moment,  as  they  are  absolutely  without  ports 
in  the  Gulf,  and  so  far  facilitate  your  negotiations  with  General  Ber- 
nadotte.  I  have  had  many  interesting  conversions  with  him,  and 
have  nothing*  to  complain  of.  Remember,  however,  neither  to  wound 
his  pride  nor  that  of  his  nation;  both  being  extremely  irritable. 

Mr.  Madison  has  never  told  me  whether  he  has  received  two  little 
essays,  calculated,  the  one  to  raise  our  importance  in  the  views  of  this 
Government  as  a  naval  Power;  and  the  other  to  disgust  them  with 
Louisiana,  preparatory  to  our  future  negotiations.  They  were  both 
read  with  considerable  attention  by  the  First  Consul,  having  had  them 
translated  for  that  purpose. 

I  broke  off  this  part  of  my  letter  to  attend  Madame  Bonaparte's 
drawing-room,  where  a  circumstance  happened  of  sufficient  importance 
to  merit  your  attention.  *  *  *  After  the  First  Consul  had  gone 
the  circuit  of  one  room,  he  turned  to  me,  and  made  some  of  the  com 
mon  inquiries  usual  on  those  occasions.  He  afterwards  returned,  and 
entered  into  a  further  conversation.  When  he  quitted  me,  he  passed 
most  of  the  other  Ministers  merely  with  a  bow,  went  up  to  Lord  Whit- 
worth,  and,  after  the  first  civilities,  said:  "I  find,  my  Lord,  your 
nation  wants  war  again."  L.  W.  fct  No,  sir,  we  are  very  desirous  of. 
peace."  First  Consul.  "  You  have  just  finished  a  war  of  fifteen 
years."  L.  W.  "It  is  true,  sir,  and  that  was  fifteen  years  too  long." 
Consul.  a  But  you  want  another  war  of  fifteen  }rears."  L.  W.  "Par 
don,  me,  sir,  wre  are  very  desirous  of  peace."  Consul.  "  I  must  either 
have  Malta  or  war."  L.  W.  "I  am  not  prepared,  sir,  to  speak  on 
that  subject;  and  I  can  only  assure  you,  citizen  First  Consul,  that  we 
wish  for  peace." 

The  prefect  of  the  palace,  at  this  time,  came  up  to  the  Consul,  and 
informed  him  that  there  were  ladies  in  the  next  room,  and  asked  him 
to  go  in.  He  made  no  reply,  but,  bowing  hastily  to  the  company, 
retired  immediately  to  his  cabinet,  without  entering  the  other  room. 
Lord  Whitworth  came  up  to  me,  and  repeated  the  conversation  as  I 
now  give  it  to  you.  I  asked  Lord  Whitworth  whether  there  were  any 
pending  negotiations  relative  to  Malta.  He  told  me  that  there  were; 
that  the  conduct  of  France  having  convinced  them  that  they  still  had 
views  upon  Egypt,  and  the  guaranties  to  which  they  were  entitled, 
with  respect  to  Malta,  not  having  been  executed,  they  thought  the}^ 
could  not  surrender  it  with  safety.  But  what  brought  on  the  business 
to-day  was,  a  message  from  the  King  of  Great  Britain  to  the  Parlia 
ment  on  the  1st,  which  has  just  been  received  here,  speaking  with 
distrust  of  the  armaments  in  the  French  ports,  and,  in  fact,  preparing 
them  for  war. 

This  you  will  have  sooner  by  the  way  of  England  than  this  letter. 
It  is,  then,  highly  probable  that  a  new  rupture  will  take  place,  since 
it  is  hardly  possible  that  the  First  Consul  would  commit  himself  so  pub- 
H.  Doc.  431 10 


146  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

licly,  unless  his  determination  had  been  taken.  I  am  fearful  that  this 
may  again  throw  some  impediment  in  the  way  of  our  claims,  which 
1  believed  in  so  prosperous  a  train.  In  other  views  it  may  serve  us, 
and  1  shall  give  all  my  attention  to  avail  myself  of  circumstances  as 
they  arise;  in  which  I  hope  shortly  to  receive  the  assistance  of  Mr. 
Monroe. 

I  must  pr&y  }Tou,  sir,  to  furnish  Mr.  Madison  with  such  an  extract 
from  this  letter  as  ought  to  be  on  his  file  of  correspondence  with  me; 
since  the  fear  of  losing  the  opportunity,  and  the  necessity  of  the 
greater  activity  at  this  interesting  moment,  will  deprive  me  of  the 
pleasure  of  writing  further  to  him  by  this  conveyance. 
I  am,  &c., 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


Mr.  King  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

LONDON,  March  17, 1803. 

SIR:  War  seems  more  and  more  probable;  indeed,  it  appears  to  me 
inevitable.  Holland  will  be  involved,  and  Spain  and  Portugal  must 
.  obey  the  commands  of  France.  The  day  after  the  King's  message  to 
Parliament  was  communicated  to  the  French  Government,  Bonaparte 
delivered  to  Lord  Whitworth  a  paper  (a  copy  of  which  1  have  seen) 
stating: 

1.  That  the  expedition  preparing  in  the  Dutch  ports  was,  as  all  the 
world  knew,  destined  for  America;  but.  in  consequence  of  the  message, 
that  it  had  been  recalled  and  would  not  proceed. 

2.  That  if  the  armament  announced  in  the  message  be  not  satisfac 
torily  explained,  or,   if  it  take  place,  France  would  march  twenty 
thousand  men  into  Holland. 

3.  That  the  forces  debarked  in  the  ports  of  Holland  would  be  reen- 
forced  and  assembled  on  the  coast  of  Flanders. 

4.  That  the  French  army  will  be  immediately  put  on  a  war  estab 
lishment. 

5.  That  camps  would  be  formed  on  the  coast  between  Dunkirk  and 
Boulogne. 

6.  That  an  army  would  enter  Switzerland. 

7.  That  an  army  would  march  into  Italy,  and  occupy  Tarento.    And, 

8.  That  England  must  not  expect,  under  the  cover  of  an  armament, 
to  avoid  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  of  Amiens. 

The  greatest  activity  continues  to  prevail  in  the  military  and  naval 
departments.  It  is  understood  that  the  squadrons  in  the  West  and 
East  Indies,  and  in  the  Mediterranean,  will  not  immediately  require 
reenforcement,  and  that  a  respectable  fleet  will  soon  appear  in  the 
Channel  and  on  the  coast  of  Ireland.  The  regular  army  on  foot  in 
Great  Britain  (exclusive  of  the  force  in  Ireland,  Egypt,  Malta,  Gibral- 


PUKCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  147 

tar,  and  the  Colonies,)  consists  of  twenty -seven  thousand  infantry,  and 
twelve  thousand  cavalry;  and  will  be  reenforced  immediately  by  thirty- 
seven  thousand  of  the  militia,  which  have  been  called  out. 

I  do  not  hear  of  Mr.  Monroe's  arrival,  though  I  learn  from  Mr. 
Livingston  that  he  is  daily  expected  in  France.  Mr.  Merry  is  pre 
paring  to  embark  for  the  United  States,  and  is  pressed  by  his  Govern 
ment  to  be  ready  to  leave  England  in  the  first  week  of  April. 

With  perfect  respect  and  esteem,  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your 
obedient  and  humble  servant. 

KUFUS  KING. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  Mr.  Madison. 

PARIS,  March  18,  ISO*. 

SIR:  I  sent  despatches  a  few  da}Ts  ago  to  Havre,  in  expectation  of 
their  going  by  a  vessel  which  left  that  place  for  Philadelphia,  but  they 
arrived  too  late.  Duplicates  were  sent  to  go  by  a  vessel  bound  for 
New  York.  You  will,  therefore,  I  fear,  have  originals  and  duplicates 
by  the  same  vessel.  This  compels  me  to  send  triplicates  by  this  con 
veyance.  You  will  see  that,  on  the  subject  of  New  Orleans,  the  answer 
to  my  letter  is  very  unsatisfactory.  I,  at  first,  intended  to  let  the  mat 
ter  rest  till  Mr.  Monroe  arrived;  but,  on  reflection,  I  dreaded  the  con 
sequences  of  delay,  if  France  should  take  possession,  and  continue  the 
policy  of  Spain;  and,  as  the  moment  was  critical,  and  the  time  of  Mr. 
Monroe's  arrival  uncertain,  I  sent  in  the  enclosed  note,  and  am  doing 
all  that  I  can  to  get  a  speedy  and  favorable  answer. 

On  the  subject  of  the  debts,  I  have  already  met  with  a  great  deal  of 
trouble  in  procuring  the  necessary  information,  and  this  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at.  I  hope  to  get  through  with  it,  strengthened  as  I  am  by 
the  First  Consul's  engagement. 

I  can  not  but  wish,  sir,  that  my  fellow-citizens  should  not  be  led  to 

(believe,  from  Mr.  Monroe's  appointment,  that  I  had  been  negligent  of 

their  interests,  or  too  delicate  on  any  of  the  great  points  intrusted  to 

]  my  care.     I  trust  that  a  communication  of  my  notes  to  some  of  them 

would  sjiow  that  I  had  gone  as  far  as  it  was  possible  for  me  to  go,  and 

\  perhaps  further  than  my  instructions  would  justify. 

We  are  here  all  in  a  bustle,  not  knowing  whether  we  are  to  have  war 
or  peace.  In  England,  they  expect  war  certainly.  Here  they  are  very 
anxious  to  avoid  it;  and  I,  who  have  hitherto  believed  that  a  rupture 
would  happen,  begin,  from  some  circumstances  I  heard  last  night  at 
Consul  Le  Bran's,  to  believe  the  storm  will  pass  over.  But  this  is  by 
no  means  certain;  because  it  is  possible  that  England  will  rise  in  her 
terms  as  France  recedes.  Peace  will,  in  no  event,  last  long.  I  frankly 
confess,  that,  though  I  believe  a  war  would  be  extremely  dangerous 
for  Great  Britian,  yet  1  think  her  ruin  inevitable  if  France  continues 
ten  years  at  peace, 


148  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

MARCH  19. 

Nothing  decisive,  as  yet,  on  the  subject  of  war  or  peace.  The  idea 
of  peace  seems  to  gain  ground;  and,  in  fact,  war  is  so  much  dreaded 
by  all  the  neighbors  of  France  that  they  will  make  every  effort  to 
maintain  peace,  lest  they  should  be  drawn  into  the  vortex.  I  shall 
call  this  morning  on  the  Minister  in  order  to  enforce  upon  him  the 
subject  of  my  note. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  &c.,  ROBT.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


Mr.  Livingston,  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States  of  America, 

to  His  Excellency  the  Minister  for  Exterior  Relations  of  the  French 

Republic. 

PARIS,  March  16,  1803. 

SIR:  I  have  received,  with  great  sensibility,  your  note  containing 
the  First  Consul's  reply  to  that  which  I  had  the  honor  to  present  to 
him  on  the  subject  of  the  American  claims.  The  sentiments  are  such 
as  would  naturally  be  entertained  }}\  an  enlightened  statesman,  who, 
after  advancing  his  country  to  the  highest  pinnacle  of  military  glory 
and  national  prospects,  had  determined  to  give  permanency  to  that 
prosperity,  by  establishing  it  upon  the  tirm  basis  of  religion,  good 
faith,  justice,  and  national  credit.  On  this  subject,  sir,  I  have  no 
doubts;  and  I  am  satisfied  that,  when  the  claims  are  brought  forward, 
they  will,  as  you  have  the  goodness  to  declare,  be  promptly  and  fully 
satisfied.  But,  sir,  as  this  will  form  the  subject  of  a  future  note,  I 
shall  beg  leave  to  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  a  question  in  the 
highest  degree  interesting  to  the  harmony  of  France  and  the  United 
States,  and  which,  I  am  sorry  to  say,  is  of  a  nature  too  pressing  to 
admit  of  any  delay. 

The  First  Consul  has  done  me  the  honor,  through  you,  to  inform  me 
that  he  proposes  to  send  a  Minister  to  the  United  States,  to  acquire  such 
information  as  he  may  deem  necessary  previous  to  his  taking  any 
measures  relative  to  the  situation  in  which  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana 
will  place  France  with  respect  to  the  United  States.  If,  sir,  the  ques 
tion  related  to  the  formation  of  a  new  treaty,  I  should  find  no  objection 
to  this  measure.  On  the  contrary,  I  should  readily  acquiesce  in  it,  as 
that  which  would  be  best  calculated  to  render  the  treaty  mutually 
advantageous.  But,  sir,  it  is  not  a  new  treaty  for  which  we  now  press, 
(though  one  mutually  advantageous  might  be  made,)  but  the  recogni 
tion  of  an  old  one.  by  which  the  United  States  have  acquired  rights, 
that  no  change  in  the  circumstances  of  the  country  obliges  them  to 
relinquish,  and  which  they  never  will  relinquish  but  with  their  polit 
ical  existence.  By  their  treaty  with  Spain,  their  right  to  the  naviga 
tion  of  the  Mississippi  is  recognized,  and  a  right  of  depot  granted, 
with  a  provision,  on  the  part  of  the  King  of  Spain,  to  revoke  this 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  149 

right,  if,  within  three  years,  he  found  it  prejudicial  to  his  interests;  in 
which  case,  he  is  to  assign  another  equivalent  establishment.  The  King 
of  Spain  has  never  revoked  that  right;  but,  after  having  made  the 
experiment  of  its  effects  upon  his  interests  for  three  years,  he  has  con 
tinued  it.  The  United  States  have,  by  this  continuance,  acquired  a  per 
manent  and  irrevocable  right  to  a  depot  at  New  Orleans;  nor  can  that 
right  now  be  called  in  question,  either  by  Spain  or  by  any  other  nation 
to  whom  she  may  transfer  her  title.  Even  the  assignment  of  another 
equivalent  establishment  can  not,  at  this  day,  be  forced  upon  the  United 
States  without  their  consent.  The  time  allowed  to  Spain  has  passed, 
and  she  has  preferred  to  have  the  depot  at  New  Orleans  to  placing  it 
elsewhere;  and  I  will  venture  to  say,  that,  in  so  doing,  she  has  acted 
wisely,  for  New  Orleans  derives  its  whole  value  from  its  being  the 
market  for  American  produce,  and  their  principal  port  of  entry;  and, 
if  this  consideration  was  important  to  Spain,  it  is  infinitely  more  so  to 
France,  the  produce  of  whose  agriculture  and  manufactures  will  then 
find  a  ready  exchange  for  the  raw  materials  of  the  United  States. 
Under  these  circumstances,  at  the  very  moment  that  Spain  is  about  to 
relinquish  the  possession  of  that  country  to  France,  she  violates  her 
treaty  without  any  apparent  interest,  and  leaves  the  country  with  a 
stain  upon  her  character. 

In  what  situation,  sir,  are  we  now  placed?  An  armament  is  on  the 
point  of  sailing  for  New  Orleans;  the  port  has  been  shut  by  the  order 
of  Spain;  the  French  commandant  will  find  it  shut.  Will  he  think 
himself  authorized  to  open  it?  If  not,  it  must  remain  shut  till  the 
Envoy  of  France  shall  have  arrived  in  America,  and  made  the  necessary 
inquiries,  and  transmitted  the  result  of  those  inquiries  to  the  First  Con 
sul.  In  the  meanwhile,  all  the  produce  of  five  States  is  left  to  rot  upon 
their  hands.  There  is  only  one  season  in  which  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  is  practicable.  This  season  must  necessarily  pass  before 
the  Envoy  of  France  can  arrive  and  make  his  report.  Is  it  supposable, 
sir,  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  will  tranquilly  wait  the  prog 
ress  of  negotiations  when  the  ruin  of  themselves  and  their  families 
will  be  attendant  on  the  delay?  Be  assured,  sir,  that,  even  were  it 
possible  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  could  be  insensible 
to  their  sufferings,  they  would  find  it  as  easy  to  prevent  the  Mississippi 
from  rolling  its  waters  into  the  ocean,  as  to  control  the  impulse  of  the 
people  to  do  themselves  justice.  If,  sir,  in  pursuance  of  the  treaties 
that  France  has  made  with  the  Porte,  she  had  established  valuable 
comptoirs  upon  the  Black  Sea,  and,  subsequent  to  this,  the  Dardenelles 
were  ceded  to  the  Emperor,  would  France  suffer  him  to  shut  up  the 
passage,  and  ruin  their  merchants,  till  a  new  treaty  had  been  negotiated 
for  an  object  that  she  already  possessed?  Sir,  I  would  venture  to  say, 
that,  were  a  fleet  to  shut  up  the  mouths  of  the  Chesapeake,  Delaware, 
and  Hudson,  it  would  create  less  sensation  in  the  United  States  than  the 


150  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

denial  of  the  right  of  depot  at  New  Orleans  has  done.  The  people  of 
the  Western  country  were  emigrants  from  the  different  States,  in 
which  they  have  left  connexions  deeply  interested  in  their  prosperity. 
This  circumstance,  combining  with  the  just  sense  of  national  independ 
ence  and  national  dignity,  makes  them  extremely  sensible  to  the  injus 
tice  they  have  suffered.  Nor  is  it  without  the  utmost  difficulty  that 
they  have  been  restrained  from  breaking  out  into  acts  of  immediate 
hostility  against  Spain,  by  the  prudent  measures  of  Government,  and 
by  the  hope  that  the  mission  of  a  Minister,  who  will  bring  with  him  a 
conviction  of  their  feelings  on  this  subject,  will  procure  them  the  most 
immediate  and  express  recognition  of  their  rights  by  France,  in  whose 
justice  and  good  faith  the\T  hope  to  find  a  resource  against  the  breach 
of  faith  by  the  officers  of  Spain. 

I  can  not  but  flatter  myself,  sir,  that  the  answer  which  the  First 
Consul  has  been  pleased  to  honor  me  with,  has  a  reference  only  to 
such  new  treaties  as  it  may  be  for  the  mutual  interest  of  both  coun 
tries  early  to  negotiate.  But  that  relative  to  the  rights  the  United 
States  already  possess,  in  virtue  of  existing  treaties  with  Spain,  he  is 
ready  to  afford  me  those  explicit  and  formal  assurances  which  are 
necessary  to  calm  the  emotions  which  have  been  so  unwisely  excited 
in  the  United  States.  I  can  never  bring  myself  to  believe,  sir,  that 
the  First  Consul  will,  by  deferring  for  a  moment  the  recognition  of  a 
right  that  admits  of  no  discussion,  break  all  those  ties  which  bind  the 
United  States  to  France,  obliterate  the  sense  of  past  obligations,  change 
every  political  relation  that  it  has  been,  and  still  is,  the  earnest  wish  of 
the  United  States  to  preserve,  and  force  them  to  connect  their  interests 
with  those  of  a  rival  Power;  and  this,  too,  for  an  object  of  no  real 
moment  in  itself.  Louisiana  is,  and  ever  must  be,  from  physical  causes, 
a  miserable  country  in  the  hands  of  a  European  Power.  Nor  can  any 
principal  of  sound  policy  dictate  to  France  (even  if  bound  by  no 
treaty)  a  change  in  the  circumstances  of  New  Orleans,  that  should 
exclude  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  from  that  right  of  depot  to 
which  alone  it  must  be  indebted  for  its  prosperity.  I  feel  a  pleasure 
in  declaring,  sir,  that  the  people  and  Government  of  the  United  States 
will  receive  the  highest  satisfaction  from  the  assurances  that  the  First 
Consul  has  empowered  you  to  make  to  me  of  his  attachment  to  them; 
and  will  reflect  with  pleasure  on  his  having  called  to  mind,  that, 
amidst  the  changes  that  both  nations  have  undergone,  they  have  been 
mutually  forward  in  tendering  their  alliance  to  each  other.  Nor  will 
it  be  less  flattering  to  the  President  to  have  acquired,  as  a  magistrate 
and  as  a  man,  the  esteem  of  a  chief  who  has  merited  and  obtained  that 
of  the  world.  But  these  occurrences  add  to  my  pain  when  I  reflect 
on  occurrences  that  may  lay  the  foundation  for  future  enmities;  and  I 
trust,  sir,  that  they  will  serve  as  an  apology  for  anything  that  may 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  151 

appear  harsh  in  this  note.  For,  if  ever  there  was  a  moment  in  which 
it  becomes  a  Minister  to  speak  with  freedom,  it  is  when  he  feels  that 
the  dearest  interests  of  his  country  are  at  stake,  and  has  reason  to 
hope  that  a  knowledge  of  the  truth  may  prevent  the  breach  of  rela 
tions  between  nations  that  esteem  and  respect  each  other,  and  the 
calamities  that  humanity  may  feel  in  such  breach. 

1  pray  your  Excellency  to  receive  my  thanks  for  the  interesting- 
manner  in  which  you  have  made  the  communications  of  the  First 
Consul,  and  my  assurances  of  the  highest  consideration. 

ROBKRT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  March  %  1803. 

DEAR  SIR:  The  question  of  war  }^et  remains  undetermined.  My 
letters  from  Mr.  King  of  the  18th  leave  me  to  believe,  as  well  as  nry 
persuasion  of  the  present  system  of  politics  in  England,  that  war  will 
come  soon.  Here  there  is  an  earnest  arid  sincere  desire  to  avoid  it,  as 
well  in  the  Government  as  the  people.  I  enclosed,  in  my  last,  a  note 
to  the  Minister.  Some  days  after,  I  called  on  him.  He  told  me  that  an 
answer  was  prepared,  and  that  everything  should  be  arranged;  and  I 
have  no  doubt  the  answer  contained  all  those  assurances  which  I  have 
been  so  long  soliciting.  Unfortunately,  despatches  arrived  at  that 
moment  from  Mr.  Pichon,  informing  them  that  the  appointment  of 
Mr.  Monroe  had  tranquilized  everything.  Conceiving,  then,  that  they 
might  safely  await  his  arrival,  they  determined  to  see  whether  the 
storm  would  not  blow  over;  in  which  case,  they  will  treat  to  more 
advantage.  They  accordingly  substituted,  for  the  first  note,  which,  as 
the  Minister  told  me,  arranged  everything,  the  inclosed  No.  1,  which 
contains  nothing.  To  this  I  put  in  the  note  No.  2,  which  I  suppose 
will  produce  no  effect  if  the  war  does  not  happen.  Last  night  I  received 
another  note,  No.  3,  complaining  of  our  supplying  the  blacks  at  St. 
Domingo;  to  this  I  returned  the  answer  No.  4. 

I  have  had  a  great  deal  of  conversation  with  General  Bernadotte,  and 
communicated  my  two  notes  to  him.  1  gave  them  to  him  to  show  to 
the  gentlemen  1  have  mentioned,  and  endeavored  to  convince  him  that 
he  was  personally  interested;  that  the  specific  declarations  I  require 
should  be  given  before  he  goes  out,  which  will  be  in  a  few  days.  Upon 
the  whole,  1  think  everything  is  prepared  for  Mr.  Monroe.  I  can  not 
but  hope  that  something  may  be  effected,  though  I  fear  Dupont  de 
Nemours  has  given  them,  with  the  best  intentions,  ideas  that  we 
shall  find  it  hard  to  eradicate,  and  impossible  to  yield  to. 

Florida  is  not  yet  ceded,  nor,  as  I  hope,  very  likely  to  be  so.     The 


15 '2  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

armament  in  Holland,  designed  for  Louisiana,  is  stopped  for  th3  pres 
ent,  in  consequence  of  the  state  of  things  here. 

I  am,  dear  sir,  with  the  highest  consideration,  your  most  obedient, 
humble  servant, 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 
Hon.  JAMES  MADISON, 

Secretary  of  State. 


Mr.  Talleyrand  to  Mr.  Livingston. 

PARIS,  March  81,  1803. 

SIR:  I  see  with  pleasure,  by  the  last  letters  from  the  French  lega 
tion  in  the  United  States,  that  the  excitement  which  had  been  raised 
on  the  subject  of  Louisiana  has  been  allayed  by  the  wisdom  of  your 
Government,  and  the  just  confidence  which  it  inspires,  to  that  state  of 
tranquillity  which  is  alone  proper  for  discussion,  and  which,  in  the 
existing  relations  between  the  two  nations,  can  not  fail  to  lead  to  suit 
able  explanations  on  difficulties  arising  from  contingent  circumstances, 
and  draw  still  closer  the  bands  by  which  they  are  mutually  united. 
1  ought  to  acknowledge,  sir,  that,  in  the  publicity  recently  given  to 
the  proceedings  respecting  Louisiana,  it  is  difficult  to  recognize  the 
ancient  sentiments  of  attachment  and  confidence  with  which  France 
has  always  been  desirous  to  inspire  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
and  by  which,  from  the  first  moment  of  their  existence  as  an  inde 
pendent  and  sovereign  nation,  she  has  been  induced  to  consider  her 
concerns  with  the  United  States  as  among  the  most  important  of  her 
political  relations. 

On  what  account,  then,  either  political  or  commercial,  can  the  Amer 
ican  nation  view  the  proximity  of  France  with  so  unfriendly  an  eye? 
Has  the  French  Republic  ever  evinced  a  desire  to  arrest  the  pros 
perity  of  the  United  States,  assume  an  influence  to  which  she  had  no 
right,  weaken  her  means  of  safety  or  annoyance,  or  place  an  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  their  expanding  commerce?  Your  Government,  sir, 
ought  to  be  persuaded  that  the  First  Consul  entertains  for  the  American 
nation  the  same  affection  with  which  France  has  been  at  all  times  ani 
mated;  and  that,  among  the  advantages  which  he  expects  to  derive 
from  the  possession  of  Louisiana,  he  estimates  the  additional  means 
whi^hwill  be  at  his  command,  to  convince  the  Government  and  people 
of  theUnited  States  of  his  uniformly  liberal  and  friendly  sentiments. 

I  ought^slr,  at  the  present  time,  to  confine  nryself  to  this  declara 
tion,  which  alone  should  be  sufficient  to  quiet  the  apprehensions 
expressed  in  your  last  letters.  The  subject  itself  does  not  rest  on  that 
accurate  and  extensive  information  which  alone  could  authorize  a  more 
detailed  explanation.  In  announcing  to  me,  moreover,  the  speedy 


PURCHASE    OF   THE   TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  153 

departure  of  Mr.  Monroe,  who  has  been  appointed  a  Minister  Extra 
ordinary  to  discuss  this  matter,  you  give  me  reason  to  conclude  that 
your  Government  desires  that  this  Minister  should  be  received  and 
heard;  because  every  point  susceptible  of  contradiction  should  be  com 
pletely  and  definitely  discussed.  In  the  meantime,  the  First  Consul 
charges  me  to  assure  your  Government,  that,  although  he  does  not 
think  that  his  new  position  in  relation  to  Louisiana  ought  to  be  the 
subject  of  just  inquietude,  or  can  occasion  the  least  injury  to  the  United 
States,  he  will  yet  receive  with  the  greatest  pleasure  the  Minister 
Extraordinary  whom  the  President  is  about  to  send,  and  that  he  hopes 
his  mission  will  terminate  in  a  way  to  give  mutual  satisfaction  to  both 
nations. 

At  the  same  time,  sir,  I  avail  myself  of  this  occasion  to   renew  the 
assurance  of  my  high  consideration. 

CH.  MAU.  TALLKYKAND. 


No.  2. 
R.  R.  Livingston  to  the  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations. 

PARIS,  W  Ventose,  an  11  (March  11,  1803).° 

SIR:  I  acknowledge  that  I  feel  some  mortification  in  finding  that  the 
note  with  which  you  honor  me  yesterday  contains  nothing  more  deci 
sive  upon  the  interesting  subject  that  I  have  submitted  to  your  con 
sideration;  and  still  more,  that  you  should  think  the  sensibility  that 
the  inhabitants  of  the  United  States  have  manifested  upon  the  change 
in  the  situation  of  Louisiana  repugnant  to  the  sentiments  of  friendship 
which  the  former  conduct  of  France  ought  to  inspire. 

I  should  be  deficient,  sir,  in  that  frankness  which  has  alwa}Ts  formed 
the  basis  of  my  communications  with  you,  if  1  should  conceal  that  the 
vicinity  of  a  nation  whose  political  situation  puts  it  out  of  her  power 
to  injure  the  United  States,  was  less  alarming  than  that  of  an  active, 
powerful,  and  enterprising  people,  whom  a  variety  of  circumstances 
might  lead,  in  the  common  course  of  events,  to  painful  discussions; 
and  you  will,  sir,  readily  admit  that  the  profound  secrecy  that  the 
Government  of  France  has  always  observed  in  whatever  related  to 
Louisiana  was  ill  calculated  to  allay  those  alarms.  To  this  moment, 
the  treaty  to  which  they  might  have  expected  to  be  parties  is  concealed 
from  them;  and  while  explications  are  given  to  another  Power  upon 
the  destination  of  the  armament,  in  which  the  United  States  wTere  most 
interested,  not  the  most  distant  hint  is  afforded  to  the  Minister  of  the 
United  States,  nor  is  he  informed,  except  through  the  medium  of 

"There  seems  to  be  some  mistake  either  in  the  date  of  this  letter  (March  11)  or  in 
that  of  the  preceding  letter  (March  21)  to  which  this  is  an  answer.  The  originals 
have  been  followed. 


154  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

another  Court,  of  the  present  arrangement  with  respect  to  that  arma 
ment. 

Under  these  circumstances,  sir,  how  painful  soever  it  may  be  to 
manifest  a  distrust  of  a  nation  to  whom  they  have  formerly  been 
indebted,  and  to  whom,  in  return,  they  have  manifested  their  grati 
tude,  it  would  be  to  discover  an  ignorance  of  the  change  that  was  about 
to  take  place  in  their  situation,  and  a  blamable  indifference  to  their 
most  important  interest,  if  they  did  not  demand  those  securities  to 
which  they  are  entitled  for  the  performance  of  engagements  that 
France  has  assumed  by  putting  herself  in  the  place  of  Spain.  1  would 
earnestly  hope,  sir,  that  the  information  you  have  received  from  the 
legation  of  France  in  the  United  States,  was  more  correct  than  that 
which  induces  me  to  fear  that,  seeing  in  your  note  a  determination  to 
postpone  to  the  latest  moment  those  arrangements  which  they  will 
conceive  need  only  to  have  been  mentioned  to  have  been  taken,  they 
will  resort  to  those  precautionary  remedies  which  prudence  justifies, 
and  which  their  situation  in  the  present  state  of  Europe  most  pecul 
iarly  demands. 

The  United  States,  sir,  have  vested  me  with  full  powers  to  receive 
and  make  those  arrangements;  and,  in  the  appointment  of  Mr.  Monroe, 
jointly  with  me,  as  Minister  Extraordinary  to  the  First  Consul,  it  was 
by  no  means  their  intention,  considering  the  variety  of  accidents 
which  may  postpone  or  prevent  his  arrival,  to  defer  receiving  from 
the  Government  of  France  those  explicit  confirmations  of  the  Treaty 
of  Madrid  which  must  precede  every  arrangement  which  it  might  be 
thought  proper  hereafter  to  enter  into. 

A  treaty,  sir,  is  a  work  of  time;  and  it  can  hardly  be  presumed  that 
an  ardent  and  intelligent  people  should  wait  the  slow  progress  of 
negotiations  for  the  attainment  of  objects  that  admit  of  no  dispute, 
and  see  with  indifference  France  strengthen  herself  in  their  vicinity, 
while  she  declines  to  acknowledge  the  validity  of  a  treaty  which,  in 
their  opinion,  she  has  virtually  adopted.  It  is  not,  sir,  to  negotiate 
for  this  acknowledgment  that  an  additional  Minister  is  sent;  for  this, 
as  I  have  before  had  the  honor  to  inform  your  Excellency,  is  not  con 
sidered  in  the  United  States  as  susceptible  of  controversy :  but  it  was 
with  a  view  to  such  further  arrangements  as  might  be  rendered  neces 
sary,  in  case  (as  was  generally  presumed)  the  Florida*  should  be  added 
to  the  acquisitions  of  France.  It  was  that  he  might  be  the  bearer  of 
the  strong  sentiments  of  the  people  upon  the  late  measures  of  Spain, 
and  show  to  France  the  inutility  of  these  acquisitions,  and  the  senti 
ments  of  distrust  that  they  would  naturally  excite  between  her  and  the 
United  States. 

Having  thus,  sir,  frankly  stated  the  evils  that  may  result  to  both 
countries  from  the  indecision  of  France  on  a  question  that  admits  of 
no  dispute,  I  can  only  lament  the  ineffioacy  of  my  representation,  and 


PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  155 

hasten  to  submit  your  note  to  the  inspection  of  my  Government.  From 
which,  taken  in  connexion  with  the  general  politics  of  Europe  and 
America,  they  will  naturall}7  draw  their  own  conclusions.  And  I 
merely  wish  that  the  measures,  which  it  is  at  their  option  to  adopt, 
may  be  such  as  will  tend  less  to  their  future  harmony  with  France  than 
to  their  own  security. 

The  President  will  receive  great  pleasure  from  your  assurances  of 
the  attachment  of  the  First  Consul  to  the  Government  and  people  of 
the  United  States;  and  will  felicitate  himself  upon  having  fixed  upon 
one  so  perfectly  acceptable  to  the  First  Consul  in  the  person  of  his 
additional  Minister,  as  to  insure  him  the  agreeable  reception  which 
you  so  politely  promise  him. 

I  avail  myself,  sir,  of  this  occasion  to  renew  to  you  the  assurances 
of  my  high  consideration. 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


Mr.  King  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 
A     C    <T°    n    '    r  zr  )          r  n  j 

LONDON,  April  2, 1803. 

SIR:  Nothing  further  has  occurred  since  the  date  of  my  last:  no 
answer  has  yet  been  given  to  the  note  of  the  French  Ambassador,  which 
declines  all  discussion  respecting  Malta.  Lord  Hawks bu IT'S  answer 
will  probably  be  delivered  to-day;  it  will,  without  doubt,  persist  in  the 
determination  communicated  in  his  first  note,  and  may  disclose  new 
and  additional  reasons  in  its  support.  If,  as  is  said  to  be  the  case, 
the  First  Consul  has  lately  made  an  overture  to  Russia  for  a  partition 
of  the  Turkish  Empire,  the  fact  may  be  urged  on  this  occasion,  not 
withstanding  the  refusal  of  Russia  to  listen  to  the  proposal. 

I  shall  continue  to  believe  the  war  unavoidable,  in  which  England 
can  have  no  expectation  of  a  single  ally.  The  system  of  Russia  is 
pacific,  with  less  attachment,  however,  to  France  than  to  England; 
Austria  is  not  yet  recovered  from  the  blows  by  which  she  was  driven 
from  the  contest;  and  Prussia  will  be  inclined  to  adhere  to  her  past 
policy.  Although  Denmark  and  Sweden  have  been  much  dissatisfied 
with  England,  France,  contrary  to  her  usual  policy,  has  done  nothing 
to  secure  their  confidence;  while  England  has  been  endeavoring  to 
reestablish  her  ancient  friendship  with  these  States.  For  this  purpose, 
she  has  given  assurances  that  what  is  called  the  two  Swedish  convoys 
shall  be  restored  or  paid  for:  the  first,  which  consisted  of  seventeen 
vessels,  was  condemned,  and  the  Envoy  of  Sweden  has  given  in  his 
claim  of  compensation,  which  amounts  to  sixty  thousand  pounds 
sterling;  the  claim  for  the  second,  consisting  of  twenty-one  vessels, 
and  which,  I  think,  is  not  yet  condemned,  will  be  about  ninety  thou 
sand  pounds  sterling.  By  cultivating  the  friendship  of  these  Powers, 
England  expects,  with  the  good  will  of -Russia,  to  keep  the  Baltic  open 


156  PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF   LOUISIANA. 

against  the  efforts  that  France  will  again  make  to  close  it.  Portugal 
will  be  compelled  to  exclude  the  English  trade;  and  Spain,  with  all 
Italy,  must  obey  the  orders  that  shall  be  given  them. 

I  have  sought  occasions  both  with  Ministers  and  other  leading  men 
since  the  discussions  with  France,  to  inculcate  the  disadvantage  which 
England  has  heretofore  brought  upon  herself  by  the  system  of  war 
fare  she  has  been  accustomed  to  pursue,  and  which  has  been  chiefly 
directed  against  the  colonies  of  her  enemy,  which,  after  being  acquired 
at  the  expense  of  much  blood  and  treasure,  in  addition  to  the  vexation 
of  the  commerce  of  neutral  nations,  have  been  commonly  restored, 
enriched  by  English  capital,  at  the  conclusion  of  peace.  Instead  of  a 
warfare  liable  to  these  objections,  and  which  has  moreover  furnished 
an  opportunity  to  France  to  appear  as  the  friend  and  protector  of 
neutral  States,  a  system  might  be  suggested  that  would  not  only  avoid 
these  disadvantages,  but  which  would  materially  contribute  to  the 
future  prosperity  of  Great  Britain.  No  neutral  commerce  would  be 
interrupted  by  it;  on  the  contrary,  it  would  serve  to  increase  and 
extend  it;  and,  when  the  object  was  once  attained,  no  Treaty  of  Peace 
would  restore  things  to  their  former  state. 

This  conversation  has  been  everywhere  understood  and  well  received; 
and  it  is  my  firm  belief,  if  the  war  breaks  out,  that  Great  Britain  will 
immediately  attempt  the  emancipation  and  independence  of  South 
America. 

In  a  late  conversation  with  Mr.  Addington,  he  observed  to  me,  if  the 
war  happen,  it  would,  perhaps,  be  one  of  the  first  steps  to  occupy  New 
Orleans.  I  interrupted  him  by  saying,  I  hoped  the  measure  would  be 
well  weighed  before  it  should  be  attempted;  that,  true  it  was,  we  could 
not  see  with  indifference  that  country  in  the  hands  of  France;  but  it 
was  equally  true,  that  it  would  be  contrary  to  our  views,  and  with  much 
concern,  that  we  should  see  it  in  the  possession  of  England;  we  had 
no  objection  to  Spain  continuing  to  possess  it;  they  were  quiet  neigh 
bors,  and  we  looked  forward  without  impatience  to  events  which,  in  the 
ordinary  course  of  things,  must,  at  no  distant  day,  annex  this  country 
to  the  United  States.  Mr.  Addington  desired  me  to  be  assured  that 
England  would  not  accept  the  country,  were  all  agreed  to  give  it  to 
her;  that,  were  she  to  occupy  it,  it  would  not  be  to  keep  it,  but  to 
prevent  another  Power  from  obtaining  it;  and,  in  his  opinion,  this  end 
would  t)e  best  effected  by  its  belonging  to  the  United  States.  I 
expressed  my  acquiescence  in  the  last  part  of  his  remark,  but  observed, 
that,  if  the  country  should  be  occupied  by  England  it  would  be  sus 
pected  to  be  in  concert  with  the  United  States,  and  might  involve  us 
in  misunderstandings  with  another  Power,  with  which  we  desired  to 
live  in  peace.  He  said,  if  you  can  obtain  it,  well,  but  if  not,  we 
ought  to  prevent  its  going  into  the  hands  of  France;  though,  you  may 
rest  assured,  continued  Mr.  Addington,  that  nothing  shall  be  done 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  157 

injurious  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States.     Here  the  conversa 
tion  ended. 

I  have  lately  received  your  letter  of  January  29;  and  as  soon  as 
Lord  Hawkesbury  shall  have  named  a  time  to  receive  me,  which  i  have 
requested  him  to  do,  I  will  explain  to  him,  in  conversation,  the  Presi 
dent's  views  relative  to  the  Mississippi. 

Considering  the  critical  state  of  affairs,  it  is  much  to  be  wished  that 
my  successor  may  arrive  before  my  departure.  I  shall  delay  taking 
my  leave  to  the  last  moment;  and  should  the  posture  of  affairs,  in  my 
opinion,  require  it,  I  will  risk  the  expense  of  detaining  my  vessel  even 
beyond  the  time  in  which  I  have  engaged  to  embark:  in  any  event,  I 
shall  not  leave  London  before  the  last  week  of  the  present  month. 

With  perfect  respect  and  esteem,  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your 
obedient  and  faithful  servant, 

RUFUS  KING. 


Robert  R.  Livingston  to  the  Hon.  James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  April  11,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR:  My  note" will  tell  you  how  far  1  have  officially  pressed 
the  Government  on  the  subject  of  Louisiana.  I  have  omitted  no 
means,  in  conversation,  of  eradicating  their  prejudices  in  its  favor; 
and  I  informed  you  that  I  had  reason  to  think  that  1  had  been  suc 
cessful  with  all,  unless  it  was  the  First  Consul,  to  whom  I  addressed 
myself  in  the  letter  and  essays  that  you  have  seen,  and  which  were 
attentively  read  by  him,  as  well  as  several  informal  notes  to  his 
brother.  I  had  reason  to  think  that  he  began  to  waver;  but  we  had 
nothing  to  offer  but  money,  and  commercial  advantages:  of  the  latter, 
I  did  not  think  myself  entitled  to  be  liberal;  and  of  the  first,  I  found 
in  them  a  certain  degree  of  reluctance  to  treat,  as  derogatory  to  the 
dignity  of  the  Government.  The  affair  of  New  Orleans  gave  me  two 
very  important  strings  to  touch:  I  endeavored  to  convince  the  Gov 
ernment  that  the  United  States  would  avail  themselves  of  the  breach 
of  the  treaty  to  possess  themselves  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas; 
that  Britain  would  never  suffer  Spain  to  grant  the  Floridas  to  France, 
even  were  she  so  disposed,  but  would  immediately  seize  upon  them  as 
soon  as  the  transfer  was  made;  that  without  the  Floridas,  Louisiana 
would  be  indefensible,  as  it  possesses  not  one  port  even  for  frigates; 
and  I  showed  the  effect  of  suffering  that  important  country  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  the  British,  both  as  it  affected  our  country,  and  the 
naval  force  of  all  Europe. 

These  reasons,  with  the  probability  of  war,  have  had,  I  trust,  the 
desired  effect.  M.  Talleyrand  asked  me  this  da}^  when  pressing  the 
subject,  whether  we  wished  to  have  the  whole  of  Louisiana.  I  told 
him  no;  that  our  wishes  extended  only  to  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas; 


158  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

that  the  policy  of  France  should  dictate  (as  I  had  shown  in  an  official 
note)  to  give  us  the  country  above  the  river  Arkansas,  in  order  to 
place  a  barrier  between  them  and  Canada.  He  said,  that  if  they  gave 
New  Orleans  the  rest  would  be  of  little  value;  and  that  he  would  wish 
to  know  "what  we  would  give  for  the  whole."  I  told  him  it  was  a 
subject  I  had  not  thought  of;  but  that  I  supposed  we  should  not  object 
to  twenty  millions,  provided  our  citizens  were  paid.  He  told  me  that 
this  was  too  low  an  offer;  and  that  he  would  be  glad  if  I  would  reflect 
upon  it,  and  tell  him  to-morrow.  I  told  him  that,  as  Mr.  Monroe  would 
be  in  town  in  two  days,  I  would  delay  my  further  offer  until  I  had  the 
pleasure  of  introducing  him.  He  added,  that  he  did  not  speak  from 
authority,  but  that  the  idea  had  struck  him.  I  have  reason,  however, 
to  think  that  this  resolution  was  taken  in  Council  on  Saturday.  On 
_Friday,  I  received  Mr.  Ross's  motion:  I  immediately  sent  it  to  M.  Tal 
leyrand,  with  an  informal  note  expressive  of  my  fears  that  it  would  be 
carried  into  effect;  and  requesting  that  General  Bernadotte  might  not 
go  till  something  effectual  was  done.  I  also  translated  it,  and  gave  it 
to  General  Bernadotte,  and  pressed  upon  him  the  necessity  of  asking 
express  instructions,  in  case  he  should  find  the  island  in  possession  of 
the  Americans.  He  went  immediately  to  Joseph  Bonaparte.  These, 
I  believe,  were  exciting  causes  to  the  train  we  are  now  in,  and  which 
I  flatter  myself  we  shall  be  able,  on  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Monroe,  to 
pursue  to  effect.  I  think,  from  every  appearance,  that  war  is  very 
near  at  hand;  and,  under  these  circumstances,  I  have  endeavored  to 
impress  the  Government  that  not  a  moment  should  be  lost,  lest  Britain 
should  anticipate  us.  I  have  used  every  exertion  with  the  Spanish 
Ambassador  and  Lord  Whitworth,  to  prevent  the  transfer  of  the 
Floridas;  and  wrote  to  Mr.  Graham,  in  Mr.  Pinckney's  absence,  to 
give  every  attention  to  that  object,  and  to  avail  himself  of  the  coolness 
which  subsisted  between  the  French  Ambassador  and  the  Prince  of 
Peace.  This  has  retarded  the  negotiation;  and  unless  they  get  Florida 
I  have  convinced  them  Louisiana  is  worth  little.  I  would  rather  have 
confined  our  views  to  smaller  objects;  and  I  think  that,  if  we  succeed, 
it  would  be  good  policy  to  exchange  the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi 
with  Spain  for  the  Floridas,  reserving  New  Orleans.  Perhaps,  how 
ever,  I  am  too  sanguine  in  my  expectations:  we  will  not,  therefore, 
dispose  of  the  skin  till  we  have  killed  the  bear. 

I  have  written  to  Mr.  King,  pressing  him  to  stay  until  a  successor 
is  appointed.  The  moment  is  so  critical  that  we  can  not  justify  being 
without  a  Minister  in  England,  and  he  is  a  very  useful  one. 

I  believe  you  may  calculate  that  Britain  will  not  give  up  Malta,  and 
that  France  will  not  leave  it  in  her  hands  by  consent;  and,  of  course, 
hostilities  must  commence,  or  Britain  be  kept,  at  immense  expense,  in 
her  present  warlike  attitude,  while  France  expends  nothing.  This  she 
can  not  submit  to,  and  must,  therefore,  strike  the  first  stroke,  which 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 


159 


this  country  wishes,  in  order  to  render  the  war  more  popular  here. 
France  has  marched  troops  into  Holland,  and  those  of  Victor  are 
embarking,  but,  I  think  will  not  sail,  or,  if  they  do,  will  be  inter 
cepted  by  England,  who  will  probably  think  the}^  are  designed  for 
the  islands,  which  is  very  probable. 

Mr.  Monroe  arrived  on  the  1st  at  Havre.  I  expect  him  here  in  two 
days  at  furthest  from  this  date.  His  passage  was  twenty-nine  days. 

I  shall  see  the  Minister  again  to-morrow,  in  order  to  sound  him  more 
fully  before  we  offer  anything  formal  on  Mr.  Monroe's  arrival. 

I  wished  and  proposed  that  General  Bernadotte  should  wait  until 
something  was  done,  having  formally  notified  the  Minister  that  Mr. 
Monroe  had  arrived,  but  I  could  not  prevail  upon  him  to  make  any 
alteration.  He  said  that  Mr.  Bernadotte,  having  received  his  des 
patches,  was  to  be  considered  by  him  as  gone. 

You  will  receive  this  by  Mr.  Petrie,  his  secretary,  who  waits  here 
until  to-morrow. 

I  am,  R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

P.  S.,  12th. — Orders  are  gone  this  day  to  stop  the  sailing  of  vessels 
from  the  French  ports;  war  is  inevitable;  my  conjecture  as  to  their 
determination  to  sell  is  well  founded;  Mr.  Monroei^ust  arrived  here. 

Hon.  JAMES  MADISON, 

Secretary  of  State. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  Mr.  Madison,  Secretary  of  State. 


PARIS,  April  13,  1803,  midnight. 

DEAR  SIR:  I  have  just  come  from  the  Minister  of  the  Treasury.  Our 
conversation  was  so  important,  that  I  think  it  necessary  to  write  it, 
while  the  impressions  are  strong  upon  my  mind;  and  the  rather,  as  I 
fear  I  shall  not  have  time  to  copy  and  send  this  letter,  if  I  defer  it  till 
morning. 

By  my  letter  of  yesterda}^  you  learned  that  the  Minister  had  asked 
me  whether  I  would  agree  to  purchase  Louisiana,  &c.  On  the  12th,  I 
called  upon  him  to  press  this  matter  further.  He  then  thought  proper 
to  declare  that  his  proposition  was  only  personal,  but  still  requested 
me  to  make  an  offer;  and,  upon  declining  to  do  so,  as  I  expected  Mr. 
Monroe  the  next  day,  he  shrugged  up  his  shoulders,  and  changed  the 
conversation.  Not  willing,  however,  to  lose  sight  of  it,  I  told  him  I 
had  been  long  endeavoring  to  bring  him  to  some  point;  but,  unfortu 
nately,  without  effect:  that  I  wished  merely  to  have  the  negotiation 
opened  by  any  proposition  on  his  part;  and,  with  that  view,  had  writ 
ten  him  a  note  which  contained  that  request,  grounded  upon  my  appre 
hension  of  the  consequence  of  sending  General  Bernadotte  without 


160  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

enabling  him  to  say  a  treaty  was  begun.  lie  told  me  he  would  answer 
my  note,  but  that  he  must  do  it  evasively,  because  Louisiana  was  not 
theirs.  I  smiled  at  this  assertion,  and  told  him  I  had  seen  the  treaty 
recognizing  it;  that  I  knew  the  Consul  had  appointed  officers  to  gov 
ern  the  country,  and  that  he  had  himself  told  me  that  General  Victor 
was  to  take  possession;  that,  in  a  note  written  by  the  express  order  of 
the  First  Consul,  he  had  told  me  that  General  Bernadotte  was  to  treat 
relative  to  it  in  the  United  States,  &c.  He  still  persisted  that  they 
had  it  in  contemplation  to  obtain  it,  but  had  it  not.  I  told  him  that  I 
was  very  well  pleased  to  understand  this  from  him,  because,  if  so,  we 
should  not  commit  ourselves  with  them  in  taking  it  from  Spain,  to 
whom,  by  his  account,  it  still  belonged;  and  that,  as  we  had  just  cause 
of  complaint  against  her,  if  Mr.  Monroe  concurred  in  opinion  with 
me,  we  should  negotiate  no  further  on  the  subject,  but  advise  our 
Government  to  take  possession.  He  seemed  alarmed  at  the  boldness 
of  the  measure,  and  told  me  he  would  answer  my  note,  but  that  it 
would  be  evasively.  I  told  him  I  should  receive  with  pleasure  any 
communication  from  him,  but  that  we  were  not  disposed  to  trifle;  that 
the  times  were  critical,  and  though  I  did  not  know  what  instructions 
Mr.  Monroe  might  bring,  I  was  perfectly  satisfied  that  they  would 
require  a  precise  and  prompt  notice;  that  I  was  very  fearful,  from  the 
little  progress  I  had  made,  that  my  Government  would  consider  me  as 
a  very  indolent  negotiator.  He  laughed,  and  told  me  that  he  would 
give  me  a  certificate  that  I  was  the  most  importunate  he  had  met  with. 

There  was  something  so  extraordinary  in  all  thisT  that  I  did  not  detail 
it  to  you  till  I  found  some  clue  to  the  labyrinth,  which  I  have  done, 
as  you  will  find  before  I  finish  this  letter;  and  the  rather,  as  I  was 
almost  certain  that  I  could  rely  upon  the  intelligence  I  had  received 
of  the  resolution  to  dispose  of  this  countiy. 

This  day  Mr.  Monroe  passed  with  me  in  examining  my  papers;  and 
while  he  and  several  other  gentlemen  were  at  dinner  with  me,  I 
observed  the  Minister  of  the  Treasury  walking  in  my  garden.  I  sent 
out  Colonel  Livingston  to  him;  he  told  him  he  would  return  when  we 
had  dined.  While  we  were  taking  coffee  he  came  in;  and,  after  being 
some  time  in  the  room,  we  strolled  into  the  next  room,  when  he  told 
me  he  heard  I  had  been  at  his  house  two  days  before,  when  he  was 
at  St.  Cloud;  that  he  thought  I  might  have  something  particular  to 
say  to  him,  and  had  taken  the  first  opportunity  to  call  on  me.  I  saw 
that  this  was  meant  as  an  opening  to  one  of  those  free  conversations 
which  I  had  frequently  had  with  him.  I  accordingly  began  on  the 
subject  of  the  debt,  and  related  to  him  the  extraordinary  conduct  of 
the  Minister,  &c.  He  told  me  that  this  led  to  something  important, 
that  had  been  cursorily  mentioned  to  him  at  St.  Cloud;  but  as  my 
house  was  full  of  company,  he  thought  I  had  better  call  on  him  any  time 
before  11  that  night.  He  went  away,  and,  a  little  after,  when  Mr. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  161 

Monroe  took  leave,  1  followed  him.  He  told  me  that  he  wished  me 
to  repeat  what  I  had  said  relative  to  M.  Tallej^rand's  requesting-  a 
proposition  from  me  as  to  the  purchase  of  Louisiana.  I  did  so;  and 
concluded  with  the  extreme  absurdity  of  his  evasions  of  that  day,  and 
stated  the  consequence  of  any  delay  on  this  subject,  as  it  would  enable 
Britain  to  take  possession,  who  would  readily  relinquish  it  to  us.  He 
said  that  this  proceeded  upon  a  supposition  of  her  making  so  success 
ful  a  war  as  to  be  enabled  to  retain  her  conquests.  1  told  him  that  it 
was  probable  that  the  same  idea  might  suggest  itself  to  the  United 
States;  in  which  case,  it  would  be  their  interest  to  contribute  to  render 
her  successful,  and  I  asked  whether  it  was  prudent  to  throw  us  into 
her  scale?  This  led  to  long  discussions  of  no  moment  to  repeat.  We 
returned  to  the  point:  he  said,  that  what  I  had  told  him  led  him  to 
think  that  what  the  Consul  had  said  to  him  on  Sunday,  at  St.  Cloud, 
(the  day  on  which,  as  I  told  you,  the  determination  had  been  taken  to 
sell,)  had  more  of  earnest  than  he  thought  at  the  time;  that  the  Consul 
had  asked  him  what  news  from  England  ?  As  he  knew  he  read  the 
papers  attentively,  he  told  him  that  he  had  seen  in  the  London  papers 
the  proposition  for  raising  fifty  thousand  men  to  take  New  Orleans. 
The  Consul  said  he  had  seen  it  too,  and  had  also  seen  that  something 
was  said  about  two  millions  of  dollars  being  disposed  among  the  peo 
ple  about  him,  to  bribe  them,  &c. ;  and  then  left  him.  That  after 
wards,  when  walking  in  the  garden,  the  Consul  came  again  to  him, 
and  spoke  to  him  about  the  troubles  that  were  excited  in  America,  and 
inquired  how  far  1  was  satisfied  with  his  last  note. 

Here  some  civil  things  were  introduced,  for  which  1  presume  I  am 
more  indebted  to  the  Minister's  politeness  than  to  his  veracity;  so  let 
them  sleep.  He  (Marbois)  then  took  occasion  to  mention  his  sorrow 
that  any  cause  of  difference  should  exist  between  our  countries.  The 
Consul  told  him,  in  reply,  u  Well,  you  have  the  charge  of  the  treasury; 
let  them  give  you  one  hundred  millions  of  francs,  and  pay  their  own 
claims,  and  take  the  whole  country."  Seeing,  by  my  looks,  that  I  was 
surprised  at  so  extravagant  a  demand,  he  added  that  he  considered  the 
demand  as  exorbitant,  and  had  told  the  First  Consul  that  the  thing 
was  impossible;  that  we  had  not  the  means  of  raising  that.  The  Con 
sul  told  him  we  might  borrow  it.  I  now  plainly  saw  the  whole  busi 
ness:  first,  the  Consul  was  disposed  to  sell;  next,  lie  distrusted 
Talb^raridL,  .QIL .account  of  the  business  of  the  supposed  intention  to, 
bribe,  and  meant  to  put  the  negotiation  into  the  hands  of  Marbois, 
whoso  diameter  for  integrity  is  established.  I  told  him  that  the 
United  States  were  anxious  to  preserve  peace  with  France;  that,  for 
that  reason,  they  wished  to  remove  them  to  the  west  side  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  ;  that  we  would  be  perfectly  satisfied  with  New  Orleans  and  the 
Floridas,  and  had  no  disposition  to  extend  across  the  river;  that,  of 
course,  we  would  not  give  any  great  sum  for  the  purchase;  that  he  was 
H.  Doc.  431 11 


162  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TEEKITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

right  iii  his  idea  of  the  extreme  exorbitancy  of  the  demand,  which 
would  not  fall  short  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  millions;  that, 
however,  we  would  be  ready  to  purchase,  provided  the  sum  was  reduced 
to  reasonable  limits.  He  then  pressed  me  to  name  the  sum.  I  told 
him  that  this  was  not  worth  while,  because,  as  he  only  treated  the 
inquiry  as  a  matter  of  curiosity,  any  declaration  of  mine  would  have 
no  effect.  If  a  negotiation  was  to  be  opened,  we  should  (Mr.  Monroe 
and  myself)  make  the  offer  after  mature  reflection.  This  compelled 
him  to  declare,  that,  though  he  was  not  authorized  expressly  to  make 
the  inquiry  from  me,  yet,  that,  if  I  could  mention  any  sum  that  came  near 
the  mark,  that  could  b?  accepted,  he  would  communicate  it  to  the  First 
Consul.  1  told  him  that  we  had  no  sort  of  authority  to  go  to  a  sum 
that  bore  any  proportion  to  what  he  mentioned;  but  that,  as  he  himself 
considered  the  demand  as  too  high,  he  would  oblige  me  by  telling  me 
what  he  thought  would  be  reasonable.  He  replied  that,  if  we  would 
name  sixty  millions,  and  take  upon  us  the  American  claims,  to  the 
amount  of  twenty  more,  he  would  try  how  far  this  would  be  accepted. 
I  told  him  that  it  was  vain  to  ask  anything  that  was  so  greatly  beyond 
our  means;  that  true  policy  would  dictate  to  the  First  Consul  not  to 
press  such  a  demand;  that  he  must  know  that  it  would  render  the 
present  Government  unpopular,  and  have  a  tendency,  at  the  next  elec 
tion,  to  throw  the  power  into  the  hands  of  men  who  were  most  hostile 
to  a  connection  with  France;  and  that  this  would  probably  happen  in 
the  midst  of  a  war.  I  asked  him  whether  the  few  millions  acquired 
at  this  expense  would  not  be  too  dearly  bought? 

He  frankly  confessed  that  he  was  of  my  sentiments;  but  that  he 
feared  the  Consul  would  not  relax.  I  asked  him  to  press  this  argu 
ment  upon  him,  together  with  the  danger  of  seeing  the  country  pass 
into  the  hands  of  Britain.  I  told  him  that  he  had  seen  the  aidor  of 
the  Americans  to  take  it  by  force,  and  the  difficulty  with  which  the}7 
were  restrained  by  the  prudence  of  the  President;  that  he  must  easily 
see  how  much  the  hands  of  the  war  party  would  be  strengthened,  when 
they  learned  that  France  was  upon  the  eve  of  a  rupture  with  England. 
He  admitted  the  weight  of  all  this:  ''But,"  says  he,  "you  know  the 
temper  of  a  youthful  conqueror;  everything  he  does  is  rapid  as  light 
ning;  we  have  only  to  speak  to  him  as  an  opportunity  presents  itself, 
perhaps  in  a  crowd,  when  he  bears  no  contradiction.  When  I  am  alone 
with  him,  I  can  speak  more  freely,  and  he  attends;  but  this  oppor 
tunity  seldom  happens,  and  is  always  accidental.  Try,  then,  if  you 
can  not  come  up  to  my  mark.  Consider  the  extent  of  the  country, 
the  exclusive  navigation  of  the  river,  and  the  importance  of  having 
no  neighbors  to  dispute  you,  no  war  to  dread."  I  told  him  that  I  con 
sidered  all  these  as  important  considerations,  but  there  was  a  point 
beyond  which  we  could  not  go,  and  that  fell  far  short  of  the  sum  he 
mentioned. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  163 

I  asked  him,  in  case  of  a  purchase,  whether  they  would  stipulate 
that  France  would  never  possess  the  Floridas,  and  that  she  would  aid 
us  to  procure  them,  and  relinquish  all  right  that  she  might  have  to 
them.  He  told  me  that  she  would  go  thus  far.  I  added,  that  I  would 
now  say  nothing  on  the  subject,  but  that  I  would  converse  with  Mr. 
Monroe;  and  that  I  was  sure  to  find  him  disposed  to  do  everything 
that  was  reasonable,  or  could  be  expected  to  remove  every  cause  of 
difference  between  the  two  countries.  That,  however,  if  any  negotia 
tion  should  go  on,  I  would  wish  that  the  First  Consul  would  depute 
somebody  to  treat  with  us,  who  had  more  leisure  than  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs. 

I  said  this  to  see  whether  my  conjectures  relative  to  him  were  well 
founded.  He  told  me  that  as  the  First  Consul  knew  our  personal 
friendship,  he  having  several  times  had  occasion  to  speak  of  me  and 
my  family,  and  the  principles  that  we  held,  he  believed  that  there  would 
be  no  difficulty,  when  this  negotiation  was  somewhat  advanced,  to  have 
the  management  of  it  put  into  his  hands.  He  earnestly  pressed  me  to 
make  some  proposition  that  was  so  near  the  First  Consul's  as  to  admit  his 
mentioning  it  to  him.  I  told  him  that  I  would  consult  Mr.  Monroe, 
but  that  neither  he  nor  I  could  accede  to  his  ideas  on  the  subject. 
Thus,  sir,  you  see  a  negotiation  is  fairly  opened,  and  upon  grounds 
which  I  confess  I  prefer  to  all  other  commercial  privileges;  and  always 
to  some  a  simple  money  transaction  is  infinitety  preferable.  As  to  the 
quantum,  I  have  yet  made  up  no  opinion.  The  field  opened  to  us  is 
infinitely  larger  than  our  instructions  contemplated;  the  revenue 
increasing,  and  the  land  more  than  adequate  to  sink  the  capital,  should 
we  even  go  the  sum  proposed  by  Marbois;  nay,  I  persuade  myself,  that 
the  whole  sum  may  be  raised  by  the  sale  of  the  territory  west  of  the 
Mississippi,  with  the  right  of  sovereignty,  to  some  Power  in  Europe, 
whose  vicinity  we  should  not  fear.  I  speak  now  without  reflection, 
arid  without  having  seen  Mr.  Monroe,  as  it  was  midnight  when  I  left 
the  Treasury  Office,  and  is  now  near  3  o'clock.  It  is  so  very  important 
that  you  should  be  apprized  that  a  negotiation  is  actually  opened,  even 
before  Mr.  Monroe  has  been  presented,  in  order  to  calm  the  tumult 
which  the  news  of  war  will  renew,  that  I  have  lost  no  time  in  commu 
nicating  it.  We  shall  do  all  we  can  to  cheapen  the  purchase;  but  my 
present  sentiment  is  that  we  shall  buy.  Mr.  Monroe  will  be  presented 
to  the  Minister  to-morrow,  when  we  shall  press  for  as  early  an  audi 
ence  as  possible  from  the  First  Consul.  I  think  it  will  be  necessary 
to  put  in  some  proposition  to-morrow:  the  Consul  goes  in  a  few  days 
to  Brussels,  and  every  moment  is  precious. 

I  am,  dear  sir,  with  the  most  respectful  consideration,  your  most 
obedient,  humble  servant, 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


1(54  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

Mr.  Monroe  to  Mr.  Madison. 

PARIS  April  15,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR, — It  is  proper  for  me  to  mention  to  you  in  confidence 
some  circumstances  which  I  wish  not  to  include  in  an  official  letter. 
I  was  informed  on  my  arrival  here  by  Mr.  Skipwith  that  Mr.  Living 
ston  mortified  at  my  appointment  had  done  everything  in  his  power  to 
turn  the  occurrences  in  America,  and  even  my  mission  to  his  account, 
by  pressing  the  Government  on  every  point  with  a  view  to  show  that 
he  had  accomplished  what  was  wished  without  my  aid:  and  perhaps 
also  that  my  mission  had  put  in  hazard  what  might  otherwise  have 
been  easily  obtained.  His  official  correspondence  will  show  what 
occurred  prior  to  my  arrival  &  sufficiently  proves  that  he  did  not 
abstain  even  on  hearing  that  I  was  on  my  way,  from  the  topics  intrusted 
to  us  jointly.  Col.  Mercer  who  was  present  says  this  information  was 
given  next  morning  at  the  second  interview.  When  1  called  on  him 
he  told  me  that  this  government  had  resolved  to  sell  Louisiana  &c  but 
that  the  resolution  had  grown  out  of  the  state  of  things  in  Europe,  & 
the  danger  of  a  war  with  England:  that  that  point  would  be  decided  in 
a  fortnight,  perhaps  immediately  on  the  return  of  a  courrier  from 
Russia  who  was  expected  in  less  time:  that  he  had  been  with  Talley 
rand  that  day,  advised  him  that  I  was  on  the  way  from  Havre  &  pressed 
him  on  the  subject  of  my  mission,  &  ultimately  on  being  asked  what 
we  would  give  had  actually  offered  terms.  On  the  next  day  I  dined 
with  Mr.  Livingston;  while  at  dinner  Mr.  Marbois  came  there,  with 
drew  and  returned  after  we  arose  from  dinner;  they  had  a  private  con 
ference  and  it  was  agreed,  there  being  company  with  him,  that  Mr. 
Livingston  should  call  on  him  after  the  company  dispersed  at  his  (Mr. 
Marbois')  house  to  confer  relative  to  the  purchase  of  Louisiana.  He 
told  me  he  was  going  there  &  the  object,  and  in  a  private  conference 
with  Mr.  Skipwith  who  dined  with  him  on  the  same  day,  after  repeat-  / 
ing  the  above,  he  regretted  his  misfortune  in  my  arrival,  since  it  took/ 
from  him  the  credit  of  having  brought  everything  to  a  proper  conclu 
sion  without  my  aid.  You  will  perceive  the  dilemma  into  which  I  have 
been  &  am  still  placed  by  this  course  of  proceeding,  since  I  have  not 
only  to  negotiate  with  the  French  Government,  especially  its  ministers, 
but  my  colleagues  also.  There  is  a  plausible  pretext  foi\not  present 
ing  me  to  the  Consul  till  the  monthly  audience,  &  in  strict  propriety  I 
ought  to  hold  no  communication  or  sanction  one  with  this  government 
till  I  am  presented:  tho'  my  colleague  considers  my  reception  by  the 
minister,  his  official  notes  relative  to  it,  the  terms  in  which  he  spoke 
of  me  on  the  part  of  the  Consul  &  the  information  he  gave  us  that  a 
person  would  be  designated  to  treat  with  us,  with  whom  we  might  hold 
informal  communications  in  the  interim  as  placing  me  on  the  ground 
of  a  person  recognized.  If  I  held  back  on  the  rule  of  strict  etiquette 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  165 

&  permitted  no  communication  at  all  in  case  our  negotiation  failed 
1  exposed  myself  &  our  government  to  the  charge  of  having  lost, 
by  the  measure  taken,  a  brilliant  opportunity  of  securing  all  our 
objects  here  &  myself  particularly  of  sacrificing  everything  thro' 
selfish  motives.  It  is  well  known  that  the  crisis  pressed  here  and 
still  does,  that  the  Consul  had  resolved  to  sell,  that  Marbois  was  a 
minister  &  entitled  to  credit,  that  my  colleague  was  one  also  already 
recognized  &  jointly  associated  with  me  in  the  trust.  He  was  also 
possessed  with  the  views  of  our  government  as  well  as  myself,  & 
might  speak  without  my  approbation  with  whom  he  pleased.  I  could 
not  withhold  confidential  communications  with  him.  Under  these 
circumstances  I  have  been  driven  by  necessity,  in  private  communi 
cations  with  him,  signing  nothing  or  authorizing  it  on  his  part,  to 
permit  him  to  state  to  Mr.  Marbois  that  I  would  assent  to  the  pur 
chase  of  Louisiana  at  the  price  we  were  willing  to  give  for  the  terri 
tory  to  the  left  of  the  river,  France  relinquishing  all  pretensions  to  / 
the  Floridas,  &  engaging  to  support  with  her  influence  our  negotiation*^ 
with  Spain  for  them.  By  so  doing  I  disarm  those  who  might  wish 
it  of  charging  on  me  or  our  government  the  fault  of  future  events, 
should  they  be  unpropitious,  and  am  not  aware  that  I  substantially 
hazard  anything.  All  this  attention  to  my  colleague  &c  may  be  an 
intrigue  tho'  on  the  part  of  Marbois.  I  put  confidence  in  the  facts 
he  states.  It  may  be  wished  to  inspire  jealousy  and  distrust  between 
my  colleague  &  myself;  the  minister  may  suppose  he  will  be  less 
reserved,  tho'  it  is  certain  till  my  appointment  was  known  that  he 
often  treated  him  with  great  neglect  &  even  disrespect.  The  opinion 
entertained  of  the  character  of  the  Consul  for  promptitude  &  decision, 
that  if  he  liked  the  terms  he  would  conclude  at  once,  &  if  he  was  dis 
gusted  would  perhaps  not  soon  return  to  the  subject  induced  me  with 
the  consideration  mentioned  to  assent  to  the  above.  My  Colleague  has 
now  promised  me  in  the  most  explicit  terms  to  hold  no  further  com-  / 
munication  with  Mr.  Marbois  or  any  other  person,  till  I  am  recognized,^ 
&  a  person  regularly  appointed  to  treat  with  us.  I  do  not  know  that 
any  real  injury  will  occur  to  the  object  of  the  mission  by  what  has 
passed. 


Mr.  Monroe's  Journal  or  Memoranda. 
,  *.-  :'\V J    T 

APRIL  27. 

Mr.  Marbois  came  to  my  lodgings  by  appointment  of  Mr.  Livingston, 
at  two  o'clock  and  I  being  indisposed  it  was  agreed  that  I  might  repose 
as  it  suited  me.  Mr.  Marbois  opened  the  conversation  by  presenting 
us  with  a  project  of  a  treaty  given  him  by  the  gov*.  to  be  proposed  to 
us,  which  he  admitted  he  thought  hard  and  unreasonable;  he  presented 
at  the  same  time  another  project  which  he  called  his  own,  which  had 


166  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

not  been  seen  by  the  gov*.,  but  to  which  he  presumed  the  first  consul 
would  assent,  as  he  had  told  him  he  would  not  insist  on  the  terms  con 
tained  in  the  first,  and  would  only  ask  or  propose  such  as  he  had  drawn 
in  the  second;  but  to  which  he  declared  that  the  first  consul  had  not 
assented  explicitly.  Mr.  Marbois  thought  himself  however  at  liberty 
to  propose  his  own  project  as  the  basis  of  our  negotiation.  That  proj 
ect  claimed  one  hundred  millions  &  the  debts  due  our  citizens  esti 
mated  at  20.  more.  His  own  reduced  that  demand  to  80,  including 
the  debt.  There  were  some  other  differences  between  them,  his  going 
more  into  detail,  in  the  form  of  a  publick  act.  Mr.  Livingston 
observed  that  the  debt  was  a  thing  to  be  provided  for  in  an  especial 
manner;  that  the  consul  had  said  to  him  it  should  be  paid;  that  we 
ought  to  begin  from  points  agreed  &  proceed  to  difficulties — that  the 
points  agreed  were  the  debts  that  were  due  and  our  right  of  deposit. 
Mr.  Marbois  said  that  if  we  made  a  treaty  on  the  general  &  great  sub 
ject  of  the  Louisiana,  he  would  include  in  it  a  provision  for  the  debts; 
that  if  he  did  not  make  a  treat^y  of  that  kind  he  would  have  nothing  to 
do  with  the  debts.  Mr.  Livingston  repeated  the  promise  of  the  Consul 
&c.  for  the  payment  of  them,  to  which  Mr.  Marbois  replied  that  he 
did  not  mean  to  impair  the  force  of  our  claim  founded  on  the  treaty 
&  the  promise  of  the  gov*. — what  he  meant  to  say  was,  that  if  our 
negotiation  succeeded  in  the  object  of  it,  the  debts  would  be  comprized 
in  it  &  provided  for,  and  if  it  did  not  succeed  he  would  leave  them 
where  he  found  them;  the  claim  would  still  be  supported  by  the  treaty 
&  any  assurance  Mr.  Livingston  may  have  received  from  tho  gov*. 
since.  Mr.  Livingston  still  pressing  the  high  ground  on  which  the 
claim  to  the  payment  of  the  debt  rested,  Mr.  Marbois  observed  that  in 
the  promise  referred  to  no  time  was  fixed  or  sum  specified,  &  inti 
mated  that  the  Consul  did  not  contemplate  a  greater  sum  than  3  or  4 
millions  of  livres.  I  then  observed  that  I  thought  we  were  all  of  the 
same  opinion  respecting  the  debts  that  the  ground  on  which  they  stood 
could  not  be  impaired  by  the  failure  of  this  negotiation;  that  a  pro 
vision  might  be  made  for  the  payment  of  them  by  it;  that  we  had 
better  go  on  to  the  other  object  &  with  that  view  to  examine  &  discuss 
the  project  presented  by  M1'.  Marbois.  One  of  the  articles  contained 
in  Mr.  Marbois's  project,  proposed  that  the  payment  to  our  citizens  & 
the  French  gov*.  should  proceed  in  equal  degree  regarding  the  amount 
to  be  paid  to  each  party,  by  the  month,  that  is  that  neither  should 
have  a  priority  or  preference,  to  the  other  as  to  time  or  proportion. 
Mr.  Livingston  insisted  that  the  payment  to  our  citizens  should  be 
prompt  &  full,  which  he  supposed  we  might  make,  without  render 
ing  ourselves  unable  to  meet  the  views  of  the  French  gov*.  in  any  sum 
we  might  stipulate  to  give  in  point  of  time:  to  that  Mr.  Marbois  seemed 
to  have  no  objection. 
/  APPENDIX  I. — 1  objected  to  the  commerc1.  priviledge,  as  being  cal- 

.  \  *^  •  M.V1,  ^  ^°.  -  5 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  167 

culated  to  embarrass  our  revenue  system,  create  irregularities  between 
one  part  and  another,  give  offense  to  foreign  powers,  fix  a  badge  of 
degradation  on  the  part  of  the  Union,  &  actually  defeat  the  policy  of 
France  in  inclining  us  to  Engld.  —  He  seemed  to  think  that  being  the 
condition  of  the  cession  it  was  not  liable  to  all  the  objections  stated — 
both  my  colleague  and  myself  observed  that  that  idea  had  not  been 
communicated  by  him  to  either  of  us  in  our  former  conversations,  wh. 
he  admitted  on  our  word,  but  observed  that  it  was  an  omission  on  his 
part,  his  gov*.  having  always  contemplated  it — that  it  imported  the 
honor  of  the  govt.,  to  furnish  a  publick  motive  for  the  cession  distinct 
from  money — I  then  objected  to  the  perpetuity  of  the  stipulation  to 

/  which  he  assented — 12  years  were  proposed  to  which  he  agreed. 

At  the  same  time  that  we  presented  to  Mr.  Marbois  our  project  we 

\gave  him  a  paper  drawn  by  my  colleague  on  the  subject,  translated  in 
French,  wh.  being  long,  it  was  deemed  then  unnecessary  to  read  it, 
but  proposed  by  my  colleague  that  Mr.  Marbois  shod.  keep  &  read  it 
himself  &  shew  it  to  the  consul,  wh.  he  promised.  This  paper  was 
given  me  by  my  colleague  some  days  before,  but  it  being  lengthy  &  I 
being  much  engaged  in  the  arrangement  of  our  project  had  paid  but 
little  attention  to  it — when  my  colleague  called  on  me  on  his  way  to 
Mr.  Marbois  he  asked  me  for  it;  I  gave  it  to  him,  he  asked  me  to  sign 
it — I  told  him  there  were  passages  I  did  not  like,  particularly  the 
admission  that  the  formation  of  our  adm118.  depended  on  the  conduct  of 
foreign  powers:  that  that  was  not  the  fact,  that  that  idea  was  degrad 
ing  to  our  country,  that  the  application  of  the  term  sovereign  to  the 
first  consul  was  improper,  that  of  Ch:  Magistrate  was  the  correct  one — 
I  also  did  not  like  the  terms  used  relative  to  the  debts  due  by  France — 
tho'  I  wished  &  wod  secure  them  in  our  treaty — he  said  that  the 
paper  contained  mere  cursory  observations, — that  the  first  idea  wh.  I 
objected  to  wod.  have  weight  here,  since  this  gov*.  did  not  wish  a 
change  of  adm71.  in  the  U.  States  so  that  he  thought  the  paper  might 
have  use.  On  the  intimation  that  he  considered  the  paper  as  contain 
ing  cursory  observations,  b}T  which  I  understood  that  he  meant  it  as 
informal,  I  signed  it — I  did  this  on  the  principle  that  the  negotiation 
had  reached  a  stage  which  prevented  this  paper  from  doing  harm,  and 
to  put  it  out  of  my  colleague's  power  to  say  that  I  prevented  his  doing 
good.  I  never  heard  of  the  paper  afterwards,  tho'  my  colleague  told 
me  next  day  on  leaving  the  first  consul's  that  Mr.  Marbois  had  informed 
him  that  the  first  consul  had  approved  it — I  had  conferred  with  Mr. 
Marbois  just  before  my  colleague  did  &  arranged  our  meeting  that 
night  at  his  home,  in  wh.  he  said  nothing  of  that  paper.  I  therefore 
inferred  that  what  he  did  say  was  in  consequence  of  the  enquiry  of  my 
colleague,  &  on  perusing  that  he  felt  some  interest  respecting  it. 

JOURNAL. — My  colleague  took  Mr.   Marbois's  project  with  him  & 
brought  one  very  loosely  drawn  founded  on  it,  which  with  our  com- 


168  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

munications  together  on  the  subject  &  the  modifications  we  gave  it, 
will  be  noted  hereafter. 

We  called  on  Mr.  Marbois  the  29th  and  gave  him  our  project  which 
we  read  to  him  &  discussed.  We  proposed  to  offer  50.  millions  to 
France  &  20.  on  ace*,  of  her  debt  to  the  citizens  of  the  U  States,  mak 
ing  70.  in  the  whole.  On  reading  that  article  he  declared  that  he 
would  not  proceed  in  the  negotiation  on  a  less  sum  than  80.  Millions, 
since  it  would  be  useless  as  the  Consul  had  been  sufficiently  explicit 
on  that  point;  Indeed  he  assured  us  that  his  government  had  never 
positively  instructed  him  to  take  that  sum,  but  that  as  he  had  told  the 
Consul  it  was  enough,  that  he  would  ask  no  more,  and  to  which  he 
understood  the  Consul  as  giving  his  assent,  he  Mr.  Marbois  had 
thought  himself  authorized  to  accept  &  propose  it  to  us,  but  that  he 
could  not  proceed  unless  we  agreed  to  give  it.  On  this  frank  &  explicit 
declaration  on  his  part  &  after  explaining  to  him  the  motive  which  led 
us  to  offer  that  sum  we  agreed  to  accede  to  his  idea  &  give  80.  millions. 
He  asked  us  if  we  could  not  advance  something  immediately,  we 
replied,  we  did  so  in  discharge  of  their  debt  to  our  citizens;  that  they 
had  suffered  and  it  was  for  the  interest  of  France  as  well  as  the  U 
States,  that  they  should  be  promptly  paid,  or  as  soon  as  possible.  To 
the  payment  in  stock  he  did  not  object,  nor  did  he  say  anything 
respecting  the  loss  to  be  sustained  by  it:  he  asked  what  effect  the  pro 
tracting  the  redemption  of  the  stock  for  15  years  would  have  on  its 
value;  we  told  him  to  raise  its  price. 

On  the  proviso  to  the  commercial  stipulation  he  seemed  to  entertain 
a  doubt,  but  on  our  shewing  the  abuse  of  which  the  article  was  capable 
without  it,  being  not  simply  to  give  a  preference  for  12  years  to 
French  vessels  &  manufactures  over  those  of  other  countries  in  the 
ports  of  the  ceded  territory,  but  to  enable  France  to  monopolize  the 
carriage  of  the  exports  from  the  Mississippi,  and  prevent  a  single 
article  raised  there  being  brought  from  the  other  States,  such  as 
tobacco,  rice,  &c.  He  admitted  that  such  a  power  was  not  sought  on 
their  part. 

He  seemed  desirous  to  secure  by  some  strong  provision  the  incor 
poration  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  country  with  our  union;  we 
told  him  that  we  would  try  to  modify  the  article  to  meet  his  ideas  as 
fairly  as  we  could — we  left  our  project  with  him,  in  expectation  of 
hearing  from  him  soon  the  result,  as  he  said  he  should  see  the  Consul 
next  morning  on  the  subject.  He  informed  me  that  Mr.  Talleyrand 
had  asked  him  whether  I  was  in  health  to  be  presented  to  the  first 
Consul,  &  on  my  answering  in  the  affirmative;  advised  me  to  let  him 
know  it.  My  colleague  promised  as  we  returned  home  to  inform  the 
minister  next  day  that  I  had  recovered  my  health.  To  guard  against 
accidents  however  I  wrote  the  minister  to  that  effect  next  morning, 
and  a  note  to  my  colleague  to  request  him  to  call  for  me  as  he  went  to 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  169 

the  house  of  the  minister.  Just  as  I  was  ready  to  visit  the  minister 
my  colleague  returned  from  him  &>  informed  me  that  it  was  arranged 
that  I  should  be  presented  next  day,  that  is  on  the  first  of  May. 

(May  1st,  1803,  Sunday.) 

"" 

#\  I  accompanied  my  colleague  to  the  Palace  of  the  Louvre,  where  I 
was  presented  by  him  to  the  Consul.  While  standing  in  the  circle  I 
received  a  communication  by  the  prefect  of  the  palace,  from  the  min 
ister,  stating  that  he  was  indisposed,  but  that  I  must  present  the  Con 
sul  my  letter  of  credence,  &  that  the  Consul  desired  I  would  dine  with 
him. 

When  the  Consul  came  round  to  me,  Mr.  Livingston  presented  me 
to  him,  on  which  the  Consul  observed  that  he  was  glad  to  see  me.  "  Je 
suis  bien  aise  de  le  voir."  "You  have  been  here  15  days?"  I  told 
him  I  had.  "  You  speak  French?  "  I  replied  "A  little."  "  You  had 
a  good  voyage  ? "  Yes.  i '  You  came  in  a  frigate  ? "  No  in  a  merchant 
vessel  charged  for  the  purpose.  Col.  Mercer  was  presented;  sa}rs  he 
"He  is  Secretary  of  legation?"  No  but  my  friend.  He  then  made 
enquiries  of  Mr.  Livingston  &  his  secretary  how  their  families  were, 
and  then  turned  to  Mr.  Livingston  &  myself  &  observed  that  our 
affairs  should  be  settled. 

We  dined  with  him.  After  dinner  when  we  retired  into  the  saloon, 
the  first  Consul  came  up  to  me  and  asked  whether  the  federal  city 
grew  much.  1  told  him  it  did.  "  How  many  inhabitants  has  it? "  It 
is  just  commencing,  there  are  two  cities  near  it,  one  above,  the  other 
below,  on  the  great  river  Potomack,  which  two  cities  if  counted  with 
the  federal  city  would  make  a  respectable  town,  in  itself  it  contains 
only  two  or  three  thousand  inhabitants.  "Well;  Mr.  Jefferson,  how 
old  is  he? "  Ab*.  sixty.  "  Is  he  married  or  single? "  He  is  not  mar 
ried.  "Then  he  is  a  garcon"  No  he  is  a  widower.  "  Has  he  chil 
dren?"  Yes  two  daughters  who  are  married.  "Does  he  reside 
alwa}^s  at  the  federal  city  ? "  Generally.  "Are  the  publick  buildings 
there  commodious,  those  for  the  Congress  and  President  especially?" 
They  are.  "  You  the  Americans  did  brilliant  things  in  your  war  with 
England,  you  will  do  the  same  again."  We  shall  I  am  persuaded 
always  behave  well  when  it  shall  be  our  lot  to  be  in  war.  "  You  may 
probably  be  in  war  with  them  again."  I  replied  I  did  not  know,  that 
that  was  an  important  question  to  decide  when  there  would  be  an  occa 
sion  for  it. 

At  i  after  eight  we  met  Mr.  Marbois  at  his  own  house,  in  con 
formity  to  an  appointment  which  we  made  with  him  at  the  Consul's, 
and  entered  on  the  subject  of  our  proposed  treaty.  He  objected  to 
the  first  article  as  being  long  &  containing  superfluities,  &  shewed  us 
a  remark  to  that  effect  on  it  by  the  department  of  foreign  affairs,  as 
being  an  act  more  suited  to  a  private  transaction  before  a  notary  pub- 


170  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

lick.  He  objected  also  to  any  guarantee  against  France  or  Spain,  as 
against  F ranee  as  useless,  since  the  cession  was  as  strong  a  guarantee 
against  her  as  she  could  make,  and  against  Spain  as  improper  &  useless 
since  it  would  be  an  ungracious  act  to  her  from  France,  &  we  had 
nothing  to  fear  from  Spain.  He  had  no  objection  to  inserting  the  art: 
of  the  treaty-  of  II  defonso  by-  which  France  acquired  the  territory,  in 
our  treaty,  &  would  make  her  good  offices  with  Spain  in  support  of 
our  negotiations  for  the  Floridas.  From  the  2d.  art:  he  agreed  to 
strike  out  whatever  restricted  the  application  of  publick  buildings 
to  the  same  use  hereafter;  &  to  be  contented  with  the  security  of 
property  to  individuals;  and  also  to  omit  the  obligation  to  transfer 
the  archives  &c.  to  the  local  authorities.  The  articles  at  the  close  of 
our  project  which  respected  the  cession  &  transfer  of  the  territory, 
he  proposed  to  put  together  in  the  commencement,  which  we  examined 
&  modified  somewhat  by  consent.  That  which  respected  the  commer 
cial  privilege,  he  said  was  objected  to  in  the  proviso;  he  admitted 
however  that  it  was  not  wished  or  contemplated  to  enjoy  more  than 
an  exemption  from  foreign  duties  in  favor  of  French,  productions, 
manufactures  &  toriage  in  the  transportation  of  the  same  into  the 
ports  of  the  Mississippi  but  not  to  affect  the  terms  on  which  our  prod 
uce  should  be  carried  from  it,  since  he  readily  foresaw  that  such  a 
power  might  be  greatly  abused.  I  proposed  an  amendment  which 
was  in  sentiment  agreed  to.  To  the  payment  to  be  made  them  in 
stock,  and  the  mode  by  which  we  proposed  to  ascertain  the  amount 
and  persons  entitled  to  the  debt  which  they  owed  our  citizens,  he  said 
objections  were  entertained.  They  wish  the  payment  to  be  made  here 
of  5.  millions  of  livres  the  month,  which  we  told  him  was  impossible- 
He  believed  it  was.  He  wished  the  term  for  which  the  stock  was 
irredeemable  to  be  omitted  &  adjusted  afterwards  between  ourselves, 
intimating  that  on  that  point'  difficulties  existed  with  his  gov*.  which 
proceeded  from  want  of  time  to  examine  it,  but  that  we  must  agree 
(on)  something,  indeed  seemed  to  assent  explicitly  to  our  ideas  on 
the  subject.  On  our  explaining  the  reasons  why  some  check  on  the 
liquidation  of  the  debt  due  our  citizens  was  necessary,  since  otherwise 
the  sum  destined  to  them  might  be  absorbed,  by  liquidations  in  favor 
of  Americans  not  entitled,  or  even  not  Americans,  he  admitted  the 
propriety  of  the  check  we  proposed.  He  said  he  would  see  the  Consul 
next  morning,  fix  the  points  in  question,  &  come  prepared  sometime 
in  the  course  of  that  day  to  conclude  &  sign  the  treaty  as  of  yester 
day,  being  Saturday. 

May  2d.  We  actually  signed  the  treaty  and  convention  for  the  sixty^ 
millions  of  Francs  to  France  in  the  French  language,  but  our  copies 
in  English  not  being  made  out  we  could  not  sign  in  our  language. 
They  were"  however  prepared  and  signed  two  or  three  days  after 
wards.  The  convention  respecting  American  claims  took  more  time 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  ll 

&  was  not  signed  till  about  the  8.  or  9th.  A  more  minute  view  of  this 
business  as  promised  in  the  third  page  will  be  annexed  hereafter. 

We  nominated  provisionally  Col:  John  Mercer,  J.  C.  Barnett  & 
Wm.  McClure  to  examine  the  claims  of  Americans  on  the  French  gov*. 
and  perform  the  duties  assigned  to  our  board  by  the  convention 
respecting  that  subject. 

As  soon  as  we  had  dispatched  the  treaty  &c.  by  Mr.  Hughes,  with 
duplicates  &  triplicates,  I  resolved  to  go  to  Spain  in  pursuit  of  my 
instructions,  which  Mr.  L.  approved  of  and  strongly  urged.  With 
that  view  I  wrote  a  note  to  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  asking  the 
good  offices  of  his'gov*.  with  Spain  as  had  been  promised  by  Mr.  Mar- 
bois  intimating  that  I  wished  to  set  out  in  a  few  days  for  Madrid.  On 
the  Sunday  following  I  dined  with  the  Consul  Cambaceres,  who  arrived 
late  from  the  counci'l  at  St.  Cloud.  The  party  was  not  large;  I  sat 
next  him;  he  observed  u you  must  not  go  to  Spain  at  present."  I 
asked  his  reason.  He  replied  "  it  is  not  the  time,  you  had  better  defer 
it."  I  revived  the  subject  repeatedly  but  he  declined  going  more  into 
it.  After  dinner  when  we  were  in  the  saloon,  he  came  up  to  me,  and 
on  my  telling  him  that  he  had  given  me  some  concern  by  what  he  had 
said,  he  replied  "  it  was  only  his  opinion,  but  you  will  talk  on  the  sub 
ject  with  the  minister  of  the  publick  treasury  (Mr.  Marbois,)  which  I 
promised.  1  went  immediately  to  Mr.  Marbois's  but  he  was  not  at 
home.  Reflecting  on  the  hint  from  the  Consul  it  occurred  it  would  be 
proper  to  call  on  the  ambassador  of  Spain  &  confer  with  him  on  the 
subject,  as  I  had  always  intended  before  I  sate  out  for  Spain.  I  found 
him  at  home  with  two  Spanish  gentlemen,  one  the  husband  of  the 
daughter  of  Don  Galvez  who  was  also  present.  1  told  him  that  I 
intended  going  to  Spain  to  treat  for  Florida  with  the  ministers  of  his 
Catholic  Majesty,  &  asked  what  he  thought  of  it.  He  replied  with 
great  candor  that  he  wished  the  affair  amicably  settled  between  our 
govts.,  and  that  two  days  before  he  had  written  to  his  Court  by  an 
extraordinary  courier  at  the  desire  of  Mr.  Livingston  to  propose  to  it 
the  question  whether  it  would  make  the  cession  to  the  U  States  and  as 
I  understood  to  authorize  him  to  treat  here  for  it.  As  Mr.  Living 
ston  had  never  spoken  to  me  on  the  subject,  as  he  had  pressed  my 
going  to  Spain,  or  at  least  given  his  decided  opinion  that  I  ought  to 
go  there,  this  information  surprised  me  much,  especially  when  I 
recollected  that  he  not  only  had  no  power  to  treat  on  the  subject,  but 
knew  that  it  was  committed  to  others.  1  asked  when  he  expected 
an  answer  to  his  letter?  He  said  if  it  was  sent  by  an  extry.  courier 
it  might  be  in  12  days,  as  it  required  7  to  go  and  as  many  to  return; 
&  it  had  been  sent  2  already:  that  if  it  came  by  the  ordinary  post  it 
would  take  a  much  longer  time  as  it  required  12  days  to  convey  a 
letter  from  Paris  to  Madrid  in  that  mode.  I  told  him  that  I  thought 
I  should  go  to  Madrid  &  then  explained  to  him  something  of  the 


172  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

nature  of  the  commission  which  existed  for  treating  with  his  govern 
ment,  it  being  thought  by  ours  more  respectful  to  his  to  treat  at 
Madrid  than  here,  but  without  giving  cause  to  infer  that  I  disapproved 
the  measure  taken  by  Mr.  Livingston  or  indeed  that  I  was  ignorant 
of  it. 

1  Next  day  Mr.  Livingston  and  myself  called  on  Mr.  Marbois  on  some 
question  relative  to  the  treaty  &c.  On  our  return  he  asked  me  wThen 
I  should  set  out  to  Spain  ?  I  told  him  that  I  had  called  on  the  Marquis 
D'Azara  to  confer  with  him  on  the  subject,  the  night  before,  and  of 
the  step  he  had  taken  at  his  request  to  draw  the  subject  here;  that 
under  those  circumstances  it  would  be  an  idle  errand  for  me  to  go 
there,  at  least  till  the  Marquis  got  an  answer  to  his  letter;  that  the 
affair  ought  not  to  play  between  the  two  countries;  He  said  that  what 
had  passed  between  him  and  the  Marquis  had  happened  casually  at  the 
minister  of  foreign  affairs:  that  the  Marquis  had  sent  the  Extry. 
courier  to  announce  our  treat>T,  &  hearing  him  say  he  intended  to  send 
one,  he  had  suggested  the  idea  of  his  proposing  to  his  court  to  make 
the  cession,  but  not  to  obtain  the  authority  to  treat  here  for  it.  I 
told  him  that  after  the  arrangement  made  by  our  gov*.  with  respect  to 
Spain,  the  affair  ought  to  have  its  course  in  the  train  in  which  it  was 
placed  by  it:  that  I  could  not  see  any  benefit  to  be  derived  from  an 
application  of  the  Ambassador  of  Spain  to  his  Court  in  the  manner 
stated  by  Mr.  Livingston,  especially  if  I  was  to  go  there. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  Mr.  Madison. 

PARIS,  April  17,  1803. 

SIR:  Mr.  Petrie  having  been  detained,  I  have  an  opportunity  to  give 
you  a  relation  of  what  has  passed  since  my  letter  of  the  13th.  On 
the  Ittth  I  called  upon  Mr.  Monroe,  to  present  him  to  the  Minister, 
who  had,  upon  my  application,  fixed  3  o'clock  that  day  for  his  recep 
tion.  Before  we  went  we  examined  our  commission,  in  which  there 
are  two  circumstances  with  which  I  am  not  quite  satisfied;  one,  indeed, 
of  little  moment,  because  it  only  respects  me  personally;  and  the  other 
very  important,  as  it  may,  if  things  should  take  a  turn  favorable  to 
France,  defeat  all  that  we  may  do,  even  at  the  moment  of  signing.  The 
first  is  that  I  have  not  the  same  rank  in  the  commission  with  Mr. 
Monroe.  It  is  important  that  I  should  be  thought  to  stand  as  well 
with  our  Government  as  an}7  other  person.  If  so,  my  age,  and  the 
stations  I  have  held  entitle  me  not  to  have  had  any  other  person 
placed  above  me  in  the  line  I  have  filled.  The  second  is,  that  the  com 
mission  contains  power  only  to  treat  for  lands  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Mississippi.  You  will  recollect  that  I  have  been  long  preparing  this 
Government  to  yield  us  the  country  above  the  Arkansas,  because  I  saw 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  173 

the  effect  of  their  holding  and  giving  encouragement  to  settle  it  would 
draw  off  a  prodigious  population  from  our  side  of  the  river,  and  from 
such  a  connexion  between  the  inhabitants  of  the  Western  country  and 
these  new  settlers,  who  would  be  their  relations  and  friends,  as  would 
be  extremely  dangerous.  In  my  private  negotiations  with  Joseph 
Bonaparte,  I  had  urged  every  reason  that  I  could  think  of  to  induce 
them  to  give  us  the  country:  and  those  reasons  have  had  their  effect. 
I  am,  therefore,  surprised  that  our  commission  should  have  entirely 
lost  sight  of  that  object.  Mr.  Monroe,  however,  agrees  with  me  that 
we  will  proceed  as  well  as  we  can;  and,  as  we  left  no  copy  of  the  com 
mission,  it  may  possibly  escape  unnoticed,  though  it  will  operate  to  our 
prejudice  if  our  negotiation  should  not  please  at  home.  It  is  abso 
lutely  necessary,  my  dear  sir,  to  repose  confidence  in  Ministers  who 
are  placed  so  far  from  the  seat  of  Government.  You  will  recollect 
that  I  have  been  absolutely  without  powers  to  the  present  moment; 
and  that  though  J  have  hazarded  many  things  upon  a  presumption  that 
I  should  have  them,  none  have  been  received  till  now,  and  now  they 
are  unfortunately  too  limited. 

But  to  proceed.  On  waiting  upon  the  Minister  we  found  M.  Mar- 
bois  there,  who  told  me  that  he  had  come  to  communicate  to  the 
Minister  what  had  passed  between  us,  and  that  he  greatly  regretted 
the  not  being  able  to  bring  us  to  such  an  offer  as  he  might  mention  to 
the  First  Consul.  I  told  him  that  it  was  unnecessary  to  repeat  what 
would  compel  us  to  limit  our  offers  to  a  much  more  moderate  sum,  as 
I  had  already  detailed  them  at  large;  and  he  knew  they  exceeded  our 
means.  We  were  very  graciously  received  by  the  Minister,  whom  I 
pressed  to  obtain  as  early  a  day  as  possible  for  the  reception  of  Mr. 
Monroe,  as  time  pressed,  and  we  were  anxious  to  conclude  our  busi 
ness,  for  reasons  arising  out  of  the  present  disturbed  state  of  America. 
He  told  me  he  would  speak  to  the  First  Consul  that  night  on  the  sub 
ject;  and  that  he  hoped  some  person  would  be  appointed  to  treat  with 
us,  even  before  Mr.  Monroe  was  presented.  After  a  little  general 
conversation,  he  took  leave,  in  expectation  that  Mr.  Monroe  would  be 
presented  this  day,  (Sunday,)  being  a  day  of  reception  for  the  civil 
officers  of  the  Government.  The  next  day,  Mr.  Monroe  and  myself, 
after  spending  some  time  in  consultation,  determined  to  offer  fifty 
millions,  including  our  debts;  we  presumed  it  would  be  best  only  to 
mention  forty  in  the  first  instance.  This  I  accordingly  did,  in  a  con 
ference  I  had  on  the  15th  with  M.  Marbois.  He  expressed  great 
sorrow  that  we  could  not  go  beyond  that  sum,  because  he  was  sure 
that  it  would  not  be  accepted,  and  that  perhaps  the  whole  business 
would  be  defeated,  which  he  the  more  feared,  as  he  had  just  received 
a  note  from  the  Minister,  indicative  of  the  Consul's  not  being  quite 
pleased  that  he  had  so  greatly  lowered  his  original  proposition.  He 
said  that  he  saw  our  situation,  and  he  knew  that  there  was  a  point 


174  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

beyond  which  we  could  not  go  safely  to  ourselves  or  the  President; 
but  he  wished  us  to  advance  to  that  point.  He  said  that  he  would, 
if  1  wished,  go  that  very  day  to  St.  Cloud,  and  let  me  know  the  result. 
I  reminded  him  of  the  Consul's  promise  to  pay  the  debt.  I  placed  in 
the  strongest  light  his  personal  obligation  on  this  subject;  and  desired 
him  to  urge  it  as  an  additional  reason  to  conclude  an  agreement  which 
would  facilitate  the  means  of  doing  it.  The  next  morning,  which  was 
yesterday,  I  again  called  to  see  him.  He  told  me  that  he  had  been  to 
St.  Cloud;  that  the  Consul  received  his  proposition  very  coolly;  and 
that  I  might  consider  the  business  as  no  longer  in  his  hands,  since  he 
had  given  him  no  further  powers;  that  he  had  urged  the  Consul's 
promise  relative  to  the  debt,  which  he  admitted;  but  said,  at  the  same 
time,  he  did  not  think  it  had  exceeded  three  millions,  though  my  letter 
expressly  mentioned  twent}T.  He  expressed  great  sorrow  upon  the 
occasion;  and  advised  me  to  press  M.  Talleyrand  to  present  Mr.  Monroe 
the  next  day,  (that  is,  this  day;)  that  he  hoped  that,  if  the  Consul  saw 
me,  as  he  had  a  very  particular  esteem  for  me,  he  would  renew  the 
subject  with  me  himself. 

I  went  to  Mr.  Monroe,  and  carried  him  to  the  Minister,  who  had  not 
returned  from  St.  Cloud;  and  afterwards  went  again,  but  could  not  see 
him.  I  dined  with  the  Second  Consul  yesterday;  and  in  the  evening 
M.  Marbois  came  in.  I  took  him  aside,  and  asked  him  if  anything 
further  had  passed:  he  said  not;  but,  that  as  he  was  to  go  to  St.  Cloud 
the  next  day,  it  was  possible  that  the  Consul  might  touch  upon  the  sub 
ject  again;  and  that,  if  he  did  not,  I  might  consider  the  plan  as  relin 
quished;  and  that,  if  I  had  any  further  proposition  to  make,  it  would  be 
well  to  state  it.  I  then  told  him  that  on  further  conversation  with 
Mr.  Monroe,  we  had  resolved  to  go  to  the  greatest  possible  length,  and 
that  we  would  give  fifty  millions.  He  said  he  had  very  little  hopes 
that  anything  short  of  his  proposition  would  succeed;  but  that  he 
would  make  the  best  use  of  the  arguments  I  had  furnished  him  with, 
if  an  opportunity  was  offered;  and  if  nothing  was  done  the  next  day, 
I  might  conclude  that  the  Consul  had  changed  his  sentiments;  that, 
having  given  the  Kingdom  of  Etruria,  whose  revenues  were  twenty- 
five  millions,  in  exchange  for  this  country,  it  was  natural  that  the  First 
Consul  should  estimate  it  be3rond  its  real  value. 

Thus  we  stand  at  present,  resolving  to  rest  a  few  days  upon  our  oars; 
in  the  meantime  I  shall  press  the  payment  of  the  debt  as  an  excite 
ment  to  forward  the  other  business. 

No  notice  has  been  given  of  Mr.  Monroe's  reception;  and  I  am  not 
without  my  fears  that  he  will  not  be  received  before  the  usual  diplo 
matic  day,  which  will  not  be  till  the  15th,  and,  before  that  time,  the 
Consul  will  probably  go  upon  his  tour  to  Flanders.  Mr.  Monroe  hav 
ing  been  compelled,  when  here,  to  be  well  with  the  party  then  upper 
most,  and  who  are  now  detested  by  the  present  ruler,  it  will  be 


PURCHASE    <JV    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  175 

some  time  before  they  know  how  to  estimate  his  worth;  and  Talleyrand 
has,  I  find,  imbibed  personal  prejudice  against  him,  that  will  induce 
him  to  throw  every  possible  obstruction  in  his  way,  that  he  can  do  con 
sistently  with  their  own  views. 

I  shall  attend  to  the  other  subjects  of  your  letter  at  the  first  moment 
of  leisure.  At  present  I  think  it  will  be  improper  to  touch  upon  less 
important  matters,  which  may  either  divert  the  attention  or  irritate. 

I  am  sorry  you  have  not  thought  it  proper  to  attend  to  my  request 
as  to  the  Italian  Republic.  It  has,  I  believe,  been  acknowledged  by  all 
the  Powers  of  Europe  except  Great  Britain.  Compliments  that  cost 
nothing  should,  I  think,  always  be  paid,  where  you  have  points  to  carry. 
Be  so  obliging,  in  answering  my  letters,  as  to  notice  any  project  I 
throw  out;  because  it  is  not  enough  to  have  them  passed  over  in  silence, 
as  that  leaves  me  in  doubt;  whereas  the  approbation  or  rejection  of 
them  precisely  would  inform  me  of  your  sentiments,  and  enable  me  to 
act  accordingly. 

I  am,  dear  sir,  with  much  esteem  and  respect,  your  most  obedient, 
humble  servant. 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


Mr.  Madison  to  Messrs.  Livingston  and  Monroe. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  April  18,  1803. 

GENTLEMEN:  A  month  having  elapsed  since  the  departure  of  Mr. 
Monroe,  it  may  be  presumed  that,  by  the  time  this  reaches  you,  com 
munications  will  have  passed  with  the  French  Government,  sufficiently 
explaining  its  views  towards  the  United  States,  and  preparing  the  way 
for  the  ulterior  instructions  which  the  President  thinks  proper  should 
now  be  given. 

In  case  a  convention  and  arrangement  with  France  should  have 
resulted  from  the  negotiations  with  which  you  are  charged;  or,  in  case 
such  should  not  have  been  the  result— but  no  doubt  should  be  left  that 
the  French  Government  means  to  respect  duly  our  rights,  and  to  culti 
vate  sincerely  peace  and  friendship  with  the  United  States — it  will  be 
expedient  for  you  to  make  such  communications  to  the  British  Gov 
ernment,  as  will  assure  it  that  nothing  has  been  done  inconsistent  with 
our  good  faith,  and  as  will  prevent  a  diminution  of  the  good  under 
standing  which  subsists  between  the  two  countries. 

If  the  French  Government,  instead  of  friendly  arrangements  or 
views,  should  be  found  to  meditate  hostilities,  or  to  have  formed  pro 
jects  which  will  constrain  the  United  States  to  resort  to  hostilities, 
such  communications  are  then  to  be  held  with  the  British  Government, 
as  will  sound  its  dispositions,  and  invite  its  concurrence  in  the  war. 
Your  own  prudence  will  suggest  that  the  communications  be  so  made 
as,  on  the  one  hand,  not  to  precipitate  France  into  hostile  operations; 


176  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

and,  on  the  other,  not  to  lead  Great  Britain  from  the  supposition  that 
war  depends  on  the  choice  of  the  United  States,  and  that  their  choice 
of  war  will  depend  on  her  participation  in  it.  If  war  is  to  be  the 
result,  it  is  manifestly  desirable  that  it  be  delayed  until  the  certainty 
of  this  result  can  be  known,  and  the  legislative  and  other  provisions 
can  be  made  here;  and  also  of  great  importance,  that  the  certainty 
should  not  be  known  to  Great  Britain,  who  might  take  advantage  of 
the  posture  of  things  to  press  on  the  United  States  disagreeable  con 
ditions  of  her  entering  into  the  war. 

It  will  probably  be  most  convenient,  in  exchanging  ideas  with  the 
British  Government,  to  make  use  of  its  public  Minister  at  Paris,  as  less 
likely  to  alarm  and  stimulate  the  French  Government,  and  to  raise  the 
pretensions  of  the  British  Government,  than  the  repairing  of  either  of 
you  to  London,  which  might  be  viewed  by  both  as  a  signal  of  rupture. 
The  latter  course,  however,  may  possibly  be  rendered  most  eligible  by 
the  pressure  of  the  crisis. 

Notwithstanding  the  just  repugnance  of  this  country  to  a  coalition 
of  any  sort  with  the  belligerent  politics  of  Europe,  the  advantages  to 
be  derived  from  the  cooperation  of  Great  Britain  in  a  war  of  the 
United  States,  at  this  period,  against  France  and  her  allies,  are  too 
obvious  and  too  important  to  be  renounced.  And  notwithstanding 
the  apparent  disinclination  of  the  British  councils  to  a  renewal  of  hos 
tilities  with  France,  it  will  probably  yield  to  the  various  motives  which 
will  be  felt  to  have  the  United  States  in  the  scale  of  Britain  against 
France,  and  particularly  for  the  immediate  purpose  of  defeating  a 
project  of  the  latter,  which  has  evidently  created  much  solicitude  in 
the  British  Government. 

The  price  which  she  may  attach  to  her  co-operation  can  not  be  fore 
seen,  and,  therefore,  can  not  be  the  subject  of  full  and  precise  instruc 
tions.  It  may  be  expected  that  she  will  insist  at  least  on  a  stipulation 
that  neither  of  the  parties  shall  make  peace  or  truce  without  the  con 
sent  of  the  other;  and  as  such  an  article  can  not  be  deemed  unreasona 
ble,  and  will  secure  us  against  the  possibility  of  her  being  detached,  in 
the  course  of  the  war,  by  seducing  overtures  from  France,  it  will  not  be 
proper  to  raise  difficulties  on  that  account.  It  may  be  useful,  however, 
to  draw  from  her  a  definition,  as  far  as  the  case  will  admit,  of  the  objects 
contemplated  by  her,  that  whenever,  with  ours,  they  may  be  attainable 
by  peace,  she  may  be  duly  pressed  to  listen  to  it.  Such  an  explanation 
will  be  the  more  reasonable,  as  the  objects  of  the  United  States  will  be 
so  fair  and  so  well  known. 

It  is  equally  probable,  that  a  stipulation  of  commercial  advantages 
in  the  Mississippi,  beyond  those  secured  by  existing  treaties,  will  be 
required.  On  this  point,  it  may  be  answered  at  once,  that  Great  Brit 
ain  shall  enjoy  a  free  trade  with  all  the  ports  to  be  acquired  by  the 
United  States,  on  the  terms  allowed  to  the  most  favored  nations  in  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  177 

ports,  generally,  of  the  United  States.  If  made  an  essential  condition, 
you  may  admit,  that  in  the  ports  to  be  acquired  within  the  Mississippi, 
the  trade  of  her  subjects  shall  be  on  the  same  footing  for  a  term  of 
about  ten  years  with  that  of  our  own  citizens.  But  the  United  States 
are  not  to  be  bound  to  the  exclusion  of  the  trade  of  any  particular 
nation  or  nations. 

Should  a  mutual  guaranty  of  the  existing  possessions,  or  of  the  con 
quests  to  be  made  by  the  parties,  be  proposed,  it  must  be  explicitly 
rejected,  as  of  no  value  to  the  United  States,  and  as  entangling  them  in 
the  frequent  wars  of  that  nation  with  other  Powers,  and  very  possibly 
in  disputes  with  that  nation  itself. 

The  anxiety  which  Great  Britain  has  shown  to  extend  her  domain 
to  the  Mississippi,  the  uncertain  extent  of  her  claims  from  North 
to  the  South,  beyond  the  Western  limits  of  the  United  States,  and  the 
attention  she  has  paid  to  the  Northwest  coast  of  America,  make  it  prob 
able  that  she  will  connect  with  a  war  on  this  occasion,  a  pretension  to 
the  acquisition  of  the  country  on  the  west  side  of  the  Mississippi, 
understood  to  be  ceded  by  Spain  to  France,  or  at  least  of  that  portion 
of  it  lying  between  that  river  and  the  Missouri.  The  evils  involved  in 
such  an  extension  of  her  possessions  in  our  neighborhood,  and  in  such 
a  hold  on  the  Mississippi,  are  obvious.  The  acquisition  is  the  more- 
objectionable,  as  it  would  be  extremely  displeasing  to  our  Western 
citizens,  and  as  its  evident  bearing  on  South  America,  might  be  expected 
to  arouse  all  the  jealousies  of  France  and  Spain,  and  to  prolong  the 
war,  on  which  the  event  would  depend.  Should  this  pretension,  there 
fore,  be  pressed,  it  must  be  resisted  as  altogether  repugnant  to  the 
sentiments  and  to  the  sound  policy  of  the  United  States.  But  it  may 
be  agreed,  in  alleviation  of  any  disappointment  of  Great  Britain,  that 
France  shall  not  be  allowed  to  retain  or  acquire  any  part  of  the  terri 
tory,  from  which  she  herself  would  be  precluded. 

The  moment  the  prospect  of  war  shall  require  the  precaution,  you 
will  not  omit  to  give  confidential  notice  to  our  public  Ministers  and 
Consuls,  and  to  our  naval  commanders  in  the  Mediterranean,  that  our 
commerce  and  public  ships  may  be  as  little  exposed  to  danger  as  pos 
sible.  It  may,  under  certain  circumstances,  be  proper  to  notify  the 
danger  immediately  to  the  collectors  in  the  principal  ports  of  the 
United  States. 

A  separate  letter  to  you  is  enclosed,  authorizing  }rou  to  enter  into 
such  communications  and  conferences  with  British  Ministers  as  may 
possibly  be  required  by  the  conduct  of  France.  The  letter  is  made  a 
separate  one,  that  it  may  be  used  with  effect,  but  without  the  formality, 
of  a  commission.  It  is  hoped  that  sound  calculations  of  interest,  as 
well  as  a  sense  of  right,  in  the  French  Government,  will  prevent  the 
necessity  of  using  the  authority  expressed  in  this  letter.  In  a  contrary 
state  of  things,  the  President  relies  on  your  own  information,  to  be 
H.  Doc.  431 12 


178  PUKCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

gained  on  the  spot,  and  on  your  best  discretion,  to  open  with  advan 
tage  the  communications  with  the  British  Government,  and  to  propor 
tion  the  degree  of  an  understanding  with  it  to  the  indications  of  an 
approaching  war  with  France.  Of  these  indications,  also,  you  will  be 
best  able  to  judge.  It  will  only  be  observed  to  you  that,  if  France 
should  avow  or  evince  a  determination  to  deny  to  the  United  States 
the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  your  consultations  with  Great 
Britain  may  be  held  on  the  ground  that  war  is  inevitable.  Should  the 
navigation  not  be  disputed,  and  the  deposit  alone* be  denied,  it  will  be 
prudent  to  adapt  your  consultations  to  the  possibility  that  Congress 
msiy  distinguish  between  the  two  cases,  and  make  a  question  how  far 
the  latter  right  may  call  for  an  instant  resort  to  armn,  or  how  far  a 
procrastination  of  that  remedy  may  be  suggested  and  justified  by  the 
prospect  of  a  more  favorable  conjuncture. 

These  instructions  have  thus  far  supposed  that  Great  Britain  and 
France  are  at  peace;  and  that  neither  of  them  intend  at  present  to 
interrupt  it.  Should  war  have  actually  commenced,  or  its  approach  be 
certain,  France  will,  no  doubt,  be  the  more  apt  to  concur  in  friendly 
accommodations  with  us,  and  Great  Britain  the  more  desirous  of 
engaging  us  on  her  side.  You  will,  of  course,  avail  yourselves  of 
this  posture  of  things,  for  avoiding  the  necessity  of  recurring  to  Great 
Britain,  or,  if  the  necessity  can  not  be  avoided,  for  fashioning  her  dis 
position  to  arrangements  formed  with  Great  Britain  in  reference  to 
war,  the  policy  of  the  United  States  requires  that  it  be  as  little  entan 
gling  as  the  case  will  permit. 

Our  latest  authentic  information  from  New  Orleans  is  of  the  25th 
of  February.  At  that  date  the  port  had  been  opened  for  provisions 
carried  down  the  Mississippi,  subject  to  a  duty  of  6  per  cent.,  if  con 
sumed  in  the  Province,  and  an  additional  duty,  if  exported;  with  a 
restriction,  in  the  latter  case,  to  Spanish  bottoms,  and  to  the  external 
ports  permitted  by  Spain  to  her  Colonial  trade.  A  second  letter, 
written  by  the  Spanish  Minister  here,  has  been  received  by  the  Inten- 
dant,  but  without  effect.  On  the  10th  of  March  his  interposition  was 
repeated  in  a  form  which  you  will  find,  by  his  translated  communica 
tion  to  the  Department  of  State,  in  one  of  the  enclosed  papers,  was 
meant  to  be  absolutely  effectual.  You  will  find  in  the  same  paper  the 
translation  of  a  letter  from  the  French  charge  d'affaires  here  to  the 
Governor  of  Louisiana,  written  with  a  co-operating  view.  A  pro 
visional  letter  to  any  French  agents  who  might  have  arrived,  had  been 
previously  written  by  him,  in  consequence  of  a  note  from  this  Depart 
ment,  founded  on  a  document  published  at  New  Orleans,  showing  that 
orders  had  been  given  by  the  Spanish  Government  for  the  surrender 
of  the  Province  to  France;  and  he  has  of  late  addressed  a  third  letter 
on  the  subject  of  the  Prefect  said  to  have  arrived  at  New  Orleans.  It 
does  not  appear,  however,  from  any  accounts  received,  that  Louisiana 
has  yet  changed  hands. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  179 

What  the  result  of  the  several  measures  taken  for  restoring  the  right 
of  deposit  will  be,  remains  to  be  seen.  A  representation  on  the  sub 
ject  was  made  by  Mr.  Graham,  in  the  absence  of  Mr.  Pinckney,  to  the 
Spanish  Government,  on  the  3d  of  February.  No  answer  had  been 
received  on  the  8th,  but  Mr.  Graham  was  led  by  circumstances  to  make 
no  particular  inference  from  the  delay.  The  silence  of  the  French 
Government  to  Mr.  Livingston's  representation,  as  stated  in  his  letter 

of  the  -    -  dav  cf  -t ,  is  a  very  unfavorable  indication.     It  might 

have  been  expected,  from  the  assurances  given,  of  an  intention  to 
observe  the  treaty  between  Spain  and  the  United  States,  and  to  culti 
vate  the  friendship  of  the  latter,  that  the  occasion  would  have  been 
seized  for  evincing  the  sincerity  of  the  French  Government;  and  it 
may  still  be  expected  that  no  interposition  that  may  be  required  by  the 
actual  state  of  things  will  be  withheld,  if  peace  and  friendship  with 
the  United  States  be  really  the  objects  of  that  Government.  Of  this, 
the  mission  of  Mr.  Monroe,  and  the  steps  taken  by  you  on  his  arrival, 
will  doubtless  have  impressed  the  proper  convictions. 

During  this  suspense  of  the  rightful  commerce  of  our  Western 
citizens,  their  conduct  has  been,  and  continues  to  be,  highly  exemplary. 
With  the  just  sensibility  produced  by  the  wrongs  done  them,  they  have 
united  a  patient  confidence  in  the  measures  and  views  of  their  Govern 
ment.  The  justice  of  this  observation  will  be  confirmed  to  you  by 
manifestations  contained  in  the  Western  newspapers,  herewith  enclosed; 
and,  if  duly  appreciated,  will  not  lessen  the  force  of  prudential  as  well 
as  other  motives,  for  correcting  past,  and  avoiding  future  trespasses 
on  American  rights. 

APRIL  20. 

The  letter  from  the  Marquis  d'  Yrujo,  of  which  you  will  find  a  trans 
lated  copy  in  the  enclosed  newspaper  of  this  date,  was  yesterday 
received.  The  letters  to  which  it  refers,  as  containing  orders  for  the 
re-establishment  of  our  deposit  at  New  Orleans,  were  immediately  for 
warded.  They  will  arrive  in  time,  we  hope,  to  mitigate  considerably 
the  losses  from  the  misconduct  of  the  Spanish  Intendant;  and  they  are 
the  more  acceptable,  as  they  are  an  evidence  of  the  respect,  in  the 
Government  of  Spain  for  our  rights  and  our  friendship. 

From  the  allusion  in  this  communication  from  the  Spanish  Minister  to 
a  future  agreement  between  the  two  Governments,  on  the  subject  of  an 
equivalent  deposit,  it  would  seem  that  the  Spanish  Government  regards 
the  cession  to  France  as  either  no  longer  in  force,  or  not  soon  to  be 
carried  into  execution.  However  this  may  be,  it  will  not  be  allowed, 
any  more  than  the  result  of  our  remonstrance  to  Spain  on  the  violation 
of  our  rights,  to  slacken  the  negotiations  for  the  greater  security  and 
the  enlargement  of  these  rights.  Whether  the  French  or  the  Spaniards, 
or  both,  are  to  be  our  neighbors,  the  considerations  which  led  to  the 


180  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TEERITOKY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

measures,  taken  with  respect  to  these  important  objects,  still  require 
that  they  should  be  pursued  into  all  the. success  that  may  be  attainable. 
With  sentiments  of  great  respect,  &c., 

JAMES  MADISON. 
R.  R.  LIVINGSTON  and  JAMES  MONROE.  Esqs. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Messrs.  Livingston  and  Monroe. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  April  18,  1803. 

GENTLEMEN:  The  reasonable  and  friendly  views  with  which  you 
have  been  instructed  by  the  President  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
the  French  Government,  justify  him  in  expecting  from  them  an  issue 
favorable  to  the  tranquillity  and  to  the  useful  relations  between  the 
two  countries.  It  is  not  forgotten,  however,  that  these  views,  instead 
of  being  reciprocal,  may  find,  on  the  part  of  France,  a  temper  adverse 
to  harmony,  and  schemes  of  ambition,  requiring,  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  as  well  as  of  others,  the  arrangements  suggested  by  a 
provident  regard  to  events.  Among  these  arrangements,  the  President 
conceives  that  a  common  interest  may  recommend  a  candid  under 
standing,  and  a  closer  connexion  with  Great  Britain:  and  he  presumes 
that  the  occasion  may  present  itself  to  the  British  Government  in  the 
same  light.  He,  accordingly,  authorizes  you,  or  either  of  you,  in  case 
the  prospect  of  your  discussion  with  the  French  Government  should 
make  it  expedient,  to  open  a  confidential  communication  with  Ministers 
of  the  British  Government,  and  to  confer  freely  and  fully  on  the  pre 
cautions  and  provisions  best  adapted  to  the  crisis,  and  in  which  that 
Government  may  be  disposed  to  concur;  transmitting  to  your  own, 
without  delay,  the  result  of  these  consultations. 
With  sentiments  of  high  respect,  &c., 

» JAMES  MADISON. 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON  and  JAMES  MONROE,  Esqs. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  King  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

APRIL  19,  1803. 

In  Lord  Whitworth's  last  despatch,  he  says:  "Two  days  ago,  General 
Bernadotte  left  Paris,  on  his  mission  to  the  United  States,  with  assur 
ances  of  the  First  Consul's  sincere  desire  to  cultivate  the  friendship  of 
that  country;  and  yesterday  Mr.  Monroe,  the  American  Envoy,  arrived 
here."  The  United  States,  says  his  Lordship,  are  likely  to  reap  the 
first  fruits  of  our  disagreement  with  France;  the  settlement  of  their 
affairs  being  already  so  nearly  finished  that  little  remains  to  be  done 
by  Mr  Monroe,  who  is  said  to  be  destined  to  relieve  Mr.  King  at 
London. 


PURCHASE   OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  l&l 

[Extract.] 

Mr.  King  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

LONDON,  April  28,  1803. 

"In  a  conference  with  Lord  Hawkesbury  on  the  6th  instant,  1 
explained  to  him  the  object  of  the  extraordinary  mission  of  Mr.  Mon 
roe,  pursuant  to  the  tenor  of  your  letter  of  the  29th  of  January,  and 
I  foave  the  pleasure  to  inform  you  that  his  Lordship  received  the  com 
munication  in  good  part,  suggested  no  doubt  of  our  right  to  pursue 
separately  and  alone  the  objects  we  aim  at,  and  appeared  to  be  satisfied 
with  the  President's  views  on  this  important  subject."" 


Mr.  Madison  to  Mr.  Monroe. 

WASHINGTON,  April  20,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR, — You  will  receive  with  this  all  the  communications 
claimed  by  the  actual  and  eventual  posture  of  our  affairs  in  the  hands 
of  yourself  and  Mr.  Livingston.  You  will  find,  also,  that  the  Spanish 
Government  has  pretty  promptly  corrected  the  wrong  done  by  its 
officer  at  New  Orleans.  This  event  will  be  a  heavy  blow  to  the  clamor 
ous  for  war,  and  will  be  very  soothing  to  those  immediately  interested 
in  the  trade  of  the  Mississippi.  The  temper  manifested  by  our  West 
ern  Citizens  has  been  throughout  the  best  that  can  be  conceived.  The 
real  injury  from  the  suspension  of  the  deposit  was,  however,  much 
lessened  by  the  previous  destruction  of  the  entire  crop  of  wheat  in 
Kentucky,  by  the  number  of  sea  vessels  built  on  the  Ohio,  and  by 
throngs  of  vessels  from  Atlantic  ports  to  the  Mississippi,  some  of 
which  ascended  to  the  Natchez.  The  permission,  also,  to  supply  the 
market  at  New  Orleans,  and  to  ship  the  surplus  as  Spanish  property 
to  Spanish  ports,  was  turned  to  good  account.  The  trial,  therefore, 
has  been  much  alleviated.  Certain  it  is  that  the  hearts  and  hopes  of 
the  Western  people  are  strongly  fixed  on  the  Mississippi  for  the  future 
boundary.  Should  no  improvement  of  existing  rights  be  gained,  the 
disappointment  will  be  great.  Still,  respect  for  principle  and  charac 
ter,  aversion  to  poor  rates  and  taxes,  the  hope  of  a  speedy  conjunc 
ture  more  favorable,  and  attachment  to  the  present  order  of  things, 
will  be  persuasive  exhortations  to  patience.  It  is  even  a  doubt  with 
some  of  the  best  judges  whether  the  deposit  alone  would  not  be  waived 
for  a  while,  rather  than  it  should  be  the  immediate  ground  of  war  and 
an  alliance  with  England.  This  suggested  a  particular  passage  in  the 
official  letter  now  sent  you  and  Mr.  Livingston.  *  *  * 


182  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

President  Jefferson  to  Dr.  Hugh  Williamson.  ^  ] 

WASHINGTON,  April  30,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR, — I  thank  you  for  the  information  on  the  subject  of  navi 
gation  of  the  Herville  contained  in  yours  of  the  10th.  In  running1 
the  late  line  between  the  Choctaws  and  us,  we  found  the  Amite  to  be 
about  thirty  miles  from  the  Mississippi  where  that  line  crossed  it, 
which  was  but  a  little  northward  of  our  southern  boundary.  For  the 
present  we  have  a  respite  on  that  subject,  Spain  having  without  delay 
restored  our  infracted  right,  and  assured  us  it  is  expressly  saved  by 
the  instrument  of  her  cession  of  Louisiana  to  France.  Although  I  do 
not  count  with  confidence  on  obtaining  New  Orleans  from  Eranue_Jor_ 
money,  yet  I  am  confident  in  the  policy  of  putting  oil'  the  day  of  con 
tention  for  it  till  we  have  lessened  the  embarrassment  of  debt  accumu 
lated  instead  of  being  discharged  by  our  predecessors,  till  we  obtain 
more  of  that  strength  which  is  growing  on  us  so  rapidly,  and  especiall}7 
till  we  have  planted  a  population  on  the  Mississippi  itself  sufficient  to 
do  its  own  work  without  marching  men  fifteen  hundred  miles  from  the 
Atlantic  shores  to  perish  by  fatigue  and  unfriendly  climates.  This 
will  soon  take  place.  In  the  meantime  we  have  obtained  by  a  peace 
able  appeal  to  justice,  in  four  months,  what  we  should  not  have  obtained 
under  seven  years  of  war,  the  loss  of  one  hundred  thousand  lives,  an 
hundred  millions  of  additional  debt,  many  hundred  millions  worth  of 
produce  and  property  lost  for  want  of  market,  or  in  seeking  it,  and 
that  demoralization  which  war  superinduces  on  the  human  mind.  To 
have  seized  New  Orleans,  as  our  federal  maniacs  wished,  would  only 
have  changed  the  character  and  extent  of  the  blockade  of  our  western 
commerce.  It  would  have  produced  a  blockade,  by  superior  naval 
force,  of  the  navigation  of  the  river  as  well  as  of  the  entrance  into 
New  Orleans,  instead  of  a  paper  blockade  from  New  Orleans  alone 
while  the  river  remained  open,  and  I  am  persuaded  that  had  not  the 
deposit  been  so  quickly  rendered  we  should  have  found  soon  that  it 
would  be  better  now  to  ascend  the  river  to  Natchez,  in  order  to  be 
clear  of  the  embarrassments,  plunderings,  and  irritations  at  New 
Orleans,  and  to  fatten  by  the  benefits  of  the  depot  a  city  and  citizens 
of  our  own,  rather  than  those  of  a  foreign  nation. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Madison  to  Mr.  Monroe. 


WASHINGTON,  May  1,  1803. 

The  order  from  Spain  for  the  restoration  of  the  deposit  has  had  a 
good  effect  everywhere.  We  are  told  at  the  same  time,  in  the  very 
words  of  the  Article,  that,  in  the  cession  of  Louisiana,  our  rights 
under  the  Treaty  of  '95  are  saved.  On  the  1st  of  April,  Laussat,  the 


PURCHASE  OF  THE  TERRITORY  OF  LOUISIANA.  183 

Prefect,  was  at  New  Orleans,  and  the  late  Governor,  Casa-Calvo,  was 
expected  in  a  few  days  from  the  Havana,  to  deliver  possession  to  the 
French.  Whether  this  message  will  be  delayed  for  the  arrival  of  the 
Cap*.  General,  or  what  may  result  to  it  from  other  causes,  can  be 
better  understood  with  you  than  here.  Laussat  professes  to  be  kindly 
disposed,  and  undertakes  to  affirm  that  the  French  Government  had 
nothing  to  do  in  the  arrest  of  the  deposit  by  the  Spanish  officer,  and 
that  if  he  had  been  there  in  authority  no  such  thing  would  have  hap 
pened.  He  does  not  admit  that  he  has  any  authority  to  meddle  in  any 
way  at  present,  and  gives  this  answer  to  Pichon's  exhortation.  The 
Intendant  had  declined  in  like  manner  to  obey  the  advice  of  Yrujo. 
The  last  more  peremptory  interpositions  of  these  Ministers  had  not 
arrived,  and  the  importance  of  them  was  superceded  by  the  orders  from 
Spain.  The  attention  here  is  much  alive  to  the  transfer  of  the  coun 
try  to  France,  and  it  becomes  her,  if  she  wishes  to  be  on  cordial  terms 
with  us,  to  proceed  in  every  step  with  strict  justice  and  exemplary 
frankness. 


Extract  of  a  letter  from  Mr.  Cevallos,  Minister  of  His  Catholic  Majesty, 
p    ft  to  Charles  Pinckney,  esq.    c  U 

^  ' "'-  •  d  •  JL :  S$  7 

AHANJUEZ,  May  £.,  1803. 

The  system  adopted  by  His  Majesty  not  to  dispossess  himself  of  any 
portion  of  his  States,  deprives  him  of  the  pleasure  of  assenting  to  the 
cessions  which  the  United  States  wish  to  obtain  by  purchase,  as  I  have 
intimated  for  their  information  to  the  Marquis  of  Casa  Yrujo. 

By  the  retrocession  made  to  France  of  Louisiana,  this  Power  regains 
the  said  province  with  the  limits  it  had,  and  saving  the  rights  acquired 
by  other  Powers.  The  United  States  can  address  themselves  to  the 
French  Government  to  negotiate  the  acquisition  of  territories  which 
may  suit  their  interest. 


Mr.  King  to  Messrs.  Livingston  and  Monroe. 

LONDON,  Nay  7,  1803. 

GENTLEMEN:  War  seems  to  be  quite  inevitable,  though  it  is  possible 
that  the  offer  of  France  to  leave  Malta  in  the  hands  of  Russia,  Austria, 
or  Prussia,  may  create  some  hesitation,  and,  had  it  been  early  made, 
would  perhaps  have  prevented  the  present  crisis.  In  case  of  war,  it  is 
the  purpose  of  this  Government  to  send  an  expedition  to  occupy  New 
Orleans.  If  it  be  ceded  to  us,  would  it  not  be  expedient  openly  or 
confidentially  to  communicate  the  fact  here?  I  have  reason  to  be 
satisfied  that  it  would  prevent  the  projected  expedition.  I  shall 
remain  here  till  the  14th,  in  hopes  that  I  may  receive  your  answer, 
which  might  be  expedited  by  a  courier,  should  the  communication  be 
deemed  prudent. 


184  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

Mr.  Monroe  to  Mr.  Livingston. 

MAY  5,  1803. 

^  DEAR  SIR,— I  have  examined  with  great  attention  the  articles  of  the 
project  which  we  presented  as  agreed  &  amended  between  ourselves, 
to  Mr.  Marbois  &  that  which  he  returned  to  us.  &  find  that  neither  is 
drawn  with  sufficient  accuracy  to  accomplish  the  object  which  is 
intended.  A  reference  to  the  statement  heretofore  given  to  you  by 
the  commercial  agent  here  and  by  you  returned  to  the  minister  of  for 
eign  affairs,  cannot  be  considered,  as  defining  with  sufficient  accuracy, 
the  claims,  that  are  to  be  admitted,  as  it  probably  comprises  many  that 
are  excluded,  by  the  latter  part  of  the  same  article,  &  may  exclude 
others  that  ought  to  be  admitted;  the  time  too,  at  which  the  interest 
is  to  commence  does  not  appear  to  me  to  be  sufficiently  definite,  or 
founded  in  justice.  The  irregularity  in  the  condition  of  the  creditors, 
some  of  whom  are  to  be  paid  immediately  &  others  at  the  end  of  the 
9  months  after  their  claims  are  liquidated,  is  also  highly  objectionable. 
The  absolute  submission  to  the  decision  of  the  French  bureaus,  in 
cases  where  the  claims  of  our  citizens  have,  or  may  be  rejected,  ought 
also  to  be  provided  against.  It  is  equally  proper,  that  the  powers  of 
our  board  should  be  enlarged  &  more  clearly  defined,  especially  that 
it  should  extend,  to  the  requiring  &  receiving  of  evidence,  necessary 
to  guide  them  to  a  just  decision.  Some  provision  is  also  necessary, 
in  favor  of  the  creditors,  whose  claims  have  accrued  since  the  last 
convention. 

If  the  board  is  organized,  as  we  propose,  it  appears  to  me,  to  be 
unnecessary  to  assign,  to  our  commercial  agent,  the  duty  which  is  pro 
posed  in  our  project;  the  more  so,  as  if  it  is  not  comprised  in  his  duty 
assigned  by  the  Government,  we  should  incur  an  useless  expense. 

I  have  drawn  such  a  paper  as  appears  to  me  to  be  free  from  those 
objections,  which  1  beg  to  submit  to  your  consideration.  I  have 
assumed  the  Debt,  reserving  to  the  United  States,  the  sum,  which  m&y 
remain,  if  any,  after  paying  it,  of  the  20  millions  assigned  for  the 
purpose.  I  will  be  happy  to  call  on  you,  or  receive  you  here  imme 
diately;  after  you  have  examined  the  enclosed,  as  may  be  most  con 
venient  to  you.  Very  sincerely  &c. 


-_  Mr.  Monroe  to  Mr.  Livingston. 

}»  \ 

MAY  6,  1803. 
Dear  Sir,— 

I  send  you  a  translation  of  the  project  for  the  debts.  The  French 
copy  I  sent  to  Mr.  Marbois  last  night  at  11.  not  being  able  to  do  it 
sooner.  I  informed  him  that  if  he  wished  a  meeting  this  morning  we 
would  attend  him  on  a  notification  to  that  effect.  I  find  that  the  3/A 
Art.  does  not  go  as  far  as  it  ought  to  do.  It  does  not  give  to  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  185 

board  to  be  established  by  the  U.  States  a  power  over  the  claims  to  be 
liquidated,  of  the  same  extent  as  is  given  to  them  over  those  which  are, 
in  respect  to  the  character  of  the  debt  &  of  the  claimant.  The  board 
is  also  restrained  from  the  cognizance  of  such  claims  which  are  not 
objected  to  by  our  agent,  which  if  proper  as  to  the  merit  of  such 
claims,  can  not  be  so  on  the  principle  referred  to.  The  money  also 
should  be  paid  on  the  certificate  of  that  board  &  the  order  of  our 
ministers  as  in  other  cases.  I  send  you  a  note  on  that  subject  which  I 
wish  you  to  examine,  to  be  added  to  the  end  of  that  article  &  incor 
porated  in  it,  if  you  approve. 


Mr.  Monroe's  Draft  of  Conventions 

*  /  —  5  / ; 

*/'     —    v<t-c 

ART.  1.  The  debts  due  by  France  to  citizens  of  the  United  States 
which  accrued  before  the  2d.  Vendre  9  year  of  the  French  Republic, 
30  Sep*.  1800,  shall  be  paid  according  to  the  following  principles  with 
interest  at  six  per  cent:  from  the  time  they  respectively  became  due. 

The  debts  which  it  is  hereby  intended  to  provide  for,  according  to 
the  true  intent  &  meaning  of  the  5th  Art:  of  the  above  mentioned 
convention,  are  such  as  are  due  to  American  citizens  for  supplies  fur 
nished  to  the  French  Republic,  for  embargoes  &  other  detention  of 
vessels,  for  captures  in  which  the  appeal  has  been  properly  lodged 
within  the  time  specified  by  the  said  convention.  It  being  the  express 
intention  of  the  contracting  parties  to  preclude  from  the  benefits  of 
this  article,  all  contracts  for  covering  goods  not  the  sole  property  of 
American  citizens;  all  commercial  speculations  made  by  American 
citizens  establishing  houses  of  commerce  in  France,  England  or  other 
foreign  country,  in  their  own  names  or  in  conjunction  with  foreigners, 
whereb}^  they  are  to  be  considered  in  the  commercial  transactions  of 
such  houses,  as  domiciliated  in  the  countries  where  such  houses  are 
established,  and  entitled  to  the  aid  of  the  governments  under  which 
they  were  so  established. 

It  is  agreed  that  the  government  of  France  shall  by  means  of  its  suit 
able  department  adjust  the  whole  amount  of  such  of  the  above  claims 
as  have  been  returned  or  presented  to  the  several  bureaus,  within  the 
space  of  months  from  the  date  of  this  treaty,  &  that  it  will  cause  all 
other  claims  which  may  hereafter  be  presented  to  be  adjusted  with  the 
least  possible  delay.  As  soon  as  any  claim  shall  be  thus  adjusted,  the 
department  by  whom  the  adjustment  is  made,  shall  grant  a  certificate 
for  the  sum  due,  stating  the  object  or  consideration  for  which  it 
became  due,  to  the  person  entitled  to  it,  who  shall  present  the  same 
for  revision  to  the  board  provided  for  in  the  following  article. 

Should  any  claim  be  rejected  by  such  department  of  the  French  Gov 
ernment,  the  party  thinking  himself  thereby  injured  shall  be  entitled 


186  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

to  a  statement  of  his  case  comprising  the  motive  of  the  rejection,  to  be 
presented  in  like  manner  before  the  said  board. 

ART.  2.  And  that  suitable  &  adequate  provision  may  be  made  for 
the  payment  of  all  just  debts  due  by  the  French  Government  to  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  above  described  &  none  other,  according 
to  the  true  intent  &  meaning  of  the  5th  article  of  the.  said  convention, 
it  is  further  agreed  that  the  ministers  plenipotentiary  of  the  United 
States  shall  appoint  a  board  consisting  of  three  persons  to  act  till  the 
same  are  finally  adjusted,  or  until  the  President  with  the  advice  of  the 
Senate  shall  appoint  others,  who  or  a  majority  of  them  shall  have  full 
power  to  revise  all  such  claims  thus  adjusted  or  rejected  by  the  said 
department  of  the  French  Government,  &  to  reject  or  admit  the  same, 
in  part  or  in  whole,  as  in  their  judgment  shall  appear  right  &  just  on 
the  principles  above  stated.  To  enable  this  board  fully  &  completely 
to  execute  the  duties  hereby  assigned  it,  it  shall  be  authorized  to 
require  and  review  such  testimony,  in  all  cases  as  may  be  necessary  to 
a  full  &  impartial  decision  &  also  to  examine  all  authentic  pieces  & 
documents  in  the  bureaus  of  the  French  Republic,  relative  to  the  said 
claims,  &  to  take  copies  of  the  same  when  necessary. 

When  any  claim  is  admitted  by  the  above  mentioned  board,  the  party 
entitled  to  the  same  shall  receive  from  the  said  board  a  certificate  for 
the  amount  due,  in  which  shall  be  stated  the  time  at  which  it  became 
due,  &  the  Ministers  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States  in  case 
there  be  more  than  one  present,  shall  give  orders  on  the  Treasury  of 
the  United  States  for  the  payment  of  the  same,  with  interest  thereon 
from  the  time  the  debt  became  due  at  the  rate  of  six  per  cent  per 
annum  till  paid,  which  orders  shall  be  paid  at  the  Treasury  three 
months  after  sight,  in  case  the  treaty  has  been  previously  ratified  by 
both  parties,  and  the  ceded  territory  delivered  into  the  possession  of 
the  United  States. 

It  is  understood  that  the  rejection  of  any  claim  by  this  board  shall 
produce  no  other  effect  than  to  exempt  the  United  States  from  the 
payment  of  it:  The  party  holding  such  claim  shall  have  the  same 
right  to  demand  it  of  the  Government  of  France;  as  if  this  treaty  had 
not  passed.  It  is  also  understood  that  nothing  in  this  treaty  is 
intended  or  shall  be  construed  in  such  manner  as  to  affect  the  claims 
of  citizens  of  the  United  States  on  the  French  Government  for  debts 
which  have  been  contracted  since  the  30th  of  Sept.  1800. 

ART.  3.  The  United  States  engage  to  pay  the  amount  of  the  debt 
due  by  the  French  Republic  to  their  citizens,  as  above  described  & 
whose  adjustment  is  provided  for  in  the  preceding  articles,  which  debt 
is  estimated  at  a  sum  not  exceeding  20  millions  of  francs. 

It  is  further  agreed  that  should  the  claims  provided  for  in  the  pre 
ceding  articles  not  amount  to  the  sum  of  twenty  millions  of  francs, 
and  other  claims  be  hereafter  presented  to  the  Government  of  France, 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  187 

which  were  they  now  presented  would  be  entitled  to  payment  under 
this  convention  that  such  surplus  shall  be  applied  in  discharge  of  the 
same. 


Messrs.  Livingston  and  Monroe  to  Mr.  King. 

PARIS,  May  -,  1803. 

SIR:  We  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  a  treaty  (the  30th  April) 
mis  been  signed  between  the  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  French 
Government  and  ourselves,  by  which  the  United  States  have  obtained 
the  full  right  to  and  sovereignty  in  and  over  New  Orleans,  and  the 
whole  of  Louisiana,  as  Spain  possessed  the  same.  If  sir,  you  should 
find  it  necessary  to  make  any  communication  to  the  British  Govern 
ment  on  this  subject,  you  may  likewise  inform  them  that  care  has 
been  taken  so  to  frame  the  treaty  as  not  to  infringe  upon  any  of 
the  rights  that  Great  Britain  might  claim  in  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  May  12,  1803. 

SIR:  You  have  seen  in  my  late  letter  the  direct  commencement  of 
the  negotiation  previous  to  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Monroe,  and,  in  our 
joint  letter,  its  consummation.  It  will  be  matter  of  curiosity,  at  least 
to  you,  to  be  more  intimately  acquainted  with  the  exciting  causes 
which  have  been  long  operating,  and  which  I  have  hinted  at  in  my 
letters  to  the  President,  but  which,  from  their  extreme  delicacy,  I 
have  not  thought  it  proper  to  detail.  As  this  goes  with  the  treaty  by 
a  special  and  safe  messenger,  I  will  send  you  the  papers  I  referred  to 
in  my  letters  to  the  President. 

On  my  arrival,  I  found  the  credit  and  character  of  our  nation  very 
low.  They  were  considered  as  interested  apeculators,  whose  god  was 
money.  The  features  of  our  statesmen,  drawn  from  the  caricatures 
in  our  newspapers,  were  viewed  as  real  likenesses;  and  the  democracy 
of  America  was  believed  to  be  the  mad  Jacobinism  of  France.  The 
President  was  considered  as  among  the  most  mad,  because  the  head  of 
the  party;  and  it  was  not  doubted  that  his  Minister  to  France  partook 
of  his  phrenzy.  Some  of  my  former  friends  were  sent  artfully  to  sound 
me  on  the  subject  of  the  existing  Government  here.  As  I  had  seen 
and  heard  enough  to  be  satisfied  that  nothing  short  of  the  change  that 
had  taken  place,  could  have  lessened  the  calamities  of  France,  I 
answered  them  sincerely  in  such  manner  as  to  satisfy  them  that  I 
meant  to  have  no  intrigues  with  its  enemies;  I  carefully  avoided  all 


188  PURCHASE    OP    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

connexion  with  them;  and,  in  consequence  of  this,  began  to  acquire  a 
degree  of  favor  at  Court. 

As  the  attention  to  Great  Britain  began  to  diminish,  for  reasons 
which  it  will  take  me  too  much  time  to  explain,  and  was  gradually 
converted  into  aversion  by  the  freedom  with  which  the  election  of  the 
First  Consul  to  that  dignity  for  life,  and  his  other  great  measures,  were 
treated  in  England,  we  of  course  grew  more  in  favor;  and  if,  in  any 
instance,  they  relaxed  from  the  extreme  hauteur  with  which  they 
treated  all  the  foreign  Powers,  it  was  more  particularly  with  us.  They 
answered  my  notes  politely,  though  not  satisfactorily;  while  they  left 
those  of  many  other  Ministers,  who  had  demands  upon  them,  unan 
swered.  Among  the  most  favorite  projects  of  the  First  Consul,  was 
the  colonization  of  Louisiana.  He  saw  in  it^a  new  Egypt;  he  saw  in 
it  a  Colony  that  was  to  counterbalance  the  eastern  establishment  of 
Britain;  he  saw  in  it  a  provision  for  his  Generals;  and,  what  was  more 
important  in  the  then  state  of  things,  he  saw  in.  it  a  pretense  for  the 
ostracism  of  suspected  enemies]  To  render  the  acquisition  still  more 
agreeable  to  the  people,  exaggerated  accounts  of  its  fertility,  <&c., 
were  sold  in  every  print  shop;  My  first  endeavor  was  to  remove  these 
impressions  from  the  minds  of  the  people  most  likely  to  be  consulted, 
in  which  I  was,  generally  speaking,  very  successful.  But  they  all 
told  me  that  it  was  a  favorite  project  with  the  First  Consul;  nor  would 
any  of  them  hear  of  disposing  of  it  by  sale;  yet  so  ignorant  were  they 
of  the  nature  of  their  acquisition,  that  they  never  once  suspected  the 
Floridas  were  not  included  in  their  treaty,  till  they  were  convinced  of 
the  contrary  by  the  inquiries  they  set  on  foot  in  consequence  of  my 
information.  The  Floridas,  as  you  know,  they  endeavored  to  give  in 
exchange  for  Parma;  and  in  that  negotiation  set  the  price  for  which 
they  would  buy  one,  or  sell  the  other,  at  forty  millions  of  francs. 

I  endeavored,  as  far  as  possible,  to  obstruct  that  negotiation,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  urged  the  absurdity  of  attempting  to  colonize  Louisiana 
without  ports  in  the  Gulf.  When  I  found  impressions  were  made  by 
these  measures,  1  wrote  the  treaties  I  have  sent  you,  entitled  Memoire 
sur  cette  question:  Est  il  avantageux  a  la  France  de prendre possession 
de  la  Louisiana?  As  the  first  Consul  had  before  read  with  consider 
able  attention,  my  notes  on  the  relative  naval  force  and  commerce  of 
France  and  England  and  the  United  States,  (which  I  have  also  sent 
you,)  and  paid  me  some  compliments  upon  it,  I  got  this  essay  under 
his  eyes  through  the  same  channel.  It  was  read  with  attention;  and, 
though  1  have  reason  to  think  it  weakened  his  belief  in  the  impor 
tance  of  Louisiana,  yet,  as  he  does  not  easily  relinquish  his  plans,  he 
still  prosecuted  them,  though  with  much  less  ardor  than  he  had  before 
done.  As  I  knew  that  his  Ministers  seldom  dared  to  interpose  their 
opinions,  it  was  necessary  to  apply  directly  to  him,  through  the  only 
person  who  was  supposed  to  have  any  influence  with  him;  and  who 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  189 

that  was,  you  have  seen  in  my  private  letters  to  the  President.  I  will 
not  hazard  the  repetition  here.  After  breaking  the  subject  in  a  con 
versation  with  this  gentleman,  I  sent  him  the  note  No.  1.  He  received 
it  very  graciously.  Reading  it  in  my  presence,  he  told  me  that,  if  I 
would  permit  him,  he  would  show  it  to  the  First  Consul.  I  made  some 
hesitation  on  account  of  the  delicacy  of  the  subject.  He  assured  me 
that  he  would  take  care  that  1  should  not  be  committed  by  it.  Some 
days  after,  he  told  me  that  the  First  Consul  had  read  it  with  attention; 
that  so  far  as  it  referred  to  personal  objects,  he  could  not  listen  to  it; 
but  that  the  general  and  public  motives  I  had  mentioned  merited  par 
ticular  attention;  that  he  approved  my  proposition,  in  part,  but  not  to 
the  extent  I  had  proposed.  I  am  satisfied  that  from  this  period  they 
had  determined  to  let  us  have  New  Orleans,  and  the  territory  above 
the  Arkansas,  in  exchange  for  certain  commercial  advantages;  and 
that,  if  they  could  have  concluded  with  Spain,  we  should  also  have  had 
West  Florida;  but  that  nothing  could  be  done  until  that  business  was 
terminated.  This  note  had  the  effect  of  removing,  in  the  fullest 
degree,  every  doubt  that  could  possibly  have  remained  relative  to  my 
sentiments  of  the  present  Government;  and  certain  circumstances  in 
it  led  to  a  kind  of  personal  consideration  which  I  have  ever  since 
enjoyed  here. 

Not  willing,  however,  to  let  the  impressions  I  have  made  wear  off,  I 
wrote  the  note  No.  2,  which  was  also  read  with  attention  by  the  First 
Consul;  and  I  believe  produced  a  determination  to  enter  upon  the  sub 
ject  as  soon  as  matters  were  arranged  with  Spain.  As  I  believed,  from 
the  First  Consul  having  spoken  on  this  subject  to  the  Minister  of  For 
eign  Affairs,  that  the  channel  through  which  I  submitted  my  observa 
tions  was  known  to  the  latter,  and  of  course  could  not.  be  very 
pleasing  to  him;  and  as  this  was  intimated  to  me  by  -  — ,  who,  in 
answer  to  my  note  No.  3,  requested  me  to  break  the  subject  to  the 
Minister;  you  will  have  seen  in  my  several  notes,  that  I  did  not  neglect 
to  do  so.  But  two  causes  suspended  any  absolute  determination. 
First,  the  state  of  the  negotiation  with  Spain  relative  to  the  Floridas; 
and  next,  my  total  want  of  power  or  instructions,  which  reduced  me 
to  the  necessity  of  bringing  forward  nothing  more  specific;  while  I 
endeavored  to  pave  the  way  for  something  conclusive  when  I  should, 
as  I  had  long  hoped,  receive  them.  The  First  Consul,  too,  had  con 
ceived  an  idea  that,  b}^  taking  possession  of  the  country,  he  could  more 
advantageously  treat  with  our  Government;  and  Mr.  Talleyrand 
accordingly  told  me  several  times,  in  general  terms,  that  everything 
would  be  arranged;  but  that  they  must  first  take  possession.  After 
General  Bernadotte  was.appointed,  he  assured  me  that  he  should  have 
powers  for  this  purpose;  but  as  I  had  then  received  the  newspaper 
account  of  the  conduct  of  the  Governor  of  New  Orleans,  I  thought  it 
would  be  a  good  ground  for  pressing  something  decisive,  both  with 


190  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

ttye  Minister  and  through  -  -  ;  with  a  view  then  to  bring  them  to 
make  some  proposition  here,  or  at  least  to  give  such  discretionary 
powers  as  would  facilitate  your  treaty  with  General  Bernadotte.  My 
notes  to  the  Minister  you  have.  No.  4  is  a  copy  of  my  letter  to  —  — , 
which  was  also  submitted  to  the  First  Consul,  and  produced  nothing 
more  than  a  verbal  promise  that  all  would  be  arranged  when  proper 
information  could  be  received  through  General  Bernadotte. 

I  have  no  doubt  that  it  has  long  been  their  intention  to  make  the 
arrangements  I  proposed,  in  exchange  for  commercial  advantages.  A 
sale  has  always  been  disrelished,  as  I  was  constantly  told  by  Marbois 
and  Talleyrand;  and,  as  is  clearly  to  be  inferred,  from  the  Consul's 
note  in  answer  to  my  letter.  What,  however,  I  believe,  principally 
drove  him  to  this  measure,  was  the  promise  which  the  First  Consul  had 
hastily  made  me  to  pay  our  debt  fully  and  promptly;  and  which  he 
found  himself  in  no  situation  to  fulfill,  and  yet  knew  not  how  to  elutle, 
as  I  pressed  it  at  every  turn,  and  spoke  of  it  to  Talleyrand  and  all  the 
Consul's  friends,  assured  them  that  1  had  communicated  it  not  only  to 
the  Government  but  to  the  creditors,  with  the  declaration  that  they 
might  firmly  rely  on  it,  as  no  one  could  believe  that  a  man  of  the  Con 
sul's  character,  a  sovereign  and  a  soldier,  could  break  his  word.  I  told 
the  Minister  of  the  Treasury  that,  as  I  owed  it  to  myself  to  justify 
what  1  had  said,  I  thought  myself  bound  to  publish  my  letter  to  the 
First  Consul,  with  his  answer,  and  the  execution  of  his  solemn  engage 
ments.  I  asked  what  his  enemies  would  say  to  such  a  publication  ?  He 
replied — Or  his  friends? 

The  resolutions  proposed  in  Congress,  in  consequence  of  the  busi 
ness  of  New  Orleans,  coming  to  hand,  I  sent  a  translation  of  them  by 
General  Bernadotte  to  —  — ,  and  also  enclosed  them  to  the  Minister. 
They  proved  we  would  not  be  trifled  with;  and  the  probability  of  a 
rupture  with  England,  and  the  effects  of  which  upon  the  country,  as 
you  have  observed  in  my  notes,  have  been  very  strongly  stated  to 
them,  hastened  their  determination;  and  they  saw,  as  Mr.  Talleyrand 
told  me,  that  if  the}^  gave  what  I  asked,  the  rest  was  not  worth,  keep 
ing.  This,  and  the  impossibility  of  otherwise  keeping  faith  with  us, 
produced  a  determination  to  sell ;  which  was  communicated  to  the  Coun 
cil,  as  I  informed  you  on  the  8th  of  April.  There  was  a  moment,  even 
after  Talleyrand  called  on  me  to  set  a  price,  that  I  thought  the  whole 
might  drop  through.  It  was  then,  as  I  informed  you,  he  pretended 
he  spoke  without  authority,  and  that  Louisiana  was  not  theirs,  &c. 
But,  as  I  have  since  written  to  you,  that  mystery  was  cleared  the 
next  day. 

The  subsequent  measures  you  have  in  my  letters  and  notes,  and  in 
those  Mr.  Monroe  and  myself  have  jointly  written  to  you.  As  I 
believe  that,  next  to  the  negotiation  that  secured  our  independence, 
this  is  the  most  important  the  United  States  have  ever  entered  into, 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  191 

I  thought  everything  that  led  to  it  might  interest  you  and  the  Presi- 
dent._  1  wished  you  to  be  minutely  acquainted  with  every  step  I  had 
taken;  my  verbal  communications  with  ever}7 body  to  whom  I  had 
access,  whose  interest  I  conceived  might  be  useful,  it  would  be  impos 
sible  to  detail.  Nothing,  however,  was  neglected  on  my  part;  and  I 
sincerely  hope  the  issue  may  be  acceptable  to  our  country. 

Lord  Whitworth  retired  last  night,  after  the  arrival  of  a  messenger 
from  Russia.  The  Emperor  undertakes  the  mediation,  but  England 
will  certainly  decline,  as  it  would  be  to  continue  her  present  ruinous 
expense,  and  derange  her  commerce  probably  for  an  unlimited  time. 

I  have  yet  no  time,  nor  indeed  thought  it  proper,  to  interpose  any 
business  of  less  importance,  while  the  arrangements  relative  to,  and  in 
consequence  of,  the  treaty  were  going  on.     The  moment  our  messen 
gers  are  despatched  I  shall  give  it  all  my  attention. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  &c., 

II.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


Messrs.  Livingston  and  Monroe  to  Mr.  Madison,    x 

PARIS,  May  13,  1803. 

SIR:  We  have  the  pleasure  to  transmit  to  you  by  M.  Dirieux  a  treaty 
which  we  have  concluded  with  the  French  Republic  for  the  purchase 
and  cession  of  Louisiana.  The  negotiation  of  this  important  object 
was  committed,  on  the  part  of  France,  to  M.  Marbois,  Minister  of  the 
Treasury,  whose  conduct  therein  has  already  received  the  sanction  of 
his  (rovernment,  as  appears  by  the  ratification  of  the  First  Consul, 
which  we  have  aTso^he_^ulea^ujrej^fo£^ard  to  you. 

An  acquisition  of  so  great  an  extent  was,  we  well  know,  not  contem 
plated  by  our  appointment;  but  we  are  persuaded  that  the  circum 
stances  and  considerations  which  induced  us  to  make  it  will  justify  us 
in  the  measure  to  our  Government  and  country. 

Before  the  negotiation  commenced  we  were  apprized  that  the  First 
Consul  had  decided  to  offer  to  the  United  States,  by  sale,  the  whole  of 
Louisiana,  and  not  a  part  of  it.  We  found,  in  the  outset,  that  this 
information  was  correct,  so  that  we  had  to  decide,  as  a  previous  ques 
tion,  whether  we  would  treat  for  the  whole,  or  jeopardize,  if  not 
abandon,  the  hope  of  acquiring  any  part.  On  that  point  we  did  not 
long  hesitate,  but  proceeded  to  treat  for  the  whole.  We  were  per 
suaded  that,  by  so  doing,  it  might  be  possible,  if  more  desirable,  to 
conclude  eventually  a  treaty  for  a  part,  since,  being  thus  possessed  of 
the  subject,  it  might  be  easy,  in  discussion,  at  least,  to  lead  from  a  view 
of  the  whole  to  that  of  a  part,  and  with  some  advantages  peculiar  to  a 
negotiation  on  so  great  a  scale.  By  treating  for  the  whole,  whereby 
we  should  be  enabled  to  ascertain  the  idea  which  was  entertained  by 
this  Government  of  its  value,  we  should  also  be  able  to  form  some 


192  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

estimate  of  that  which  was  affixed  to  the  value  of  its  parts.  It  was, 
too,  probable  that  a  less  sum  would  be  asked  for  the  whole,  if  sold 
entire  to  a  single  purchaser,  a  friendly  Power,  who  was  able  to  pay  for 
it,  and  whom  it  might  be  disposed  to  accommodate  at  the  present  junc 
ture,  than  if  it  should  be  sold  in  parcels  either  to  several  Powers  or 
companies  of  individuals;  it  was  equally  so,  if  this  Government  should 
be  finally  prevailed  to  sell  us  a  part,  that  some  regard  would  be  paid  in 
the  price  asked  for  it  to  that  which  was  demanded  for  the  whole. 
Lastly,  by  treating  for  the  whole,  whereby  the  attention  of  this  Gov 
ernment  would  be  drawn  to  the  United  States,  as  the  sole  purchasers, 
we  might  prevent  the  interference  of  other  Powers,  as  also  that  of 
individuals,  who  might  prove  equally  injurious  in  regard  to  the  price 
asked  for  it,  whether  we  acquired  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  terri 
tory.  We  found,  however,  as  we  advanced  in  the  negotiation,  that 
M.  Marhois  was  absolutely  restricted  to  the  disposition  of  the.  whole; 
that  he  would  treat  for  no  less  portion,  and,  of  course,  that  iifwiFsT" 
useless  to  urge  it.  On  mature  consideration,  therefore,  we  finally 
concluded  a  treaty  on  the  best  terms  we  could  obtain  for  the  whole. 

By  this  measure,  we  have  sought  to  carry  into  effect,  to  the  utmost 
of  our  power,  the  wise  and  benevolent  policy  of  our  Government,  on 
the  principles  laid  down  in  our  instructions.  The  possession  of  the  left 
bank  of  the  river,  had  it  been  attainable  alone,  would,  it  is  true,  have 
accomplished  much  in  that  respect;  but  it  is  equally  true  that  it  would 
have  left  much  still  to  accomplish.  By  it  our  people  would  have  had 
an  outlet  to  the  ocean  in  which  no  Power  would  have  a  right  to  dis 
turb  them;  but  while  the  other  bank  remained  in  the  possession  of  a 
foreign  Power,  circumstances  might  occur  to  make  the  neighborhood 
of  such  Power  highly  injurious  to  us  in  many  of  our  most  important 
concerns.  A  divided  jurisdiction  over  the  river  might  beget  jealousies, 
discontents,  and  dissensions,  which  the  wisest  policy  on  our  part  could 
not  prevent  or  control.  With  a  train  of  colonial  governments  estab 
lished  along  the  western  bank,  from  the  entrance  of  the  river  far  into 
the  interior,  under  the  command  of  military  men,  it  would  be  difficult  to 
preserve  that  state  of  things  which  would  be  necessary  to  the  peace  and 
tranquillity  of  our  country.  A  single  act  of  a  capricious,  unfriendly, 
or  unprincipled  subaltern  might  wound  our  best  interests,  violate  our 
most  unquestionable  rights,  and  involve  us  in  war.  But  by  this  acquisi 
tion,  which  comprises  within  our  limits  this  great  river,  and  all  the 
streams  that  enter  into  it,  from  their  sources  to  the  ocean,  the  appre 
hensions  of  these  disasters  is  banished  for  ages  from  the  United  States. 
We  adjust  by  it  the  only  remaining  known  cause  of  variance  with  this 
very  powerful  nation;  we  anticipate  the  discontent  of  the  great  rival 
of  France,  who  would  probably  have  been  wounded  at  any  stipulation 
of  a  permanent  nature  which  favored  the  latter,  and  which  it  would 
have  been  difficult  to  avoid,  had  she  retained  the  right  bank.  We  cease 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  193 

to  have  a  motive  of  urgency,  at  least,  for  inclining  to  one  Power,  to 
avert  the  unjust  pressure  of  another.  We  separate  ourselves  in  a  great 
measure  from  the  European  world  and  its  concerns,  especially  its  wars 
and  intrigues.  We  make,  in  fine,  a  great  stride  to  real  and  substantial 
independence,  the  good  effect  whereof  will,  we  trust,  be  felt  essentially 
and  extensively  in  all  our  foreign  and  domestic  relations.  Without 
exciting  the  apprehension  of  any  Power,  we  take  a  more  imposing 
attitude  with  respect  to  all.  The  bond  of  our  Union  will  be  strength 
ened,  and  its  movements  become  more  harmonious  by  the  increased 
parity  of  interests  which  it  will  communicate  to  the  several  parts  which 
compose  it. 

In  deliberating  on  this  subject  in  a  financial  view,  we  were  strongly 
impressed  with  the  idea  that  while  we  had  only  right  of  deposit,  or, 
indeed,  while  the  right  bank  remained  in  the  possession  of  a  foreign 
Power,  it  was  always  to  be  expected  that  we  should,  at  some  time  or 
other,  be  involved  in  war  on  questions  resulting  from  that  cause.  We 
were  well  satisfied  that  any  war  would  cost  us  more  than  is  hereby 
stipulated  to  be  given  for  this  territory;  that  none  could  produce  a 
more  favorable  result;  while  it  might,  especially  in  the  present  dis 
turbed  state  of  the  world,  prove  the  ruin  of  our  affairs. 

There  were  other  considerations  which,  though  of  minor  importance, 
had,  nevertheless,  their  due  weight  in  our  decision  of  this  great  ques 
tion.  If  France,  or  any  other  Power  holding  the  right  bank  of  the 
river,  imposed  lighter  duties  than  comported  with  the  revenue  system 
of  the  United  States,  supposing  even  that  we  had  acquired  the  left 
bank,  all  the  supplies  destined  for  our  extensive  and  populous  settle 
ments  on  the  other  side  would  be  smuggled  in  through  that  channel, 
and  our  revenue  thereby  considerably  diminished.  Should  such  Power 
open  offices  for  the  sale  of  lands  on  the  western  bank,  our  population 
might  be  drained  to  the  advantage  of  such  Power,  the  price  of  our 
lands  be  diminished,  and  their  sale  prevented.  But,  by  the  possession 
of  both  banks,  these  evils  are  averted. 

The  terms  on  wrhich  we  have  made  this  acquisition,  when  compared 
with  the  objects  'attained  by  it,  will,  we  flatter  ourselves,  be  deemed 
advantageous  to  our  country.  We  have  stipulated,  as  you  will  see  by 
the  treaty  and  convention,  that  the  United  States  shall  pay  to  the 
French  Government  sixty  millions  of  francs,  in  stock,  bearing  an 
^Interest  of  six  per  cent. ;  arid  a  sum  not  exceeding  twenty  more  to  our 
citizens,  in  discharge  of  the  debts  due  to  them  by  France,  under  the 
convention  of  1800;  and  also  to  exempt  the  manufactures,  productions, 
and  vessels,  of  France  and  Spain,  in  the  direct  trade  from  those  coun 
tries,  respectively,  in  the  ports  of  the  ceded  territory,  from  foreign 
duties  for  the  term  of  twelve  years.  The  stock  is  to  be  created  irre 
deemable  for  fifteen  years,  and  discharged  afterwards  in  three  equa] 
annual  installments.  The  interest  on  it  is  to  be  paid  in  Europe,  and  the 
H.  Doc.  431 18 


194  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

principal,  in  case  this  Government  thinks  proper  to  sell  it,  disposed  of 
in  such  manner  as  will  bo  most  conducive  to  the  credit  of  tHe~2Lmeri- 
can  funds.  The  debts  due  to  our  citizens  are  to  be  discharged  by 
drafts  on  the  Treasury.  We  omit  a  more  minute  view  of  the  stipula 
tions  of  these  instruments,  since,  as  you  will  possess  them,  it  is 
unnecessary. 

Louisiana  was  acquired  of  Spain  by  France,  in  exchange  for  Tuscany, 
which  latter  is  settled  by  treaty  on  the  son-in-law  of  the  King  of  Spain, 
with  the  title  of  King  of  Etruria,  and  was  estimated  in  the  exchange, 
in  consideration  of  the  revenue,  at  one  hundred  millions  of  francs. 
The  First  Consul  thought  he  had  made  an  advantageous  bargain  in 
that  exchange,  as  appeared  by  the  high  idea  which  he  entertained  of 
its  value,  as  shown  on  many  occasions.  Louisiana  was  the  territory 
which  he  promised,  in  his  proclamation  at  the  peace,  as  an  asylum  to 
those  who  had  become  unfortunate  by  the  Revolution,  and  which  he 
spoke  of  as  vast  and  fertile.  When  he  made  up  his  mind  to  offer  the 
cession  of  it  to  the  United  States,  it  was  contemplated  to  ask  for  it  one 
hundred  millions,  exclusive  of  the  debts  they  owed  to  our  citizens,  which 
they  proposed  we  should  also  pay,  with  a  perpetual  exemption  from 
foreign  duties  on  the  manufactures,  productions,  and  vessels  of  France 
and  Spain  in-the  ports  of  the  ceded  territory.  From  that  demand  how 
ever  (in  respect  to  the  sum)  he  receded,  under  the  deliberations  of  his 
own  cabinet;  for  the  first  proposition  which  M.  Marbois  made  tons  was 
that  we  should  pay  eighty  millions — sixty  of  which  in  cash,  the  balance 
to  our  citizens,  the  whole  in  one  year  in  Paris,  with  a  perpetual  exemp 
tion  from  foreign  duties  as  above.  The  modification  in  the  mode  of 
payment,  (that  is  by  stock,  for  from  the  quantum  he  never  would  depart,) 
and  the  limitation  of  the  term  of  the  duties  to  twelve  years,  with  the 
proviso  annexed  to  it,  which  was  introduced  into  the  treaty,  with  every 
other  change  from  his  project,  was  the  effect  of  negotiation  and  accom 
modation,  in  which  we  experienced,  on  his  part,  and  that  of  his  Govern 
ment,  a  promptitude  and  candor  which  were  highly  grateful  to  us. 

In  estimating  the  real  value  of  this  country  to  the  United  States,  a 
variety  of  considerations  occur,  all  of  which  merit  due  attention.  Of 
these,  we  have  already  noticed  many  of  a  general  nature,  to  which, 
however,  it  may  be  difficult  to  fix  a  precise  value.  Others  present 
themselves  of  a  nature  more  definite,  to  which  it  will  be  more  practi 
cable  to  fix  some  standard.  By  possessing  both  banks,  the  whole 
revenue  or  duty  on  imports  will  accrue  to  the  United  States,  which 
must  be  considerable.  The  value  of  exports,  we  have  understood,  was 
last  year  four  millions  of  dollars.  If  a  portion  only  of  the  imports 
pass  through  that  channel,  (as  under  our  Government  Ave  presume 
they  will,)  the  amount  of  the  revenue  will  be  considerable.  This  will 
annually  increase  in  proportion  as  the  population  and  productions  in 
that  quarter  do.  The  value  of  the  lands  in  the  province  of  Louisiana 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  195 

(amount ing  to  .some  hundred  millions  of  acres,  of  the  best  quality,  and 
in  ..the.  best  climate)  is  perhaps  incalculable.  From  either  of  these 
sources,  it  is  not  doubted  that  the  sum  stipulated  may  be  raised  in 
time  to  discharge  the  debt. 

We  hope  to  be  able  to  forward  you  herewith  the  order  of  this  Gov 
ernment  for  the  delivery  of  the  possession  of  the  ceded  territory  to 
the  United  States,  or  to  communicate  its  arrangements  for  that  purpose, 
as  also  its  views  relative  to  the  sale  of  the  stock,  since  it  is  understood 
that  their  intention  is  to  sell  it.  It  has  been  intimated  to  us  that  the 
house  of  Baring,  in  London,  connected  with  that  of  Hope,  in  Holland, 
will  take  the  whole  at  their  risk,  at  the  current  price  in  England,  on  a 
commission  to  be  agreed  on,  paying  to  France  a  stipulated  sum  by  the 
month.  Their  object  is  .said  to  be.  exclusive  of  that  of  making  profit 
by  it.  to  keep  up  (he  credit  of  our  stock,  they  being  much  interested 
in  it.  Considering  the  great  capital  of  these  houses,  it  is  presumable 
that  they  would  be  able  to  comply  with  any  engagement  they  might 
make  to  that  effect.  And  it  can  not  be  doubted  that  it  would  be  more 
advantageous  to  us  that  the  whole  should  be  thus  disposed  of,  than 
remain  in  the  hands  of  France,  who,  under  the  pressure  of  difficulties, 
might  have  it  less  in  her  power  to  preserve  or  regard  our  credit  in  the 
disposition  of  it.  We  shall  communicate  with  M.  Marbois  fully  on 
this  subject,  and  apprise  you  of  the  result. 

We  received,  some  days  past,  a  letter  from  Mr.  King,  in  which  he 
says,  that,  in  case  of  war,  which  he  deemed  inevitable,  the  British  Gov 
ernment  contemplated  taking  possession  of  the  island  of  New  Orleans. 
He  desired  information  to  be  communicated  to  that  Government, 
whether  it  had  been  ceded  to  the  United  States,  as  he  presumed  a 
knowledge  thereof  would  prevent  the  measure.  We  gave  an  imme 
diate  reply  to  his  letter,  in  wliich  we  informed  him  that  the  whole  of 
Louisiana  had  been  ceded  to  the  United  States,  which  he  was  at  liberty 
to  communicate  to  the  British  Government.  We  likewise  made  the 
same  communication  to  Lord  Whitworth,  the  British  Ambassador 
here,  who  expressed  himself  to  be  well  satisfied  with  the  event. 

These  countries,  France  and  England,  have  been  on  the  point  of 
a  rupture  for  some  time  past.  At  present,  the  prospect  of  an  accom 
modation  is  more  remote,  as  the  English  Ambassador  left  Paris  at  10 
o'clock  last  night:  still  some  hope  of  it  is  entertained  by  some  persons 
in  power  here.  This  nation  is  desirous  of  peace,  and  it  is  believed 
that  its  Government  is  similarly  disposed. 

Perjnit  us  to  express  an  earnest  wish  that  the  President  and  Senate 
may  decide  with  the  least  possible  delay  on  the  treaty  "and  conven 
tions  which  we  have  concluded,  and  have  the  pleasure  to  transmit 
to  you.  If  it  is  the  sense  of  our  Government  to  ratify  them,  the 
sooner  that  fact  is  known  to  this  Government  the  better  its  effect 
will  be. 


196  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

The  list  of  the  debts  due  by  France  to  American  citizens  not  being 
yet  prepared,  owing  to  M.  Marbois's  absence  to-day  from  Paris,  and 
the  previous  delays  of  the  offices  in  which  the  evidences  were,  can 
not  be  sent  by  this  conveyance.  In  consequence,  we  retain  the 
original  of  the  convention  to  which  it  should  be  annexed,  and  send  a 
copy  of  it:  we  shall  forward  in  a  day  or  two  the  original.  By  the 
list,  it  may  be  inferred  that  the  debts  amount  to  a  greater  sum  than 
they  really  do:  they  will  be  subject,  according  to  the  convention,  to 
the  revision  of  our  board,  by  whom  it  is  expected  they  will  be  reduced 
considerably.  We  have  full  confidence  that,  including  the  interest, 
they  will  riot  exceed  the  sum  of  twenty  millions  of  francs,  which  is 
much  to  be  desired,  as  in  that  case  all  our  citizens,  whose  claims  are 
entitled  to  the  support  of  our  Government,  will  be  provided  for  and 
paid  by  it.  You  will  observe  that,  in  the  mode  adopted,  considerable 
indulgence  is  given  to  our  treasury.  The  whole  sum  is  to  be  paid 
there,  and  under  delays  which  will  free  it  from  embarrassment. 
We  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your  obedient  servants," 

11.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

JAMES  MONROE. 

P.  S. — It  was  intended  to  have  forwarded  this  by  M.  Derieux;  but 
he  being  forced  to  leave  Paris  some  days  since  on  his  way  to  Bor 
deaux,  from  whence  he  sails,  we  commit  it  to  Mr.  Hughes,  who  will 
embark  at  Havre.  We  shall  forward  to-morrow  or  next  day  an 
exemplification  of  it  by  Bordeaux,  under  the  care  of  M.  Derieux. 


Mr.  King  to  Lord  Hawkesbury. 

LONDON,  May  16,  1803. 

My  LORD:  In  the  present  critical  posture  of  affairs,  I  lose  no  time 
in  communicating  to  your  Lordship,  for  His  Majesty's  information, 
that  a  treaty  was  signed  at  Paris  on  the  30th  April,  past,  by  the  Pleni 
potentiaries  of  America  and  France,  by  which  the  complete  sover 
eignty  of  the  town  and  territory  of  New  Orleans,  as  well  as  of  all 
Louisiana,  as  the  same  was  heretofore  possessed  by  Spain,  has  been 
acquired  by  the  United  States  of  America. 

In  drawing  up  this  treaty,  care  has  been  taken  so  to  frame  the  same 
as  not  to  infringe  any  right  of  Great  Britain  in  the  navigation  of  the 
river  Mississippi. 

I  flatter  myself  that  this  communication  will  be  received  with  satis 
faction,  and  regarded  as  a  new  proof  of  the  disposition  of  the  United 
States  to  observe  towards  His  Majesty  a  spirit  of  amity  and  confi 
dence,  important  at  all  times,  and  more  especially  so  in  present  cir 
cumstances,  to  the  harmony  and  mutual  prosperity  of  the  two  countries. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  197 

Lord  Hawkesbury  to  Mr.  King. 

'.  SkO  DOWNING  STREET,  May  19,  1803. 

SIR:  Having  laid  before  the  King  your  letter  of  the  15th  of  this 
month,  in  which  you  inform  me  that  a  treaty  was  signed  at  Paris  on 
the  3()th  of  last  month,  by  the  Plenipotentiaries  of  America  and  France, 
by  which  the  complete  sovereignty  of  the  town  and  territory  of  New 
Orleans,  as  well  as  of  all  Louisiana,  has  been  acquired  by  the  United 
States,  I  have  received  His  Majesty's  commands  to  express  to  you  the 
pleasure  with  which  His  Majesty  has  received  this  intelligence,  and  to 
add  that  His  Majesty  regards  the  care  which  has  been  taken  so  to 
frame  this  treaty  as  not  to  infringe  any  right  of  Great  Britain  in  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  as  the  most  satisfactory  evidence  of  the  dis 
position  on  the  part  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  (corre 
spondent  to  that  which  His  Majesty  entertains)  to  promote  and  improve 
that  harmony  and  good  understanding  which  so  happily  subsists 
between  the  two  countries,  and  which  are  so  conducive  to  their  mutual 
benefit.  I  have  it  also  in  command  to  assure  you,  sir,  that  the  senti 
ments  which  you  have  expressed,  in  making  this  communication,  are 
considered  by  His  Majesty's  Government  as  an  additional  proof  of  that 
cordiality  and  confidence  which  you  have  uniforml}^  manifested  in  the 
whole  course  of  your  public  mission,  and  which  have  so  justbr  entitled 
you  to  the  esteem  and  regard  of  His  Majesty's  Government. 


Messrs.  Livingston  and  Monroe  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  x 

PARIS,  May  16,  1803. 

SIR:  We  have  the  honor  to  enclose  the  account  which  should  be 
annexed  to  the  convention  transmitted  to  you.  The  Bordeaux  embargo 
is  in  assignatS)  and  two-thirds  will  be  deducted.  From  many  of  the 
others,  we  have  reason  to  think,  from  a  particular  account  now  in  our 
hands,  there  will  be  such  considerable  deductions  as  will  reduce  the 
whole  charge  to  less  than  twenty  millions  of  livres,  including  the 
interest.  The  Consul  has  agreed  to  ratify  immediately,  and  we  hope 
to  have  the  honor  of  transmitting  yon  the  ratified  treaty,  with  an  order 
to  deliver  the  territory,  in  a  few  days.  Such  arrangements  will  also, 
we  trust,  be  made  relative  to  the  stock  as  will  prevent  it  coining  on 
the  market  to  any  loss,  or  any  part  of  it  from  being  sold  in  America. 
We  have  the  honor  to  be,  &c., 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

JAMES  MONROE. 


Mr.  Monroe  to  Mr.  Madison. 


PARIS  May  18,  1803. 
SIR, — Since  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  with  France  for  the  pur 
chase  of  Louisiana,  which  was  forwarded  to  you  on  the  13th  by  Mr. 


198  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

Hughes,  with  a  joint  letter  from  my  colleague  and  myself,  I  feel 
myself  much  at  a  loss  what  part  to  take  respecting  the  Floridas. 
There  are  some  considerations  in  favor  of  an  immediate  pursuit  of 
that  object  with  Spain  which  have  great  weight  on  my  mind.  The 
cession  of  Louisiana  by  France  to  the  U.  States  must  lessen  the  value 
of  the  Floridas  to  Spain,  and  she  will  be  apt  to  feel  that  effect  more 
sensibly  immediately  after  she  hears  it  than  at  any  other  time.  France 
too  who  has  promised  her  aid  in  the  negotiation  with  Spain,  would 
probably  take  more  interest  in  it,  at  this  moment,  while  the  obligation 
to  yield  it,  is  in  a  manner  personal,  than  she  might  do  hereafter.  At 
this  crisis  of  affairs  between  France  and  England  which  comprises 
Spain  in  an  equal  degree,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  we  should 
derive  much  aid  from  a  pressure  on  Spain,  from  that  cause.  It  is 
equally  presumable  that  England  even  in  case  of  war  would  not  inter 
fere  with  our  pursuit,  much  less  break  with  us  for  obtaining  the 
Floridas.  The  exclusion  of  her  manufactures  from  the  Continent  of 
Europe,  is  a  principal  cause  of  her  present  unquiet  and  distressed  sit 
uation.  It  is  her  interest  to  cherish  the  U.  States  and  Russia,  as  her 
best  markets;  a  policy  which  1  believe  she  understands  and  pursues 
with  sincerity.  To  be  involved  in  a  war  with  us  at  this  epoch  would 
prove  a  great  calamity  to  her.  I  have  no  doubt  that  at  this  time  she 
is  either  indifferent  respecting  our  acquisition  of  Louisiana,  and  that 
which  we  propose  to  make  of  the  Floridas,  or  in  no  situation  to  oppose 
it.  Indeed  it  is  not  improbable  that  she  may  wish  it,  as  it  weakens 
these  powers,  in  that  quarter  and  promises  to  open  new  markets  to  her 
manufactures.  Should  we  not  however  acquire  this  territory  of  Spain 
at  this  period,  there  is  danger  of  its  falling  into  the  hands  of  some 
other  power  hereafter:  a  circumstance  which  might  give  us  much 
trouble,  as  it  commands  the  mouths  of  several  of  our  rivers,  and  gives 
a  right  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  There  are  also  consid 
erations  against  my  pursuing  the  object  at  present  of  great  weight. 
We  have  already  stipulated  for  a  much  greater  sum  than  it  was  con 
templated  we  should  give  for  the  object  of  my  mission.  To  go  further 
might  embarrass  our  treasury.  It  may  be  advisable  to  exchange  a 
portion  of  Louisiana  next  Mexico  for  the  Floridas,  and  I  have  no 
power  to  make  such  an  arrangement.  I  have  weighed  these  consid 
erations  with  the  attention  they  merit,  and  the  result  is  that  I  am  of 
opinion  that  it  is  more  in  conformity  to  the  spirit  of  my  instructions, 
and  to  the  interest  of  my  country,  that  I  should  proceed  immediately 
to  Madrid  to  endeavour  to  obtain  the  Floridas  than  remain  inactive 
and  suffer  the  favorable  occasion  which  is  now  presented  to  be  lost. 
The  acquisition  of  the  Floridas  is  an  important  object  with  our  gov 
ernment,  as  is  sufficiently  shewn  by  our  instructions.  (The  purchase 
of  the  whole  of  Louisiana,  tho'  not  contemplated  is  nevertheless  a 
measure  founded  on  the  principles  and  justified  by  the  policy  of  our 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA,  199 

instructions,  provided  it  be  thought  a  good  bargain.  The  only  differ 
ence  between  the  acquisition  we  have  made,  and  that  which  we  were 
instructed  to  make  in  that  respect,  is,  that  a  favorable  occasion  pre 
senting  itself  which  indeed  was  not  anticipated  by  the  administration, 
in  the  measures  which  led  to  that  event  and  laid  the  foundation  for  it, 
we  have  gone  further  than  we  were  instructed  to  do.  Hut  the^iixlent 
of  that  acquisition  does  not  destroy  the  motive  which  existed  before 
of  acquiring  the  Floridas,  nor  essentially  diminish  it.  In  our  instruc 
tions  the  idea  entertained  by  the  President  of  the  value  of  that  country 
is  denned.  It  is  to  be  presumed  that  under  existing  circumstances  it 
may  be  had  at  a  cheaper  rate,  since  its  importance  to  Spain  is  much 
diminished.  And  altho'  the  sum  to  be  paid  for  Louisiana  is  consider 
able,  yet  the  period  at  which  that  portion  which  is  applicable  to  the 
Government  of  France  is  to  be  paid,  is  so  remote,  and  such  delays  are 
incident  to  that  which  will  be  received  by  our  citizens,  that  it  is  to  be 
presumed  the  payment  of  what  it  would  be  proper  to  stipulate  for  the 
Floridas,  would  subject  our  treasury  to  no  embarrassment.  I  am  the 
more  confident  in  this  opinion,  from  the  belief  that  it  would  be  easy  to 
raise  on  the  land  alone,  retaining  to  our  government  the  jurisdiction, 
a  sum  which  would  be  sufficient  to  discharge  the  greater  part  of  what 
it  is  probable  Spain  would  ask  for  it.  The  bias  of  my  mind  there 
fore  is  to  pursue  this  object  by  repairing  immediately  to  Madrid  and 
endeavoring  to  obtain  by  treaty  the  territory  in  question  thereby  extir 
pating  the  last  remaining  source  of  controversy  or  indeed  jealousy 
with  these  powers.  If  I  proceed  it  will  be  in  a  week  from  this  time, 
within  which  term  every  arrangement  incident  to  the  treaty  and  con 
vention  we  have  formed  with  this  republick  will  probably  be  com- 
pleated,  and  the  little  provision  necessary  for  my  journey  to  Spain 
likewise  made.  On  this  subject  I  shall  write  you  again  soon,  let  the 
decision  which  I  take  be  what  it  may.  In  case  I  go  I  shall  leave  my 
family  at  St.  Germain  till  my  return,  which  I  shall  expect  to  do  in  a 
few  months.  I  am  with  great  respect  &  esteem  yr.  ob*.  servant. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PARIS,  May  W,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR:  The  subject  of  this  letter  is  too  important  to  admit  of 
delay,  in  case  the  treaties  should  have  been  any  time  in  }rour  hands; 
but,  as  it  has  not  yet  been  fully  considered  by  Mr.  Monroe,  he  thinks 
he  can  not  make  it  that  of  a  joint  letter  till  we  have  more  fully  dis 
cussed  it,  which  we  propose  to  do  to-morrow  or  the  next  da}r.  But 
as  that  will  be  too  late  for  this  conveyance,  I  throw  out  these  hasty 
thoughts  for  your  consideration.  In  the  meantime  you  will  consider 
this  rather  as  a  private  than  as  a  public  letter;  since  it  ma}ror  may  not 


200  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

be  made  use  of  to  promote  such  measures  as,  upon  mature  delibera 
tion,  the  President  shall  think  proper  to  adopt.  I  do  not,  however, 
doubt  that  Mr.  Monroe  will  concur  with  me  in  opinion,  after  we  have 
discussed  the  subject;  and  that  we  shall,  by  the  next  opportunity,  write 
to  you  officially  thereon. 

I  informed  you  long  since,  that,  on  inquiring  whether  the  Floridas 
were  within  the  cession  of  Spain,  I  was  told  by  M.  Marbois  he  was 
sure  that  Mobile  was,  but  could  not  answer  further.  I  believed  his 
information  incorrect,  because  I  understood  that  Louisiana,  as  it  then 
was,  made  the  object  of  the  cession;  and  that  since  the  possession  of 
the  Floridas  by  Britain,  they  had  changed  their  names.  But  the 
moment  I  saw  the  words  of  the  Treaty  of  Madrid  I  had  no  doubt  but 
it  included  all  the  country  that  France  possessed  by  the  name  of  Lou 
isiana,  previous  to  their  cession  to  Spain,  except  what  had  been  con 
veyed  by  subsequent  treaties.  1  accordingly  insisted,  with  M.  Mar 
bois,  at  the  time  we  negotiated,  that  this  would  be  considered  as  within 
our  purchase.  He  neither  assented  nor  denied,  but  said  that  all  they 
received  from  Spain  was  intended  to  be  conveyed  to  us.  That  my 
construction  was  right,  is  fairly  to  be  inferred  from  the  words  of  the 
treaties,  and  from  a  comment  upon  them  contained  in  the  Spanish 
Minister's  letter  to  Mr.  Pinckney,  in  which  he  expressly  says  that 
France  had  recovered  Louisiana  as  it  formerly  belonged  to  her,  sav 
ing  the  rights  of  other  Powers.  This  leaves  no  doubt  upon  the  subject 
of  the  intention  of  the  contracting  parties.  Now,  it  is  well  known 
that  Louisiana,  as  possessed  by  France,  was  bounded  by  the  river  Per- 
dido,  and  that  Mobile  was  the  metropolis.  For  the  facts  relative  to 
this  I  refer  you  to  Reynal  and  to  his  maps.  1  have  also  seen  maps 
here  which  put  the  matter  out  of  dispute. 

I  called  this  morning  upon  M.  Marbois  for  a  further  explanation  on 
this  subject,  and  to  remind  him  of  his  having  told  me  that  Mobile  made 
a  part  of  the  cession.  Pie  told  me  that  he  had  no  precise  idea  on  the 
subject,  but  that  he  knew  it  to  bo  an  historical  fact,  and  that  on  that 
only  he  had  formed  his  opinion.  I  asked  him  what  orders  had  been 
given  to  the  prefect,  who  was  to  take  possession,  or  what  orders  had 
been  given  by  Spain  as  to  the  boundary,  in  ceding  it?  He  assured 
me  that  he  did  not  know;  but  that  he  would  make  the  inquiry,  and  let 
me  know.  At  -i  o'clock  I  called  for  Mr.  Monroe  to  take  him  to  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs;  but  he  was  prevented  from  accompanying 
me.  I  asked  the  Minister  what  were  the  east  bounds  of  the  territory 
ceded  to  us?  He  said  he  did  not  know;  we  must  take  it  as  they  had 
received  it.  I  asked  him  how  Spain  meant  to  give  them  possession? 
He  said,  according  to  the  words  of  the  treaty.  But  what  did  you 
mean  to  take?  I  do  not  know.  Then  you  mean  that  we  shall  construe 
it  our  own  way  (  I  can  give  you  no  direction;  you  have  made  a  noble 

irgain  for  yourselves,  and  I  suppose  you  will  make  the  most  of  it. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  201 

Now,  sir,  the  sum  of  this  business  is,  to  recommend  to  you,  in  the 
strongest  terms,  after  having  obtained  the  possession,  that  the  French 
Commissary  will  give  you,  to  insist  upon  this  as  a  part  of  your  right; 
and _to  take  possession,  at  all  events,  to  the  river  Perdido.  I  pledge 
myself  that  your  right  is  good;  and,  after  the  explanations  that 
have  been  given  here,  you  need  apprehend  nothing  from  a  decisive 
measure.  Your  Minister  here  and  at  Madrid,  can  support  your  claim; 
and  the  time  is  peculiarly  favorable  to  enable  you  to  do  it  without  the 
smallest  risk  at  home.  It  may  also  be  important  to  anticipate  any 
designs  that  Britain  may  have  upon  that  country.  Should  she  possess 
herself  of  it,  and  the  war  terminate  favorably  for  her,  she  will  not 
readily  relinquish  it.  With  this  in  your  hand,  East  Florida  will  be 
of  little  moment,  and  may  be  yours  whenever  you  please.  At  all 
events,  proclaim  your  rights  and  take  possession. 
I  am,  sir,  &c., 

ROBT.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

Hon.  JAMES  MADISON. 


James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to 

France. 

,(°,  ^  ',  S  fa  '  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  May  %5,  1803. 

SIR:  Your  several  letters  of  March  3,  11,  18,  and  24,  with  their  enclo 
sures,  have  been  duly  received,  as  has  been  that  of  March  12,  to  the 
President.  According  to  the  request  in  this  last,  I  now  acknowledge, 
also,  or  perhaps  repeat  the  acknowledgment,  of  the  two  papers  enclosed, 
the  one  in  your  letter  of  February  26,  the  other  in  that  of  August  10, 
1802. 

The  assurances  given  by  the  Chief  Consul,  on  the  subject  of  our 
claims,  can  not  but  be  acceptable,  although  they  amount  to  less  than 
justice;  because  no  more  than  justice  would  have  been  done  if  the 
claims  had  been  satisfied  without  the  delay  which  has  intervened,  and 
according  to  the  example  of  good  faith  and  punctuality  in  executing 
the  treat}^  given  by  the  United  States.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
sincerity  of  these  assurances  will  be  verified  by  the  success  of  the 
measures  you  are  taking  for  a  final  and  favorable  settlement  in  behalf 
of  our  citizens,  who  have  never  doubted,  as  far  as  I  know,  your  solici 
tude  or  }Tour  exertions  to  obtain  justice  for  them. 

The  assurances  given,  at  the  same  time,  by  the  Chief  Consul,  of  his 
regard  for  the  United  States,  and  of  his  personal  esteem  for  their 
Chief  Magistrate,  are  entitled  also  to  favorable  attention,  as  an  indi 
cation  that  a  juster  value  begins  to  be  placed  on  our  friendly  relations 
to  the  French  Republic.  Whether  this  language  of  the  French 
Government  be  the  effect  of  the  political  crisis  in  which  it  finds  itself, 


200  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

be  made  use  of  to  promote  such  measures  as,  upon  mature  delibera 
tion,  the  President  shall  think  proper  to  adopt.  I  do  not,  however, 
doubt  that  Mr.  Monroe  will  concur  with  me  in  opinion,  after  we  have 
discussed  the  subject;  and  that  we  shall,  by  the  next  opportunity,  write 
to  you  officially  thereon. 

I  informed  you  long  since,  that,  on  inquiring  whether  the  Floridas 
were  within  the  cession  of  Spain,  I  was  told  by  M.  Marbois  he  was 
sure  that  Mobile  was,  but  could  not  answer  further.  I  believed  his 
information  incorrect,  because  I  understood  that  Louisiana,  as  it  then 
was,  made  the  object  of  the  cession;  and  that  since  the  possession  of 
the  Floridas  by  Britain,  the^v  had  changed  their  names.  But  the 
moment  I  saw  the  words  of  the  Treaty  of  Madrid  I  had  no  doubt  but 
it  included  all  the  country  that  France  possessed  by  the  name  of  Lou 
isiana,  previous  to  their  cession  to  Spain,  except  what  had  been  con 
veyed  by  subsequent  treaties.  1  accordingly  insisted,  with  M.  Mar 
bois,  at  the  time  we  negotiated,  that  this  would  be  considered  as  within 
our  purchase.  He  neither  assented  nor  denied,  but  said  that  all  they 
received  from  Spain  was  intended  to  be  conveyed  to  us.  That  my 
construction  was  right,  is  fairhT  to  be  inferred  from  the  words  of  the 
treaties,  and  from  a  comment  upon  them  contained  in  the  Spanish 
Minister's  letter  to  Mr.  Pinckney,  in  which  he  expressly  says  that 
France  had  recovered  Louisiana  as  it  formerly  belonged  to  her,  sav 
ing  the  rights  of  other  Powers.  This  leaves  no  doubt  upon  the  subject 
of  the  intention  of  the  contracting  parties.  Now,  it  is  well  known 
that  Louisiana,  as  possessed  by  France,  was  bounded  by  the  river  Per- 
dido,  and  that  Mobile  was  the  metropolis.  For  the  facts  relative  to 
this  I  refer  you  to  Keynal  and  to  his  maps.  I  have  also  seen  maps 
here  which  put  the  matter  out  of  dispute. 

I  called  this  morning  upon  M.  Marbois  for  a  further  explanation  on 
this  subject,  and  to  remind  him  of  his  having  told  me  that  Mobile  made 
a  part  of  the  cession.  He  told  me  that  he  had  no  precise  idea  on  the 
subject,  but  that  he  knew  it  to  be  an  historical  fact,  and  that  on  that 
only  he  had  formed  his  opinion.  I  asked  him  what  orders  had  been 
given  to  the  prefect,  who  was  to  take  possession,  or  what  orders  had 
been  given  by  Spain  as  to  the  boundary,  in  ceding  it?  He  assured 
me  that  he  did  not  know;  but  that  he  would  make  the  inquiry,  and  let 
me  know.  At  4  o'clock  I  called  for  Mr.  Monroe  to  take  him  to  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs;  but  he  was  prevented  from  accompanying 
me.  I  asked  the  Minister  what  were  the  east  bounds  of  the  territory 
ceded  to  us?  He  said  he  did  not  know;  we  must  take  it  as  they  had 
received  it.  I  asked  him  how  Spain  meant  to  give  them  possession? 
He  said,  according  to  the  words  of  the  treaty.  But  what  did  you 
mean  to  take?  I  do  not  know.  Then  you  mean  that  we  shall  construe 
it  our  own  wav  '.  I  can  give  you  no  direction;  you  have  made  a  noble 

irgain  for  yourselves,  and  I  suppose  you  will  make  the  most  of  it. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  201 

Now,  sir,  the  sum  of  this  business  is,  to  recommend  to  you,  in  the 
strongest  terms,  after  having  obtained  the  possession,  that  the  French 
Commissary  will  give  you,  to  insist  upon  this  as  a  part  of  your  right; 
and  to  take  possession,  at  all  events,  to  the  river  Perdido.  I  pledge 
myself  that  your  right  is  good;  and,  after  the  explanations  that 
have  been  given  here,  you  need  apprehend  nothing  from  a  decisive 
measure.  Your  Minister  here  and  at  Madrid,  can  support  your  claim; 
and  the  time  is  peculiarly  favorable  to  enable  you  to  do  it  without  the 
smallest  risk  at  home.  It  may  also  be  important  to  anticipate  any 
designs  that  Britain  may  have  upon  that  country.  Should  she  possess 
herself  of  it,  and  the  war  terminate  favorably  for  her,  she  will  not 
readily  relinquish  it.  With  this  in  your  hand,  East  Florida  will  be 
of  little  moment,  and  may  be  yours  whenever  you  please.  At  all 
events,  proclaim  your  rights  and  take  possession. 
I  am,  sir,  &o., 

ROBT.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

Hon.  JAMES  MADISON. 


James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  to 

France. 

.f.o  ;  ^<b   '  DEPARTMENT  or  STATE,  May  #£,  1803. 

SIR:  Your  several  letters  of  March  3,  11, 18,  and  24,  with  their  enclo 
sures,  have  been  duly  received,  as  has  been  that  of  March  12,  to  the 
President.  According  to  the  request  in  this  last,  I  now  acknowledge, 
also,  or  perhaps  repeat  the  acknowledgment,  of  the  two  papers  enclosed, 
the  one  in  your  letter  of  February  26,  the  other  in  that  of  August  10, 
1802. 

The  assurances  given  by  the  Chief  Consul,  on  the  subject  of  our 
claims,  can  not  but  be  acceptable,  although  they  amount  to  less  than 
justice;  because  no  more  than  justice  would  have  been  done  if  the 
claims  had  been  satisfied  without  the  delay  which  has  intervened,  and 
according  to  the  example  of  good  faith  and  punctuality  in  executing 
the  treaty  given  by  the  United  States.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
sincerity  of  these  assurances  will  be  verified  by  the  success  of  the 
measures  you  are  taking  for  a  final  and  favorable  settlement  in  behalf 
of  our  citizens,  who  have  never  doubted,  as  far  as  I  know,  your  solici 
tude  or  your  exertions  to  obtain  justice  for  them. 

The  assurances  given,  at  the  same  time,  by  the  Chief  Consul,  of  his 
regard  for  the  United  States,  and  of  his  personal  esteem  for  their 
Chief  Magistrate,  are  entitled  also  to  favorable  attention,  as  an  indi 
cation  that  a  juster  value  begins  to  be  placed  on  our  friendly  relations 
to  the  French  Republic.  Whether  this  language  of  the  French 
Government  be  the  effect  of  the  political  crisis  in  which  it  finds  itself, 


202  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

or  of  a  growing-  conviction  of  the  important  destinies  and  honorable 
policy  of  the  United  States,  or,  as  is  probable,  of  both  these  consider 
ations,  you  will,  in  return,  communicate  the  assurances,  with  which 
you  are  charged  by  the  President,  of  his  disposition  to  cherish  a  reci 
procity  of  these  sentiments,  and  that  sincere  amity  between  the  two 
nations,  which  is  prescribed  to  both  by  such  weighty  advantages. 

The  persevering  evasion  of  3*011  r  demands  on  the  subject  of  the 
deposit  at  New  Orleans,  and  generally  of  the  rights  of  the  United 
States,  as  fixed  by  their  treaty  with  Spain,  is  not  a  little  astonishing. 
\  It  is  as  difficult  to  be  reconciled  with  the  sincerity  of  the  late  profes- 
\  sions  of  the  French  Government,  and  with  the  policv  which  the 
moment  dictates  to  it,  as  with  any  other  rational  motives.  It  is  the 
more  extraordinary,  too,  as  it  appears,  by  a  late  communication  from 
the  Spanish  Government  to  Mr.  Pinckney,  (of  which,  he  says,  he  for 
warded  a  copy  to  Paris,  and  of  which  another  is  herewith  inclosed,) 
that  the  treaty  of  cession  expressly  saves  all  rights  previously  stipu 
lated  to  other  nations.  A  conduct  so  inexplicable  is  little  fitted  to 
inspire  confidence,  or  to  strengthen  friendship;  and  rendered  proper 
the  peremptory  declaration  contained  in  your  note  of  the  10th  of 
March.  The  negotiations  succeeding  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Monroe  can 
not  fail  to  draw  out  the  views  of  France  on  this  important  subject. 

You  were  informed,  in  my  letters  of  the  18th  and  20th  of  April,  that 
orders  had  been  transmitted  by  the  Spanish  Government  for  restoring 
the  deposit.  The  answers  from  New  Orleans  to  the  Spanish  and  French 
Ministers  here  show  that  their  successive  interpositions,  including  the 
peremptory  one  from  the  Marquis  d'Yrujo,  of  the  llth  of  March,  were 
all  unavailing.  The  orders  of  the  King  of  Spain  will,  no  doubt,  be 
obeyed,  if  they  arrive  before  possession  be  given  to  the  French  author 
ity;  nor  is  it  presumable  that,  in  that  event,  they  would  be  disregarded. 
Still  it  is  possible  that  the  French  agents  may  choose  to  wait  for  the 
French  construction  of  the  treaty  before  they  relinquish  the  ground 
taken  by  the  Intendant;  and  the  more  possible,  as  the  orders  to  the 
Intendant  may  contain  no  disavowal  of  his  construction  of  it.  Under 
these  circumstances,  it  will  be  incumbent  on  the  French  Government 
to  hasten  the  orders  necessary  to  guard  against  a  prolongation  of  the 
evil,  and  the  very  serious  consequences  incident  to  it.  It  can  not  be 
too  much  pressed,  that  the  justice  and  friendship  of  France,  in  relation 
to  our  rights  and  interests  on  the  Mississippi,  will  be  the  principal 
rules  by  which  we  shall  measure  her  views  respecting  the  United  States, 
and  by  which  the  United  States  will  shape  the  course  of  their  future 
policy  toward  her. 

We  are  still  ignorant  of  the  result  of  the  armed  negotiations  between 
Great  Britain  and  France.  Should  it  be  war,  or  should  the  uncer 
tainty  of  the  result  be  spun  out,  the  crisis  may  be  favorable  to  our 
just  rights  and  our  just  objects;  and  the  President  assures  himself  that 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  203 

the  proper  use  will  be  made  of  it.     Mr.  Monroe's  arrival  has  not  yet 
been  mentioned  in  any  accounts  which  have  not  been  contradicted. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  &c. 

JAMES  MADISON. 
ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON,  Esq. 


Mr.  Monroe  to  the  Virginia  Senators.  » 

PARIS,  May  #5,  1803. 

GENTLEMEN, — We  have  as  you  will  find  concluded  a  treaty  &  two 
conventions  with  this  Government  for  the  cession  of  the  whole  of 
Louisiana.  I  flatter  myself  that  the  terms  will  be  thought  reasonable 
when  compared  with  the  immense  advantages  resulting  from  acquisi 
tion.  The  subject  however  will  be  before  you,  &  it  belongs  to  the 
suitable  authorities  to  decide  whether  we  have  acquitted  ourselves  with 
propriety  in  the  trust  reposed  in  us.  I  consider  this  transaction  as 
resulting  from  the  wise  &  firm  tho'  moderate  measures  of  the  Executive 
and  Congress  during  the  last  session.  Without  these  measures  we 
should  not  have  acquired  Louisiana.  The  pressure  of  the  crisis  here, 
but  an  approaching  rupture  with  England,  assisted  in  producing  the 
result,  but  had  our  country  not  formed  a  character,  or  rather  a  prom 
inent  feature  in  the  transactions  of  the  day,  it  would  not  have  taken 
place.  Nor  could  it  have  succeeded  so  promptly  or  advantageously, 
by  taking  any  other  attitude  than  that  which  was  taken.  Had  we 
broken  the  pacific  relations  subsisting  between  these  countries  &  the 
United  States,  or  indeed  had  not  a  respect  for  this  Government,  and 
a  desire  to  preserve  peace  with  it,  been  clearly  marked  in  our  meas 
ures  I  do  not  think  that  we  should  have  brought  it  to  the  issue  we 
have.  It  is  proper  that  you  should  possess  a  correct  knowledge  of 
the  facts  here  which  led  to  this  result.  Tjirriv^  it  TTpynn  nn  f tin  •* 
_&th  of  April,  which  fact  was  known  here  on  the  9th.  On  the  10th 
this  Ga^crmiicnt  resolved  to  offer  us  by  sale  the  whole  of  Louisiana, 
at  a  certain  price,  which  was  diminished  by  the  negotiation.  On 
the  1^.  I  arrived  in  town,  on  the  14th  was  received  by  the  minister, 
recognized  by  him,  by  order  of  the  First  Consul  &  informed  that 
"aTtho  I  might  not  be  presented  to  the  Consul  till  the  audience  day 
according  to  usage,  that  a  person  would  be  appointed  to  treat  with 
us  with  whom  we  might  proceed  in  the  interim.  This  was  accord 
ingly  done,  Mr.  Marbois  was  appointed,  the  negotiations  immediately 
commenced,  &  brought  to  as  speedy  a  conclusion  as  possible.  The 
"decision  to  offer  us  the  territory  by  sale  was  not  the  effect  of  any 
management  of  mine,  for  it  took  place  before  I  reached  Paris;  nor  of 
my  colleague  or  it  would  have  taken  place  sooner:  Being  postponed 
until  my  arrival  in  France  or  indeed  till  the  mission  was  known,  is  a 


204  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

full  proof  that  it  was  the  result  of  the  causes  above  mentioned  &  of 
those  only.  I  enclose  you  a  copy  of  a  letter  from  Mr.  Livingston 
bearing  date  on  the  10th  of  April,  in  answer  to  one  from  me  of  the  8th 
announcing  my  arrival,  which  establishes  the  above  facts.  I  com 
municate  this  letter  to  you  as  a  measure  of  precaution,  that  you  may 
not  only  know  that  the  above  facts  exist  but  the  nature  of  the  evidence 
which  supports  them.  Had  the  measures  of  our  government,  of  which 
my  mission  was  only  a  subaltern  part,  failed,  whether  the  failure 
might  be  atributed  to  their  impolicy,  or  to  such  a  delay  on  my  part  as 
suffered  the  crisis  with  England  to  pass,  all  the  responsibility  would 
have  been  on  the  government  &  myself.  It  is  equally  just  in  refer 
ence  to  the  result  that  facts  should  be  correctly  known  to  guard  against 
misrepresentation.  Personally  I  pretend  to  nothing1  but  zeal  &  indus 
try  after  I  got  here,  a  merit  which  is  equally  duo  to  my  colleague.  If 
my  mission  produced  any  effect  it  was  owing  altogether  to  the  motive 
wThich  induced  the  President  to  nominate  me,  that  is,  the  pronounced 
character  which  I  had  in  reference  to  the  object  in  question,  &  the 
belief  that  I  would  bring  the  affair  promptly  to  an  issue.  It  is  toj)c 
presumed  that  the  transaction  will  rest  on  its  true  ground  in  the  United 
Stales,  hut  as  the  contrary  may  be  the  case  &  it  is  impossible  to  foresee 
what  misrepresentations  may  be  given  of  it,  or  the  ends  that  may  be 
intended  to  subserve,  I  think  it  not  only  justifiable  but  a  duty  to  make 
to  you  this  communication.  You  will  consider  the  letter  itself  as 
strictly  confidential  since  altho'  it  is  proper  to  communicate  it  to  a  few 
from  whom  it  is  my  custom  to  withhold  nothing,  yet  it  would  be  other 
wise  if  it  should  go  further,  for  reasons  that  will  readily  occur.  It  is 
proper  to  add  that  I  expect  no  misrepresentation  from  my  colleague 
&  that  I  am  happy  to  have  it  in  my  power  to  boar  testimony  in  the 
most  explicit  manner  in  favor  of  his  zealous,  sincere  &  diligent 
co-operation  thro'  the  whole  of  this  business. 


Mr.  Madison  to  Messrs.  Livingston  and  Monroe. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  May  (2S,  1803. 

GENTLEMEN:  Since  my  last,  which  was  of  April  18,  the  tenor  of 
information  from  France  and  Great  Britain  renders  a  war  between 
these  Powers  in  the  highest  degree  probablo.  It  may  be  inferred,  at 
the  same  time,  from  the  information  given  by  Mr.  Livingston  and  Mr. 
King,  that  the  importance  of  the  United  States  is  rising  fast  in  the 
estimation  both  of  the  French  and  the  British  Cabinets;  and  that  Louisi 
ana  is  as  much  a  subject  of  solicitude  with  the  latter,  as  it  has  been  an 
object  of  acquisition  with  the  former.  The  crisis  presented  by  this 
jealous  and  hostile  attitude  of  those  rival  Powers  has,  doubtless,  hoon 
seen  in  its  bearing's  on  the  arrangements  contemplated  in  your  commis- 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  205 

sions  and  instructions;  and  it  is  hoped,  though  we  have  not  yet  heard, 
that  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Monroe  will  have  taken  place  in  time  to  give 
full  advantage  to  the  means  of  turning  the  actual  state  of  things  to  the 
just  benefit  of  the  United  States. 

The  solicitude  of  England  with  respect  to  Louisiana  is  sufficiently 
evinced  by  her  controlling  the  French  expedition  from  Holland  to  that 
country.  But  her  views  have  been  particularly  unfolded  to  Mr.  King 
by  Mr.  Addington,  who  frankly  told  him,  that,  in  case  a  war  should 
happen,  it  would,  perhaps,  be  one  of  their  first  steps  to  occupy  New 
Orleans;  adding,  that  it  would  not  be  to  keep  it,  for  that  England 
would  not  accept  the  country  were  all  agreed  to  give  it  to  her,  but  to 
prevent  another  Power  from  obtaining  it,  which,  in  his  opinion,  would 
be  best  effected  by  its  belonging  to  the  United  States;  and  concluding 
with  assurances  that  nothing  should  be  done  injurious  to  their  inter 
ests.  If  the  councils  of  Erance  should  be  guided  by  half  the  wisdom 
which  is  here  displayed  on  the  part  of  her  rival,  3- our  negotiations  will 
be  made  very  easy,  and  the  result  of  them  very  satisfactory. 

Although  the  immediate  object  of  Great  Britain  in  occupying  New 
Orleans  may  be  that  of  excluding  France,  and  although  her  prudence 
may  renounce  the  falacious  advantage  of  retaining  it  for  herself,  it  is 
not  to  be  presumed  that  she  will  yield  it  to  the  United  States  without 
endeavoring  to  make  it  the  ground  of  some  arrangement  that  will 
directly  or  indirectly  draw  them  into  her  war,  or  of  some  important 
concessions  in  favor  of  her  commerce,  at  the  expense  of  our  own. 
This  consideration  necessarily  connects  itself  with  the  explanation  and 
friendly  assurances  of  Mr.  Addington,  and  so  far  leaves  in  force  the 
inducement  to  accomplish  our  object  by  an  immediate  bargain  with 
France. 

In  forming  this  bargain,  however,  the  prospect  held  out  by  the 
British  Minister,  with  the  nature  of  the  crisis  itself,  authorizes  us  to 
expect  better  terms  than  your  original  instructions  allow. 

The  President  thinks  it  will  be  ineligible,  under  such  circumstances, 
that  any  convention  whatever  on  the  subject  should  be  entered  into, 
that  will  not  secure  to  the  United  States  the  jurisdiction  of  a  reasonable 
district  on  some  convenient  part  of  the  bank  of  the  Mississippi. 

He  is  made  the  more  anxious,  also,  by  the  manner  in  which  the 
British  Government  has  opened  itself  to  our  Minister,  as  well  as  by 
other  considerations,  that  as  little  concession  as  possible  should  be 
made  in  the  terms  with  France,  on  points  disagreeable  to  Great  Britain, 
and  particularly  that  the  acknowledgement  of  the  right  of  France  as 
holding  one  shore  of  the  Mississippi,  to  shut  it  against  British  vessels, 
should  be  avoided,  if  not  essential  to  the  attainment  of  the  great  objects 
we  have  in  view,  on  terms  otherwise  highly  expedient.  It  is  desirable 
that  such  an  acknowledgement  should  not  even  be  admitted  into  the 
discussion. 


206  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

The  guaranty  of  the  country  beyond  the  Mississippi  is  another  con 
dition  which  it  will  be  well  to  avoid  if  possible,  not  only  for  the 
reasons  you  already  possess,  but  because  it  seems  not  improbable,  from 
the  communications  of  Mr.  King,  that  Great  Britain  is  meditating 
plans  for  the  emancipation  and  independence  of  the  whole  of  the 
American  continent  south  of  the  United  States,  and  consequently,  that 
such  a  guaranty  would  not  only  be  disagreeable  to  her  but  embarrass 
ing  to  the  United  States.  Should  war,  indeed,  precede  your  conven 
tional  arrangements  with  France,  the  guaranty,  if  admitted  at  all, 
must  necessarily  be  suspended  and  limited  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be 
applicable  only  to  the  state  of  things  which  may  be  fixed  by  a  peace. 

The  proposed  occupancy  of  New  Orleans  by  Great  Britain  suggests 
a  further  precaution.  Should  possession  be  taken  by  her,  and  the  pre 
liminary  sum  of  two  millions,  or  any  part  of  it,  be  paid  to  France, 
risks  and  disputes  might  ensue,  which  make  it  advisable  to  postpone 
the  payment  till  possession  shall  be  given  to  the  United  States,  or,  if 
this  can  not  be  done,  to  obtain  every  possible  security  against  eventual 
loss. 

As  the  question  may  arise,  how  far,  in  a  state  of  war,  one  of  the 
parties  can,  of  right,  convey  territory  to  a  neutral  Power,  and  thereby 
deprive  its  enemy  of  the  chance  of  conquest  incident  to  war,  especially 
when  the  conquest  may  have  been  actually  projected,  it  is  thought 
proper  to  observe  to  you,  first,  That,  in  the  present  case,  the  project 
of  peaceable  acquisition  by  the  United  States  originated  prior  to  the 
war,  and  consequently,  before  a  project  of  conquest  could  have  existed; 
second,  That  the  right  of  a  neutral  to  procure  for  itself,  by  a  bonafide 
transaction,  property  of  any  sort,  from  a  belligerent  Power,  ought  not 
to  be  frustrated  by  the  chance  that  a  rightful  conquest  thereof  might 
thereby  be  precluded.  A  contrary  doctrine  would  sacrifice  the  just 
interests  of  peace  to  the  unreasonable  pretensions  of  war,  and  the 
positive  rights  of  one  nation  to  the  possible  rights  of  another.  A 
restraint  on  the  alienation  of  territory  from  a  nation  at  war  to  a  nation 
at  peace  is  imposed  only  in  cases  where  the  proceeding  might  have  a 
collusive  reference  to  the  existence  of  the  war,  and  might  be  calcu 
lated  to  save  the  property  from  danger,  by  placing  it  in  a  secret  trust, 
to  be  reconveyed  on  the  return  of  peace.  No  objection  of  this  sort 
can  be  made  to  the  acquisitions  we  have  in  view.  The  measures  on 
this  subject  were  taken  before  the  existence  or  the  appearance  of  war, 
and  they  will  be  pursued  as  the^y  were  planned,  with  the  Txmafide  pur 
pose  of  vesting  the  acquisition  forever  in  the  United  States. 

With  these  observations  you  will  be  left  to  do  the  best  you  can 
under  all  circumstances,  for  the  interest  of  A7our  country,  keeping  in 
mind  that  the  rights  we  assert  are  clear;  that  the  objects  we  pursue 
are  just;  and  that  you  will  be  warranted  in  providing  for  both,  by 
taking  every  fair  advantage  of  emergencies. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  207 

For  the  course  of  information  relating  to  the  deposit  at  New  Orleans, 
I  refer  you  to  my  letter  of  the  25th  instant  to  Mr.  Livingston. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  &c., 

JAMES  MADISON. 


The  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations  to  Mr.  Livingston. 

PARIS,  llth  Prairial,  an  11  (May  30,  1803). 

SIR:  The  declaration  published  the  17th  of  May  by  the  English  Gov 
ernment;  the  embargo  laid  in  the  ports  of  England  on  the  commerce 
of  the  French,  and  of  the  Batavians,  and  of  other  allies  of  the  Repub 
lic;  the  letters  of  marque  distributed  to  privateers,  authorizing  them 
to  cruise  against  the  commerce  of  France;  the  capture,  in  fine,  of  two 
vessels,  made  some  leagues  from  Brest,  by  two  English  frigates; 
permit  a  doubt  to  exist  no  longer  concerning  the  intention  of  the 
Government  of  Great  Britain. 

The  First  Consul  is  persuaded  that  nothing  can  be  wanting  to"  con- 
vince  all  the  Governments  of  Europe  of  the  hostile  dispositions  of 
His  Britannic  Majesty.  To  manifest  his  own,  it  is  only  this  day  he 
publishes  the  resolution  which  honor  extorts,  to  repulse  an  unjust 
aggression. 

In  informing  your  Government  of  this  determination,  you  will  find 
it,  I  have  no  doubt,  already  apprized  of  the  justice  of  our  claims  by 
the  publication,  made  in  France,  of  the  papers  which  this  discussion 
has  elicited. 

The  history  of  diplomatic  relations  has  never  presented,  on  the  one 
side,  more  constant  efforts  to  preserve  peace;  and,  on  the  other,  a 
more  persevering  desire,  by  any  means  and  every  pretext,  to  rekindle 
the  war. 

The  English  Government,  even  in  the  publication  which  has  been 
ordered  for  the  purpose  of  defending  her  conduct,  has  only  made  her 
injustice  the  more  apparent.  The  declaration  of  war  is  in  palpable 
contradiction  of  the  official  correspondence  which  follows  it.  This 
declaration  assigns  as  a  motive  for  the  war,  demands  of  which  the 
French  Government  has  been  always  ignorant,  and  complaints  of 
which  it  was  only  apprized  b}^  the  hostilities  and  Manifesto  of  England. 

I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  to  you  an  exact  copy  of  one  of  the  let 
ters  of  Lord  Whitworth,  the  original  of  which  has  been  communicated 
to  your  Excellency.  This  note  contains  a  false  allegation,  which  it  has 
thought  proper  to  expunge  from  the  copy  submitted  to  the  British 
Parliament.  By  comparing  this  falsified  copy  with  the  original  text, 
your  Excellency  will  be  convinced  that  the  British  Ministry  could  find 
no  other  means  to  escape  the  condemnation  of  Europe  than  that  of 
concealing  an  official  untruth  under  a  Parliamentary  imposture. 

The  First  Consul  flatters  himself  with  the  belief  that  the  Govern- 


208  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

mentis  of  Europe  will  not  hesitate  to  pronounce  that  France  has  been 
uniformly  loyal  in  a  just  cause;  and  that  amidst  the  unjust  pretensions 
of  England,  she  has  involuntarily  imposed  upon  herself  the  necessity 
of  adopting  measures  destitute  of  propriety,  and  making  declarations 
in  violation  of  good  faith. 

Accept,  sir,  the  assurances  of  my  high  consideration. 

CH.  MAIL  TALLEYRAND. 


Mr.  Livingston  to  the  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations. 

n    c     p    o    -    5"  (e  $ 

PARIS,  June  0,  1803. 

SIR:  I  have  received  the  letter  you  did  me  the  honor  to  write  on  the 
llth  Prairial,  announcing  the  measures  that  have  unfortunately  led  to 
a  rupture  between  France  and  Britain.  I  shall  transmit  the  same, 
together  with  the  papers  that  accompany  it,  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  who  will  doubtless  learn  with  much  pain  the  circum 
stances  that  have  rekindled  the  flame  of  war  in  Europe;  and  while  they 
sincerely  regret  that  the  measures  pursued  by  the  First  Consul  for  the 
preservation  of  the  peace  which  Europe  owes  to  his  humanity  have 
failed  of  success,  they  will  still  hope  that  some  expedient  may  be  found 
for  stopping  the  effusion  of  blood  and  restoring  that  repose  to  Europe 
for  which  she  so  ardently  sighs. 

I  pray  your  Excellency  to  accept  the  assurances  of  my  high  consid 
eration. 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  Mr.  Madison. 

PARIS,  June  3,  .1803. 

SIR:  Mr.  Monroe  having  undertaken  to  write  our  joint  letter,  I  shall 
confine  this  to  objects  that  do  not  relate  to  the  treaty.  I  would  only 
observe  to  you  that,  since  the  ratification,  we  have  had  a  great  deal  of 
trouble  with  it,  an  opinion  prevailing  that  we  have  made  too  favorable 
a  bargain.  My  letter  to  the  President  and  our  joint  letter  will  so  fully 
explain  this  extraordinary  business  as  to  make  any  further  observa 
tions  unnecessary.  I  must,  however,  earnestly  press  you,  if  you 
think  the  object  important,  to  get  the  ratification  as  soon  as  possible, 
and  to  do  all  that  on  our  part  remains  to  be  done. 

During  this  transaction,  I  have  thought  it  improper  to  press  any 
other  business  that  might  excite  the  smallest  irritation. 

How  happy,  my  dear  sir,  are  we  to  have  concluded  a  treaty  which 
will  forever  exclude  us  from  the  politics  of  this  stormy  quarter  of  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  209 

globe.  I  hope  that  you  will  not  let  it  totally  pass  through  your  hands. 
My  letter  to  the  President  will  fully  explain  this.  Some  commercial 
arrangements  might  be  advantageously  proposed  here  in  the  present 
state  of  things,  had  I  your  instructions  thereon  and  the  necessary 
powers.  This,  too,  is  the  moment  to  arrange  the  affair  of  extra  duty 
with  Batavia;  and  it  might,  I  believe,  be  done  here  advantageously. 

General  Bernadotte,  after  waiting  for  weeks  at  Rochefort,  has 
returned  here,  and  I  think  it  probable  will  not  go  out  now,  as  his  serv 
ices  may  be  required  at  home.  Who  will  be  appointed  in  his  place  I 
know  not.  Otto  is  still  without  office,  but  does  not  wish  to  be  sent 
across  the  Atlantic. 

I  am,  &c.,  R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

Hon.  JAMES  MADISON. 


Messrs.  Livingston  and  Monroe  to  Mr.  Madison. 


SIR:  We  had  the  pleasure  to  forward  to  you  by  Mr.  Jay,  the  ratifi 
cation  by  the  First  Consul  of  the  treaty  and  conventions  which  we 
concluded  on  the  30th  of  April  with  this  Republic.  We  have  hereto 
fore  forwarded  to  you  the  original  instruments,  and  two  copies  by 
different  ways,  the  original  by  Havre,  under  the  care  of  Mr.  Hughes, 
who  sailed  about  two  weeks  since,  expressly  charged  with  that  object,  and 
instructed  to  proceed  with  the  greatest  possible  despatch  after  his 
arrival  in  the  United  States,  to  the  City  of  Washington,  to  deliver  the 
same  in  person;  the  second  by  the  way  of  England,  under  the  care  of 
Mr.  Reed,  son  of  the  late  President  of  Pennsylvania,  who  was  instructed 
to  forward  it  immediately  on  his  arrival  in  England,  by  the  most 
prompt  and  safe  opportunity  that  offered;  the  third  by  Mr.  Derieux, 
who  sailed  from  Bordeaux.  We  flatter  ourselves  that  you  will  receive 
those  several  communications  in  the  course  of  the  present  month,  and 
this  by  Mr.  Jay  early  in  July,  as  it  is  highly  important  that  our  Gov 
ernment  should  receive  and  act  on  the  subject  of  them  as  soon  as  pos 
sible.  The  command  of  the  sum  stipulated  for  the  cession  to  be  paid 
to  this  Government  being  an  object  with  them,  is  a  motive  for  des 
patch,  but  it  is  not  the  only  one:  a  late  occurrence,  which  is  suggested 
by  the  enclosed  letter  from  M.  Marbois,  and  our  reply  to  it,  has 
excited  an  anxiety  on  that  point,  which  it  was  hoped  and  believed 
would  not  have  grown  out  of  the  transaction.  Several  circumstances 
of  late,  especially  the  delay  in  granting  us  a  passport  for  Mr.  Jay  to 
carry  the  ratifications  to  the  United  States,  surprised  us.  We  thought 
we  could  discern  some  symptoms  of  discontent  in  the  Government 
with  the  bargain  it  had  made.  The  letter  from  M.  Marbois  left  no 
doubt  on  that  head.  \Ve  are  convinced  that  if  the  transaction  was  not 


H.  Doc.  431  -  U 


2JIO  .^      PURCHASE    OF  -THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

complete,  or  was  within  the  reach  of  the  Gove^nuieutr,tkaLit  would 
not  take  place  even  on  terms  very  different  from  those  stipulated!" 
There  is  much  reason  to  believe  that  this  letter  was  not  written  solely 
for  the  purpose  of  manifesting  a  sentiment  of  regret  at  what  had  been 
done,  but  to  create  difficulties  and  embarrass  the  transaction  in  the 
execution  of  it. 

T)n  receiving  this  letter,  Ave  found  ourselves  placed  in  a  situation  of 
peculiar  embarrassment,  from  personal  as  well  as  public  considera 
tions,  which  was  much  increased  by  a  conference  with  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs.  We  learned  from  him  that  the  Consul  considered  the 
ratification  as  under  his  control  till  the  exchange  took  place,  and  that 
he  might  annex  to  it  such  conditions  as  appeared  to  him  to  be  proper; 
that  he  claimed  every  act  stipulated  on  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
to  be  performed  strictly  within  the  terms  specified,  or,  on  failure,  that 
the  parties  be  restored  to  the  state  they  were  in  if  the  treaties  were 
never  made.  We  asked  him  what  had  created  any  doubt  on  that  point: 
he  said  that  the  clause  in  the  article  of  the  convention  respecting  the 
payment  of  sixty  millions  of  francs  to  France,  which  was  made 
dependent  on  the  delivery  of  possession  of  the  country  to  our  Com 
missary,  might,  by  accident  or  other  causes,  become  nugatory;  the 
Spaniards  might  not  surrender  it  at  once,  the  British  might  take  it, 
&c.  We  told  him  that  these  things  were  contemplated  by  the  parties 
when  the  treaties  were  made,  and  provided  for;  that  we  could  not  add 
a  new  article  to  the  treaty,  or  explain  any  one  in  it,  since  it  must  be 
explained  by  itself  only;  that  delays  which  proceeded  from  bad  faith 
were  those  only  for  which  our  Government  was  responsible;  that  such 
as  were  unavoidable  attached  to  them  no  blame,  and  could  not  affect 
the  treaty:  he  replied  that,  after  the  example  of  our  Government 
in  the  last  treaty,  the  Consul  might  nevertheless  annex  a  condition 
to  the  ratification  explanatory  of  his  sense  of  it,  which  he  would 
do  if  we  did  not  satisfy  him  either  with  respect  to  the  prompt  manner 
in  which  the  treaty  would  be  executed  by  our  Government,  or  agree 
to  expunge  the  terms  in  that  convention  which  respected  taking  posses 
sion  of  the  territory.  We  did  not  fail  to  remark  that  the  treaty  must 
stand  as  it  was  to  lie  adopted,  rejected,  or  modified,  by  the  parties 
having  the  right  to  do  the  same,  not  by  us.  Thus  the  affair  was  at  a 
stand  for  a  day  or  two,  and  it  remained  for  us  to  decide  what  course 
we  had  better  take  to  put  it  in  motion. 

After  viewing  it  in  all  the  lights  in  which  it  presented  itself  to  our 
minds,  we  thought  it  best  to  reply  to  M.  Marbois's  letter  in  the  terms 
of  that  which  is  enclosed,  which  you  will  perceive,  even  had  we  had 
the  power  to  modify  the  instruments  which  were  passed  and  beyond 
our  reach,  has  in  truth  not  affected  them  at  all:  the  principles  applied 
or  insisted  on  in  M.  Marbois's  letter  are  not  admitted.  We  state  that 
the  Government  is  bound  to  execute  the  treaty  and  conventions  in  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  211 

terms  specified,  which  is  no  more  than  those  instruments  state,  that 
our  Government  is  answerable  for  neglect,  and  by  strong  and  obvious 
implications  for  it  only,  which  is  the  doctrine  of  the  law  of  nations; 
and  even  in  that  case,  that  the  right  which  arises  from  it  of  declaring 
how  far  the  party  injured  will  be  bound  by  the  treaty,  is  reciprocal, 
since,  if  our  Government  is  willing  to  make  compensation  for  the 
injury  resulting  from  delay,  it  may  -equally  insist  on  it.  The  remain 
ing  sentence  in  the  letter  states  that  we  confine  ourselves  to  the  letter 
of  the  treaty,  by  Avhich  it  is  intended  to  exclude  the  construction  of 
either  party  as  the  rule  of  interpretation  for  the  other:  this  letter 
was  accepted  as  satisfactory,  and  will,  we  presume,  remove  every  dif 
ficulty  to  the  execution  of  the  treaty.  We  expect  the  order  for  the 
surrender  of  the  country  to  be  addressed  to  M.  Pichon,  in  Washington, 
to  be  executed  by  him  or  by  some  person  to  be  appointed  by  him, 
will  be  delivered  to  us  to-morrow,  and  that  Mr.  Jay  will  take  it  with 
him  with  the  ratification  the  day  after  to-morrow:  had  wre  pursued 
any  other  course,  it  is  not  easy  to  decide  what  the  effect  might  have 
been.  The  First  Consul  in  the  moment  of  chagrin  at  what  he  may 
consider  a  bad  bargain,  (but  which  we  think  a  good  one  for  him,  since 
he  had  better  have  given  it  away  than  held  it  with  the  expense  attend 
ing  the  establishment  by  troops,  which  might  occasion  variance  and 
wars  with  us,)  might  have  so  compromitted  himself  in  opposition  to  the 
measure,  as  to  have  made  the  transaction,  if  not  finally  defeat  the 
treaties,  a  cause  of  future  discontent  between  the  two  nations,  instead 
of  what  was  contemplated  by  it,  the  establishment  of  perpetual  peace, 
by  the  removal  of  every  existing  cause  of  variance  which  could  possi 
bly  disturb  it.  The  most  favorable  result  that  we  could  have  expected 
was,  that  the  ratification  would  have  been  forwarded  to  M.  Pichon,  with 
advice  of  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  First  Consul  with  the  treaties,  and 
his  desire  to  extricate  himself  from  them,  and  with  instructions  not  to 
exchange  the  ratifications,  if  any  circumstance  on  our  part,  under  the 
most  rigid  construction,  would  justify  it.  It  is  possible  this  may  be 
still  done:  nevertheless,  we  think  it  important  to  put  the  engagements 
in  a  train  of  execution,  without  exciting  ill-temper,  in  the  belief  that 
every  stipulation  may  be  executed  in  time,  and  that  should  the  con 
trary  occur  by  any  accident  or  misfortune,  it  was  the  surest  mode  to 
prevent  discussion  and  disagreement  in  the  sequel. 

1 1  is  our  earnest  wish  and  advice,  if  the  treaties  are  approved  by  the 
President,  that  he  convene  Congress  to  provide  the  funds  for  an 
inimediate  compliance  with  them.  It  is  best  to  leave  nothing  to  hazard. 
The  surrender  of  the  posts  ought  to  precede  the  creation  of  the  fund; 
but  as  there  will  be  no  doubt  on  that  point  after  taking  the  necessary 
measures,  we  would  consider  it  as  done,  and  act  accordingly.  If  we 
execute  our  part  strictly  within  the  terms  specified,  the  transaction  is 
at  an  end;  there  will  be  no  obstacle  from  this  quarter. 


212  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

We  shall  send  you  a  copy  of  Mr.  Baring's  contract  for  the  stock 
with  this  Government,  which  will  show  in  what  manner  the  payment 
is  to  be  made.  A  third  of  the  whole  debt  is  to  be  advanced  to  him  in 
Washington;  the  remaining  two-thirds  to  be  sent  here  immediately. 
It  was  contended  lately  that  these  two-thirds  must  be  received  here  in 
three  months  after  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  but  that  seems  to  be 
given  up  at  present,  since  the  term  transfer  being  technical,  and  appli 
cable  to  an  act  to  be  performed  in  our  Treasury,  and  nowhere  alse,  it  is 
admitted  that  it  must  have  been  used  by  us  in  that  sense  only.  Still 
it  is  much  to  be  wished  that  the  certificates  might  be  sent  here  within 
the  three  months,  if  possible,  and  which  is  presumed  may  be  done  if 
the  Congress  is  immediately  convened. 

After  the  funds  are  created  and  transferred  in  our  Treasury,  it  is,  by 
the  spirit  of  the  treaty,  the  duty  of  the  French  Minister  to  forward 
them  here.  But  it  is  much  to  be  desired  that  our  Government  would 
undertake  that  service,  and  forward  thorn  by  a  public  vessel,  to  guard 
against  accidents  which  might  create  delay.  Should  it  happen,  unfor 
tunately,  that  the  ratification  or  creation  of  the  public  stock  should  be 
protracted  beyond  the  term  specified,  we  think  the  cause  should  be 
made  known  by  a  public  vessel,  with  the  assurance  of  the  President 
that  every  injury  resulting  from  it  should  be  repaired,  and  ample  com 
pensation  made  for  it.  We  can  not  too  strongly  impress  an  idea,  if 
our  conduct  is  approved,  of  the  most  prompt  execution  of  the  stipula 
tions  to  be  formed  on  our  part,  and  of  a  course  of  proceeding  which 
leaves  nothing  to  chance,  by  giving  any  cause  of  complaint  to  this 
Government. 

We  are  happy  to  have  it  in  our  power  to  assure  you,  that,  on  a  thor 
ough  examination  of  the  subject,  we  consider  it  incontrovertible  that 
West  Florida  is  comprised  in  the  cession  of  Louisiana.  West  Florida 
was  a  part  of  Louisiana  when  it  was  in  the  hands  of  France,  and  it  was 
not  in  her  hands  in  any  other  situation.  The  transfer  of  the  whole 
was  on  the  same  day,  the  3d  of  November,  17(52,  that  being  the  day 
of  the  secret  convention  between  France  and  Spain,  and  of  the  pre 
liminary  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  the  10th  Februaiy,  1763,  between 
those  Powers  and  Great  Britain.  The  Treaty  of  1783  between  Britain 
and  Spain,  by  which  the  Floridas  were  ceded  to  the  latter,  put  Loui 
siana  in  her  hands  in  the  same  state  it  was  in  the  hands  of  France;  and 
the  remaining  or  third  member  of  the  article  in  the  Treaty  of  St. 
Ildefonso  between  France,  and  Spain,  under  which  we  claim,  by 
referring  to  that  of  1783,  (as  to  that  between  Spain  and  the  United 
States  of  1795,)  and  of  course  in  the  above  character,  only  tends  to  con 
firm  this  doctrine.  We  consider  ourselves  so  strongly  founded  in 
this  conclusion,  that  we  are  of  opinion  the  United  States  should  acton 
it  in  all  the  measures  relative  to  Louisiana,  in  the  same  manner  as  if 
West  Florida  was  comprised  within  the  island  of  New  Orleans;  or,  lay 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  213 

to  the  west  of  the  river  Iberville,  and  to  the  Lakes  through  which  its 
waters  pass  to  the  ocean.  Hence  the  acquisition  becomes  of  propor 
tionally  greater  value  to  the  United  States. 

In  compliance  with  the  convention,  which  provides  for  the  payment 
of  the  debts  due  by  France  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  we 
have  organized  a  board  of  three  Commissioners,  whose  duty  it  is  to 
revise  the  claims  that  are  or  may  be  liquidated  by  the  suitable  depart 
ment  of  the  French  Government,  according  to  the  principles  of  that 
convention.  We  have  appointed  to  this  office  Col.  John  Mercer,  Isaac 
C.  Barnet,  and  William  McClure,  three  of  our  citizens,  who  are  not 
interested  in  any  of  the  claims;  and  who,  for  ability,  probity,  and 
industry,  we  think  very  deserving  of  the  trust.  Their  appointment 
is,  of  course,  provisional  only,  subject  to  the  approbation  of  the  Presi 
dent,  whose  disposition  on  the  subject  you  will  be  pleased  to  com 
municate.  We  shall  advance  them  a  sum,  by  a  draft  on  our  bankers 
in  Holland,  necessary  for  defraying  their  current  expenses;  leaving  it 
to  our  Government  to  fix  the  rate  of  compensation. 

We  consider  it  important  that  the  stock  to  be  created  should  not  be 
brought  on  the  American  market,  nor,  indeed,  strictly  speaking,  on 
the  European  market;  lest  it  might  occasion  a  decline  in  the  price,  to 
the  injury  of  our  credit,  and  the  injury  of  the  holders  of  it  here  and 
there,  as  well  as  of  France,  with  whom  we  have  a  joint  interest  in  that 
respect.  On  that  principle  we  promoted  the  disposal  of  it  to  the  com 
pany  of  Baring  and  Hope,  which  took  place  according  to  a  contract 
which  is  here  enclosed.  We  consider  the  arrangement  as  accomplish 
ing  the  object  referred  to,  and,  in  that  light,  as  being  advantageous  to 
the  United  States.  We  were  not  competent  judges  of  the  price  at 
which  the  stock  ought  to  have  sold,  on  which  account,  as  well  as  that 
that  was  a  question  which  belonged  more  peculiarly  to  the  Govern 
ment  of  France  to  attend  to,  we  did  not  interfere  further  in  the  trans 
action  than  to  communicate  to  the  latter  the  best  information  that  we 
possessed.  We  believe  the  contract  is  such  as,  while  it  gives  to  the 
company  an  adequate  profit,  and  may  prevent  sales  by  compulsion, 
will  prove  more  beneficial  to  France  than  any  other  disposition  she 
could  have  made  of  it.  It  is  a  justice  due  to  this  house  to  remark, 
that  the  assurances  which  we  received  from  it  through  its  agent 
here,  of  the  advances  of  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United  States,  in 
case  we  should  require  them  in  the  execution  of  the  trust  reposed  in 
us,  inspired  us  with  greater  confidence  than  we  might  otherwise  have 
felt,  to  make  the  engagements  we  have  entered  into. 

We  are,  with  great  respect  and  esteem,  }Tour  most  obedient 
servants, 

It.  It.  LIVINGSTON. 
JAMES  MONROE. 

P.  S.—  Since  writing  the  above,  this  Government  has,  of  its  own 
accord,  restored  our  letter  and  retaken  its  own.  It  has  also  shown  to 


214  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

us  the  instructions  given  to  M.  Pichon,  which  is  substituted  for  the 
other  measure,  and  amounts  to  this:  that,  on  exchanging1  the  ratifica 
tions,  he  is  to  declare  that  they  are  void  if  the  funds,  &c.,  are  not 
created  by  our  Government  in  the  term  stipulated.  It  is  possible  that 
this  Government  is  fearful  that  the  British  may  take  the  territory,  and 
we,  in  consequence,  delay  the  payment;  though  we  rather  think  that 
the  hesitation  and  procedure  arose  from  some  sentiment  relative  to  the 
contract.  It  is  known  that  the  Consul  has  said  lately,  that  he  thought 
the  territory  worth  three  or  four  hundred  millions  of  livres.  The 
above  change  is  the  effect  of  further  reflection  on  the  subject.  It  will 
be  well  that  some  of  these  circumstances  be  known,  and  that  nothing 
appear  under  the  sanction  of  the  Government  or  otherwise,  if  to  be 
avoided,  to  excite  an  unpleasant  sensation  here:  since  a  belief  they 
stand  well  with  us,  which  is  their  political  motive  in  the  transaction, 
will  contribute  greatly  to  reconcile  the  Government  and  nation  t'o  the 
cession,  and  promote  its  harmonious  execution. 

We  have  thought  it  advisable  to  employ  Mr.  Jay  to  bear  the  ratifi 
cations  of  the  First  Consul  to  our  Government;  to  whom  we  have 
advanced  fifty  louis,  and  undertaken  that  his  expenses  shall  be  borne. 
The  above  sum  to  that  object  are  credited  in  his  account.  The  ratifi 
cations  are  addressed  to  M.  Pichon,  as  is  the  order  for  the  surrender 
of  the  territory.  The  whole,  however,  is  under  our  -  -  to  be 

delivered  by  Mr.  Jay  to  you,  and  by  you  handed  over  to  M.  Pichon. 
The  exchange  of  ratifications  in  the  United  States  has  been  very 
favorable  to  us. 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 

JAMES  MONROE. 


M.  Marbois,  Minister  of  the  Public  Treasury,  to  Messrs.  Livingston  and 

C\    .  S,  <?   2  '.  rtr  Monroe. 

PARIS,  Wth  Floreal,  llth  year  (9th  April,  1803.} 
GENTLEMEN:  The  article  of  the  convention  relative  to  the  payment 
which  the  United  States  have  to  make  to  France,  in  three  months  at 
most  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaties,  and  after  the  taking  posses 
sion  of  Louisiana  in  the  name  of  the  United  States,  determines,  in  a 
precise  manner,  the  longest  terms  agreed  upon  for  the  consummation 
of  this  affair.  They  are  three  months  after  the  ratification  and  the 
taking  of  possession.  It  is  proper  to  foresee,  also,  the  case  in  which 
this  business  shall  not  be  consummated  within  the  interval  above 
expressed,  and  as  they  are  precise,  it  is  well  understood  that  every 
extraordinary  dela}7  beyond  the  terms  fixed  places  the  contracting 
parties  in  the  same  situation  as  if  they  had  never  treated.  These  con 
sequences  of  the  stipulations  agreed  upon  are  just  and  necessary.  It 
has,  nevertheless,  appeared  useful  to  recall  them  to  view,  in  consider- 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  215 

ation  of  the  great  distance  which  separates  the  parties  who  contract, 
and  that  no  doubt  may  be  raised  upon  this  subject.  I  have,  neverthe 
less,  gentlemen,  a  sure  guarantee  that  delays  will  be  abridged,  as  far 
as  circumstances  will  permit,  in  the  good  faith  which  has  presided  in 
this  negotiation  during  its  whole  continuance;  and  I  know  b\^  my  own 
and  old  experience,  that  it  will  be  consummated  by  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  according  to  these  same  principles. 

I  pray  you  to  accept  the  assurance  of  my  distinguished  consideration. 

BARBK  M ABBOTS. 


Messrs.  Livingston   and  Monroe  to  M.  Marbois,  Minister  of  the  Public 

Treasury.    I  *• 

t    fl     o     •      ^     to    b 

PARTS,  June  2,  1803. 

SIR:  We  have  received  the  letter  with  which  you  have  honored  us, 
dated  the  90th  Floreal.  Without  entering  into  the  principles  it  lays 
down,  we  are  ready  to  admit,  in  order  to  remove,  as  far  as  depends  on 
us,  all  difficulties,  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  to  carry  into  effect  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  and  conventions 
in  the  times  therein  specified;  and  that  any  neglect  on  their  part  so  to 
do,  puts  it  in  the  power  of  the  Government  of  France  to  declare  how 
far  it  will,  or  will  not,  be  bound  thereby,  or  entitle  it  to  a  compensa 
tion  for  the  damage  it  may  sustain.  We  will  observe,  sir,  that  in 
making  these  concessions,  we  mean  to  confine  ourselves  to  the  letter 
of  the  treaty. 

With  the  highest  respect,  &<•.,  R.  R.   LIVINGSTON, 

JAMES  MONROE. 


Mr.  Monroe  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 


VVv 


V  V.   i  PARTS,  8th  of  June  1803. 

SIR, — Since  my  letter  of  yesterda}7  I  have  had  an  interesting  com 
munication  with  the  Minister  of  foreign  affairs.  Our  letter  had  been 
restored  to  Mr.  Livingston  by  Mr.  Marbois  in  a  casual  interview  who 
also  shewed  him  the  order  to  Mr.  Pinchon,  which  was  substituted  for 
it.  To  see  that  order  and  receive  one  to  him  for  the  surrender  of  the 
country  to  the  United.  States,  I  called  yesterday  evening  by  appoint 
ment  on  the  Minister,  where  I  found  Mr.  Marbois  also.  They  had 
expected  Mr.  Livingston  and  myself  together,  but  on  my  observing 
that  we  had  not  so  understood  it,  he  having  already  seen  the  paper.  The 
Minister  read  the  order  to  me  and  asked  how  I  liked  it,  1  replied  that 
it  was  not  for  us  to  say,  it  being  the  act  of  his  government  only,  but 
says  he,  comparatively  which  do  you  prefer,  this  mode  or  the  other? 
I  replied  this  without  doubt.  He  said  it  was  on  the  idea  it  would  be 
more  agreeable  to  us  and  our  government  that  it  was  adopted,  since 
suppressing  our  letter  it  became,  as  it  ought  to  be.  entirely  the  act  of 


21<)  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

(the)  government  and  in  his  opinion  strictly  a  justifiable  one,  the  Con 
sul  having  a  right  to  annex  a  condition  to  the  ratification  in  the  spirit 
of  the  treaty  at  any  time  before  the  exchange.  1  told  him  that  having 
discussed  the  subject  already  I  had  only  to  repeat  that  I  preferred 
much  this  mode  to  the  other,  lie  added  that  he  hoped  no  difficulty 
would  take  place  hereafter;  that  we  had  sufficient  time  to  perform  what 
we  had  stipulated,  and  that  he  sincerely  wished  we  might  do  it  in  due 
time,  as  his  government  had  much  at  heart  the  future  harmony  of  the 
two  nations.  I  replied  that  similar  sentiments  animated  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States;  that  I  was  persuaded  the  treaty  would  be 
ifrtitied;  that  even  before  the  creation  of  the  stock  I  was  confident  that 
Abe  President  far  from  delaying  the  payment  of  what  was  stipulated, 
/would  if  (in)  his  power  after  the  ratification  promote  aid  which  might 
be  useful  to  them  in  the  United  States  to  evince  his  desire  of  a  prompt 
execution  of  the  treaty;  that  on  our  part  and  on  our  own  responsibility 
if  it  was  desired  we  would  prevail  on  the  house  of  Baring  and  Hope  to 
advance  the  first  payment,  that  is  six  millions  of  livres,  before  we  heard 
from  our  government,  in  confidence  that  our  conduct  would  be  approved. 
I  told  him  I  thought  my  colleague  would  unite  in  this  sentiment.  He 
expressed  himself  highly  gratified  with  the  communication,  which  he 
considered  as  a  strong  proof  of  the  friendship  of  the  government  of 
the  United  States  for  the  nation  and  government  of  France.  (He) 
declared  that  as  it  was  made  after  everything  was  concluded  it  was  the 
more  honorable  to  us,  and  would  affect  in  a  greater  degree  the  sensi- 
bilitv  of  the  First  Consul,  to  whom  he  would  make  it  known,  tho1  he 
knew  that  he  would  accept  nothing  but  as  it  became  due  in  strict  con 
formity  to  the  treaty.  I  should  deem  it  fortunate  for  the  United 
States  if  the  payment  was  made  as  being  an  act  of  liberality  on  our 
part,  and  in  the  degree  a  prompt  execution  of  the  treaty.  It  would 
bind  this  government  more  completely  to  the  execution  of  it  on  its 
part.  I  am  happy  however  that  the  offer  was  refused,  since  while  it 
cannot  fail  to  produce  a  good  effect,  it  avoids  all  responsibility  on  our 
part,  or  that  of  the  President,  tho'  indeed  in  the  payment  here  the 
responsibility  would  be  entirely  on  us.  It  is  proper  to  inform  you 
that  the  treaty  and  conventions  bear  date  from  the  period  when  (every)- 
thing  was  agreed  on,  the  thirtieth  of  April,  but  as  it  (was  necessary) 
to  reduce  them  to  writing  the  treaty  was  signed  on  the  second  of  May, 
and  the  convention  concerning  the  claims  of  our  citizens  the  ninth  or 
tenth  which  will  explain  why  they  were  not  sooner  despatched  from 
Paris.  I  am  sir  with  great  respect  &  esteem  yr.  ob*.  serv*. 


Mr.  Monroe  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 
-j*o 

PARIS  June  19,  1803. 

SIR, — We  have  recrt.  yr.  communications  of  the  18.  and  20.  of  April 
&  after  due  consideration  deem  it  most  advisable  that  I  shod.  proceed 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  217 

immediately  to  England.  The  departure  of  Mr.  King  from  that 
country  at  the  commencement  of  a  war  between  it  &  France,  without 
nominating  a  charge  des  affaires  may  expose  our  commercial  concerns 
to  much  embarrassment  if  there  is  no  one  there  soon  to  take  charge  of 
them.  The  arrangement  however  proposed  by  the  President  will 
probably  obviate  any  inconvenience  since  the  place  will  be  occupied 
in  a  fortnight  from  this  date.  I  am  happy  to  have  it  in  my  power  to 
add  that  the  state  in  which  our  affairs  are  here  admits  a  compliance 
with  this  arrangement  without  inconvenience  to  any  interest  of  a  pub- 
lick  nature.  Since  the  despatch  of  the  ratifications  of  the  treaty  &c, 
there  is  nothing  to  be  done  here  till  the  question  is  decided  by  our 
government,  nor  even  then  in  case  of  ratification,  as  the  instruments 
will  be  given  by  you  to  the  Minister  of  France  to  be  forwarded  to  his 
government  here.  It  is  only  in  case  of  difficulty  from  some  cause  or 
other,  that  the  commission  will  have  to  act  again  in  this  affair,  &  then 
it  will  be  in  your  power,  if  a  joint  agency  is  deemed  necessary  to  avail 
v'self  of  it,  by  suitable  instructions  to  the  members  who  compose  it. 
In  regard  to  Spain  it  is  not  likely  that  any  injury  can  result  from  the 
delay  which  becomes  inevitable  by  this  measure.  It  was  never  a  very 
clear  point  that XI  ought  to  pursue  the  object  with  that  power,  after 
what  was  done  here,  untill  I  heard  from  you.  The  motive  which 
inclined  me  to  it  at  first  diminished  daily  by  my  detention  here,  so 
that  your  late  instructions  arrived  in  good  time  to  relieve  me  from 
further  suspense.  My  visit  to  England  will  not  I  think  be  attributed 
by  this  gov*.  to  an  improper  motive.  It  seems  to  have  a  just 
view  of  the  policy  of  our  government  in  regard  to  both  powers, 
which  is  to  cultivate  their  friendship  by  fair  &  honorable  means 
while  it  pays  a  scrupulous  attention  &  maintains  with  firmness  the 
respect  which  is  due  to  our  national  character  rights  &  interests. 
My  position  in  England  will  not  prevent  my  attention  in  due  time  to 
the  object  with  Spain,  if  the  President  should  be  of  opinion  that  it 
might  be  useful.  I  have  suggested  to  this  government  the  probability 
of  my  being  instructed  by  him  to  pursue  that  object  with  that  power, 
after  the  decision  on  our  treaty  &c.  with  France,  in  which  case  I 
informed  the  Minister  that  I  shod.,  according  to  the  promise  made  to 
M1.  Livingston  and  myself  by  Mr.  Marbois,  expect  the  good  offices  of 
his  government  with  its  ally,  and  of  which  he  gave  me  the  most  posi 
tive  &  satisfactory  assurance.  On  this  subject  as  on  what  concerns  us 
more  generally  I  shall  write  you  hereafter  more  fully.  I  shall  only 
add  at  present  that  in  the  communications  which  have  passed  between 
this  government  &  myself  since  my  last,  to  which  this  incident  has  in 
part  given  the  occasion,  much  has  occurred  to  inspire  me  with  confi 
dence  in  its  friendly  disposition  towards  our  gov*.  &  country  and  in  a 
mode  that  could  not  otherwise  than  be  peculiarly  grateful  to  me.  I 
am  with  great  respect  &  esteem  yr.  most  oh*,  servant. 


218  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

P.  8.  I  have  sent  you  two  copies  of  the  view  1  have  taken  of  the 
question  whether  W.  Florida  is  comprized  in  the  cession  of  Louisiana, 
which  I  think  too  clear  to  admit  of  a  doubt.  1  have  many  reasons  for 
believing  that  the  gov*.  of  Spain  entertains  the  same  opinion  on  that 
point.  I  doubt  not  if  it  is  taken  possession  of  as  a  part  of  Louisiana, 
that  the  measure  will  be  acquiesced  in  by  that  gov'.,  or  at  least  that  it 
will  not  be  taken  ill  by  it,  or  impede  an  amicable  and  favorable  adjust 
ment  relative  to  the  territory  of  Spain  Eastward  of  the  Mississippi..  . 


Mr.  Monroe  to  Mr.  Livingston. 
Y3     /  :> 

(Reply  to  his  of  May  '28.) 

DEAR  SIR, — I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  23.  expressing  your 
idea  of  the  extent  of  the  acquisition  we  have  made  by  the  late  treaty 
with  France,  which  I  have  read  with  attention.  I  thank  you  for  the 
communication,  as  it  tends  to  throw  light  on  that  interesting  topic. 

Before  however  I  proceed  to  make  any  remark  on  that  subject  per 
mit  me  to  observe  that  I  am  sorry  I  cannot  agree  with  you  in  the  last 
sentiment  expressed  in  your  letter,  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  probe 
this  business  to  the  bottom  nor  until  future  circumstances  should 
render  it  proper.  Had  I  thought  so  I  should  not  have  asked  of  you 
3^our  ideas  on  paper  on  the  subject.  My  opinion  has  been  from  the 
moment  that  our  treaty  with  France  was  concluded,  that  it  was  my 
first  duty  to  ascertain  correctly  the  extent  of  that  acquisition,  by  ref 
erence  to  all  the  authentic  documents  to  which  access  could  be  had,  & 
such  other  sources  of  information  as  might  illustrate  it.  There  are  a 
variety  of  considerations  which  imposed  this  duty  on  me;  I  will  how 
ever  on\y  mention  that  which  grows  out  of  the  transaction  itself,  the 
propriety  of  communicating  to  our  government,  such  information  as 
we  possess  &  such  opinion  as  we  have  formed  of  the  extent  of  the 
acquisition.  This  consideration  is  much  strengthened  by  the  advice 
which  3^ou  propose  to  give  to  our  government  to  take  possession  of 
W.  Florida  as  a  part  of  Louisiana.  We  ought  not  to  give  such 
advice  till  we  had  probed  the  question  to  the  bottom,  and  seen  that  it 
was  founded  in  principles  of  Justice  such  as  could  be  demonstrated  to 
the  impartial  world,  even  to  Spain  herself.  Nor  can  I  agree  with 
you  that  my  motive  for  asking  your  ideas  on  that  subject  on  paper, 
was  because  I  had  not  leisure  to  examine  it  myself.  The  fact  is  I  was 
at  the  time  engaged  in  the  examination  of  it,  as  I  have  been  ever 
since,  and  with  the  greatest  attention  that  other  duties  would  permit, 
as  indeed  I  think  I  mentioned  to  you  at  the  time.  My  object  in  mak 
ing  the  request  was  that  we  might  examine  the  question  separately, 
compare  our  ideas  together  and  after  forming  our  opinions,  take  the 
course  which  in  reference  to  our  respective  duties  might  appear  to  be 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  219 

proper.  I  have  made  these  observations  solely  for  the  purpose  of 
explaining  to  you  the  motive  which  induced  me  to  make  the  above 
mentioned  request,  which  I  have  been  sorry  to  find  you  had  misunder 
stood. 

Having  aiso  examined  the  question  with  some  attention  and  com 
mitted  my  ideas  to  paper  1  shall  have  the  pleasure  to  communicate 
them  to  you  at  our  first  interview.  1  shall  only  observe  at  present 
that  we  perfectly  agree  in  the  opinion  that  Louisiana,  as  it  was  in  the 
hands  of  France  prior  to  the  year  1763,  extended  to  the  River  Perdigo, 
&  that  it  was  restored  to  her  by  Spain,  in  the  treaty  of  II  Dephonso, 
precisely  in  the  same  extent:  that  the  reservation  contained  in  the  last 
member  of  the  article,  which  respects  the  subject,  is  in  favor  of  the 
United  States  only,  intended  to  secure  their  rights  under  their  treaty 
with  Spain  in  1795.  I  also  think  with  you  that  the  communications  of 
the  Spanish  Minister  at  Madrid  to  Mr.  Pinckney  tend  to  confirm  this 
doctrine.  But  in  tracing  this  subject  under  the  several  treaties  which 
respect  it,  I  had  a  difficult}1-  on  a  point  which  appeared  to  me  to  be  of 
importance.  Did  France  disnxember  the  country  while  she  was  pos 
sessed  of  it?  it  is  not*  material  to  how  many  powers  she  granted  it 
provided  it  was  at  one  &  the  same  time,  that  is  that  it  did  not  remain 
her  propert}^  in  a  dismembered  state.  At  first  I  was  led  to  fear  that  a 
strong  argument  might  be  drawn  against  us  from  this  source.  The 
secret  treaty  by  which  New  Orleans  &  the  Western  bank  of  Louisiana 
was  ceded  to  Spain  bears  date  on  the  3rd  Nov.  1762;  the  order  of  the 
King  to  his  governor  for  the  surrender  of  it  on  the  21  April  1764  and 
the  actual  surrender  did  not  take  place  till  some  years  afterwards, 
according  to  one  of  the  papers  which  I  have  seen,  not  till  18  Augt  1769. 
The  treaty  between  France,  Great  Britain,  Spain  &c  by  which  the  part 
since  called  W.  Florida  was  ceded  to  Great  Britain  bears  date  on  the  10th 
Feby  1763.  1  presume  that  the  cession  of  a  country  takes  its  date  from 
the  treaty  making  the  cession,  not  from  the  surrender:  but  in  the 
present  case  whether  we  date  the  cession  referred  to,  under  the  secret 
treaty  of  '62,  to  Spain  from  the  one  or  the  other  epoch,  the  effect  would 
be  the  same.  If  these  were  the  only  facts  in  the  case,  it  might  be  said 
that  there  was  a  dismemberment  of  Louisiana  in  the  hands  of  France. 
Happily  these  are  not  the  only  facts  existing;  by  a  note  in  one  of  the 
books  I  have  obtained,  it  appears  that  the  preliminary  articles  of  the 
treaty  of  1763  were  actually  signed  on  the  same  day  with  the  secret 
convention  above  mentioned,  &  of  course  that  the  transfer  or  cession 
of  the  whole  country  by  France  was  made  on  the  same  day.  I  presume 
that  this  note  may  be  relied  on,  &  verified  by  reference  to  authentic 
documents,  to  which  access  may  be  had.  I  communicate  its  contents 
with  pleasure,  because  it  seems  to  place  beyond  all  controversy  our 
right  to  West  Florida  under  the  treaty  we  have  lately  formed  with 
France. 


220  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

[Extract,] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  Mr.  Madison. 

PARIS,  June  25,  1803. 

SIR:  I  have  received  your  letter  of  the—  —with  the  commissions, 
&c.  Before  this  reaches  you,  you  will  have  learned  that  they  were 
unnecessary,  as  they  respected  our  negotiations.  You  will  find,  by 
looking  back  to  my  letters,  that  I  had  long  anticipated  something  of 
this  kind,  and  I  was  greatly  surprised  when  Mr.  Monroe  came  without 
it.  I,  however,  in  all  my  conversations,  held  out  the  idea  very  strongly 
and  you  will  see  it  hinted  at  in  my  notes  and  in  my  letters  to  J.  B. ;  so 
that  it  doubtless  has  had  a  considerable  operation  in  bringing  this 
Government  to  the  resolution  they  took,  before  the  arrivral  of  Mr. 
Monroe,  to  part  with  Louisiana.  You  will  remember  that  in  one  of 
my  letters  I  request  you  to  set  on  foot  a  negotiation  with  Britain  for 
ascertaining  your  Northwestern  boundary,  but  not  to  come  to  a  con 
clusion.  Indeed,  as  I  was  at  that  time  endeavoring  to  excite  an  alarm 
here  that  should  put  us  in  possession  of  the  country  above  the  Arkansas, 
I  own  I  have  felt  very  much  distressed  that  I  never  found  any  of  these 
suggestions  noticed  or  encouraged  by  our  Government.  But  presum 
ing  always  that  they  ultimately  would  be,  1  have  carefully  concealed 
my  want  of  powers,  and  acted  as  decidedly  as  if  I  had  possessed  them; 
and  to  this,  as  well  as  to  the  firm  attitude  that  our  Government  took, 
you  may  attribute  the  success  of  our  negotiations.  1  hope  that  nothing 
will  prevent  your  immediate  ratification,  without  altering  a  syllable 
of  the  terms.  If  you  wish  anything  changed,  ratify  unconditional \y 
and  set  on  foot  a  new  negotiation.  Be  persuaded  that  France  is  sick 
of  the  bargain;  that  Spain  is  much  dissatisfied;  and  that  the  slightest 
pretense  will  lose  you  the  treaty.  Nothing  has  raised  the  reputation 
of  bur  country  in  Europe  so  high  as  the  conduct  of  our  Government 
upon  this  occasion,  both  at  home  and  abroad.  In  pursuance  of  the 
wish  expressed  in  your  letter,  Mr.  Monroe  proceeds,  in  a  few  days,  as 
your  resident  Minister  Plenipotentiary  to  England;  for  though  it  was 
doubtful  whether  this  was  or  was  not  intended  to  depend  upon  the  con 
tingency  mentioned  therein,  yet,  as  you  were  unrepresented  there,  and 
the  war  rendered  some  representation  necessary,  we  thought  it  most 
conformable  to  the  President's  intentions  that  he  should  go. 

I  am,  &c., 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 
Hon.  JAMES  MADISON, 

Secretary  of  State. 

2f,.  w  "^  -^  ^f  t ;, . 

President  Jefferson  to  General  Gates. 

WASHINGTON,  July  11,  1803. 

DEAR  GENERAL,— I  accept  with  pleasure,  and  with  pleasure  recip 
rocate  your  congratulations  on  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana;  for  it  is 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  221 

a  subject  of  mutual  congratulations,  as  it  interests  every  man  of  the 
nation.  T^he  territory  acquired,  as  it  includes  all  the  waters  of  the 
Missouri  and  Mississippi,  has  more  than  doubled  the  area  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  new  parts  is  not  inferior  to  the  old  in  soil,  cli 
mate,  productions  and  important  communications.  If  our  Legislature 
tepostTof  it  with  the  wisdom  we  have  a  right  to  expect,  they  may 
maKe"'It  the  means  of  tempting  all  our  Indians  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Mississippi  to  remove  to  the  west,  and  of  condensing  instead  of  scat- 
b?rfng  our  population.  I  find  our  opposition  is  very  willing  to  pluck 
Feathers  from  Monroe,  although  not  Fond  of  sticking  them  into  Liv 
ingston's  coat.  The  truth  is,  both  have  a  just  portion  of  merit;  and 
were  it  necessary  or  proper,  it  would  be  shown  that  each  has  rendered 
peculiar  services,  and  of  important  value.  These  grumblers,  too,  are 
very  uneasy  lest  the  administration  should  share  some  little  credit  for 
the  acquisition,  the  whole  of  which  they  ascribe  to  the  accident  of 
war.  They  would  be  cruelly  mortified  could  they  see  our  files  from 
May,  1801,  the  first  organization  of  the  administration,  but  more 
especially  from  April,  1802.  They  would  see,  that  though  we  could 
not  say  when  war  would  arise,  yet  we  said  with  energy  what  would 
take  place  when  it  should  arise.  We  did  not,  by  our  intrigues,  pro 
duce  the  war;  but  we  availed  ourselves  of  it  when  it  happened.  The 
other  party  saw  the  case  now  existing,  on  which  our  representations 
were  predicated,  and  the  wisdom  of  timely  sacrifice.  But  when  these 
people  make  the  war  give  us  everything,  they  authorize  us  to  ask 
what  the  war  gave  us  in  their  day?  They  had  a  war;  -what  did  they 
make  it  bring  us?  Instead  of  making  our  neutrality  the  ground  of 
gain  to  their  country,  they  were  for  plunging  into  the  war.  And  if 
they  were  now  in  place,  they  would  now  be  at  war  against  the  atheists 
and  disorganizes  of  France.  They  were  for  making  their  country 
an  appendage  to  England.  We  are  friendly,  cordially  and  eonscien->< 
tiously  friendly  with  England.  We  are  not  hostile  to  France.  We  ) 
will  be  rigorously  just  and  sincerely  friendly  to  both.  I  do  not  believe  S 
we  shall  have  as  much  to  swallow  from  them  as  our  predecessors  had.  .j 


Mr.  Madison  to  Mr.  Livingston. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  July  29,  1803. 

SIR:  Since  the  date  of  my  last,  which  was  May  24,  I  have  received 
your  several  letters\of  April  11,  13,  17,  and  May  12th.  As  they  relate 
almost  wholly  to  the  subject  which  was  happily  terminated  on  the  30th 
of  April,  a  particular  answer  is  rendered  unnecessary  by  that  event, 
and  by  the  answer  which  goes  by  this  conveyance  to  the  joint  letter 
from  yourself  and  Mr.  Monroe  of  the  13th  of  May.  It  will  only  be 
observed,  first,  that  the  difference  in  the  diplomatic  titles  given  to 
Mr.  Monroe  from  that  given  to  you,  and  which  you  understood  to 


222  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

have  ranked  him  above  you,  was  the  result  merely  of  an  error  in  the 
clerk,  who  copied  the  document,  and  which  escaped  attention  when 
they  were  signed.  It  was  not  the  intention  of  the  President  that  any 
distinction  of  grade  should  be  made  between  you.  Indeed,  according 
to  the  authority  of  Vattel,  the  characters  of  Minister  Plenipotentiary 
and  Envoy  Extraordinary  are  precisely  of  the  same  grade;  although  it 
is  said  that  the  usage  in  France,  particularly,  does  not  correspond  with 
this  idea.  Secondly,  that  the  relation  of  the  First  Consul  to  the  Italian 
Republic  received  the  compliment  deemed  sufficient  in  the  answer  to  a 
note  of  M.  Pichon,  communicating  the  flag  of  that  nation.  A  copy  of 
the  communication  and  of  the  answer  are  now  enclosed. 

The  boundaries  of  Louisiana  seem  to  be  so  imperfectly  understood, 
and  are  of  so  much  importance,  that  the  President  wishes  them  to  be 
investigated  whenever  information  is  likely  to  be  obtained.  You  will 
be  pleased  to  attend  particularly  to  this  object,  as  it  relates  to  the 
Spanish  possessions  both  on  the  wrest  and  on  the  east  side  of  the  Mis 
sissippi.  The  proofs  countenancing  our  claim  to  a  part  of  West 
Florida  may  be  of  immediate  use  in  the  negotiations  which  are  to  take 
place  at  Madrid.  Should  Mr.  Monroe  proceed  thither,  as  is  probable, 
and  any  such  proofs  should,  after  his  departure,  have  come  to  your 
knowledge,  you  will  of  course  have  transmitted  them  to  him. 

You  will  find  by  our  gazettes  that  your  memorial,  drawn  up  about 
a  year  ago  on  the  subject  of  Louisiana,  has  found  its  way  into  public 
circulation.  The  passages  in  it  which  strike  at  Great  Britain  have 
undergone  some  comment;  and  will  probably  be  conveyed  to  the  atten 
tion  of  that  Government.  The  document  appears  to  have  been  sent 
from  Paris,  where  you  will  be  able,  no  doubt,  to  trace  the  indiscretion 
to  its  author. 

No  answer  has  yet  been  received  either  from  you  or  Mr.  Monroe  to 
the  diplomatic  arrangement  for  London  and  Paris.  The  importance 
of  shortening  the  interval  at  the  former,  and  preventing  one  at  the 
latter,  makes  us  anxious  on  this  point.  As  your  late  letters  have  not 
repeated  your  intention  of  returning  home  this  fall,  it  is  hoped  that 
the  interesting  scenes  which  have  since  supervened  may  reconcile  you 
to  a  longer  stay  in  Europe. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  &c., 

JAMES  MADISON. 


The  Secretary  of  State  to  Messrs.  Livingston  and  Monroe. 

1  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  July  29,  1803. 

GENTLEMEN:  Your  dispatches,  including  the  treaty  and  two  conven 
tions  signed  with  a  French  Plenipotentiary,  on  the  30th  of  April,  were 
safely  delivered  on  the  14th  instant  by  Mr.  Hughes,  to  whose  care  you 
had  committed  them. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  223 

In  concurring  with  the  disposition  of  the  French  Governnent  to 
treat  for  the  whole  of  Louisiana,  although  the  western  part  of  it  was 
not  embraced  by  your  powers,  you  were  justified  by  the  solid  reasons 
which  you  give  for  it;  and  I  am  charged  by  the  President  to  express  to 
you  his  entire  approbation  for  so  doing. 

This  approbation  is  in  no  respect  precluded  by  the  silence  of  your 
commission  and  instructions.  When  these  were  made  out,  the  object 
of  the  most  sanguine  was  limited  to  the  establishment  of  the  Missis 
sippi  as  our  boundary.  It  was  not  presumed,  that  more  could  be  sought 
by  the  United  States,  either  with  a  chance  of  success,  or  perhaps  with 
out  being  suspected  of  greedy  ambition,  than  the  island  of  New 
Orleans  and  the  two  Floridas;  it  being  little  doubted  that  the  latter 
was,  or  Avould  be  comprehended  in  the  cession  from  Spain  to  France. 
To  the  acquisition  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas,  the  provision  was, 
therefore,  accommodated.  Nor  was  it  to  be  supposed  that  in  case  the 
French  Government  should  be  willing  to  part  with  more  than  the  ter 
ritory  on  our  side  of  the  Mississippi,  an  arrangement  with  Spain  for 
restoring  to  her  the  territory  on  the  other  side,  would  not  be  preferred 
to  a  sale  of  it  to  the  United  States.  It  might  be  added,  that  the  ample 
views  of  the  subject  carried  with  him  by  Mr.  Monroe,  and  the  confi 
dence  felt  that  your  judicious  management  would  make  the  most  favor 
able  occurrences,  lessened  the  necessity  of  multiplying  provisions  for 
every  turn  which  your  negotiations  might  possibly  take. 

The  effect  of  such  considerations  was  diminished  by  no  information, 
or  just  presumptions  whatever.  The  note  of  Mr.  Livingston,  in  par 
ticular,  stating  to  the  French  Government  the  idea  of  ceding  the  Western 
country  above  the  Arkansas,  and  communicated  to  this  Department  in 
his  letter  of  the  29th  January,  was  not  received  here  till  April  5, 
more  than  a  month  after  the  commission  and  instructions  had  been 
forwarded.  And,  besides,  that  this  project  not  only  left  with  France 
the  possession  and  jurisdiction  of  one  bank  of  the  Mississippi  from  its 
mouth  to  the  Arkansas,  but  a  part  of  West  Florida,  the  whole  of  East 
Florida,  and  the  harbors  for  ships  of  war  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The 
letter  enclosing  the  note,  intimated  that  it  had  been  treated  by  the 
French  Government  with  decided  neglect.  Jji  truth,  the  communica 
tions  in  general  between  Mr.  Livingston  and  the  French  Government, 
both  of  prior  and  subsequent  date,  manifested  a  repugnance  to  our 
views  of  purchase,  which  left  no  expectation  of  any  arrangement  with 
France,  by  which  an  extensive  acquisition  was  to  be  made,  unless  in  a 
favorable  crisis,  of  which  advantage  should  be  taken.  Such  was  thought 
to  be  the  crisis  which  gave  birth  to  the  extraordinary  commission  in 
which  you  are  joined.  It  consisted  of  the  state  of  things  produced  by 
the  breach  of  our  deposit  at  New  Orleans;  the  situation  of  the  French 
islands,  particularly  the  important  island  of  St.  Domingo;  the  distress 
of  the  French  finances;  the  unsettled  posture  of  Europe;  the  increasing 


224  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

jealousy  between  Great  Britain  and  France;  and  the  known  aversion 
of  the  former  to  see  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  in  the  hands  of  the 
latter.  These  considerations,  it  was  hoped,  might  so  far  open  the  eyes 
of  France  to  her  real  interest,  and  her  ears  to  the  monitory  truths 
which  were  conveyed  to  her  through  different  channels,  as  to  reconcile 
her  to  the  establishment  of  the  Mississippi  as  a  natural  boundary  to 
the  United  States;  or,  at  least,  to  some  concessions  which  would  justify 
our  patiently  waiting  for  a  fuller  accomplishment  of  our  wishes,  under 
auspicious  events.  The  crisis  relied  on  has  derived  peculiar  force  from 
the  rapidity  with  which  the  complaints  and  questions  between  France 
and  Great  Britain  ripened  towards  a  rupture;  and  it  is  just  ground  for 
mutual  and  general  felicitation  that  it  has  issued  under  your  zealous 
exertions  in  the  extensive  acquisitions  beyond  the  Mississippi. 

With  respect  to  the  terms  on  which  the  acquisition  is  made,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  bargain  will  be  regarded  as  on  the  whole 
highly  advantageous.  The  pecuniary  stipulations  would  have  been 
more  satisfactory  if  they  had  departed  less  from  the  plan  prescribed; 
and  particularly  if  the  two  millions  of  dollars  in  cash,  intended  to 
reduce  the  price  to  hasten  the  delivery  of  possession,  had  been  so 
applied,  and  the  assumed  payments  to  American  claimants  placed  on  a 
footing  specified  in  the  instructions.  The  unexpected  weight,  of  the 
draft  now  to  be  made  on  the  Treasury  will  be  sensibly  felt  by  it,  and 
may  possibly  be  inconvenient  in  relation  to  other  important  objects. 

The  President  has  issued  his  proclamation  convening  Congress  on 
the  17th  of  October,  in  order  that  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications 
',,.  may  be  made  within  the  time  limited.  It  is  obvious  that  the  exchange, 
to  be  within  the  time,  must  be  made  here,  and  not  at  Paris;  and  we 
infer  from  }Tour  letter  of  -  -  that  the  ratifications  of  the  Chief 
Consul  are  to  be  transmitted  hither  with  that  view. 

I  only  add  the  wish  of  the  President  to  know  from  you  the  under 
standing  which  prevailed  in  the  negotiation  with  respect  to  the  bound 
aries  of  Louisiana;  and  particularly  the  pretensions  and  proofs  for 
carrying  it  to  the  river  Perdido,  or  for  including  any  lesser  portion  of 
West  Florida. 

With  high  respect  and  consideration,  &c. , 

JAMES  MADISON. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Livingston  to  Mr.  Madison. 

PARIS,  July  30,  1803. 

SIR:  The  house  of  Hope  and  Baring  will  to-morrow  lodge  with  me  the 
amount  in  bills  of  the  stock  they  have  purchased  from  the  French 
Government,  to  be  delivered  by  me  according  to  the  terms  of  their 
contract.  If  the  treaty  is  ratified,  I  believe  that  this  meets  with  no 


PUKCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  225 

delay.  IV.  assured  that  were  the  business  to  do  again  it  never  would 
be  done^.  They  think  we  have  obtained  an  immense  advantage  over 
them.  Though  the  appearance  of  war  had  some  influence,  it  had  much 
less  than  is  ascribed  to  it.  Whenever  I  mentioned  its  falling  into  the 
hands  of  England,  they  admitted  the  possibility,  but  insisted  that,  as  it 
must  abide  the  event  of  the  war,  they  had  no  doubt  of  ultimate  suc 
cess;  they  would  get  it  back  with  the  British  improvements.  Mr. 
Skipwith  still  thinks  that  the  American  debt  will  fall  much  within  the 
twenty  millions  for  which  we  have  engaged,  and  all  the  fair  creditors 
be  fully  satisfied;  the  supposed  debt  being  extremely  exaggerated  in 
America.  Other  nations,  creditors  of  France,  have,  at  present,  no 
prospect  of  being  paid.  , 

I  this  day  got  a  sight  of  a  letter  from  the  Minister  to  M.  Laussat,  con 
taining  directions  for  giving  up  the  country,  and  assigning  the  reasons 
for  the  cession.  I  was  much  flattered  to  find  their  reasons  wholly 
drawn  from  the  memoir  I  had  presented;  and  that  the  order  for  the 
cession  was  full,  and  contained  no  other  description  of  the  country 
than  that  which  had  been  designated  in  the  Treaty  of  St.  Ildefonso:  so 
that  I  hope  you  have  not  failed  to  insist  on  West  Florida. 

1  have  also  this  day  been  favored  with  a  duplicate  of  yours  of  the 
?Hth  (25th)  of  May.  You  observe  that  the  promise  I  had  obtained  for 
payment  Avas  still  short  of  justice.  This  may  be  true;  but,  sir,  were 
you  here,  or,  indeed,  in  any  Court  in  Europe,  you  would  admit  that 
obtaining  of  anything  that  approaches  to  justice,  required  some  skill 
and  much  good  fortune.  At  present,  I  believe,  you  may  purchase 
millions  of  just  debt  of  Denmark,  Sweden,  &c.,  here  at  fifty-seven  in 
the  pound,  and  purchase  it  dear  enough;  and  I  think  that  I  may,  with 
out  vanity,  ascribe  my  obtaining  the  promise  to  what  are  here  consid 
ered  as  very  delicate  measures;  and  to  that  promise,  a  ruling  influence 
in  procuring  a  treaty  that  I  trust  will  be  considered  in  America  (as  in 
Europe)  among  the  most  important  and  advantageous  the  United  States 
ever  made. 

I  have  the  honor,  &c., 

K.  R.  LIVINGSTON. 


Mr.  Madison  to  Mr.  Monroe. 

WASHINGTON,  July  30,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR,— I  received  your  favor  of  -  -  by  Mr.  Hughes,  the 
bearer  of  the  public  despatches  from  you  and  Mr.  Livingston.  .The 
purchase  of  Louisiana  in  its  full  extent,  tho'  not  contemplated,  is 
received  with  warm,  and,  in  a  manner,  universal  approbation.  The 
uses  to  which  it  may  be  turned  render  it  a  truly  noble'  acquisition. 
Under  pendent  management  it  may  be  made  to  do  much  good,  as  well 
as  to  prevent  much  evil.  By  lessening  the  military  establishment 
H.  Doc.  431 15 


226  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

otherwise  requisite  or  countenanced,  it  will  answer  the  double  pur 
pose  of  saving  expence  and  favoring  liberty.  This  is  a  point  of  view 
in  which  the  Treaty  will  be  particularly  grateful  to  a  most  respectable 
description  of  our  Citizens.  It  will  be  of  great  importance,  also,  to 
take  the  regulation  and  settlement  of  that  Territory  out  of  other  hands 
into  those  of  the  U.  S.,  who  will  be  able  to  manage  both  for  the  gen 
eral  interest  and  convenience.  By  securing,  also,  the  exclusive  juris 
diction  of  the  Mississippi  to  the  mouth,  a  source  of  much  perplexitv 
and  collision  is  effectually  cut  off.  The  communications  of  your  col 
league  hither  have  fully  betrayed  the  feelings  excited  by  your  mes 
sage,  and  that  he  was  precipitating  the  business  soon  after  your 
arrival,  without  respect  to  the  measure  of  the  government,  to  yourself, 
or  to  the  advantage  to  be  expected  from  the  presence  and  co-operation 
of  the  more  immediate  depository  of  the  objects  and  sensibilities  of 
his  Country.  It  is  highly  probable  that  if  the  appeal  to  the  French 
Government  had  been  less  hacknej^ed  by  the  ordinary  minister,  and 
been  made  under  the  solemnity  of  a  joint  and  extraordinary  embassy, 
the  impression  would  have  been  greater  and  the  gain  better. 

What  course  will  be  taken  by  his  friends  here  remains  to  be  seen. 
You  will  find  in  the  Gazettes  a  letter  from  Paris,  understood  to  be 
from  Swan,  indorsing  a  copy  of  his  memorial,  representing  it  as  the 
primary  cause  of  the  cession,  praising  the  patriotism  which  undertook 
so  great  a  service  without  authority,  and  throwing  your  agency  out  of 
any  real  merit,  while,  by  good  fortune,  it  snatched  the  ostensible  merit. 
This  letter,  with  the  memorial,  has  been  published  in  all  our  papers; 
some  of  them  making  comments  favorable  to  Mr.  Livingston,  others 
doing  justice  to  you,  others  ascribing  the  result  wholly  to  the  impend 
ing  rupture.  Another  letter  from  Paris  has  been  published,  which 
makes  him  Magnus  Apollo.  The  publication  of  the  memorial  is  so 
improper,  and  in  reference  to  the  writer  invites  such  strictures,  that 
from  him  is  not  to  be  presumed.  The  passages  against  England 
have  not  escaped  the  lash.  It  would  not  be  very  wonderful  if  they 
were  to  be  noticed  formally  or  informally  by  the  British  legation  here. 

M^y  public  letter  will  show  the  light  in  which  the  purchase  of  all 
Louisiana  is  viewed,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  was  thought  proper 
to  touch  the  policy  of  Mr.  Livingston,  in  complaining  that  the  com 
munication  did  not  authorize  the  measure,  notwithstanding  the  infor 
mation  given  that  he  was  negociating  for  more  than  the  East  side  of 
the  Mississippi.  The  pecuniary  arrangements  are  much  disrelished, 
particularly  by  Mr.  Gallatin.  The  irredeemability  of  the  stock,  which 
gives  it  value  above  par,  the  preference  of  the  conditions  to  the  true 
object  in  the  cash  payment,  and  the  barring  of  a  priority  among  them, 
are  errors  most  regarded.  The  claims  of  the  different  creditors  rest 
on  principles  as  different. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  227 


Mr.  Monroe  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 


LONDON,  July  W  1803. 

SIR, — I  am  too  recently  on  this  theatre  to  give  you  any  information 
of  the  state  of  public  affairs  which  you  will  not  obtain  of  the  gazettes 
which  I  shall  therefore  not  repeat. 

It  will  be  more  useful  to  go  back  to  the  transactions  in  which  I  have 
been  lately  engaged,  and  to  communicate  some  incidents  which 
occurred  in  them  with  which  you  are  not  yet  acquainted.  The  pres 
sure  of  business  at  the  time,  the  necessity  of  hastening  here  as  soon 
as  that  measure  was  decided  on,  and  the  hope  that  I  should  enjoy  more 
leisure  here  than  I  had  done  in  France,  induced  me  to  reserve  them 
for  the  present  communication. 

You  saw  by  my  letters  after  the  conclusion  of  our  treaties  with 
France  that  I  had  in  a  great  measure  decided  to  proceed  to  Spain,  on 
the  idea  that  by  so  doing  I  should  best  fulfil  the  ulterior  object  of  my 
instructions.  You  saw  likewise  by  the  joint  letter  of  Mr.  Livingston 
and  myself  of  June  7th  that  I  had  been  prevented  pursuing  that 
object,  by  an  obstacle,  the  circumstances  attending  which  were  fully 
detailed  in  it.  There  occurred  however  another  difficulty  which  you 
are  }^et  to  be  apprized  of. 

At  the  time  when  my  judgment  inclined  in  favor  of  that  measure,  I 
applied  to  Mr.  Talleyrand  for  the  support  of  his  Gov*.  in  the  negotia 
tion  according  to  the  promise  made  us  by  Mr.  Marbois,  with  which 
you  are  acquainted.  This  application  was  made  on  theJJ  of  May 
immediately  before  the  discussion  mentioned  in  the  letter  of  the  7 
June  above  referred  to.  On  the  Sunday  following,  three  or  four  days 
afterwards,  I  dined  witli  the  Consul  Cambaceres  who  hud  been  with 
the  First  Consul  in  council  at  Sfc  Cloud  whence  he  returned  late  to 
dinner.  He  said  to  me  soon  after  entering  the  room  "you  must  not 
go "fo 'Spain  at  present/'  I  asked  his  reason.  He  replied  "it  is  not 
the  lime:  you  had  better  defer  it."  I  revived  the  subject  repeatedly  but 
he  declined  going  farther  into  it.  After  dinner  when  we  were  in  the 
Salon,  he  came  up  to  me,  and  on  my  informing  him  that  he  had  given 
me  much  concern  by  what  he  had  said,  he  replied  ' c  that  it  was  only  his 
opinion;  but  you  will  talk  on  the  subject  with  the  Minister  of  the  public 
treasury,"  which  1  assured  him  that  I  would  not  fail  to  do.  I  went 
immediately  to  Mr.  Marbois,  but  had  not  the  good  fortune  to  find  him 
at  home. 

On  the  Tuesday  following  I  saw  the  Consul  le  Bru'n,  who  suggested 
to  me  precisely  the  same  idea  which  I  had  received  from  the  Consul 
Cambaceres,  and  who  I  was  persuaded  had  imbibed  it  at  the  same  time 
in  the  Council  at  S*  Cloud.  I  proposed  to  him  the  same  question  that 
I  had  done  to  his  Colleague,  and  received  nearly  the  same  answer.  He 
told  me  that  we  should  obtain  our  object,  but  that  this  was  not  the 


228  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

J;ime  for  it.  About  this  time  the  incident  mentioned  in  the  letter  of 
June  7th  occurred,  which  increased  and  continued  my  suspense  till  we 
recd.  yours  of  the  18  &  20  of  April  which  directed  my  route  here. 

As  soon  as  my  course  was  marked  I  called  on  the  Minister  of  foreign 
Affairs,  and  reminded  him  of  my  application  to  him  for  the  aid  of  his 
gov*.  in  our  negotiation  with  Spain,  which  as  he  well  recollected  had 
been  promised.  I  then  told  him,  without  waiting  for  an  answer,  that 
niy  route  was  changed;  that  1  had  just  received  the  order  of  the  Presi 
dent  to  proceed  to  England  in  case  our  affairs  were  amicably  adjusted 
with  France;  that  the  motive  for  it  was,  a  knowledge  that  Mr.  King 
was  about  to  return  home:  the  probability  of  a  rupture  between  France 
&  Britain  and  the  consequent  exposure  of  our  commerce;  and  the  pro 
priety  of  our  being  represented  there  in  case  of  that  event:  that  the 
urgency  was  increased  by  the  circumstance  under  which  I  received  the 
order,  Mr.  King  having  sailed  without  having  nominated  any  one  to 
take  charge  of  our  affairs  till  his  successor  arrived.  I  adverted  in 
the  commencement  to  the  affair  with  Spain,  to  fix  in  his  mind,  by 
evidence  not  to  be  resisted,  an  important  fact,  the  date  at  which 
the  late  order  was  received,  that  he  might  see  that  it  grew  out  of 
recent  circumstances,  those  mentioned,  and  was  not  part  of  a  system 
of  menace  adopted  at  the  time  of  my  appointment.  I  had  seen  the 
advantage  of  inculcating  this  truth  on  more  than  one  occasion,  or 
thought  I  had,  &  wished  to  have  it  in  full  force  on  the  present  one. 
The  Minister  acknowledged  in  explicit  terms  the  frankness  of  the 
communication,  which  he  considered  as  a  strong  proof  of  the  fair  deal 
ing  of  our  Government  in  its  conduct  towards  his,  and  of  its  sincere 
desire  to  preserve  peace  and  friendship  between  the  two  nations.  Then 
taking  a  cursory  review  of  what  had  passed  in  the  late  negotiation,  he 
declared  that  nothing  short  of  the  course  which  had  been  taken  by  our 
Government  would  have  produced  the  result  which  had  attended  it. 
He  asked  me  when  I  proposed  setting  out  on  the  proposed  mission  ? 
I  answered  very  soon,  as  there  was  nothing  to  detain  me  longer  there. 
I  requested  him  to  communicate  the  above  to  the  First  Consul,  and  to 
express  my  wish  to  be  favored  with  a  private  audience,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  taking  my  leave  of  him  before  my  departure.  This  he  readily 
undertook,  but  observed  that  as  the  first  Consul  was  to  set  out  in  a 
few  days  for  the  Belgic  and  his  time  was  preengaged  by  appointments 
for  the  whole  of  the  interval,  he  doubted  whether  it  would  bo  in  his 
power  to  grant  me  an  audience,  tho'  he  was  persuaded  he  would  if  he 
could.  Having  asked  an  audience  1  resolved  to  wait  an  answer  till  his 
departure,  and  the  more  so  as  I  knew  it  would  not  detain  me  long. 
As  soon  as  I  had  made  the  above  communication  to  the  minister,  I 
made  a  like  one  to  Mr.  Marbois,  whose  candid  and  upright  deportment 
through  the  whole  of  our  negotiation,  had  inspired  me  with  a  very 
high  respect  for  his  character.  I  asked  and  obtained  about  the  same 
time  &  for  the  same  purpose,  a  private  audience  of  the  Consuls  Cam- 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  229 

baceres  &  le  Brim,  by  whom  I  had  been  received  with  kindness,  and 
treated  with  attention  during-  my  mission  in  France,  &  who  I  had  rea 
son  to  believe  had  promoted  the  object  of  it.  It  was  not  strictly  in 
course  to  make  to  these  characters  such  a  communication,  but  I  felt 
that  I  owed  it  to  the  part  they  had  taken  in  the  late  important  trans 
actions  with  our  country,  and  am  persuaded  that  it  was  received  in 
the  spirit  in  which  it  was  made.  I  called  on  Joseph  Bonaparte  the 
elder  brother  of  the  first  Consul  with  the  same  view,  but  as  he  had 
left  town  1  had  not  the  pleasure  to  see  him. 

The  day  before  the  Consul  commenced  his  tour  I  received  a  note 
from  the  Minister  of  foreign  affairs  requesting  me  to  meet  him  the 
next  day  at  1  o'clock  at  Sfc  Cloud  to  be  presented  by  him  to  the  first 
Consul,  which  was  accordingly  done.  The  audience  was  of  some 
length. 

I  made  a  communication  similar  in  substance  to  what  I  had  already 
done  to  the  Minister,  to  which  I  added  that  it  was  the  wish  of  the 
President  that  I  should  assure  him  before  my  departure  of  his  high 
respect  &  esteem  for  him  personally  &  for  the  French  Nation,  and  of 
his  earnest  desire  to  preserve  peace  &  friendship  with  it.  The  first 
Consul  reciprocated  the  sentiment  toward  the  President  and  the  U.  S. 
in  strong  terms.  He  said  that  he  considered  the  President  as  a  virtu 
ous  and  enlightened  man,  who  understood  and  pursued  the  interest  of 
his  country,  as  a  friend  of  liberty  and  equalityj  That  no  one  wished 
more  than  himself  the  preservation  of  a  good  understanding  between 
the  two  Republics:  that  he  had  been  prompted  to  make  the  late  Cession 
to  the  U.  States  not  so  much  on  account  of  the  sum  given  for  the  terri 
tory  as  from  views  of  policy:  that  France  had  been  their  first  friend 
ami  he  wished  to  preserve  that  relation  between  the  two  countries  for 
ever:  he  had  perceived  that  we  entertained  a  jealousy  of  their  posses 
sion  of  Louisiana  which  was  likely  to  drive  us  into  measures  ^  con 
nexions  that  would  prove  not  only  hurtful  to  France,  but  as  he  pre 
sumed  to  ourselves  also:  He  therefore  wished  to  remove  the  cause  by 
an  act  which  would  free  us  from  all  apprehension  on  that  head  and 
leave  us  at  liberty  to  pursue  our  course  according  to  our  interest  and 
inclination.  1  told  him  in  reply  that  I  had  considered  the  cession  of 
Louisiana  as  having  been  prompted  by  the  motives  which  he  stated,  as 
being  an  act  of  great  and  enlightened  policy  rather  than  an  affair  of 
commerce,  and  was  persuaded  that  our  government  would  view  it  in 
the  same  light:  that  the  cession  would  place  us  on  the  ground  he  men 
tioned  of  real  independence:  that  we  had  however  been  willing  to  give 
what  was  deemed  an  equivalent  for  it.  He  observed  that  there  was  no 
rivalship  between  us,  our  relation  to  France  being  chiefly  commercial; 
but  that  we  must  be  on  our  guard,  not  to  give  the  protection  of  our 
flag  to  the  British.  I  told  him  that  the  latter  was  a  question  which 
merited  all  his  deliberation  and  candor,  since  the  principle  that 
free  ships  made  free  goods,  if  sustained  by  him  as  I  understood  it 


230  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

to  be,  precluded  any  discussion  on  that  point.  He  admitted  that 
there  were  difficulties  in  the  case  which  he  should  examine  with  care. 
He  then  observed,  without  my  leading  to  the  subject  tho'  I  had 
intended  doing  it,  with  respect  to  Florida  that  this  was  not  the  time 
to  pursue  that  object:  that  the  Spaniards  had  complained  much  of  the 
cession  they  had  made  to  us  of  Louisiana.  I  told  him  that  we  were 
neighbors  of  Spain  and  wished  to  be  on  friendly  terms  with  her,  which 
the  possession  would  promote:  that  it  was  a  little  piece  of  land  com 
prized  within  our  present  limits  which  we  ought  to  have.  He  replied 
that  it  was  because  we  were  their  neighbors  that  they  were  jealous  of 
our  possessing  that  territory  which  by  its  ports  commanded  the  gulph 
of  Mexico.  I  told  him  it  would  be  better  for  Spain  that  we  held  it 
than  the  British,  which  might  take  place  if  we  did  not.  Still  he_urged 
that  this  was  not  the  time  to  negotiate  for  it.  1  ceased  therefore  to 
press  the  subject  further,  preferring  to  let  it  be  understood  that  the 
negotiation  was  postponed  for  the  present,  to  be  revived  at  a  more 
suitable  season,  when  we  should  expect  his  good  offices  in  it,  to  which 
he  seemed  to  assent. 

It  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  natural  weight  and  respectability  of 
the  United  States  will  enable  their  government  to  obtain  this  object 
of  Spain,  without  the  aid  of  any  other  power:  It  cannot  be  doubted 
however  that  France,  has  the  means  of  essentially  promoting  or  embar 
rassing  it.  It  was  on  that  principle  that  we  sought  to  avail  ourselves 
of  her  aid  in  the  late  negotiation  &  that  I  applied  for  it  when  I  was 
about  to  go  to  Spain.  To  have  gone  after  the  promise  made  us,  with 
out  this  communication,  might  have  produced  an  ill  eft'ect;  to  have 
gone  after  my  application  for  it  in  opposition  to  her  advice  would 
most  probably  have  had  the  same  tendency,  which  it  seemed  peculiarly 
proper  to  avoid  especially  while  our  treaties  with  her  were  depending. 
The  Consul  set  out  on  his  tour  the  evening  of  the  day  on  which  I  had 
the  above  audience,  which  was  on  the  (24th)  of  June.  On  the  Mon 
day  following  I  requested  my  passport  of  Mr.  d'Hermand  the  chief  in 
the  department  of  foreign  relations  charged  with  that  business  who  I 
found  had  not  the  power  to  grant  one.  I  immediately  wrote  to  the 
Minister  of  foreign  relations,  who  had  left  Paris  about  the  same  time 
with  the  Consul  to  apprize  him  of  this  fact  &  request  that  he  would 
be  pleased  to  send  me  a  passport  immediately  as  I  was  ready  for  my 
journey  and  only  waited  one. 


-X- 

5- 


>-•     ST1, 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Monroe  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

LONDON  26  July  1803 

Our  government  ought  to  know  to  the  minutest  detail  the  motives 
which  induced  the  government  of  France  to  adopt  this  measure,  to 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

enable  it  to  do  justice  to  those  motives  &  bring  the  affair  itself  to  a 
happy  conclusion.  The^  extrication  of  ourselves  from  a  dangerous, 
perhaps  a  disastrous,  war,  by  the  acquisition  of  an  important  territory 
which  gives  such  vast  relief  and  comfort  to  30  many  of  our  people,  is  an 
invent  which  if  the  causes  which  produced  it  are  well  understood,  may 
serve  as  a  monitory  lesson  to  influence  if  not  prescribe  the  course  to  be 
pin-sued  in  our  future  controversies  with  the  European  powers,  if  any 
should  occur.  America  certainly  bears  a  very  distinct  relation  to 
Europe,  from  what  the  several  powers  of  the  latter  bear  to  each  other, 
which  it  is  equally  important  for  her  to  understand  &  to  have  under 
stood  by  the  latter.  Of  this  truth  the  event  referred  to  is  a  striking 
example  as  it  is  a  very  satisfactory  illustration.  I  should  weary  you 
if  I  pursued  this  subject.  I  have  touched  it  to  remark  that  for  these 
and  other  obvious  reasons  I  have  considered  it  my  dutv  to  communi 
cate  to  you  every  fact  belonging  to  this  transaction  with  which  I  was 
acquainted  that  it  might  be  seen  by  the  President  in  its  true  light.  To 
these  I  shall  at  present  take  the  liberty  to  add  a  few  observations. 

You  saw  by  Mr.  Livingstons  and  my  joint  letter  which  bore  date  a 
day  or  two  before  1  left  Paris  about  the  11th  ultomo  that  the  English 
government  had  no  agency  in  this  affair:  that  it  never  had  made  a 
question  of  Louisiana  in  its  discussions  with  the  government  of  France, 
at  any  period  since  the  French  possessed  it.  This  information  was 
obtained  of  Lord  Whitworth  on  the  application  of  M1'.  Livingston  on 
his  &  my  part  at  a  time  when  we  deemed  it  important  to  know  what 
interest  that  power  had  taken  in  the  affair  if  any.  Lord  Whitworth's 
answer  was  as  I  understand  frank  and  explicit  to  that  effect.  It  there 
fore  proves  fully  that  the  Cession  of  Louisiana  did  not  proceed  from 
any  interference  of  G.  Britain  respecting  it. 

The  proof  is  in  other  respects  positive  and  conclusive  that  it  was 
produced  by  the  measures  of  our  Government  and  that  the  decision  to 
make  the  cession  was  intended  to  meet  them  in  the  spirit  in  which 
they  were  taken.  It  is  a  well  established  fact  that  before  those  meas 
ures  were  well  known  in  France  the  First  Consul  had  manifested  no 
inclination  to  make  the  Cession.  For  some  time  after  they  were 
known  his  disposition  to  retain  the  territory  remained  unshaken,  tho' 
it  was  evident  he  had  become  more  conciliatory  in  his  deportment 
towards  our  country.  As  late  as  the  10.  of  March  he  announced  his 
resolution  not  even  to  discuss  the  subject  in  any  light  until  after  he 
had  sent  a  Minister  to  the  U.  S.  and  received  from  him  such  infor 
mation  as  he  deemed  necessary  for  the  purpose.  On  the  22d.  of  March 
he  manifested  his  desire  to  retain  the  countiy  to  be  as  strong  as  ever, 
intimated  that  he  had  always  considered  the  possession  of  it  as  fur 
nishing  him  with  the  means  of  giving  new  proofs  of  his  friendship  for 
the  U.  States,  by  which  he  meant,  as  is  presumed,  the  opening  of  the 
river  to  our  Citizens,  on  more  favorable  terms  than  had  yet  been 


232  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

enjoyed  by  them,  he  absolutely  refused  to  treat  at  that  time,  tlio'  he 
acknowledged  his  sensibility  to  the  conduct  of  the  President  in  the 
conjuncture  which  had  produced  an  extraordinary  mission,  and  declared 
that  he  would  receive  the  Envoy  with  pleasure  &  hoped  that  his  im^- 
sion  would  terminate  to  the  satisfaction  of  both  powers.  The  decision 
to  make  the  cession  was  taken  on  the  10th  of  April  after  the  arrival 
of  that  Envoy  at  Havre  (which  was  on  the  8th)  was  known  at  Paris, 
and  with  a  view  to  lay  the  foundation  for  the  negotiation  which  was  so 
soon  to  commence.  For  the  proof  of  these  facts  I  refer  you  to  the 
official  notes  of  Mr.  Talleyrand  to  Mr.  Livingston  of  the  10th  and  22nd 
of  March,  which  I  presume  are  in  your  possession,  and  to  such  other 
information  as  you  have  heretofore  received  of  the  latter.  The 
demonstration  which  they  furnish  of  what  I  have  above  stated,  is  too 
strong  to  be  resisted  by  ai.y  one  whose  mind  is  not  sealed  by  preju 
dice  against  the  clearest  result.  Had  the  disposition  of  the  first  Con 
sul  to  make  the  cession  been  produced  by  any  but  the  measures  of  our 
government  and  country  taken  together,  but  more  especially  by  the 
firm  &  dignified  yet  conciliatory  conduct  of  the  President,  he  would 
not  have  postponed  the  discussion  of  the  subject  till  he  was  apprized 
of  those  measures,  nor  would  he,  after  he  knew  of  them,  have  delayed 
the  avowal  of  his  disposition  to  the  period  that  he  did,  or  assigned 
the  motive  which  he  gave  in  the  letter  of  March  22d.  for  the  delay. 

It  was  impossible,  had  we  possessed  the  requisite  power,  after  our 
negotiation  commenced  to  have  opened  any  communication  with  this 
government  without  great  hazard  to  our  interest  &  credit,  while  it 
was  impossible  to  derive  any  advantage  from  it.  A  proposition  to 
Britain  for  her  agency  in  the  affair,  could  not  have  been  expected  to 
succeed  without  our  paying  some  equivalent  for  it,  which  must  have 
been  by  making  common  cause  with  her  in  her  own  controversy  and  per 
haps  also  by  giving  her  some  portion  of  the  territory  or  rights  in  the 
navigation  of  the  river.  Had  we  stipulated  either  of  these  considera 
tions  we  should  most  probably  have  been  carried  into  the  war  with 
her,  the  result  of  which  is  very  uncertain.  By  making  any  stipula 
tion  in  favor  of  G.  Britain  we  should  have  tied  up  our  hands  in  the 
degree  from  doing  anything  for  ourselves,  while  we  bound  ourselves  to 
her  fortunes.  Had  we  made  any  overture  for  any  such  an  arrangement 
we  hazarded  its  being  made  known,  with  a  view  to  her  own  interest, 
to  the  government  of  France,  with  whom  it  could  not  fail  to  have  pro 
duced  an  ill  effect  in  regard  to  ours.  Perfect  freedom  to  take  such 
part  as  our  interest  required  was  the  happiest  situation,  in  which  we 
could  be  placed  in  the  negotiation,  &  it  equally  comported  with  honor 
&  policy  not  only  to  remain  so  in  reality,  but  to  preserve  also'  the 
appearance  of  it,  while  there  was  a  prospect  of  success.  Had  we 
erred  in  the  present  case  our  folly  and  disposition  for  intrigue  must 
have  been  extreme,  since  from  the  commencement  there  was  great 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  233 

probability  of  success,  which  continued  to  increase  till  the  object  was 
accomplished. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  there  were  a  variety  of  causes,  which  con 
tributed  to  produce  a  change  in  the  mind  of  the  first  Consul  relative 
to  Louisiana,  &  to  facilitate  the  cession  which  I  flatter  myself  our 
government  has  been  fortunate  in  obtaining.  Among  these  may  be 
calculated  the  failure  of  the  Expedition  to  Sfc.  Domingo,  the  pressure 
of  the  crisis  in  Europe  &c.  There  are  occasions  which  it  is  fair  arid 
honorable  for  every  government  to  take  advantage  of  &  which  none 
fail  to  do,  when  those  at  their  head  have  discernment  enough  to  see 
them.  They  are  such  as  our  distance  from  Europe,  &  fortunate  situa 
tion  in  other  respects,  will  1  hope  always  furnish  us,  when  they  may 
be  necessary.  I  affirm,  however,  with  perfect  confidence  in  the  opin 
ion,  that  notwithstanding  these  favorable  circumstances,  wo  should 
not  have1  succeeded  had  the  amiable  relations  between  America  <t 
Franco  boon  broken,  or  had  the  President  have  taken  an  attitude  of 
menace  towards  that  power,  or  any  other  than  precisely  that  which  ho 
dj/^tak.e. 


Extract  of  a  letter  from  James  Monroe,  esq.,  Minister  Plenipotentiary, 
London,  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

AUGUST  15,  1803. 

The  enclosed,  which  I  received  last  night  from  Paris  by  an  Ameri 
can  gentleman,  containing  important  information,  is,  therefore,  trans 
mitted  to  you. 

[Extract  of  a  letter  from  Mr.  Fenwick  to  Mr.  Monroe.] 

(i  S,  1°,    2  :  sr&  ']  PARIS,  August  5,  1803. 

Since  you  left  this  city  nothing  very  material  has  transpired.  I 
know,  however,  from  a  faithful  source,  that  the  Spanish  Government 
has  made  the  most  serious  remonstrances  against  the  cession  of  Loui 
siana,  and  their  instructions  here  are  to  prevent  its  being  carried  into 
execution,  if  yet  possible:  and  if  pecuniary  arguments  could  succeed, 
the  hands  of  their  Ministers  are  not  tied  on  that  score.  This  might  be 
a  useful  hint,  if  our  Senate  should  not  disregard  federal  examples  in 
modifying  treaties,  as  it  is  now  well  understood,  that,  if  any  conditional 
clause  of  ratification  should  be  introduced  by  the  United  States,  this 
Government  would  profit  of  the  circumstance  to  annul  the  whole  work. 


President  Jefferson  to  Mr.  Breckenridge. 

MONTICELLO,  August  12,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR, — The  enclosed  letter,  though  directed  to  you,  was  intended 
to  me  also,  and  was  left  open  with  a  request,  that  when  forwarded,  I 

,  \   i»  \  ~  b^ 


234  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

would  forward  it  to  you.  It  gives  me  occasion  to  write  a  word  to  you 
on  the  subject  of  Louisiana,  which  being  a  new  one,  an  interchange  of 
sentiments  may  produce  correct  ideas  before  we  are  to  act  on  them. 

Our  information  as  to  the  country  is  very  incomplete;  we  have  taken 
measures  to  obtain  it  full  as  to  the  settled  part,  which  I  hope  to  receive 
in  time  for  Congress.  The  boundaries,  which  I  deem  not  admitting 
question,  are  the  high  lands  on  the  western  side  of  the  Mississippi 
enclosing  all  its  waters,  the  Missouri  of  course,  and  terminating  in  the 
line  drawn  from  the  northwestern  point  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  to 
the  nearest  source  of  the  Mississippi,  as  lately  settled  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States.  We  have  some  claims,  to  extend  on 
the  seacoast  westwardly  to  the  Rio  Norte  or  Bravo,  and  better,  to  go 
eastwardly  to  the  Rio  Perdido,  between  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  the 
ancient  boundary  of  Louisiana.  These  claims  will  be  a  subject  of 
negotiation  with  Spain,  and  if,  as  soon  as  she  is  at  war,  we  push  them 
strongly  with  one  hand,  holding  out  a  price  in  the  other,, we  shall  cer 
tainly  obtain  the  Floridas,  and  all  in  good  time.  In  the  meanwhile, 
without  waiting  for  permission,  we  shall  enter  into  the  exercise  of  the 
natural  right  we  have  always  insisted  on  with  Spain,  to-wit,  that  of  a 
nation  holding  the  upper  part  of  streams,  having  a  right  of  innocent 
passage  through  them  to  the  ocean.  We  shall  prepare  her  to  see  us 
practice  on  this,  and  she  will  not  oppose  it  by  force. 

Objections  are  raising  to  the  eastward  against  the  vast  extent  of  our 
boundaries,  and  propositions  are  made  to  exchange  Louisiana,  or  a 
part  of  it,  for  the  Floridas.  But,  as  I  have  said,  we  shall  get  the 
Floridas  without,  and  I  would  not  give  one  inch  of  the  waters  of  the 
Mississippi  to  any  nation,  because  I  see  in  a  light  very  important  to 
our  peace  the  exclusive  right  to  its  navigation,  and  the  admission  of 
no  nation  into  it,  but  as  into  the  Potomac  or  Delaware,  with  our  con 
sent  and  under  our  police.  These  federalists  see  in  this  acquisition  the 
formation  of  a  new  confederacy,  embracing  all  the  waters  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  on  both  sides  of  it,  and  a  separation  of  its  eastern  waters  from 
us.  These  eomhinations  depend  on  *o  many  eiremnst:mee>  which  we 
can  not  foresee,  that  I  place  little  reliance  on  them.  We  have  seldom 
seen  neighborhood  produce  affection  among  nations.  The  reverse  is 
almost  the  universal  truth.  Besides,  if  it  should  become  the  great 
interest  of  those  nations  to  separate  from  this,  if  their  happiness 
should  depend  on  it  so  strongly  as  to  induce  them  to  go  through  that 
convulsion,  why  should  the  Atlantic  States  dread  it?  But  especially 
why  should  we,  their  present  inhabitants,  take  side  in  such  a  question? 
When  I  view  the  Atlantic  States,  procuring  for  those  on  the  eastern 
waters  of  the  Mississippi  friendly  instead  of  hostile  neighbors  on  its 
western  waters,  I  do  not  view  it  as  an  Englishman  would  the  procuring 
future  blessings  for  the  French  nation,  Avith  whom  he  has  no  relations 
of  blood  or  affection.  The  future  inhabitants  of  the  Atlantic  and  Mis- 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITOEY    OF    LOUISIANA.  285 

sissippi  States  will  be  our  sons.  We  leave  them  in  distinct  but  border 
ing  establishments.  We  think  we  see  their  happiness  in  their  union, 
and  we  wish  it.  Events  may  prove  it  otherwise;  and  if  they  see  their 
interest  in  separation,  why  should  we  take  side  with  our  Atlantic 
rather  than  our  Mississippi  descendants?  Jt  is  the  elder  and  the 
younger  son  differing.  God  bless  them  both,  and  keep  them  in  union, 
if  it  be  for  their  good,  but  separate  them,  if  it  be  better.  The  inhab- 
feoTpart  of  Louisiana,  from  Point  Coupee  to  the  sea,  will  of  course 
be  immediately  a  territorial  government,  and  soon  a  State.  But  above 
that,  the  best  use  we  can  make  of  the  country  for  some  time,  will  be 
to  give  establishments  in  it  to  the  Indians  on  the  east  side  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  in  exchange  for  their  present  country,  and  open  land  offices 
in  the  last,  and  thus  make  this  acquisition  the  means  of  filling  up  the 
eastern  side,  instead  of  drawing  off  its  population.  When  we  shall 
be  full  on  this  side,  we  may  lay  off  a  range  of  States  on  the  western 
bank  from  the  head  to  the  mouth,  and  so,  range  after  range,  advancing 
compactly  as  we  multiply. 

This  treaty  must  of  course  be  laid  before  both  Houses,  because  both 
have  important  functions  to  exercise  respecting  it.  They,  I  presume, 
willjsee  their  duty  to  their  country  in  ratifying  and  paying  for  it,  sc 
as  to  secure  a  good  which  would  otherwise  probably  be  never  again  ii 
their  power.  But  I  suppose  they  must  then  appeal  to  the  nation  foi 
!in  additional  article  to  the  Constitution,  approving  and  confirming  an! 
act  which  the  nation  had  riot  previously  authorized.  The  Constitution 
has  made  no  provision  for  our  holding  foreign  territory,  still  less  for 
incorporating  foreign  nations  into  our  Union.  (.The  executive  in  seiz 
ing  the  fugitive  occurrence  which  so  much  advances  the  good  of  their 
country,  have  done  an  act  beyond  the  Constitution^  The  Legislature 
in  casting  behind  them  metaphysical  subtleties,  and  risking  themselves 
like  faithful  servants,  must  ratify  and  pay  for  it,  and  throw  themselves 
on  their  country  for  doing  for  them  unauthorized,  what  we  know 
they  would  have  done  for  themselves  had  they  been  in  a  situation  to 
do  it.  It  is  the  case  of  a  guardian  investing  the  money  of  his  ward  in 
purchasing  an  important  adjacent  territory;  and  sa}ring  to  him  when 
of  age,  I  did  this  for  your  good;  I  pretend  to  no  right  to  bind  you: 
you  may  disavow  me,  and  I  must  get  out  of  the  scrape  as  I  can :  I 
thought  it  my  duty  to  risk  myself  for  you.  But  we  shall  not  be  dis- 
ayowed  by  the  nation,  and  their  act  of  indemnity  will  confirm  and  not' 
weaken  the  Constitution,  by  more  strongly  marking  out  its  li 




Uu^j 


[Extract.] 

President  Jefferson  to  Mr.  Madison. 

MONTICELLO,  August  25,  1803. 


«7 

I  suppose  Monroe  will  touch  on  the  limits  of  Louisiana  only  inci 
dentally,  inasmuch  as  its  extension  to  Perdido  curtails  Florida,  and 


236 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 


.i 


renders  it  of  less  worth.  I  have  used  my  spare  moments  to  investi 
gate,  by  the  help  of  my  books  here,  the  subject  V  theMimits  of  Lou 
isiana.  I  am  satisfied  our  right  to  the  Pordido  is  substantial,  and  can 
be  opposed  by  a  quibble  on  form  only;  and  our  right  westwardly  to 
the  Bay  of  St.  Bernard,  may  be  strongly  maintained.  I  will  use  the 
first  leisure  to  make  a  statement  of  the  facts  and  principles  on  which 
this  depends.  Further  reflection  on  the  amendment  to  the  Constitu 
tion  necessary  in  the  case  of  Louisiana,  satisfies  me  it  will  be  better 
to  give  general  powers,  with  specified  exceptions,  somewhat  in  the 
way  stated  below.  *  *  * 

P.  S.—  Louisiana,  as  ceded  by  France  to  the  United  States,  is  made 
part  of  the  United  States.     Its  white  inhabitants  shall  be  citizens, 
nd  stand,  as  to  their  rights  and  obligations,  on  the  same  footing  with 
ther  citizens  of  the  United  States  in  analogous  situations. 
Save^only  that  as  to  the  portion  thereof  lying  north  of  ( the  latitude 
f  the  mouth  of  the  Oreansa  river,  no  new  State  shall  be  established, 
or  an}r  grants  of  land  made  therein,  other  than  to  Indians,  in  exchange 
!or  equivalent  portions  of  land  occupied  by  them,  until  amendment  to 
le  Constitution  shall  be  made  for  these  purposes. 
Florida  also,  whensoever  it  may  be  rightfully  obtained,  shall  become 
part  of  the  United  States.     Its  white  inhabitants  shall  thereupon  be 
tizens,  and  shall  stand,  as  to  their  rights  and  obligations,  on  the 
ame  footing  with  other  citizens  of  the  United  States  in  analogous 
rcumstances. 


President  Jefferson  to  Wilson  C.  Nicholas.  f 

\l  •  0     '     .** 

MONTICELLO,  /September  7,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR, — Your  favor  of  the  3d  was  delivered  me  at  court;  but 
we  were  much  disappointed  at  not  seeing  you  here,  Mr.  Madison  and 
the  Governor  being  here  at  the  time.  I  enclose  you  a  letter  from 
Mr.  Monroe  on  the  subject  of  the  late  treaty.  You  will  observe  a  hint 
in  it,  to  do  without  delay  what  we  are  bound  to  do.  There  is  reason, 
in  the  opinion  of  our  ministers,  to  believe,  that  if  the  thing  were  to 
do  over  again,  it  could  not  be  obtained,  and  that  if  we  give  the  least 
opening,  they  will  declare  the  treaty  void.  A  warning  amounting  to 
that  has  been  given  to  them,  and  an  unusual  kind  of  letter  written  by 
their  minister  to  our  Secretary  of  State,  direct.  W hate  ver  ^Congress 
shall  think  it  necessary  to  do,  should  be  done  with  as  little  debate  as 
possible,  and  particularly  so  far  as  respects  the  constitutional  diffi 
cult^/  I  am  aware  of  the  force  of  the  observations  you  make  on  the 
power  given  by  the  Constitution  to  Congress,  to  admit  new  States 
into  the  Union,  without  restraining  the  subject  to  the  territory  then 
constituting  the  United  States.  But  when  I  consider  that  the  limits 
of  the  United  States  are  precisely  fixed  by  the  treaty  of  1783,  that 


K 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  237 

the  Constitution  expressly  declares  itself  to  be  made  for  the  United 
States,  I  cannot  help  believing  the  intention  was  not  to  permit 
Congress  to  admit  into  the  Union  new  States,  which  should  be  formed 
out  of  the  territory  for  which,  and  under  whose  authority  alone,  they 
were  then  acting.  I  do  not  believe  it  was  meant  that  they  might 
receive  England,  Ireland,  Holland,  &c.,  into  it,  which  would  be  the 
case  on  your  construction.  LWhen  an  instrument  admits  two  construc 
tions,  the  one  safe,  the  other  dangerous,  the  one  precise,  the  other 
indefinite,  I  prefer  that  which  is  safe  and  precise.  I  had  rather  ask  an 
enlargement  of  power  from  the  nation,  where  it  is  found  necessary, 
than  to  assume  it  by  a  construction  which  would  make  our  powers 
boundless.  Our  peculiar  security  is  in  the  possession  of  a  written 
Constitution.  Let  us  not  make  it  a  blank  paper  by  construction,  j  I  say 
the  same  as  to  the  opinion  of  those  who  consider  the  grant  of  the  treaty- 
making  power  as  boundless.  If  it  is,  then  we  have  no  Constitution. 
If  it  has  bounds,  the}7  can  be  no  others  than  the  definitions  of  the 
powers  which  that  instrument  gives.  It  specifies  and  delineates  the 
operations  permitted  to  the  federal  government,  and  gives  all  the 
powers  necessary  to  carry  these  into  execution.  Whatever  of  these 
enumerated  objects  is  proper  for  a  law,  Congress  may  make  the  law; 
whatever  is  proper  to  be  executed  by  way  of  a  treaty,  the  President 
and  Senate  may  enter  into  the  treaty;  whatever  is  to  be  done  by  a 
judicial  sentence,  the  judges  may  pass  the  sentence.  Nothing  is  more 
likely  than  that  their  enumeration  of  powers  is  defective.  This  is  the 
ordinary  case  of  all  human  works.  Let  us  go  on  than  pp.rfpptino-  it, 
by  adding,  b}^  way  of  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  those  powers 
wjich  time  and  trial  show  are  still  wanting.  But  it  has  been  taken 
too  much  for  granted,  tlmt  by  this  rigorous  construction  the  treaty 
power  would  be  reduced  to  nothing.  I  had  occasion  once  to  examine 
its  Hied  on  the  French  treaty,  made  by  the  old  Congress,  and  found 
that  out  of  thirty  odd  articles  which  that  contained,  there  were  one, 
two,  or  three  only  which  could  not  now  be  stipulated  under  our  present 
Constitution.  J.  confess,  then,  I  think  it  important,  in  the  present 
case,  to  set  an  example  against  broad  construction,  by  appealing  for 
ne\\  power  to  the  people.  If,  however,  our  friends  shall  think  .differ 
ently,  certainly  I  shall  acquiesce  with  satisfaction;  confiding,  that  the 
good  sense  of  our  country  will  correct  the  evil  of  construction  when 
it  shall  produce,  ill  effects.  r:: 


Mr.  Madison  to  Mr.  Livingston. 

a :  .  S .  0  JL  ••  rfe  7  -  M 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  October  6,  1803. 

SIR:  My  last  was  of  July  29,  written  a  few  days  before  my  depar 
ture  from  Virginia,  whence  I  returned,  as  did  the  President,  ten  or 


238  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

twelve  days  ago.     Your  letters  received  since  that  date  are  of  May  20, 
June  3  and  25,  and  July  11,  12,  and  30th. 

In  the  reply  to  the  communication  made  by  the  French  Government 
on  the  subject  of  the  war,  }^ou  are  charged  by  the  President  to  express 
the  deep  regret  felt  by  the  United  States  at  an  event  so  afflicting  to 
humanity.  Deploring  all  the  calamities  with  which  it  is  pregnant, 
they  devoutly  wish  that  the  benevolent  considerations  which  pleaded 
in  vain  for  a  continuance  of  peace,  may  have  a  due  effect  in  speedily 
restoring  its  blessings.  UjitiLthis. happy  change  shall  take  place,  the 
French  Government  may  be  assured  that  the United  States  will  forget 
-lone  of  the  obligations  which  the  laws  of  neutrality Jmposejmjhem. 
^aithful  to  their  character,  they  will  pay  to  every  belligerent  riglit 
le  respect  which  is  due  to  it;  but  this  duty  will  be  performed  in  the 
>nfidence  that  the  rights  of  the  United  States  will  be  equally  respected, 
"he  French  Government  will  do  justice  to  the  frankness  of  this  decla 
ration,  which  is  rendered  the  more  proper  by  the  irregularities  of 
which  too  many  examples  have  been  heretofore  experienced.  The 
President  does  not  permit  himself  to  doubt  that  the  French  Govern 
ment,  consulting  equally  its  own  honor  and  the  true  interests  of 
France,  will  guard,  by  effectual  regulations,  against  every  abuse  under 
color  of  its  authority,  whether  on  the  high  seas  or  within  French  or 
foreign  jurisdiction,  which  might  disturb  the  commerce,  or  endanger 
the  friendly  relations  so  happily  subsisting,  and  which  the  United 
States  are  so  much  disposed  to  cherish,  between  the  two  nations. 

Your  interposition  against  the  arret  of  the  1st  Messidor,  an  11,  was 
due  to  the  just  interests  of  your  fellow-citizens.  It  is  to  be  hoped, 
that  the  strong  views  which  you  have  presented  of  the  subject,  will 
lead  the  French  Government  to  retract,  or  remodify,  a  measure  not  less 
unjust  to  foreigners  than  injurious  to  the  interests  of  France:  regu 
lations  which,  by  their  suddenness,  ensnare  those  who  could  not  pos 
sibly  know  them,  and  who  meant  to  observe  those  naturally  supposed 
to  be  in  force,  are,  to  all  intents,  retrospective— having  the  same  effect, 
and  violating  the  same  privileges,  as  laws  enacted  subsequent  to  the 
cases  to  which  the}^  are  applied.  The  necessity  of  leaving  between 
the  date  and  the  operation  of  commercial  regulations  an  interval  suf 
ficient  to  prevent  surprise  on  distant  adventurers,  is,  in  general,  too 
little  regarded,  and  so  far  there  may  be  room  for  common  complaint; 
but  when  great  and  sudden  changes  are  made,  and  above  all,  when 
legal  forfeitures,  as  well  as  mercantile  losses,  are  sustained,  redress 
may  fairly  be  claimed  by  the  innocent  sufferers.  Admitting  the  public 
safety,  which  rarely  happens,  to  require  regulations  of  this  sort,  and 
the  right  of  every  Government  to  judge  for  itself  of  the  occasions,  it 
is  still  more  reasonable  that  the  losses  should  be  repaired  than  that  they 
should  fall  on  the  individuals  innocently  ensnared. 

Your  suggestion  as  to  commercial  arrangements  of  a  general  nature 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  239 

with  France,  at  the  present  juncture,  has  received  the  attention  of  the 
President,  but  he  has  not  decided  that  any  instructions  should  be  given 
you  to  institute  negotiations  for  that  purpose;  especially  as  it  is  not 
known  on  what  particular  points,  sufficiently  advantageous  to  the 
United  States,  the  French  Government  would  be  likely  to  enter  into 
stipulations.  Some  obscurity  still  hangs  on  the  extra  duty  exacted 
by  the  Batavian  Government.  The  state  of  our  information  leaves 
it  doubtful,  whether  the  interests  of  the  United  States  would  be  pro 
moted  by  the  change  authorized  by  our  treaty  with  that  Republic. 

Mr.  Pinckney  will  doubtless  have  communicated  to  you  his  conver 
sation  with  Mr.  Cevallos,  in  which  the  latter  denied  the  right  of  France 
to  alienate  Louisiana  to  the  United  States,  alleging  a  secret  stipula- 
lation  by  France  not  to  alienate.  Two  notes  on  the  same  subject  have 
lately  been  presented  here  by  the  Marquis  d'Yrujo.  In  the  first, 
dated  September  4,  he  enters  a  caveat  against  the  right  of  France  to 
alienate  Louisiana,  founding  it  on  a  declaration  of  the  French  Ambas 
sador  at  Madrid,  in  July,  1802,  that  France  would  never  part  with 
that  territory;  and  affirming  that  on  no  other  condition  Spain  would 
have  ceded  it  to  France.'  In  the  second  note,  dated  September  27,  it 
is  urged,  as  an  additional  objection  to  the  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  France,  that  the  French  Government  had  never  completed 
the  title  of  France,  having  failed  to  procure  the  stipulated  recognition 
of  the  King  of  Etruria  from  Russia  and  Great  Britain,  which  was  a 
condition  on  which  Spain  agreed  to  cede  the  country  to  France. 
Copies  of  these  notes  of  the  Minister  here,  with  my  answer,  as  also 
extracts  from  Mr.  Pinckney's  letter  to  me,  and  from  a  note  of  the 
Spanish  Minister  at  Madrid  to  him,  are  also  enclosed. 

From  this  proceeding  on  the  part  of  Spain,  as  well  as  by  accounts 
from  Paris,  it  is  not  doubted,  that  whatever  her  views  may  be,  in 
opposing  our  acquisition  of  Louisiana,  she  is  soliciting  the  concurrence 
of  the  French  Government.  The  interest  alone  which  France  mani 
festly  has  in  giving  effect  to  her  engagement  with  the  United  States, 
seems  to  forbid  apprehensions  that  she  will  listen  to  any  entreaties 
or  temptations  which  Spain  may  employ.  A&  to  Spain,  it  can  hardly 
be  conceived  that  she  will,  unsupported  by  France,  persist  in  her 
remonstrances,  much  less  that  she  will  resist  the  cession  to  the  United 
States  by  force. 

The  objections  to  the  cession  advanced  by  Spain,  are  in  fact  too 
futile  to  weigh  either  with  others  or  with  herself.     The  promise  made 
by  the  French  Ambassador,  that  no  alienation  should  be  made,  formed 
no  part  of  the  treaty  of  retrocession  to  France;  and,  if  it  had,  could 
have  no  effect  on  the  purchase  by  the  United  States,  which  was  made   I 
in  good  faith,  without  notice  from  Spain  of  any  such  condition,  and    \ 
even  with   sufficient   evidence  that  no  such  condition  existed.     The     \ 
objection  drawn  from  the  failure  of  the  French  Government  to  pro-     / 


240  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

cure  Jrom  othei:  PoJOLtiLs,  an  acknowledgment  of  the  King  of  Etruria,  is 
equally  groundless.  This  stipulation  was  never  communicated  either  to 
the  public  or  to  the  United  States,  and  could,  therefore,  be  no  bar  to 
the  contract  made  by  them.  Tt  might  be  added,  that,  as  the  acknowl 
edgment  stipulated  was,  according  to  the  words  of  the  article,  to 
precede  possession  b^v  the  King  of  Etruria,  the  overt  possession  by 
him  was  notice  to  the  world  that  the  conditions  on  which  it  depended 
had  been  either  fulfilled  or  had  been  waived.  Finally,  no  particular 
Powers  whose  acknowledgment  was  to  be  procured  are  named  in  the 
article,  and  the  existence  of  war  between  Great  Britain  and  France  at 
the  time  of  the  stipulation,  is  a  proof  that  the  British  acknowledgment, 
the  want  of  which  is  now  alleged  as  a  breach  of  the  treaty,  could  never 
ave  been  in  its  contemplation. 

But  the  conduct  of  the  Spanish  Government,  both  toward  the  United 
States  and  France,  is  a  complete  answer  to  every  possible  objection  to 
the  treaty  between  them.  That  Government  well  knew  the  wish  of 
the  United  States  to  acquire  certain  territories  which  it  had  ceded  to 
France,  and  that  they  were  in  negotiation  with  France  on  the  subject; 
yet  the  slightest  hint  was  never  given  that  France  had  no  right  to 
alienate,  or  even  that  an  alienation  to  the  United  States  would  be  dis 
agreeable  to  Spain.  On  the  contrary,  the  Minister  of  His  Catholic 
Majesty,  in  an  official  note,  bearing  date  Ma}^  4  last,  gave  information 
to  the  Minister  of  the  United  States  at  Madrid,  that  "the  entire  prov 
ince  of  Louisiana,  with  the  limits  it  had  when  held  by  France,  was 
retroceded  to  that  Power,  and  that  the  United  States  might  address 
themselves  to  the  French  Government  in  order  to  negotiate  the  acqui 
sition  of  the  territories  which  would  suit  their  interest."  Here  is  at 
once  a  formal  and  irrevocable  recognition  of  the  right  as  well  of 
France  to  convey,  as  of  the  United  States  to  receive,  the  territory 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  treaty  between  them.  More  than  this  can 
not  be  required  to  silence,  forever,  the  cavils  of  Spain  at  the  titles  of 
France,  now  vested  in  the  United  States:  yet,  for  more  than  this,  she 
may  be  referred  to  her  own  measures  at  New  Orleans,  preparatory  to 
the  delivery  of  possession  to  France;  to  the  promulgation,  under 
Spanish  authority  at  that  place,  that  Louisiana  was  retroceded,  and  to 
be  delivered  to  France;  and  to  the  orders  signed  by  His  Catholic 
Majesty's  own  hand,  now  ready  to  be  presented  to  the  Government  of 
Louisiana,  for  the  delivery  of  the  province  to  the  person  duly  author 
ized  by  France  to  receive  it. 

n  a  word,  the  Spanish  Government  has  interposed  two  objections 
only  to  the  title  conveyed  to  the  United  States  by  France.  It  is  said, 
first,  that  the  title  in  the  United  States  is  not  good,  because  France 
was  bound  not  to  alienate.  To  this  it  is  answered,  that  the  Spanish 
Government  itself  referred  the  United  States  to  France,  as  the  Power 

pable,  and  the  only  Power  capable,  of  conveying  the  territory  in 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  241 

question.  It  is  said,  next,  that  the  title  in  France  herself  was  not  good,  f 
To  this,  if  the  same  answer  is  less  decisive,  the  orders  of  the  King  of  I 
Spain  for  putting  France  into  possession  are  an  answer  which  admits) 
of  no  reply. 

The  President  has  thought  proper  that  this  view  of  the  subject 
should  be  transmitted  to  you;  not  doubting  that  you  will  make  the 
proper  use  of  it  with  the  French  Government,  nor  that  that  Govern 
ment  will  feel  the  full  force  of  its  stipulated  obligations  to  remove 
whatever  difficulties  Spain  may  interpose  towards  embarrassing  a 
transaction,  the  complete  fulfillment  of  which  is  as  essential  to  the 
honor  of  France  as  it  is  important  to  the  interests  of  both  nations.  In 
the  meantime,  we  shall  proceed  in  the  arrangements  for  taking  possesA 
sion  of  the  country  ceded,  as  soon  as  possession  shall  be  authorized;  \ 
and  it  may  be  presumed,  that  the  provisions  depending  on  Congress 
will  be  sufficient  to  meet  the  discontents  of  Spain,  in  whatever  form/ 
they  may  assume. 

The  United  States  have  obtained,  b}^  just  and  honorable  means,  a! 
clear  title  to  a  territory  too  valuable,  in  itself,  and  too  important  to  I 
their  tranquillity  and  security,  not  to  be  effectually  maintained.     And  \ 
they  count  on  every  positive  concurrence,  on  the  part  of  the  French  \ 
Government,  which  the  occasion  may  demand  from  their  friendship  ) 
and  their  good  faith. 

The  rightful  limits  of  Louisiana  are  under  investigation.  It  seems 
undeniable,  from  the  present  state  of  the  evidence,  that  it  extends 
eastwardly  as  far,  at  least,  as  the  river  Perdido;  and  there  is  little 
doubt  that  we  shall  make  good  both  a  western  and  northern  extent 
highly  satisfactory  to  us. 

The  considerations  which  led  Mr.  Monroe  to  decline  his  trip  to 
Madrid,  having  the  jgame  weight  with  the  President,  the  mission  is 
suspended  until  other  instructions  shall  be  given,  or  until  circum 
stances  shall  strongly  invite  negotiations  at  Madrid  for  completing  the 
acquisition  desired  b}^  the  United  States. 
With  great  respect, 

JAMES  MADISON. 
ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON,  &c. 

P.  S.,  October  14. — Since  the  above  was  written,  I  have  received  a 
third  note  from  the  Marquis  d'Yrujo  in  reply  to  my  answer  to  his 
two  preceding.  A  copy  of  it  is  herewith  added.  It  requires  no  com 
ment  beyond  what  may  be  applicable  in  the  above  observations  on  his 
two  first  notes;  being  probably  intended  for  little  more  than  a  proof 
of  fidelity  to  his  trust  and  of  a  zeal  recommending  him  to  the  favor  of 
his  Sovereign. 

It  having  been  thought  proper  to  communicate  to  M.  Pichon,  the 
French  Charge  d'Aff'aires  here,  the  tenor  of  the  notes  from  the  Marquis 
H.  Doc.  431 10 


242  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

d'Yrujo,  he  has  presented,  in  a  note  just  received,  a  vindication  of  his 
Government,  and  its  treaty  with  the  United  States,  against  the  objec 
tions  proceeding  from  the  Spanish  Government.  A  copy  of  this  note 
is  herewith  inclosed. 


The  Marquis  d'Yrujo  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

PHILADELPHIA,  September  4,  1803. 

Through  the  medium  of  the  Ambassador  of  the  King  my  master,  in 
Paris,  it  has  come  to  His  Royal  knowledge  that  that  Government  has 
sold  to  that  of  the  United  States  the  Province  of  Louisiana,  which  His 
Majest}^  has  retroceded  to  the  French  Republic.  This  information  has 
occasioned  to  the  King  my  master  no  small  surprise,  seeing  that  the 
French  Government  had  contracted  with  His  Majesty  the  most  solemn 
engagements  never  to  alienate  the  said  province.  In  order  to  convince 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  the  nature  of  these  engage 
ments,  I  take  the  liberty  here  to  insert  a  paragraph  of  a  note  presented 
on  the  22d  July,  1802.  by  M.  de  St.  Cyr,  Ambassador  of  the?  French 
Republic,  at  Madrid,  to  the  Secretary  of  State  of  His  Majesty,  as 
follows: 

u  His  Catholic  Majesty  has  appeared  to  -wish  that  France  should 
engage  not  to  sell  nor  alienate,  in  any  manner,  the  property  and  the 
enjoyment  of  Louisiana.  Its  wish  in  this  respect  is  perfectly  con 
formable  with  the  intentions  of  the  Spanish  Government;  and  its  sole 
motive  for  entering  therein  was  because  it  respected  a  possession  which 
had  constituted  a  part  of  the  French  territory.  I  am  authorized  to 
declare  to  you  in  the  name  of  the  First  Consul  that  France  will  never 
alienate  it." 

The  mere  reading  of  the  paragraph  which  precedes  will  convince 
you,  as  well  as  the  President  of  the  United  States,  that  the  sale  of 
Louisiana,  which  France  has  lately  made,  is  a  manifest  violation  of 
the  obligations  contracted  by  her  with  His  Catholic  Majesty,  and  that 
France  wants  the  powers  to  alienate  the  said  province  without  the 
approbation  of  Spain,  as  is  seen  i neon testably  in  the  above-recited  note 
of  the  Ambassador  St.  Cyr,  authorized  by  his  Government. 

The  King  my  master  charges  me  to  inform  this  Government  as 
soon  as  possible  of  this  important  circumstance;  and,  in  compliance 
with  His  Royal  will,  I  hasten  to  acquaint  you  therewith,  in  order  that  it 
may  as  soon  as  possible  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States.  God  preserve  you  many  years. 

M.  DE  CASA  YKUJO. 

JAMES  MADISON,  Esq. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERR1TOKY    OF    LOUISIANA.  243 

From  Marquis  d'Yrujo  to  Mr.  Madison. 

#    S    /°.  i  •  5-  4».<7 

VICINITY  OF  PHILADELPHIA,  September  £7,  1803. 

SIR:  On  the  4th  current  I  had  the  honor  to  intimate  to  you  the 
extraordinary  surprise  with  which  the  King  my  master  had  heard  of 
the  sale  of  Louisiana,  made  to  the  United  States,  in  contravention  of 
the  most  solemn  assurances  given  in  writing  to  His  Majesty  by  the 
Ambassador  of  the  French  Republic  near  his  person,  and  with  the  con 
sent  and  approbation  of  the  First  Consul.  The  King  my  master 
charges  me  again  to  remind  the  American  Government  that  the  said 
French  Ambassador  entered,  in  the  name  of  his  Republic,  into  the  pos 
itive  engagement  that  France  never  would  alienate  Louisiana,  and  to 
observe  to  it  that  the  sale  of  this  province  to  the  United  States  is 
founded  in  the  violation  of  a  promise  so  absolute  that  it  ought  to  be 
respected;  a  promise,  without  which  the  King  my  master  would,  in  no 
manner,  have  dispossessed  himself  of  Louisiana.  His  Catholic  Majesty 
entertains  too  good  an  opinion  of  the  character  of  probity  and  good 
faith  which  the  Government  of  the  United  States  has  known  how  to 
obtain  so  justly  for  itself,  not  to  hope  that  it  will  suspend  the  ratifica 
tion  and  effect  of  a  treaty  which  rests  on  such  a  basis.  There  are  other 
reasons  no  less  powerful  which  come  to  the  support  of  the  decorum 
and  respect  which  nations  mutually  owe  each  other.  France  acquired 
from  the  King  my  master  the  retrocession  of  Louisiana  undel-  obliga 
tions,  whose  entire  f  uliillnient  was  absolutely  necessary  to  give  her  the 
complete  right  over  the  said  province;  such  was  that  of  causing  the 
King  of  Tuscany  to  be  acknowledged  by  the  Powers  of  Europe;  but, 
until  now,  the  French  Government  has  no!  procured  thi>  acknou  led^- 
ment  promised  and  stipulated,  either  from  the  Court  of  London  or 
from  that  of  St.  Petersburg.  Under  such  circumstances  it  is  evident 
that  the  treaty  of  sale  entered  into  between  France  and  the  United 
States  does  not  give  to  the  latter  any  right  to  acquire  and  claim  Louisi 
ana,  and  that  the  principles  of  justice  as  well  ;i^  sound  policy  oiiu'ht  to 
recoiiugafijiiLit  To  their  Government  not  to  meddle  wftE  engagements  as 
contrary  in  reality  to  her  true  interests  as  they  would  be  to  good  faith, 
and  to  their  good  correspondence  with  Spain. 

Such  are  the  sentiments  which  the  King  my  master  has  ordered  me 
to  communicate  to  the  President  of  the  United  States;  and,  having  done 
it  through  you,  I  conclude,  assuring  you  of  my  respect  and  considera 
tion  towards  your  person,  and  of  my  wishes  that  our  Lord  may 
preserve  your  life,  &c. 

M.  DE  CASA  YRUJO. 

JAMES  MADISON,  Esq. 


244  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

From  Mr.  Madison  to  the  Marquis  d'Yrujo. 

a  .s.ip,  V-bG>^_-)0 

OCTOBER  4,  1803. 

SIR:  I  have  duly  received  your  two  letters  of  the  4th  and  27th 
ultimo,  and  have  laid  them  before  the  President. 

The  repugnance  manifested  in  these  communications,  on  the  part  of 
His  Catholic  Majesty,  to  the  cession  of  Louisiana  lately  made  by  the 
French  Republic  to  the  United  States,  was  as  little  expected  as  the 
objections  to  the  transaction  can  avail  against  its -solidity. 

The  United  States  have  given  unquestionable  proofs  to  the  Spanish 
Government  and  nation  of  their  justice,  their  friendship,  and  their 
desire  to  maintain  the  best  neighborhood;  and  the  President  confides 
too  much  in  the  reciprocity  of  these  sentiments,  so  repeatedly  and  so 
recently  declared  on  the  part  of  His  Catholic  Majesty,  to  have  sup 
posed  that  he  would  see  with  dissatisfaction  a  convenient  acquisition 
by  the  United  States  of  territories  which  were  no  longer  to  remain 
with  Spain.  With"  respect  to  the  transaction  itself,  by  which  the 
United  States  have  acquired  Louisiana,  it  would  be  superfluous  to  say 
more  in  justification  of  its  perfect  validity  than  to  refer  to  the  official 
communication  made  by  Mr.  Cevallos  to  the  Minister  Plenipotentiary 
of  the  United  States  at  Madrid,  in  a  note  dated  on  the  4th  of  May  last. 
His  words  are:  "Por  la  retrocesion  hecha  a  la  Francia  de  la  Luisiana, 
recobro  esta  Potencia  dicha  provincia  con  los  limites  con  que  Ion  tubo, 
y  salvos  los  derechos  adquiridos  por  otras  Potencias.  La  de  Inn  Extados 
Unidos  podra  dirigirse  al  Gobierno  Frances  para  negociar  la  ad^iiwi- 
cian  de  territorios  que  convengan  a  su  interest a  Here  is  an  explicit 
and  positive  recognition  of  the  right  of  the  United  States  and  France 
to  enter  into  the  transaction  which  has  taken  place. 

To  these  observations,  which  I  have  been  charged  by  the  President 
to  make  to  you,  I  have  only  to  add,  sir,  that  his  high  respect  for  His 
Catholic  Majesty,  and  his  desire  to  cherish  and  strengthen  the  friendly 
sentiments  happily  subsisting  between  the  two  nations,  will  induce  him 
to  cause  such  explanations  and  representations  to  be  made  through  the 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States  at  Madrid  as  can  not  fail 
to  reconcile  His  Catholic  Majesty  to  an  event  so  essentially  connected 
with  the  respect  which  the  United  States  owe  to  their  character  and 
their  interest. 

Be  pleased,  sir,  to  accept  assurances  of  the  high  respect  and  consid 
eration  with  which  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  your  most  obedient, 
humble  servant, 

JAMES  MADISON. 

« Translation:  "By  the  retrocession  made  to  France  of  Louisiana,  this  Power  has 
recovered  the  said  province  with  the  limits  which  it  had,  and  saving  the  rights 
acquired  by  other  Powers.  .The  United  States  can  address  themselves  to  the  French 
Government  to  negotiate  the  acquisition  of  territories  which  may  suit  their  interest." 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  245 

Mr.  Madison  to  Mr.  Monroe. 

WASHINGTON,  Oct.  10,  1803. 

DEAR  SIR, — Finding  that  Mr.  Purveyance  is  within  reach  of  a  few 
lines,  I  add  them  to  what  he  is  already  charged  with,  to  observe  that 
Yrujo  has  written  another  remonstrance  against  our  acquisition  of 
Louisiana,  alleging  as  a  further  objection,  that  France,  by  not  obtain 
ing  the  stipulated  acknowledgements  of  the  King  of  Etruria  from  the 
Courts  of  Petersburg  and  London,  had  a  defective  title  herself  to  the 
Cession.  Nothing  can  be  more  absurd  than  these  cavils  on  the  part 
of  -Hpain,  unless  it  should  be  her  using  in  support  of  them  force 
against  our  taking  possession.  This  she  will  scarlely  attempt,  if  not 
backed  by  France,  which  we  hope  is  impossible.  I  am  writing  on 
this  subject  to  Livingston  and  Pinckney.  I  have  already  done  so  to 
Yrujo,  giving  him  to  understand  that  we  shall  not  withhold  any 
means  that  may  be  rendered  necessary  to  secure  our  object.  Pichon 
is  perfectly  well  disposed,  is  offended  with  the  Spanish  Minister,  and, 
if  left  under  the  orders  he  now  has,  will  co-operate  zealously,  with  an 
honest  view  to  the  honor  and  obligations  of  his  own  Country.  On 
our  part,  I  trust  every  thing  that  the  crisis  demands  will  be  done,  and 
that  we  sriaTr~speediry  be  in  possession  of  the  valuable  object  which 
tli^Treaty  with  France  has  gained  for  us.  Baring  is  here,  but  hav 
ing  not  yet  called  on  me  I  have  had  no  opportunity  of  paying  him 
civilities,  or  obtaining  explanations  from  him. 


Marquis  d' Yrujo  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

/°*     ^    fl        •    <."~~  ^  f\ 

BALTIMORE,    October  12,  1803. 

SIR:  I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  4th  current  in  reply  to  those 
which  I  had  the  honor  to  write  to  you  on  the  4th  and  27th  of  last 
month;  and  as,  without  entering  into  the  examination  of  the  powerful 
reasons  which,  in  the  name  of  the  King  my  master,  I  unfolded 
therein,  against  the  sale  of  Louisiana,  you  refer  generally  to  the 
explanations  which,  as  you  inform  me,  the  Minister  of  the  United 
States  near  His  Majesty  is  to  make  at  Madrid.  I  shall  at  present  con- 
fine  my  observations  to  that  which  you  are  pleased  to  make  to  me, 
founded  upon  certain  expressions  which  you  cite  to  me  from  an  official 
letter  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  of  the  King  my  master,  to  the  above- 
mentioned  American  Minister  in  Spain.  The  expressions  are  the  fol 
lowing: 

"By  the  retrocession  made  to  France  of  Louisiana,  this  Power  has 
recovered  the  said  province,  with  the  limits  which  it  had,  and  saving 
the  rights  acquired  by  other  Powers.  The  United  Stated  can  address 
themselves  to  the  French  Government  to  negotiate  the  acquisition  of 
territory  which  may  suit  their  interests." 


246  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

These  expressions,  which  you  consider  as  an  explicit  and  positive 
acknowledgment  of  the  right  of  the  United  States  and  France  to  enter 
into  the  engagements  which  they  afterwards  did,  do  not,  in  my  opinion, 
weaken  in  any  manner  the  foundation  and  the  force  of  the  represen 
tations  which  I  had  the  honor  to  make  to  you  against  the  sale  of 
Louisiana. 

There  is  an  expression,  among  those  you  cite,  which  will  suffice  to 
refute  the  inference  which  you  draw  from  them,  and  it  is  that  of  sav 
ing  the  rights  acquired  by  other  Powers.  Although  the  general  form 
of  this  expression  gives,  in  other  respects,  much  latitude  to  its  true 
meaning,  it  is  indubitable  that  Spain  having  made  the  retrocession  of 
Louisiana,  to  France,  under  certain  conditions  and  modifications,  Spain 
has  the  indubitable  right  to  claim  their  execution.  Of  this  nature  was 
the  stipulation,  that  France  should  not  sell  or  alienate  Louisiana  in 
any  manner  whatever,  and  likewise  the  solemn  and  positive  accession 
and  declaration  of  the  French  Government  adhering  to  the  wishes  of 
Spain;  consequently  this  expression  destro}Ts  the  possibility  that, 
according  to  existing  circumstances,  the  French  Government  should 
possess  the  right  of  selling  the  said  province,  or  that  of  the  United 
States  of  buying  it. 

There  is  another  consideration  still  stronger,  and  which  is  not  at  all 
subject  to  the  interpretation  of  equivocal  expressions.  It  is  evident 
that  the  engagement  entered  into*  by  France  with  Spain  not  to  alienate 
Louisiana  in  any  manner,  is  much  older  in  date  than  the  official  letter 
of  Mr.  Cevallos,  whose  expressions  you  are  .pleased  to  cite  to  me.  In 
that  letter  those  which  you  have  scored,  that  the  United  States  can 
address  themselves  to  the  French  Government  to  negotiate  the  acquisition 
of  the  territory  which  may  suit  their  interests,  neither  signify  nor  can 
signify  anything  but  a  deference  towards  France,  whose  Government 
alone  is  now  concerned  to  give  a  decisive  answer  to  the  requests  of  the 
United  States,  an  answer  analogous  and  conformable  to  the  nature  of 
the  previous  engagements  which  had  been  entered  into  with  Spain. 
The  repugnance  of  the  Spanish  Government  may  likewise  be  recog 
nized  to  give  to  that  of  the  United  States  a  necessary  negative  at  a 
time  when  it  found  itself  united  with  them  by  bands  of  the  most 
sincere  friendship. 

Other  interpretations  of  equal  force  may  be  derived  from  the  obvi 
ous  meaning  of  the  expressions  of  the  official  letter  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  of  His  Majesty  mentioned  by  you;  but  as  those  which  I  have 
just  made  are,  in  my  opinion,  conclusive,  I  abstain  from  entering  upon 
others  in  detail,  and  I  take  the  liberty  to  call  to  them  the  attention,  as 
well  of  yourself  as  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  in  order  that 
you  may  be  more  and  more  convinced  of  the  reason  and  justice  with 
which  the  King  my  master  objects  to  the  ratification  of  a  treaty 
founded  upon  a  manifest  violation  of  the  most  solemn  engagements 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  247 

entered  into  by  France.  I  avail  myself,  with  pleasure,  of  this  occasion 
to  reiterate  to  you  my  wishes  to  serve  you  arid  that  our  Lord  would 
preserve  your  life,  &c. 

M.  DE  CASA  YRUJO. 
JAMES  MADISON,  Esq. 


James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Charles  Pinckney,  Minister  to  Spain. 

-  7 !  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  October  12,  1803. 

Since  my  last  of  July  29th,  I  have  received  your  several  letters  of 
April  12th  and  20th,  May  2d  and  4th,  June  12th,  and  July  18th. 

Mr.  Monroe  has  already  informed  you  of  his  having  proceeded  to 
London,  and  of  his  intention  not  to  repair  to  Madrid  for  the  present. 
He  will  have  since  received  instructions,  given  on  a  contrary  supposi 
tion;  but  it  is  probable  he  will  wait  where  he  is  for  the  determination 
of  the  President,  on  the  reasons  which  kept  him  from  proceeding  to 
Madrid.  I  have  just  informed  him  that  the  President  approves  the 
course  he  has  taken,  so  that  he  is  not  to  be  expected  to  join  }^ou  at 
Madrid,  until  he  shall  be  so  instructed,  or  until  a  change  of  circum 
stances  shall,  in  his  view,  clearly  invite  him  to  do  so.  My  last  letter 
to  you,  having  provided  for  the  case  of  Mr.  Monroe's  postponing  this 
trip,  I  need  not  repeat  the  instructions  and  observations  then  made 
to  you.  I  shall  only  add  that  it  is  more  proper  now  than  ever  that 
you  should  not  be  in  haste,  without  the  concurrence  of  your  colleague, 
to  revive  the  negotiation  jointly  committed  to  you. 

Among  the  reasons  which  weighed  with  the  President,  as  well  as 
with  Mr.  Monroe,  against  attempting,  at  present,  to  procure  from 
the  Spanish  Government  the  residuum  of  territory  desired  by  the 
United  States,  is  the  ill-humor  shown  by  that  Government  at  the 
acquisition  already  made  by  them  from  France;  and  of  which  the 
language  held  to  you  by  Mr.  Cevallos,  as  communicated  in  your  letter 
of  -  — ,  is  a  sufficient  proof.  A  still  fuller  proof  of  the  same  fact 
is  contained  in  three  letters  lately  received  from  the  Spanish  Minister 
here;  copies  of  which,  with  the  answer  to  my  two  first,  are  herewith 
enclosed.  1  enclose  also  a  copy  of  a  letter  written  on  the  occasion  to 
Mr.  Livingston,  which  was  rendered  more  proper  by  the  probability, 
as  welt  as  by  information  from  Paris,  that  efforts  would  be  used  by 
Spain  to  draw  the  French  Government  into  her  views  of  frustrating 
the  cession  of  Louisiana  to  the  United  States. 

In  these  documents  you  will  find  the  remarks  by  which  the  objections 
made  by  the  Spanish  Government  to  the  Treaty  of  Cession  between 
the  United  States  and  France  are  to  be  combatted.  The  President 
thinks  it  proper,  that  they  should,  without  delay,  be  conveyed  to  the 
Spanish  Government,  either  by  note  from  you  or  in  conversation,  as 
you  may  deem  most  expedient;  and  in  a  form  and  style  best  uniting  the 


248  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

advantages  of  making  that  Government  sensible  of  the  absolute  deter 
mination  of  the  United  States  to  maintain  their  right  with  the  pro 
priety  of  avoiding  undignified  menace  and  unnecessary  irritation. 

The  conduct  of  Spain,  on  this  occasion,  is  such  as  was,  in  several 
views,  little  to  be  expected,  and  as  is  not  readily  explained.  If  her 
object  be  to  extort  Louisiana  from  France,  as  well  as  to  prevent 
its  transfer  to  the  United  States,  it  would  seem  that  she  must  be 
emboldened  by  an  understanding  with  some  other  very  powerful 
quarter  of  Europe.  If  she  hopes  to  prevail  on  France  to  break  her 
engagement  with  the  United  States,  and  voluntarily  restore  Louisiana 
to  herself,  why  has  she  so  absurdly  blended  with  the  project  the  offen 
sive  communication  of  the  perfidy  which  she  charges  on  the  First 
Consul?  If  it  be  her  aim  to  prevent  the  execution  of  the  treaty 
between  the  United  States  and  France,  in  order  to  have  for  her  neigh 
bor  the  latter  instead  of  the  United  States,  it  is  not  difficult  to  show 
that  she  mistakes  the  lesser  for  the  greater  danger  against  which  she 
wishes  to  provide.  Admitting,  as  she  may  possibly  suppose,  that 
Louisiana,  as  a  French  Colony,  would  be  less  able,  as  well  as  less  dis 
posed,  than  the  United  States,  to  encroach  on  her  southern  possessions, 
and  that  it  would  be  too  much  occupied  with  its  own  safety  against 
the  United  States  to  turn  its  force  on  the  other  side  against  her 
possessions,  still  it  is  obvious,  in  the  first  place,  that  in  proportion  to 
the  want  of  power  in  the  French  the  colony  would  be  safe  for  Spain; 
compared  with  the  power  of  the  United  States,  the  colony  would  be 
insufficient  as  a  barrier  against  the  United  States;  and,  in  the  next 
place,  that  the  very  security  which  she  provides  would  itself  be  a 
source  of  the  greatest  of  all  the  dangers  she  has  to  apprehend. 

The  collisions  between  the  United  States  and  the  French  would  lead 
to  a  contest,  in  which  Great  Britain  would  naturally  join  the  former, 
and  in  which  Spain  would,  of  course,  be  on  the  side  of  the  latter;  and 
what  becomes  of  Louisiana  and  the  Spanish  possessions  beyond  it,  in 
a  contest  between  the  Powers  so  marshaled?  An  easy  and  certain  vic 
tim  to  the  fleets  of  Great  Britain  and  the  land  armies  of  this  country. 
A  combination  of  these  forces  was  always,  and  justly,  dreaded  by  both 
Spain  and  France.  It  was  the  danger  which  led  both  into  our  Revo 
lutionary  war,  and  much  inconsistency  and  weakness  is  chargeable  on 
the  projects  of  either  which  tend  to  reunite,  for  the  purposes  of  war,  the 
power  which  has  been  divided.  France,  returning  to  her  original 
policy,  has  wisely,  by  her  late  treaty  with  the  United  States,  obviated 
a  danger  which  could  not  have  been  very  remote.  Spain  will  be  equally 
wise  in  following  the  example;  and,  by  acquiescing  in  an  arrangement 
which  guards  against  an  early  danger  of  controversy  between  the 
United  States,  first  with  France,  and  then  with  herself,  and  removes 
to  a  distant  day  the  approximation  of  the  American  and  Spanish  set 
tlements,  provides  in  the  best  possible  manner  for  the  security  of  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  '249 

latter,  and  for  a  lasting  harmony  with  the  United  States.  WJl&t ..is  it 
that  Spain  dreads?  She  dreads,  it  is  presumed,  the  growing-  power  of 
(his  country,  and  the  direction  of  it  against  her  possessions  within  its 
reach.  Can  she  annihilate  this  power?  No.  Can  she  sensibly  retard 
its  growth?  No.  Does  not  common  prudence  then,  advise  her  to 
conciliate,  by  every  proof  of  friendship  and  confidence,  the  good  will 
of  a  nation  whose  power  is  formidable  to  her;  instead  of  yielding  to 
the  impulses  of  jealousy  and  adopting  obnoxious  precautions  which 
can  have  no  other  effect  than  to  bring  on,  prematurely,  the  whole 
weight  of  the  calamity  which  she  fears?  Reflections  such  as  these  may, 
perhaps,  enter  with  some  advantage  into  your  communications  with 
the  Spanish  Government;  and,  as  far  as  they  may  be  invited  by  favor 
able  occasions,  you  will  make  that  use  of  them. 

Perhaps,  after  all  this  interposition  of   Spain,  it  may  be  intended  / 
merely  to  embarrass  a  measure  which  she  does  not  hope  to  defeat,  in', 
order  to  obtain  from  France,  or  the  United  States,  or  both,  concessions 
of  some  sort  or  other  as  the  price  of  her  acquiescence.     As  yet  no  indi 
cation   is  given   that  a  resistance,  by  force,  to  the  execution  of  the 
treaty   is  prepared  or   meditated.     And  if  it  should,  the  provisions 
depending  on  Congress,  whose  session  will  commence  in  two  days,  will, 
it  may  be  presumed,  be  effectually  adapted  to  such  an  event. 

With  sentiments,  &c.,  JAMES  MADISON. 

CHARLES  PLNCKNEY,  Esq. 


Mr.  Pichon  to  the  Secretary  of  State.    £  ^v~'* 
•  s  •  *  5, ',  SI   I  -^ 

GEORGETOWN,  21  Vendemiaire,  12th  year  (October  1J^  1803). 

The  undersigned,  to  whom  the  Secretary  of  State  has  been  pleased 
to  communicate  the  proceedings  of  the  Minister  of  His  Catholic 
Majesty  to  the  United  States,  in  relation  to  the  treaty  by  which  the 
French  Republic  has  ceded  Louisiana  k>  the  United  States,  thinks  that 
he  owes  it  to  his  own  Government  as  well  as  to  the  American  Govern 
ment,  to  present  to  Mr.  Madison  the  observations  of  which  those  pro 
ceedings,  as  far  as  they  attack  the  rights  arid  even  the  dignity  of  the 
French  Government,  have  appeared  to  him  susceptible. 

The  Court  of  Madrid,  according  to  the  notes  of  its  Minister,  con 
siders  the  cession  made  by  France  to  the  United  States  as  irregular  and 
invalid:  1st.  Because  France  had  renounced  the  right  of  alienating  the 
territories  in  question:  2d.  Because  the  Treaty  of  St.  Ildefonso,  by 
wrhich  Spain  retroceded  those  territories  to  France,  has  not  been  fully 
executed  with  respect  to  the  acknowledgment  of  the  King  of  Etruria, 
an  acknowledgment  which  was  one  of  the  conditions  of  the  retrocession 
to  be  fulfilled  by  France. 

On  the  first  point,  the  undersigned  will  observe  that  the  Treaty  of 


250  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

St.  Ildefonso  retrocedes  Louisiana  in  full  sovereignty,  and  without  any 
limitation  as  to  the  future  domain  of  France.  To  operate  a  limitation 
so  essential  as  is  that  to  which  the  Court  of  Madrid  appeals,  nothing- 
less  would  have  been  necessary,  according  to  the  nature  of  contracts 
in  general  arid  of  treaties  in  particular,  than  a  stipulation  to  this  effect 
inserted  in  the  treaty  itself.  A  promise  made  fifteen  months  after  the 
signature  of  this  pact,  and  which  might,  on  one  side,  have  been  j'ieldcd 
to  the  solicitations  of  one  of  the  contracting  parties,  and,  on  the  other, 
dictated  by  dispositions  which  might  then  exist  in  the  other  party,  but 
which  ulterior  circumstances  might  have  changed;  such  a  promise 
can  not  create  in  favor  of  Spain  a  right  sufficient  to  enable  her  to 
charge  with  invalidity  the  transactions  which  have  contravened  it. 
The  contrary  pretension  would  certainly  confound  all  the  principles 
relative  to  the  nature  of  obligations,  and  would  destroy  the  solemnity 
of  treaties.  These  general  reasonings  would  receive  a  new  force  from 
the  circumstances  which  are  peculiar  to  different  nations  in  relation 
to  the  subject  of  pacts;  but  the  undersigned  will  not  enter  into  the 
examination  of  these  circumstances,  under  the  persuasion  that  general 
principles  sufficiently  repel  the  pretensions  of  the  Court  of  Madrid. 

On  the  second  point,  the  objections  of  that  Court  do  not  appear  to 
the  undersigned  to  be  better  founded.  It  is  known  that  the  King  of 
Etruria  was  placed  on  the  throne  since  the  Treaty  of  St.  Ildefonso. 
We  have  a  right  to  suppose  that  His  Catholic  Majesty  was  satisfied 
from  that  period  with  the  measures  and  efforts  employed  by  France, 
to  cause  the  title  of  this  Prince  to  be  acknowledged  by  the  other 
nations.  It  is  at  least  what  might  be  concluded  from  facts  within  the 
knowledge  of  all  the  world.  In  the  Treaty  of  Amiens,  concluded  on 
the  27th  of  March,  1802,  Great  Britain  did  not  acknowledge  the  King 
of  Etruria.  Notwithstanding  the  silence,  of  the  Court  of  London,  on 
so  solemn  an  occasion,  that  of  Madrid  ordered,  in  the  month  of  Octo 
ber  following,  the  deliveiy  of  the  Colony  to  France,  as  is  proved  by 
the  Royal  cedula,  which  the  undersigned  has  received  and  exhibited  to 
Mr.  Madison;  a  cedula,  which,  as  all  the  world  knows,  was  long  ago 
forwarded  to  the  Captain-General  of  Louisiana,  who  sent  the  Marquis 
of  Casa  Calvo  to  New  Orleans  to  superintend  its  execution. 

To  these  conclusive  observations,  the  undersigned  will  add,  that  the 
Court  of  Madrid  might  have  been  informed  in  the  course  of  the  month 
of  February  last,  by  its  Minister  to  the  United  States,  that  the  Ameri 
can  Government  was  sending  to  Paris  a  Minister  Extraordinary,  in 
order  to  negotiate  with  the  French  Government  the  acquisition  of 
New  Orleans.  If  the  Court  of  Madrid  had  seen,  in  the  object  of  this 
mission,  an  injury  offered  to  its  rights,  what  prevented  it,  after  being 
thus  early  apprized,  from  informing  thereof  the  Minister  of  the 
United  States  at  Paris,  and  the  French  Government,  and  from  inter 
posing,  before  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty,  its  intervention  in  a  form 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  251 

adapted  to  suspend  it?  It  does  not  appear  that  that  Court  has 
taken,  at  Paris,  any  steps  of  this  nature.  To  suppose  it,  would  be 
inconsistent  with  the  instructions  which  the  undersigned  has  received 
from  his  Government,  to  accelerate  as  much  as  is  in  his  power  the 
execution  of  the  treaty  concluded  on  the  30th  of  April  last,  between 
the  French  Republic  and  the  United  States. 

The  undersigned  therefore  hopes,  that  the  American  Government 
will  not  see  in  the  proceedings  of  the  Court  of  Madrid,  in  order  to 
obstruct  the  execution  of  this  treaty,  anything  but  specious  reasonings, 
and  will  proceed  to  its  execution  with  the  same  earnestness  which  the 
French  Government  has  employed  on  its  part.  The  undersigned  lias 
received  the  necessary  orders  to  exchange  the  ratifications,  and  to 
effect  the  taking  of  possession  of  Louisiana  by  France,  and  its  transfer 
to  the  United  States.  He  does  not  presume  that  the  Court  of  Madrid 
would  wish  to  oppose  the  execution  of  the  first  orders.  This  suppo 
sition  would  be  as  contrary  to  its  loyalty  as  to  the  dignity  of  the 
French  Government.  In  an}7  event,  as  soon  as  the  ratifications  are 
exchanged,  the  undersigned  will  proceed  without  delay,  in  concert 
with  the  Commissaiy  appointed  for  that  purpose  by  the  First  Consul, 
to  the  delivery  of  the  colony  to  the  persons  whom  the  President  of  the 
United  States  shall  appoint  to  take  possession  of  it. 

The  undersigned  has  the  honor  to  request  Mr.  Madison  to  submit  to 
the  President  of  the  United  States  the  contents  of  this  note,  which  is 
intended  to  prevent  the  imputations  cast  by  the  Minister  of  Spain 
against  the  French  Government,  from  remaining  without  reply.  The 
undersigned  prays,  at  the  same  time,  Mr.  Madison  to  receive  the 
assurance  of  his  respect  and  of  his  high  consideration. 

L.  A.  Pic  1  1  ON. 


W/ 


-A- 

r  ,  /   r 


Message  from  the  President  of  the  United  States,  October  17,  1803. 

'*•» 

To  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States: 

In  calling  you  together,  fellow-citizens,  at  an  earlier  day  than  was 
contemplated  by  the  act  of  the  last  session  of  Congress,  I  have  not 
been  insensible  to  the  personal  inconveniences  necessarily  resulting 
from  an  unexpected  change  in  your  arrangements.  But  matters  of 
great  public  concernment  have  rendered  this  call  necessary,  and  the 
interest  you  feel  in  these  will  supersede  in  your  minds  all  private 
considerations. 

Congress  witnessed,  at  their  last  session,  the  extraordinary  agitation 
produced  in  the  public  mind  by  the  suspension  of  our  right  of  deposit 
at  the  port  of  New  Orleans,  no  assignment  of  another  place  having 


252  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OK    LOUISIANA. 

been  made  according"  to  treaty.  The}'  were  sensible  that  the  continu 
ance  of  that  privation  would  be  more  injurious  to  our  nation  than  any 
consequences  that  could  flow  from  any  mode  of  redress;  but,  reposing1 
just  confidence  in  the  good  faith  of  the  Government  whose  officer  had 
committed  the  wrong,  friendly  and  reasonable  representations  were 
resorted  to,  and  the  right  of  deposit  was  restored. 

Previous,  however,  to  this  period  we  had  not  been  unaware  of  the 
danger  to  which  our  peace  would  be  perpetually  exposed  whilst  so 
important  a  key  to  the  commerce  of  the  Western  country  remained 
under  a  foreign  power.  Difficulties  too  were  presenting  themselves 
as  to  tbe  navigation  of  other  streams,  which  arising  in  our  territories, 
pass  through  those  adjacent.  Propositions  had  therefore  been  author 
ized  for  obtaining  on  fair  conditions  the  sovereignty  of  New  Orleans, 
and  of  other  possessions  in  that  quarter,  interesting  to  our  quiet,  to 
such  extent  as  was  deemed  practicable;  and  the  provisional  appropri 
ation  of  two  million  dollars,  to  be  applied  and  accounted  for  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  intended  as  part  of  the  price,  was 
considered  as  conveying  the  sanction  of  Congress  to  the  acquisition 
proposed.  The  enlightened  Government  of  France  saw,  with  just 
discernment,  the  importance  to  both  nations  of  such  liberal  arrange 
ments  as  might  best  and  permanently  promote  the  peace,  interests 
and  friendship  of  both;  and  the  property  and  sovereignty  of  all 
Louisiana,  which  had  been  restored  to  them,  has,  on  certain  condi 
tions,  been  transferred  to  the  United  States,  by  instruments  bearing 
date  the  30th  of  April  last.  When  these  shall  have  received  the  con 
stitutional  sanction  of  the  Senate,  they  will,  without  delay,  be  commu 
nicated  to  the  Representatives  for  the  exercise  of  their  functions,  as 
to  those  conditions  which  are  within  the  powers  vested  by  the  Consti 
tution  in  Congress.  Whilst  the  property  and  sovereignty  of  the 
Mississippi  and  its  waters  secure  an  independent  outlet  for  the  produce 

j  of  the  Western  States,  and  an  uncontrolled  navigation  through  their 
whole  course,  free  from  collision  with  other  Powers,  and  the  dangers 
to  our  peace  from  that  source,  the  fertility  of  the  country,  its  climate 
.and  extent,  promise,  in  due  season,  important  aids  to  our  Treasury,  an 
.'ample  provision  for  our  posterity,  and  a  wide  spread  for  the  blessings 

/  of  freedom  and  equal  laws. 

W'ith  the  wisdom  of  Congress  it  will  rest  to  take  those  ulterior  meas 
ures  which  may  be  necessary  for  the  immediate  occupation  and  tempo 
rary  government  of  the  country;  for  its  incorporation  into  our  union; 
for  rendering  the  change  of  government  a  blessing  to  our  newly  adopted 
brethren;  for  securing  to  them  the  rights  of  conscience  and  of  prop 
erty;  for  confirming  to  the  Indian  inhabitants  their  occupincy  and  self- 
government,  establish  friendly  and  commercial  relations  with  them, 
and  for  ascertaining  the  geography  of  the  country  acquired.  Such 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  253 

materials  for  your  information  relative  to  its  affairs  in  general,  as  the 
short  space  of  time  has  permitted  me  to  collect,  will  be  laid  before  you 
when  the  subject  shall  be  in  a  state  for  your  consideration. 


TH.  JEFFERSON. 
OCTOBER  17,  1803. 


P.V—   »n**  -s"^ 

Treaty  between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  French  Republic. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  the  First  Consul 
of  the  French  Republic,  in  the  name  of  the  French  people,  desiring  to 
remove  all  source  of  misunderstanding,  relative  to  objects  of  discus 
sion  mentioned  in  the  second  and  fifth  articles  of  the  Convention  of 
(the  8th  Vendemiaire,  an  9,)'September  30,  1800,  relative  to  the  rights 
claimed  by  the  United  States,  in  virtue  of  the  treaty  concluded  at 
Madrid,  the  27th  October,  1795,  between  His  Catholic  Majesty  and  the 
said  United  States,  and  willing  to  strengthen  the  union  and  friendship, 
which  at  the  time  of  the  said  Convention  was  happily  reestablished 
between  the  two  nations,  have  respectively  named  their  Plenipoten 
tiaries,  to-wit:  The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  of  the  said  States,  Robert 
R.  Livingston,  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States,  and 
James  Monroe,  Minister  Plenipotentiary  and  Envoy  Extraordinary  of 
the  said  States,  near  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic;  and  the 
First  Consul,  in  the  name  of  the  French  people,  the  French  citizen 
Barbe  Marbois,  Minister  of  the  Public  Treasury,  who,  after  having 
respectively  exchanged  their  full  powers,  have  agreed  to  the  following 
articles: 

ART.  1.  Whereas,  by  the  article  the  third  of  the  Treaty  concluded 
at  St.  Ildefonso,  (the  9th  Vendemiaire,  an  9,)  October  1, 1800,  between 
the  First  Consul  of  the  French  Republic  and  His  Catholic  Majesty, 
it  was  agreed  as  follows :  His  Catholic  Majesty  promises  and  engages 
on  his  part  to  cede  to  the  French  Republic,  six  months  after  the  full 
and  entire  execution  of  the  conditions  and  stipulations  herein,  relative 
to  His  Ro}^al  Highness  the  Duke  of  Parma,  the  Colori}^  or  Province  of 
Louisiana,  with  the  same  extent  that  it  now  has  in  the  hands  of  Spain, 
and  that  it  had  when  France  possessed  it;  and  such  as  it  should  be 
after  the  treaties  subsequently  entered  into  between  Spain  and  other 
States:  And  whereas,  in  pursuance  of  the  Treaty,  particularly  of  the 
third  article,  the  French  Republic  has  an  incontestible  title  to  the 
domain  and  to  the  possession  of  the  said  territory,  the  First  Consul  of 
the  French  Republic,  desiring  to  give  to  the  United  States  a  strong 


254  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

proof  of  friendship,  doth  hereby  cede  to  the  said  United  States,  in  the 
name  of  the  French  Republic,  for  ever  and  in  full  sovereignty,  the 
said  territory,  with  all  its  rights  and  appurtenances,  as  fully  and  in 
the  same  manner  as  they  might  have  been  acquired  by  the  French 
Republic,  in  value  of  the  above  mentioned  treaty,  concluded  with  His 
Catholic  Majesty. 

ART.  *2.  In  the  cession  made  by  the  preceding  article,  are  included 
the  adjacent  islands  belonging  to  Louisiana,  all  public  lots  and  squares, 
vacant  lands,  and  all  public  buildings,  fortifications,  barracks,  and  other 
edifices,  which  are  not  private  property.  The  archives,  papers,  and 
documents,  relative  to  the  domain  and  sovereignty  of  Louisana  and  its 
dependencies,  will  be  left  in  the  possession  of  the  Commissaries  of  the 
United  Slates,  and  copies  will  be  afterwards  given  in  due  form  to  the 
magistrates  and  municipal  officers,  of  such  of  the  said  papers  and 
documents  as  may  be  necessary  to  them. 

ART.  3.  The  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  territory  shall  be  incorporated 
in  the  Union  of  the  United  States,  and  admitted  as  soon  as  possible, 
according  to  the  principles  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  to  the  enjoy 
ment  of  all  the  rights,  advantages,  and  immunities,  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States;  and,  in  the  meantime,  they  shall  be  maintained  and 
protected  in  the  free  enjoyment-  of  their  liberty,  property,  and  the 
religion  which  they  profess.* 

ART.  4.  There  shall  be  sent  by  the  Government  of  France  a  Com 
missary  to  Louisana,  to  the  end  that  he  do  every  act  necessary,  as  well 
to  receive  from  the  officers  of  His  Catholic  Majesty  the  said  country 
and  its  dependencies  in  the  name  of  the  French  Republic,  if  it  has  not 
been  already  done,  as  to  transmit  it,  in  the  name  of  the  French  Republic, 
to  the  Commissary  or  agent  of  the  United  States. 

ART.  5.  Immediately  after  the  ratification  of  the  present  treaty  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  and  in  case  that  of  the  First  Consul 
shall  have  been  previously  obtained,  the  Commissary  of  the  French 
Republic  shall  remit  all  the  military  posts  of  New  Orleans,  and  other 
parts  of  the  ceded  territory,  to  the  Commissary  or  Commissaries  named 
by  the  President  to  take  possession;  the  troops,  whether  of  France  or 
Spain,  who  may  be  there,  shall  cease  to  occupy  any  military  post  from 
the  time  of  taking  possession,  and  shall  be  embarked  as  soon  as  possible 
in  the  course  of  three  months  after  the  ratification  of  this  treaty. 

ART.  0.  The  United  States  promise  to  execute  such  treaties  and 
articles  as  may  have  been  agreed  between  Spain  and  the  tribes  and 
nations  of  Indians,  until,  by  mutual  consent  of  the  United  States  and 
the  said  tribes  or  nations,  other  suitable  articles  shall  have  been 
agreed  upon. 

ART.  7.   As   it   is    reciprocally  advantageous   to   the   commerce   of 

*Said  to  have  been  drawn  by  Napoleon  himself. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  255 

Franco  and  the  United  States,  to  encourage  the  communication  of 
both  nations,  for  a  limited  time,  in  the  country  ceded  by  the  present 
treaty,  until  general  arrangements  relative  to  the  commerce  of  both 
nations  ir.&y  be  agreed  on,  it  has  been  agreed  between  the  contracting 
parties,  that  the  French  ships  coming  directly  from  France  or  any  of 
her  Colonies,  loaded  only  with  the  produce  or  manufactures  of  France 
or  her  said  Colonies,  and  the  ships  of  Spain  coming  directly  from 
Spain  or  any  of  her  Colonies,  loaded  only  with  the  produce  or  manu 
factures  of  Spain  or  her  Colonies,  shall  be  admitted  during  the  space 
of  twelve  years  in  the  port  of  New  Orleans,  and  in  all  other  legal 
ports  of  entry  within  the  ceded  territory,  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
ships  of  the  United  States  coming  directly  from  France  or  Spain,  or 
any  of  their  Colonies,  without  being  subject  to  any  other  or  greater 
duty  on  the  merchandise,  or  other  or  greater  tonnage  than  those  paid 
by  the  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

During  the  space  of  time  above  mentioned,  no  other  nation  shall  have 
a  right  to  the  same  privileges  in  the  ports  of  the  ceded  territory.  The 
twelve  years  shall  commence  three  months  after  the  exchange  of  rati 
fications,  if  it  shall  take  place  in  France,  or  three  months  after  it  shall 
have  been  notified  at  Paris  to  the  French  Government,  if  it  shall  take 
place  in  the  United  States;  it  is,  however,  well  understood,  that  the 
object  of  the  above  article  is  to  favor  the  manufactures,  commerce, 
freight,  and  navigation  of  France  and  Spain,  so  far  as  relates  to  the 
importations  that  the  French  and  Spanish  shall  make  into  the  said 
ports  of  the  United  States,  without  in  any  sort  affecting  the  regulations 
that  the  United  States  may  make  concerning  the  exportation  of  the 
produce  and  merchandise  of  the  United  States,  or  any  right  they  may 
have  to  make  such  regulations. 

ART.  8.  In  future  and  forever,  after  the  expiration  of  the  twelve 
years,  the  ships  of  France  shall  be  treated  upon  the  footing  of  the 
most  favored  nations  in  the  ports  above-mentioned. 

ART.  9.  The  particular  convention  signed  this  day  by  the  respective 
Ministers,  having  for  its  object  to  provide  the  payment  of  debts  due 
to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  by  the  French  Republic,  prior  to 
the  30th  of  September,  1800,  (8th  Vendemiaire,  an  9,)  is  approved,, 
and  to  have  its  execution  in  the  same  manner  as  if  it  had  been  inserted 
in  the  present  treaty;  and  it  shall  be  ratified  in  the  same  form  and  in 
the  same  time,  so  that  the  one  shall  not  be  ratified  distinct  from  the 
other.  Another  particular  convention,  signed  at  the  same  date  as  the 
present  treaty,  relative  to  a  definitive  rule  between  the  contracting 
parties  is,  in  the  like  manner,  approved,  and  will  be  ratified  in  the 
same  form  and  in  the  same  time,  and  jointly. 

ART.  10.  The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  in  good  and  due  form, 
and  the  ratification  shall  be  exchanged  in  the  space  of  six  months  after 


256  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

the  date  of  the  signature  by  the  Ministers  Plenipotentiary,  or  sooner 
if  possible. 

In  faith  whereof,  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed  these 
articles  in  the  French  and  English  languages,  declaring,  nevertheless, 
that  the  present  treaty  was  originally  agreed  to  in  the  French  language, 
and  have  thereunto  put  their  seals. 

Done  at  Paris,  the  10th  day  of  Floreal,  in  the  llth  year  of  the 
French  Republic,  and  the  30th  April,  1803. 

R.  R.  LIVINGSTON, 
JAMES  MONROE, 
MARBOIS. 


A  Convention  between   the  United   States  of  America  and  the   French 

Republic. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  the  First  Con 
sul  of  the  French  Republic,  in  the  name  of  the  French  people,  in  con 
sequence  of  the  Treaty  of  Cession  of  Louisiana,  which  has  been 
signed  this  day,  wishing  to  regulate  definitively  everything  which  has 
relation  to  the  said  cession,  have  authorized,  to  this  effect,  the  Plenipo 
tentiaries,  that  is  to  say:  the  President  of  the  United  States  has,  by 
and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  of  the  said  States,  nom 
inated  for  their  Plenipotentiaries,  Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States,  and  James  Monroe,  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  and  Envoy  Extraordinary  of  the  said  United  States, 
near  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic;  and  the  First  Consul  of 
the  French  Republic,  in  the  name  of  the  French  people,  has  named, 
as  Plenipotentiary  of  the  said  Republic,  the  French  citizen  Barbe 
Marbois,  who.  in  virtue  of  their  full  powers,  which  have  been 
exchanged  this  day,  have  agreed  to  the  following  articles. 

ART.  1.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  engages  to  pay  to 
the  French  Government,  in  the  manner  specified  in  the  following  arti 
cles,  the  sum  of  sixty  millions  of  francs,  independent  of  the  sum 
which  shall  be  fixed  by  any  other  convention  for  the  payment  of  the 
debts  due  by  France  to  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

ART.  2.  For  the  payment  of  the  sum  of  sixty  millions  of  francs, 
mentioned  in  the  preceding  article,  the  United  States  shall  create  a 
stock  of  eleven  million  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars,  bearing 
an  interest  of  six  per  cent,  per  annum,  payable,  half  yearly,  in  London, 
Amsterdam,  or  Paris,  amounting,  by  the  half  year  to  three  hundred  and 
thirty-seven  thousand  five  hundred  dollars,  according  to  the  propor 
tions  which  shall  bo  determined  by  the  French  Government,  to  be  paid 
at  either  place:  the  principal  of  the  said  stock  to  be  reimbursed  at  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  257 

Treasury  of  the  United  States,  in  annual  payments  of  not  less  than 
three  millions  of  dollars  each;  of  which  the  first  payment  shall  com 
mence  fifteen  years  after  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  ratifications:  this 
stock  shall  be  transferred  to  the  Government  of  France,  or  to  such 
person  or  persons  as  shall  be  authorized  to  receive  it,  in  three  months, 
at  most,  after  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  this  treaty,  and  after 
Louisiana  shall  be  taken  possession  of  in  the  name  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States. 

It  is  further  agreed  that,  if  the  French  Government  should  be  desir 
ous  of  disposing  of  the  said  stock,  to  receive  the  capital  in  Europe  at 
shorter  terms,  that  its  measures,  for  that  purpose,  shall  be  taken  so  as 
to  favor,  in  the  greatest  degree  possible,  the  credit  of  the  United  States, 
and  to  raise  to  the  highest  price  the  said  stock. 

ART.  3.  It  is  agreed  that  the  dollar  of  the  United  States,  specified  in 
the  present  convention,  shall  be  fixed  at  five  francs  3333-lOOOOths  or 
five  livres  eight  sous  tournois. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  in  good  and  true  form,  and 
the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  in  the  space  of  six  months,  to  date 
from  this  day,  or  sooner  if  possible. 

In  faith  of  Avhich,  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed  the 
above  articles,  both  in  the  French  and  English  languages,  declaring, 
nevertheless,  that  the  present  treaty  has  been  originally  agreed  on  and 
written  in  the  French  language,  to  which  they  have  hereunto  affixed 
their  seals. 

Done  at  Paris,  the  10th  day  of  Floreal,  eleventh  year  of  the  French 
Republic,  (30th  April,  1803.) 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON. 
JAMES  MONROE, 
BARBE  MABBOIS. 


Convention  between  the  French  Republic  and  the  United  States. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  the  First  Consul 
of  the  French  Republic,  in  the  name  of  the  French  people,  having,  by 
a  treaty  of  this  date,  terminated  all  difficulties  relative  to  Louisiana, 
and  established  on  a  solid  foundation  the  friendship  which  unites  the 
two  nations,  and  being  desirous,  in  compliance  with  the  second  and 
fifth  articles  of  the  convention  of  the  8th  Vendemiaire,  9th  year  of  the 
French  Republic,  (30th  Sept.  1800,)  to  secure  the  payment  of  the  sum 
due  by  France  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  have  respectively, 
nominated  as  Plenipotentiaries,  that  is  to  say:  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  b}^  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  their 
Senate,  Robert  R.  Livingston,  Minister  Plenipotentiary,  and  James 

H.  Doc.  431 17 


258  PUECHASE    OF    THE    TEEEITOEY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

Monroe,  Minister  Plenipotentiary  and  Envoy  Extraordinary  of  the 
said  States,  near  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic,  and  the 
First  Consul,  in  the  name  of  the  French  people,  the  French  citizen 
Barbe  Marbois,  Minister  of  the  Public  Treasury,  who,  after  having 
exchanged  their  full  powers,  have  agreed  to  the  following  articles: 

ART.  1.  The  debts  due  by  France  to  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
contracted  before  the  8th  of  Yendemiaire,  9th  year  of  the  French 
Republic,  (30th  September,  1800,)  shall  be  paid  according  to  the  fol 
lowing  regulations,  with  interest  at  six  per  cent.,  to  commence  from 
thf,  periods  when  the  accounts  and  vouchers  were  presented  to  the 
French  Government. 

ART.  2.  The  debts  provided  for  by  the  preceding  article  are  those 
whose  result  is  comprised  in  the  conjectural  note  annexed  to  the  present 
convention,  and  which,  with  interest,  cannot  exceed  the  sum  of  twenty 
millions  of  francs.  The  claims  comprised  in  the  said  note,  which  fall 
within  the  exceptions  of  the  following  articles,  shall  not  be  admitted  to 
the  benefit  of  this  provision. 

ART.  3.  The  principal  and  interest  of  the  said  debts  shall  be  dis 
charged  by  the  United  States  by  orders  drawn  by  their  Ministers 
Plenipotentiary  on  their  Treasury;  these  orders  shall  be  payable  sixty 
days  after  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  the  treaty  and  the  conven 
tions  signed  this  day,  and  after  possession  shall  be  given  of  Louisiana 
by  the  Commissaries  of  France  to  those  of  the  United  States. 

ART.  ±.  It  is  expressly  agreed  that  the  preceding  articles  shall  com 
prehend  no  debts  but  such  as  are  due  to  citizens  of  the  United  States 
who  have  been,  and  are  yet,  creditors  of  France  for  supplies,  for 
embargoes,  and  prizes  made  at  sea,  in  which  the  appeal  has  been  prop 
erly  lodged,  within  the  time  mentioned  in  the  said  convention  of  the 
8th  Vendemiaire,  9th  year,  (30th  September,  1800.) 

ART.  5.  The  preceding  articles  shall  apply  only,  first,  to  capture  of 
which  the  council  of  prizes  shall  have  ordered  restitution,  it  being 
well  understood  that  the  claimant  cannot  have  recourse  to  the  United 
States,  otherwise  than  he  might  have  had  to  the  Government  of  the 
French  Republic,  and  only  in  case  of  the  insufficiency  of  the  captors; 
secondly,  the  debts  mentioned  in  the  said  fifth  article  of  the  convention 
contracted  before  the  8th  Vendemiaire,  an  9,  (30th  September,  1800,) 
the  payment  of  which  has  been  heretofore  claimed  of  the  actual  Gov 
ernment  of  France,  and  for  which  the  creditors  have  a  right  to  the 
protection  of  the  United  States.  The  said  fifth  article  does  not  com 
prehend  prizes  whose  condemnation  has  been  or  shall  be  confirmed. 
It  is  the  express  intention  of  the  contracting  parties  not  to  extend  the 
benefit  of  the  present  convention  to  reclamations  of  American  citizens, 
who  shall  have  established  houses  of  commerce  in  France,  England,  or 
other  countries  than  the  United  States,  in  partnership  with  foreigners, 


PURCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  259 

and  who,  by  that  reason,  and  the  nature  of  their  commerce,  ought  to 
be  regarded  as  domiciliated  in  the  places  where  such  houses  exist.  All 
agreements  and  bargains  concerning  merchandise,  which  shall  not  be 
the  property  of  American  citizens,  are  equally  excepted  from  the 
benefit  of  the  said  convention;  saving,  however,  to  such  persons  their 
claims  in  like  manner  as  if  this  treaty  had  not  been  made. 

ART.  6.  And  that  the  different  questions  which  ma}^  arise  under  the 
preceding  articles  may  be  fairly  investigated,  the  Ministers  Plenipo 
tentiary  of  the  United  States  shall  name  three  persons,  who  shall  act 
from  the  present,  and  provisionally,  and  who  shall  have  full  power  to 
examine,  without  removing  the  documents,  all  the  accounts  of  the  dif 
ferent  claims  already  liquidated  by  the  bureau  established  for  this 
purpose  by  the  French  Republic,  and  to  ascertain  whether  they  belong 
to  the  classes  designated  by  the  present  convention,  and  the  principles 
established  in  it;  or  if  they  are  not  in  one  of  its  exceptions,  and  on 
their  certificate  declaring  that  the  debt  is  due  to  an  American  citizen, 
or  his  representative,  and  that  it  existed  before  the  8th  Vendemiaire, 
ninth  year,  (30th  September,  1800,)  the  debtor  shall  be  entitled  to  an 
order  on  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States,  in  the  manner  prescribed 
by  the  third  article. 

ART.  7.  The  same  agents  shall  likewise  have  power,  without  remov 
ing  the  documents,  to  examine  the  claims  which  are  prepared  for 
verification,  and  to  certify  those  which  ought  to  be  admitted  by  unit 
ing  the  necessary  qualifications,  and  not  being  comprised  in  the  excep 
tions  contained  in  the  present  convention. 

ART.  8.  The  same  agents  shall  likewise  examine  the  claims  which 
are  not  prepared  for  liquidation,  and  certify  in  writing  those  whiyh, 
in  their  judgments,  ought  to  be  admitted  to  liquidation. 

ART.  9.  In  proportion  as  the  debts  mentioned  in  these  articles  shall 
be  admitted,  they  shall  be  discharged  with  interest  at  six  per  cent,  by 
the  Treasury  of  the  United  States. 

ART.  10.  And  that  no  debt,  which  shall  not  have  the  qualifications 
above-mentioned,  and  that  no  unjust  or  exorbitant  demand  may  be 
admitted,  the  commercial  agent  of  the  United  States  at  Paris,  or  such 
other  agent  as  the  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States  shall 
think  proper  to  nominate,  shall  assist  at  the  operations  of  the  bureau, 
and  co-operate  in  the  examination  of  the  claims;  and  if  this  agent  shall 
be  of  opinion  that  any  debt  is  not  completely  proved,  or  if  he  shall 
judge  that  it  is  not  comprised  in  the  principles  of  the  fifth  article 
above-mentioned,  and  if,  notwithstanding  his  opinion,  the  bureau  estab 
lished  by  the  French  Government  should  think  that  it  ought  to  be 
liquidated,  he  shall  transmit  his  observations  to  the  board  established 
by  the  United  States,  who,  without  removing  documents,  shall  make  a 
complete  examination  of  the  debt,  and  vouchers  which  support  it,  and 


260  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

report  the  result  to  the  Minister  of  the  United  States.  The  Minister 
of  the  United  States  shall  transmit  his  observations,  in  all  such  cases, 
to  the  Minister  of  the  Treasury  of  the  French  Republic,  on  whose 
report  the  French  Government  shall  decide  definitively  in  every  case. 

The  rejection  of  any  claim  shall  have  no  other  effect  than  to  exempt 
the  United  States  from  the  payment  of  it;  the  French  Government 
reserving  to  itself  the  right  to  decide  definitely  on  such  claims,  so  far 
as  it  concerns  itself. 

AKT.  11.  Every  necessary  decision  shall  be  made  in  the  course  of 
a  year,  to  commence  from  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  and  no  recla 
mation  shall  be  admitted  afterwards. 

ART.  12.  In  case  of  claims  for  debts  contracted  by  the  Government 
of  France  with  citizens  of  the  United  States  since  the  8th  Venderniaire, 
9th  year,  (September  30, 1800,)  not  being  comprised  in  this  convention, 
may  be  pursued,  and  the  payment  demanded  in  the  same  manner  as  if 
it  had  not  been  made. 

ART.  13.  The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  in  good  and  due 
form,  and  the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  in  six  months  from  the 
date  of  the  signature  of  the  Ministers  Plenipotentiary,  or  sooner,  if 
possible. 

In  faith  of  which,  the  respective  Ministers  Plenipotentiary  have 
signed  the  above  articles,  both  in  the  French  and  English  languages, 
declaring,  nevertheless,  that  the  present  treaty  has  been  originally 
agreed  on  and  written  in  the  French  language,  to  which  they  have 
hereunto  afiixed  their  seals. 

Done  at  Paris,  the  10th  day  of  Floreal,  the  llth  year  of  the  French 
Republic,  (30th  of  April,  1803.) 

ROBT.  R.  LIVINGSTON, 
JAMES  MONROE, 
BARBE  MARBOIS. 


[Extract] 

Mr.  Madison  to  Mr.  Monroe. 

*\T\ 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  October  (2^  1803. 

SIR:  I  have  received  from  you  letters  of  the  following  dates,  written 
after  your  arrival  in  London,  viz:  the  19th,  20th,  and  26th  of  July, 
and  the  llth  and  15th  of  August. 

I  have  the  pleasure  to  inform  you  that  the  treaty  for  Louisiana  has 
been  ratified  in  form,  and  is  now  before  both  Houses  for  the  legislative 
provisions  necessary  with  respect  to  the  stock,  to  taking  possession, 
and  to  governing  the  country.  There  is  no  doubt  that  they  will  be 
made  by  very  large  majorities. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  261 

It  will  be  agreeable  to  you  to  know  that  the  ratifications  were 
exchanged  by  M.  Pichon  and  myself,  unshackled  by  any  condition  or 
modification  whatever.  The  note  from  me  to  him,  with  his  reply,  of 
which  copies  are  enclosed,  will  show  the  turn  and  issue  of  our  consul 
tations  on  that  point. 

The  information  from  Paris,  enclosed  in  your  letter  of  the  15th  of 
August,  had  been  previously  received  here  from  the  same  source,  and 
was  followed  by  full  proof  of  the  discontent  of  Spain  at  the  transfer  of 
Louisiana  to  the  United  States,  in  a  formal  protest  against  it  from 
the  Spanish  Minister  here,  in  pursuance  of  orders  from  his  Govern 
ment.  You  will  find  herewith  copies  of  his  correspondence  with  this 
Department,  and  of  my  letters  to  Mr.  Livingston  and  Mr.  Pinckney, 
and  of  M.  Pichon's  to  me  on  this  subject;  all  of  which  were  included 
in  the  communications  to  the  Senate.  These  documents  will  put  you 
in  possession  of  all  that  has  passed,  as  well  as  of  the  present  posture 
of  the  business.  It  remains  to  be  seen  how  far  Spain  will  persist  in 
her  remonstrances,  and  how  far  she  will  add  to  them  resistance  by 
force.  Should  the  latter  course  be  taken,  it  can  lead  to  nothing  but 
a  substitution  of  a  forcible  for  a  peaceable  possession.  Having  now  a 
clear  and  honest  title,  acquired  in  a  mode  pointed  out  by  Spain  herself, 
it  will,  without  doubt,  be  maintained  with  a  decision  becoming  our 
national  character,  and  required  by  the  importance  of  the  object. 
I  have  the  honor,  &c., 

JAMES  MADISON. 

JAMES  MONROE,  Esq. 


President  Jefferson  to  M.  Dupont  De  Nemours. 

WASHINGTON,  November  1,  1803. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, — Your  favors  of  April  the  6th,  and  June  the  27th, 
were  duly  received,  and  with  the  welcome  which  everything  brings 
from  you.  The  treaty  which  has  so  happily  sealed  the  friendship  of 
our  two  countries,  has  been  received  here  with  general  acclamation. 
Some  inflexible  federalists  have  still  ventured  to  brave  the  public  opin7 
ion.  It  will  fix  their  character  with  the  world  and  with  posterity,  who, 
not  descending  to  the  other  points  of  difference  between  us,  will  judge 
them  by  this  fact,  so  palpable  as  to  speak  for  itself  in  all  times  and 
places.  For  myself  and  my  country,  I  thank  you  for  the  aids  you 
have  given  in  it;  and  I  congratulate  you  on  having  lived  to  give  those 
aids  in  a  transaction  replete  with  blessings  to  unborn  millions  of  men, 
and  which  will  mark  the  face  of  a  portion  on  the  globe  so  extensive  as 
that  which  now  composes  the  United  States  of  America.  It  is  true 
that  at  this  moment  a  little  cloud  hovers  in  the  horizon.  The  govern 
ment  of  Spain  has  protested  against  the  right  of  France  to  transfer; 


262  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OP    LOUISIANA. 

and  it  is  possible  she  may  refuse  possession,  and  that  this  may  bring  on 
acts  of  force.  But  against  such  neighbors  as  France  there,  and  the 
United  States  here,  what  she  can  expect  from  so  gross  a  compound  of 
folly  and  false  faith,  is  not  to  be  sought  in  the  book  of  wisdom.  She 
is  afraid  of  her  enemies  in  Mexico;  but  not  more  than  we  are.  Our 
policy  will  be,  to  form  New  Orleans,  and  the  country  on  both  sides  of 
it  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  into  a  State;  and,  as  to  all  above  that,  to 
transplant  our  Indians  into  it,  constituting  them  a  Marechaussee  to 
prevent  emigrants  crossing  the  river,  until  we  shall  have  filled  up  all 
the  vacant  country  on  this  side.  This  will  secure  both  Spain  and  us  as 
to  the  mines  of  Mexico,  for  half  a  century,  and  we  may  safely  trust 
the  provisions  for  that  time  to  the  men  who  shall  live  in  it.  *  *  * 

vj  }^:,      fa 

»V'^.vnVJ)o    &.rt 
President  Jefferson  to  Mr.  Livingston. 

WASHINGTON,  November^  1803. 

DEAR  SIR, — A  report  reaches  us  this  day  from  Baltimore,  (on  prob 
able,  but  not  certain  grounds,)  that  Mr.  Jerome  Bonaparte,  brother 
of  the  First  Consul,  was  yesterday  married  to  Miss  Patterson,  of  that 
cit\^.  The  effect  of  this  measure  on  the  mind  of  the  First  Consul,  is 
not  for  me  to  suppose;  but  as  it  might  occur  to  M\\\\primcb  facie,  that 
the  Executive  of  the  United  States  ought  to  have  prevented  it,  I  have 
thought  it  advisable  to  mention  the  subject  to  3rou,  that,  if  necessary, 
you  may  by  explanations  set  that  idea  to  rights.  You  know  that  by 
our  laws,  all  persons  are  free  to  enter  into  marriage,  if  of  twenty-one 
years  of  age,  no  one  having  a  power  to  restrain  it,  not  even  their 
parents;  and  that  under  that  age,  no  one  can  prevent  it  but  the  parent 
or  guardian.  The  lady  is  under  age,  and  the  parents,  placed  between 
her  affections,  which  were  strongly  lixed,  and  the  considerations 
opposing  the  measure,  yielded  with  pain  and  anxiety  to  the  former. 
Mr.  Patterson  is  the  President  of  the  Bank  of  Baltimore,  the  wealth 
iest  man  in  Maryland,  perhaps  in  the  United  States,  except  Mr.  Car 
roll;  a  man  of  great  virtue  and  respectability;  the  mother  is  the  sister 
of  the  lady  of  General  Samuel  Smith;  and,  consequently,  the  station  of 
the  family  in  society  is  with  the  first  in  the  United  States.  These  cir 
cumstances  fix  rank  in  a  country  where  there  are  no  hereditary  titles. 

Your  treaty  has  obtained  nearly  a  general  approbation.  The  fed 
eralists  spoke  and  voted  against  it,  but  they  are  now  so  reduced  in 
their  numbers  as  to  be  nothing.  The  question  on  its  ratification  in  the 
Senate  was  decided  by  twenty-four  against  seven,  which  were  ten 
more  than  enough.  The  vote  in  the  House  of  Representatives  for 
making  provision  for  its  execution  was  carried  by  eighty-nine  against 
twenty-three,  which  was  a  majority  of  sixty-six,  and  the  necessary 
bills  are  going  through  the  Houses  by  greater  majorities.  Mr.  Pichon, 


t 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  2()3 

according  to  instructions  from  his  government,  proposed  to  have 
added  to  the  ratification  a  protestation  against  any  failure  in  time  or 
other  circumstances  of  execution,  on  our  part.  He  was  told,  that  in 
that  case  we  should  annex  a  counter  protestation,  which  would  leave 
the  thing  exactly  where  it  was.  That  this  transaction  had  been  con 
ducted,  from  the  commencement  of  the  negotiation  to  this  stage  of  it, 
with  a  frankness  and  sincerity  honorable  to  both  nations,  and  comfort 
able  to  the  heart  of  an  honest  man  to  review;  that  to  annex  to  this 
last  chapter  of  the  transaction  such  an  evidence  of  mutual  distrust, 
was  to  change  its  aspect  dishonorably  for  us  both,  and  contrary  to 
truth  as  to  us;  for  that  we  had  not  the  smallest  doubt  that  France 
would  punctually  execute  its  part;  and  I  assured  Mr.  Pichon  that_I 
had  more  confidence  in  the  word  of  the  First  Consul  than  in  all  the 
parchment  we  could  sign.  He  saw  that  we  had  ratified  the  treat}7; 
that  both  branches  had  passed,  by  great  majorities,  one  of  the  bills  for 
execution,  and  would  soon  pass  the  other  two;  that  no  circumstances 
remained  that  could  leave  a  doubt  of  our  punctual  performance;  and 
like  an  able  and  an  honest  minister,  (which  he  is  the  highest  degree,)  he 
undertook  to  do  what  he  knew  his  employers  would  do  themselves,  wero 
they  here  spectators  of  all  the  existing  circumstances,  and  excham  td 
the  ratifications  purely  and  simply:  so  that  this  instrument  goes  to  the 
world  as  an  evidence  of  the  candor  and  confidence  of  the  nations  in 
each  other,  which  will  have  the  best  effects.  This  was  the  more 
justifiable,  as  Mr.  Pichon  knew  that  Spain  had  entered  with  us  a 
protestation  against  our  ratification  of  the  treaty,  grounded,  first, 
on  the  assertion  that  the  First  Consul  had  not  executed  the  condi 
tions  of  the  treaties  of  cession;  and,  secondly,  that  he  had  broken  a 
solemn  promise  not  to  alienate  the  country  to  any  nation.  We 
answered,  that  these  were  private  questions  between  France  and 
Spain,  which  they  must  settle  together;  that  we  derived  our  title 
from  the  First  Consul,  and  did  not  doubt  his  guarantee  of  it;  and  we, 
four  days  ago,  sent  off  orders  to  the  Governor  of  the  Mississippi 
territory  and  General  Wilkinson  to  move  down  with  the  troops  at 
hand  to  New  Orleans,  to  receive  the  possession  from  Mr.  Laussat. 
If  he  is  heartily  disposed  to  carry  the  order  of  the  Consul  into  execu 
tion,  he  can  probably  command  a  volunteer  force  at  New  Orleans, 
and  will  have  the  aid  of  ours  also,  if  he  desires  it,  to  take  the  posses 
sion,  and  deliver  it  to  us.  If  he  is  not  so  disposed,  ice  shall  take  the 
possession,  and  it  will  rest  with  the  government  of  France,  by  adopt 
ing  the  act  as  their  own,  and  obtaining  the  confirmation  of  Spain,  to 
supply  the  non-execution  of  their  stipulation  to  deliver,  and  to  entitle 
themselves  to  the  complete  execution  of  our  part  of  the  agreements. 
In  the  meantime,  the  Legislature  is  passing  the  bills,  and  we  are  pre 
paring  everything  to  be  done  on  our  part  towards  execution;  and  we 
shall  not  avail  ourselves  of  the  three  months'  delay  after  possession  of 


264  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

the  province,  allowed  by  the  treaty  for  the  delivery  of  the  stock,  but 
shall  deliver  it  the  moment  that  possession  is  known  here,  which  will 
be  on  the  eighteenth  day  after  it  has  taken  place.  *  *  * 


Mr.  Madison  to  Mr.  Marbois. 

DEPT  OF  STATE,  Novr  h  1803. 

Sir, — I  received  your  favor  of  the  21  prairial,  with  a  pleasure  which 
is  redoubled  by  the  consideration  that  1  am  able,  in  acknowledging  it, 
to  inform  you  of  the  formal  approbation  of  the  late  Treaty,  and 
by  every  branch  of  our  Government.  The  event  estab 
lishes,  I  hope  forever,  perfect  harmony  between  the  two  Countries. 
It  is  the  more  likely  to  do  so,  as  it  is  founded  in  a  policy,  coeval  with 
their  political  relations,  of  removing  as  much  as  possible  all  sources 
of  jealousy  and  collision.  The  frankness  and  uprightness  which 
marked  the  progress  of  this  transaction  are  truly  honorable  to  all  con 
cerned  in  it;  and  it  is  an  agreeable  circumstance  that,  in  the  exchange 
of  ratifications,  it  was  closed  in  the  same  spirit  of  mutual  confidence, 
Mr.  Pichon  inferring,  doubtless  with  the  truest  reason,  that  an 
unqualified  exchange,  under  actual  circumstances,  would  best  accord 
with  the  real  views  of  his  Government. 

It  remains  now  to  compleat  the  work  by  an  honest  execution  of  the 
mutual  stipulations.  On  our  part,  the  sequel  will  certainly  corre 
spond  with  the  good  faith  and  prompt  arrangements  thus  far  pursued; 
and  full  reliance  is  placed  on  the  reciprocal  disposition  of  your  Gov 
ernment,  of  which  so  many  proofs  have  been  seen. 

The  interposition  of  Spain  is  an  incident  not  more  unexpected  than 
it  is  unreasonable.  It  is  to  be  wished  that  it  may  terminate  without 
any  serious  consequences,  even  to  herself.  Whatever  turn  it  may 
take,  the  honor  of  the  French  Government  guaranties  the  object  at 
which  our  measures  are  pointed;  and  the  interest  of  France  will  equally 
lie  in  making  the  fruits  of  these  measures  hers,  as  well  as  ours. 


Mr.  Madison  to  Mr.  Livingston. 

"*  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  November  .9,  1803. 

Sm:  In  my  letter  of  the  22d  ultimo,  I  mentioned  to  you  that  the 
exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the  treaty  and  conventions  with  France, 
had  taken  place  here,  unclogged  with  any  conditions  or  reserve.  Con 
gress  has  since  passed  an  act  to  enable  the  President  to  take  possession 
of  the  ceded  territory,  and  to  establish  a  temporary  Government 
therein.  Other  acts  have  been  passed  for  complying  with  the  pecuni 
ary  stipulations  of  those  instruments.  The  newspapers  enclosed  will 
inform  you  of  these  proceedings. 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  265 

By  the  post  which  left  this  city  for  Natchez  on  Monday  last,  a  joint 
and  several  commission  was  forwarded  to  Governor  Claiborne  and 
General  Wilkinson,  authorizing  them  to  receive  possession  of  andoccupy 
those  territories,  and  a  separate  commission  to  the  former  as  tem 
porary  Governor.  The  possibility  suggested,  by  recent  circumstances, 
that  delivery  may  be  refused  at  New  Orleans  on  the  part  of  Spain, 
required  that  provision  should  be  made  as  well  for  taking  as  receiving 
possession.  Should  force  be  necessary,  Governor  Claiborne  and  Gen 
eral  Wilkinson  will  have  to  decide  on  the  practicability  of  a  coup  de 
main  without  waiting  for  the  reinforcements,  which  will  require  time 
on  our  part,  and  admit  of  preparations  on  the  other.  The  force  pro 
vided  for  this  object  is  to  consist  of  the  regular  troops  near  at  hand,  as 
many  of  the  militia  as  may  be  requisite,  and  can  be  drawn  from  the 
Mississippi  Territory,  and  as  many  volunteers  from  any  quarter  as  can 
be  picked  up.  To  them  will  be  added  500  mounted  militia  from  Ten 
nessee,  who,  it  is  expected,  will  proceed  to  Natchez  with  the  least 
possible  delay. 

M.  Pichon  has,  in  the  strongest  manner,  pressed  on  M.  Laussat, 
the  French  Commissary  appointed  to  deliver  possession,  the  necessit}T 
of  co-operating  in  these  measures  of  compulsion,  should  they  prove 
necessary  by  the  refusal  of  the  Spanish  officers  to  comply  without 
them.  On  the  8th  of  October  it  was  not  known,  and  no  indications 
have  been  exhibited  at  New  Orleans,  of  a  design,  on  the  part  of  Spain, 
to  refuse  or  oppose  the  surrender  of  the  province  to  France,  and 
thereby  to  us.  With  high  respect  and  consideration,  &c. 

JAMES  MADISON. 
ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON,  Esq. 

P.  S.- — The  President  approves  of  the  individuals  appointed  as  com 
missioners  to  liquidate  the  claims  payable  under  the  convention  of  the 
30th  of  April  last.  But  as  it  now  appears  that  difficulties  have  arisen, 
and  are  likely  to  increase,  respecting  the  true  construction  of  that 
instrument,  and  especially  as  it  seems  more  than  possible  that  the 
twenty  millions  allotted  for  the  payments  to  be  made  under  it,  may  be 
insufficient  to  cover  all  which,  in  equity,  and  by  a  sound  interpretation, 
ought  to  be  included,  it  is  the  desire  of  the  President  you  apply  to  the 
French  Government  for  its  consent  to  suspend  the  issuing  of  any 
drafts  upon  the  awards  which  may  be  given,  until  it  is  ascertained 
whether  the  twent}r  millions  be  sufficient  or  not,  and  with  a  view  to 
give  time  for  such  mutual  explanations  and  arrangements  as  may  tend 
to  effectuate  the  true  spirit  and  object  of  the  convention.  In  taking 
this  step,  you  will  refer  yourself  to  the  further  communications  you 
are  to  expect  from  your  Government  upon  the  subject;  the  applica 
tion  3^011  may  make  upon  it  to  that  of  France  being  intended  only  as  a 
preliminary  to  a  further  development. 


266  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

Mr.  Livingston  to  Mr.  Madison. 

PARIS,  November  15,  1803. 

SIR:  I  have  only  within  these  few  days  been  honored  by  your  letter 
to  me  of  the  29th  July,  by  way  of  Hamburg,  together  with  one  of 

the  same  date  to  Mr.  Monroe,  which  I  have  sent  to  him  by  Mr. ,  an 

American  gentleman,  by  the  way  of  Holland,  none  more  direct  offer 
ing  here,  as  the  intercourse  is  very  strictly  forbidden.  I  shall  make 
the  communication  you  direct,  of  Mr.  Pichon's  note,  and  your  reply, 
relative  to  the  flag  of  the  Italian  Republic.  It  appears  to  me,  how 
ever,  that  this  notice  rather  recommends  than  supersedes  the  propriety 
of  a  direct  recognition  of  the  First  Consul,  and  the  compliment  of  a 
commission,  upon  the  principle  I  have  mentioned;  but  of  this,  the 
President  is  the  best  judge.  The  letters  you  have  received  since  the 
date  of  yours,  you  will  find  have  anticipated  your  direction  relative 
to  information  on  the  subject  of  West  Florida,  since  they  refer  to 
documents  and  historic  facts  that  it  will  be  easy  to  adduce.  As  I  pre 
sume  you  will  have  no  trouble  on  this  ground,  I  do  not  think  it  neces 
sary  to  put  you  to  the  expense  of  procuring  original  papers.  Should 
it  happen  otherwise,  I  shall  obey  your  orders;  and  if  any  negotiation 
is  necessary  at  Madrid,  I  shall  transmit  to  Mr.  Pinckney  all  the  proofs 
I  can  collect;  and  I  think  they  will  be  too  numerous  to  admit  of  doubt, 
especially  taken  in  connexion  with  the  letter  of  the  Spanish  Minister 
to  Mr.  Pinckney,  of  which  a  copy  has  been  transmitted  to  you.  The 
moment  is  so  favorable  for  taking  possession  of  that  country,  that  I 
hope  it  has  not  been  neglected  even  though  a  little  force  should  be 
necessary  to  effect  it.  Your  Minister  must  rind  the  means  to  justify  it. 

I  have  seen,  as  you  mention,  a  publication  of  my  memoir  on  the 
subject  of  Louisiana.  But,  as  it  is  not  an  official  paper,  as  it  is  not 
signed  or  delivered  in  my  public  character,  I  do  not  see  that  it  can 
ever  be  noticed  on  this  side  of  the  water  as  such;  besides  that,  there 
is  nothing  in  it  relative  to  Britain  that  has  not  been  told  them  officially 
by  our  Government  and  by  almost  every  maritime  Power  in  Europe, 
on  the  subject  of  their  vexations  at  sea.  Nor  can  they  blame  any 
endeavor  of  mine  to  effect  the  objects  of  my  country,  by  such  argu 
ments  as  I  thought  would  have  weight  here.  It  could  hardly  be 
expected  that  this  paper  could  be  secret;  since,  as  I  informed  you  at 
the  time,  I  had  delivered  printed  copies  of  it,  not  only  to  the  First  atid 
other  Consuls,  and  to  the  French  Ministers,  but  to  most  of  those  per 
sons  who  I  believed  would  be  consulted  upon  the  occasion.  A  few 
were  also  sent  to  America,  with  injunctions,  however,  not  to  publish 
them.  I  am  very  sorry  a  bad  translation  of  it  has  found  its  way  into 
the  papers,  though  it  may  serve,  in  some  measure,  to  justify  the  Presi 
dent's  appointment  of  me,  by  showing  that  I  had  not  been  inattentive 
to  the  great  interests  of  my  country.  The  zeal  of  our  friends  often 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  267 

carries  them  too  far.  Some  of  them,  finding  that  Mr.  Monroe  was 
appointed  (through  circumstances  which  you  have  done  me  the  honor 
to  explain,  but  which  they  could  not  know)  with  a  higher  grade  than 
myself;  seeing  him  only  mentioned  in  the  newspapers,  as  the  acting 
Minister;  and  finding  some  endeavor  here  to  impress  a  belief  that  he 
was  the  principal  agent  in  treating  with  France;  it  was  natural  that 
they  should  feel  some  mortification,  and  endeavor  to  do  me  the  justice 
they  know  I  was  entitled  to.  This  may  apologize  for,  I  mean  not  by 
it  to  justify,  their  imprudence.  There  is  another,  on  the  part  of  Mr. 
Monroe's  friends,  which  I  should  not  mention,  but  that  it  carries  with 
it  a  circumstance  for  which  I  may  be  under  the  necessity  of  apologiz 
ing  to  the  President,  should  my  private  letter  to  Mr.  Monroe  have 
reached  the  United  States;  since  it  argues  a  difference  of  sentiment 
upon  an  important  point,  which  1  fear  will  be  laid  hold  of  by  our  com 
mon  enemies.  I  have,  in  my  former  letter,  informed  you  of  M.  Tal 
leyrand's  calling  upon  me  previous  to  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Monroe,  for 
a  proposition  for  the  whole  of  Louisiana;  of  his  afterwards  trifling 
with  me,  and  telling  me  that  what  he  had  said  was  unauthorized.  This 
circumstance,  for  which  I  have  accounted  to  you  in  one  of  my  letters, 
led  me  to  think,  though  it  afterwards  appeared  without  reason,  that 
some  change  had  taken  place  in  the  determination  which  I  knew  the 
Consul  had  before  taken  to  sell.  I  had  just  then  received  a  line  from 
Mr.  Monroe,  informing  me  of  his  arrival. 

I  wrote  to  him  a  hasty  answer,  under  the  influence  of  ideas,  excited 
by  these  prevarications  of  the  Minister,  expressing  the  hope  that  he 
had  brought  information  that  New  Orleans  was  in  our  possession; 
that  I  hoped  our  negotiation  might  be  successful;  but  that,  while  I 
feared  nothing  but  war  would  avail  us  anything,  I  had  paved  the  way 
for  him.  This  letter  is  very  imprudently  shown  and  spoken  of  by 
Mr.  Monroe's  particular  friends,  as  a  proof  that  he  had  been  the  prin 
cipal  agent  in  the  negotiation.  So  far.  indeed,  as  it  may  tend  to  this 
object,  it  is  of  little  moment;  because  facts  and  dates  are  too  well 
known  to  be  contradicted.  For  instance,  it  is  known  to  everybody 
here  that  the  Consul  had  taken  his  resolution  to  sell  previous  to  Mr. 
Monroe's  arrival.  It  is  a  fact  well  known  that  M.  Marbois  was  author 
ized,  informally,  by  the  First  Consul,  to  treat  with  me  before  Mr. 
Monroe  reached  Paris;  that  he  actually  made  me  the  very  proposition 
we  ultimately  agreed  to,  before  Mr.  Monroe  had  seen  a  Minister,  except 
M.  Marbois,  for  a  moment,  at  my  house,  where  he  came  to  make  the 
proposition:  Mr.  Monroe  not  having  been  presented  to  M.  Talleyrand, 
to  whom  I  introduced  him  the  afternoon  of  the  next  day.  All,  then, 
that  remained  to  negotiate,  after  his  arrival,  was  a  diminution  of  the 
price;  and  in  this  our  joint  mission  was  unfortunate;  for  Ave  came  up, 
as  soon  as  Mr.  Monroe's  illness  would  suffer  him  to  do  business,  after 
a  few  days'  delay,  to  the  Minister's  offers.  There  is  no  doubt  that 


268  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

Mr.  Monroe's  talents  and  address  would  have  enabled  him,  had  he  been 
placed  in  my  circumstances,  to  have  effected  what  I  have  done.  But 
he  unfortunately  came  too  late  to  do  more  than  assent  to  the  proposi 
tions  that  were  made  to  us,  and  to  aid  in  reducing  them  to  form.  I 
think  he  has  too  much  candor  not  to  be  displeased  that  his  friends 
should  publicly  endeavor  to  depreciate  me  by  speaking  of  a  private 
letter,  hastily  written,  under  circumstances  of  irritation,  with  which 
Mr.  Monroe  is  fully  acquainted;  a  letter,  too,  which  may  contribute 
in  two  ways  to  advance  the  views  of  the  enemies  of  the  Administra 
tion.  It  is  in  this  light  only  that  it  gives  me  pain.  First,  it  shows 
that  it  was  my  sentiment,  founded  upon  the  knowledge  I  must  have 
been  supposed  to  possess  of  the  temper  of  this  Court,  and  the  state  of 
things  here,  that  we  should  have  availed  ourselves  of  the  circumstance 
of  the  denial  of  the  right  of  depot  to  possess  New  Orleans.  That  this 
was  my  sentiment,  I  confess;  and  you  have  found,  by  my  notes,  that  I 
labored  to  impress  this  Government  with  a  belief  that  it  would  be 
done.  And  I  have  every  reason  to  think  that  the  treaty  would  have 
been  concluded  in  March,  had  not  M.  Pichon's  letter,  at  the  moment, 
contradicted  my  suggestion  on  this  subject. 

As  the  President's  views  have  been  happily  more  correct  than  mine; 
as  he  has  effected,  without  this  harsh  measure,  his  great  object;  it  cer 
tainly  is  not  advisable  to  publish  that  we  differed  in  sentiment;  and 
introduce  discussions  on  the  comparative  advantages  that  might  be 
derived  from  the  one  or  the  other  mode  of  proceeding.  The  next 
point  in  which  the  letter  may  do  harm,  is  in  authorizing  an  opinion, 
which  the  enemies  of  the  Administration  are  most  zealous  in  pro 
moting,  viz:  that  no  credit  is  due  either  to  the  President  or  his  Minis 
ters,  since  the  war  only  produced  the  measure.  The  wrar,  doubtless, 
had  its  effect  upon  the  First  Consul;  but  it  is  equally  true  that  every 
person  he  consulted  had  long  before  been  convinced,  and  even  the 
Consul's  opinion  shaken,  and  I  will  venture  to  say  by  my  means,  of 
the  little  advantage  France  would  derive  from  the  possession  of  that 
country;  and  he  had  even,  as  I  have  before  informed  you,  through 
Joseph  Bonaparte,  given  me  assurances  that  such  arrangements  should 
be  made  as  we  should  approve.  The  not  selling  was  a  sort  of  personal 
point  of  honor,  particularly  as  he  was  bound  by  the  express  stipula 
tion  of  his  treaty  with  Spain  not  to  do  so.  Nor,  until  he  found  him 
self  hampered  by  another  personal  consideration,  to  wit,  his  promise 
to  pay  the  American  claims,  which  I  had  purposely  published,  could 
he  bring  himself  to  take  the  step  which  the  prospect  of  war  and  the 
spirited  measures  of  our  Government,  among  which  1  number  the 
special  mission  of  Mr.  Monroe,  gave  him  the  strongest  apology  for 
doing;  particularly  as,  in  case  of  war,  he  had  no  other  means  of  keep 
ing  his  word  with  us.  Thus,  sir,  you  see  that  it  is  very  difficult  for 
the  most  prudent  man  to  restrain  the  ill-judged  zeal  of  his  friends;  and 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TEREITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  269 

I  dare  say  that  Mr.  Monroe  will  as  sincerely  lament  that  of  his  friends, 
who,  indeed,  ought  not  to  have  seen  a  mere  private  letter,  as  I  do  that 
of  the  gentleman  that  I  suspect  to  have  occasioned  the  publication 
which  you  so  justly  blame. 

Having  had  the  goodness,  sir,  to  correct  one  of  the  errors  of  the 
clerk  that  gave  me  some  cause  of  complaint,  I  must  notice  another  which 
added  to  my  doubts  of  success  at  the  moment  I  Avrote  to  Mr.  Monroe. 
In  the  copy  of  our  joint  instructions  which  3^011  had  forwarded  to  me, 
the  ultimatum  that  we  were  limited  to  was  thirty  millions,  out  of 
which  the  American  claims  were  to  be  paid.  Now,  I  was  satisfied  that, 
if  Mr.  Monroe,  on  his  arrival,  should  adhere  to  this,  our  prospect  of 
success  was  not  very  great;  since  ten  millions  in  cash  to  the  Govern 
ment  was  an  object  of  but  little  moment.  More  might  have  been  got 
from  Spain  by  a  transfer.  On  looking  over,  however,  the  original 
instructions,  of  which  Mr.  Monroe  was  the  bearer,  I  found  that  we 
were  authorized  to  give  fifty  millions  for  New  Orleans  and  the  Flori- 
das;  so  that  we  could,  without,  too,  an  extraordinary  assumption  of 
powers,  go  to  the  price  they  expected  for  Louisiana. 

I  have  applied  to  M.  Talleyrand  on  the  subject  of  East  Florida, 
thinking  the  moment  favorable  for  making  the  acquisition.  I  have 
endeavored  to  alarm  him  and  Spain  about  the  danger  that  will  result 
to  Spain  and  France  if  England  takes  possession  of  the  ports  on  the 
Gulf;  and  I  have  obtained  from  him  a  positive  promise  that  this  Gov 
ernment  shall  aid  any  negotiation  that  may  be  set  on  foot  for  its  pur 
chase.  I  have  written  on  this  subject  to  Mr.  Pincknev,  and  advised 
him  to  open  his  negotiation  by  reiterating  this  argument,  and  by  mak 
ing  some  offer  of  payment  in  American  stocks.  1  shall  inform  Mr. 
Monroe  of  these  circumstances,  and  will  forward  for  him  any  instruc 
tions  he  limy  choose  to  send  to  Mr.  Pinckney. 
I  am.  &c., 

ROBERT  11.  LIVINGSTON. 

Hon.  JAMES  MADISON, 

Secretary  of  State. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Madison  to  Mr.  Livingston. 

/  ^DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  January  31,  180  J^. 

SIR:  The  two  last  letters  received  from  you  bear  date  on  the  —  and 
30th  September;  so  that  we  have  been  now  four  months  without  hear 
ing  from  you.  The  last  from  me  to  you  was  dated  on  the  16th  day  of 
January,  giving  you  information  of  the  transfer  of  Louisiana,  on  the 
20th  December,  by  the  French  Commissioner,  M.  Laussat,  to  Gov 
ernor  Claiborne  and  General  Wilkinson,  the  Commissioners  appointed 


270  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  receive  it.  The  letters  subsequent 
to  that  date  from  Governor  Claiborne,  who  is  charged  with  the  pres 
ent  administration  of  the  ceded  territory,  show  that  the  occupancy  by 
our  troops  of  the  military  posts  on  the  island  of  New  Orleans,  and  on 
the  western  side  of  the  Mississippi,  was  in  progression;  and  that  the 
state  of  things,  in  other  respects,  was  such  as  was  to  be  expected  from 
the  predisposition  of  the  bulk  of  the  inhabitants,  and  the  manifest 
advantages  to  which  they  have  become  entitled  as  citizens  of  the  United 
States.  A  bill  providing  for  the  government  of  the  territory  has  been 
some  time  under  the  deliberation  of  the  Senate,  but  has  not  yet  passed 
to  the  other  branch  of  the  Legislature.  The  enclosed  copy  shows  the 
form  in  which  it  was  introduced.  Some  alterations  have  already  been 
made,  and  others  may  be  presumed.  The  precise  form  in  which  it  will 
pass  can  not,  therefore,  be  foreknown;  and  the  less  so  as  the  peculiar 
ities  and  difficulties  of  the  case  give  rise  to  more  than  the  ordinary 
differences  of  opinion.  It  is  pretty  certain  that  the  provisions  gener 
ally  contemplated  will  leave  the  people  of  that  district,  for  a  while, 
without  the  organization  of  power  dictated  by  the  republican  theory; 
but  it  is  evident  that  a  sudden  transition  to  a  condition  so  much  in  con 
trast  with  that  in  which  their  ideas  and  habits  have  been  formed,  would 
be  as  unacceptable  and  as  little  beneficial  to  them  as  it  would  be  diffi 
cult  for  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  It  may  fairly  be 
expected  that  every  blessing  of  liberty  will  be  extended  to  them  as 
fast  as  they  shall  be  prepared  and  disposed  to  receive  it.  In  the  mean 
time,  the  mild  spirit  in  which  the  powers  derived  from  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  will,  under  its  superintendence,  be  adminis 
tered,  the  parental  interest  which  it  takes  in  the  happiness  of  those 
adopted  into  the  general  family,  and  a  scrupulous  regard  to  the  tenor 
and  spirit  of  the  treaty  of  cession,  promise  a  continuance  of  that  satis 
faction  among  the  people  of  Louisiana  which  has  thus  far  shown  itself. 
These  observations  are  made  that  you  may  be  the  better  enabled  to 
give  to  the  French  Government  the  explanations  and  assurances  due 
to  its  solicitude  in  behalf  of  a  people  whose  destiny  it  has  committed 
to  the  justice,  the  honor,  and  the  policy  of  the  United  States. 

It  does  not  appear  that,  in  the  delivery  of  the  Province  by  the  Span 
ish  authorities  to  M.  Laussat,  anything  passed  denoting  its  limits, 
either  to  the  east,  the  west,  or  the  north;  nor  was  any  step  taken  by 
M.  Laussat,  either  whilst  the  Province  was  in  his  hands,  or  at  the  time 
of  his  transferring  it  to  ours,  calculated  to  dispossess  Spain  of  any  part 
of  the  territory  east  of  the  Mississippi.  On  the  contrary,  in  a  private 
conference,  he  stated  positively  that  no  part  of  the  Floridas  was 
included  in  the  eastern  boundary;  France  having  strenuously  insisted 
to  have  it  extended  to  the  Mobile,  which  was  peremptorily  ruf  used  by 
Spain. 

We  learn,  from  Mr.  Pinckney,  that  the  Spanish  Government  holds  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  27 1 

same  language  to  him.  To  the  declaration  of  M.  Laussat,  however, 
we  can  oppose  that  of  the  French  Minister,  made  to  you,  that  Louisi 
ana  extended  to  the  river  Perdido:  and  to  the  Spanish  Government, 
as  well  as  to  that  of  France,  we  can  oppose  the  treat}7  of  St.  Ildefonso, 
and  of  September  30,  1803,  interpreted  by  facts  and  fair  inferences. 
The  question  with  Spain  will  enter  into  the  proceedings  of  Mr.  Mon 
roe,  on  his  arrival  at  Madrid,  whither  he  will  be  instructed  to  repair 
as  soon  as  he  shall  have  executed  at  London  the  instructions  lately 
transmitted  to  him  in  relation  to  the  impressment  of  seamen  from 
American  vessels,  and  several  other  points  which  call  for  just  and 
stipulated  arrangements  between  the  two  countries.  As  the  question 
relates  to  the  French  Government,  the  President  relies  on  your  pru 
dence  and  attention  for  availing  yourself  of  the  admission,  by  M.  Mar- 
bois,  that  Louisiana  extended  to  the  river  Perdido,  and  for  keeping 
the  weight  of  that  Government  in  our  scale  against  that  of  Spain. 
With  respect  to  the  western  extent  of  Louisiana,  M.  Laussat  held  a 
language  more  satisfactory.  He  considered  the  Rio  Bravo  or  Del 
Norte,  as  far  as  the  thirtieth  degree  of  north  latitude,  as  its  true 
boundary  on  that  side.  The  northern  boundary,  we  have  reason  to 
believe,  was  settled  between  France  and  Great  Britain  by  Commis 
sioners  appointed  under  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  who  separated  the 
British  and  French  territories  west  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  by  the 
forty-ninth  degree  of  latitude.  In  support  of  our  just  claims  in  all 
these  cases,  it  is  proper  that  no  time  should  be  lost  in  collecting  the 
best  proofs  which  can  be  obtained.  This  important  object  has  already 
been  recommended  generally  to  your  attention.  It  is  particularly 
desirable  that  you  should  procure  an  authenticated  copy  of  the  com 
mercial  charter  granted  by  Louis  XIV.  to  Crozat,  in  1712,  which  gives 
an  outline  to  Louisiana  favorable  to  our  claims,  at  the  same  time  that 
it  is  an  evidence  of  the  highest  and  most  unexceptionable  authority. 
A  copy  of  this  charter  is  annexed  to  the  English  translation  of  Joutel's 
Journal  of  La  Salle's  voyage,  the  French  original  not  containing  it. 

A  record  of  the  charter  doubtless  exists  in  the  archives  of  the  French 
Government;  and  it  may  be  expected  that  an  attested  copy  will  not  be 
refused  to  you.  It  is  not  improbable  that  the  charter,  or  other  docu 
ments  relating  to  the  Mississippi  project,  a  few  years  after,  may  afford 
some  light,  and  be  attainable  from  the  same  source.  The  proceedings 
of  the  Commissioners  under  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  will  merit  particular 
research,  as  they  promise  not  only  a  favorable  northern  boundary,  but 
as  they  will  decide  an  important  question  involved  in  a  convention  of 
limits  now  depending  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain. 
To  these  may  be  added  whatever  other  documents  may  occur  to  your 
recollection  or  research,  including  maps,  &c.  If  the  secret  treaty  of 
Paris,  in  1762-'3,  between  France  and  Spain,  and  an  entire  copy  of 
that  of  St.  Ildefonso,  in  1800,  can  be  obtained,  they  may  also  be  useful. 


272  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITOEY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

An  authentication  of  the  precise  date,  at  least,  of  the  former  is  very 
important.  You  will  be  sensible  of  the  propriety  of  putting  Mr. 
Monroe  in  possession  of  all  the  proofs  and  information  which  you  may 
obtain.  Should  he  take  Paris  in  his  way  to  Madrid,  you  will  have  the 
best  of  opportunities  for  the  purpose. 

In  my  letter  of  the  9th  of  November  last  I  communicated  the  ideas 
entertained  by  the  President,  with  respect  to  the  pecuniary  provision 
in  the  last  convention  with  France  in  behalf  of  our  citizens.  It  is  pre 
sumed  that  you  will  have  found  no  difficulty  in  chaining  the  concur 
rence  of  the  French  Government  in  suspending  drafts  in  favor  of  any 
until  the  claims  of  all  shall  have  been  ascertained.  Should  the  sum  of 
three  million  seven  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars  be  insufficient 
for  the  payment  of  all,  as  becomes  daily  more  probable,  the  least  that 
ought  to  be  attempted  will  be  an  apportionment  of  it  among  them. 
Perhaps  more  than  this  may  now  be  attended  with  great  difficulty; 
although  it  is  clear  that  the  patronage  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  due,  on  prior  considerations,  more  to  some  classes  of  the 
claimants  than  to  others;  to  those,  for  example,  whose  property  was 
wrongfully  taken  on  the  high  seas  by  force,  than  to  those  who,  by 
voluntary  contracts,  placed  a  confidence  in  the  French  Government, 
which  was  disappointed.  It  seems  requisite,  nevertheless,  that  some 
effort  should  be  made  in  behalf  of  those  whose  claims  were  embraced 
by  the  convention  of  September  30th,  1800,  and  not  provided  for  by 
that  of  April  30th,  1803. 

With  this  view,  the  President  thinks  it  proper  that  you  should 
adjust  with  the  French  Government  a  provision  for  comprehending  in 
the  convention  of  1803  the  claims  still  remaining  under  the  convention 
of  1800;  and  for  apportioning  the  money  payable  at  the  Treasury  of 
the  United  States  among  the  claimants  under  both;  as  the  object  next 
to  be  pursued,  a  provision  for  apportioning  among  the  whole,  tne 
money  so  payable,  and  also  the  balance  chargeable  on  France,  accord 
ing  to  the  tenor  of  the  last  convention.  Or,  as  the  object  next  in  order, 
a  provision  for  apportioning,  among  the  whole,  the  money  payable  at 
the  Treasury  of  the  United  States,  leaving  to  the  claimants  under  the 
last  convention  the  balance  from  France  to  which  it  entitles  them;  or, 
lastly,  a  provision  for  apportioning  among  the  claimants  under  the 
last  convention  the  money  so  payable,  instead  of  paying  it  in  the  order 
of  settlement,  or  according  to  any  other  rule  of  preference. 

The  first  arrangement  takes  for  granted  that  France  considers  her 
self  bound,  notwithstanding  the  last  convention,  to  satisfy  all  the 
claims  provided  for  by  the  first  convention,  permitted  by  the  last. 
The  supposition  is  founded  on  several  expressions  and  implications  of 
its  text,  as  the  head  of  the  fifth  article,  "all  agreements,"  &c.,  and 
particularly  in  the  closing  words  of  article  tenth;  and  with  respect  to 
debts,  the  provision  is  express  in  article  twelve.  This  construction  is 


PUKCHASE    OF   THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  273 

the  more  reasonable  also,  inasmuch  as  the  reciprocal  stipulation  of  the 
convention  of  1800,  in  this  particular,  were  carried  into  immediate  and 
full  effect  on  the  part  of  the  United  States;  and  as  a  contrary  con 
struction  would  imply  the  relinquishment,  without  equivalent,  of 
vested  rights  never  formally  contested  by  France. 

Should  France,  however,  be  unlikely  to  admit  her  responsibility  for 
the  pretermitted  claims,  and  there  be  danger  that,  by  urging  her  respon 
sibility  at  this  time,  an  equitable  modification  of  any  sort  may  be  ren 
dered  more  difficult,  it  will  be  best  to  pass  over  the  question  for  the 
present,  taking  care  that  no  waiver  be  made  which  ma}^  either  still 
further  weaken  the  claims  against  France,  or  give  color  for  turning 
them  over  against  the  United  States. 

Neither  of  the  succeeding  alternatives  will  increase  the  balance  pay 
able  by  France,  nor  is  it  contemplated  that  in  these  or  any  other 
modifications  whatever,  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States  is  to  be 
made  chargeable  with  more  than  three  million  seven  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  dollars;  or  rather,  with  more  than  so  much  of  that  sum 
as  would  satisfy  the  debts  to  which  it  is  subjected  by  the  last  con 
vention. 

The  object  of  each  of  the  proposed  modifications  is  to  distribute  what 
ever  is  to  be  paid  by  the  United  States  and  by  France  among  all  the 
claimants,  as  well  those  omitted  as  those  included  in  the  last  convention; 
and  in  such  a  manner  that  every  claimant  of  both  descriptions  shall 
receive  a  fair  proportion  from  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States,  as 
well  of  the  balance  to  be  paid  b}^  France. 

The  claimants  who  were  provided  for  in  the  last  convention  can  not 
justly  complain  of  any  arrangement  that  will  replace  on  the  same  foot 
ing  with  themselves  their  fellow-claimants  left  by  the  last,  under  the 
first  convention,  as  being  a  retrospective  measure  working  a  disadvan 
tage  to  them.  The  retrospective  proceeding  will  be  found  to  lie  in  the 
last  convention,  so  far  as  it  is  advantageous  in  its  operation,  to  those 
claiming  under  the  first  only.  An  act  superseding  a  retrospective  act 
is  not  itself  retrospective.  The  effect  of  it  is  to  restore  and  enforce 
the  original  rule  of  justice. 

Should  the  French  Government  refuse  to  concur  in  any  proposition 
that  will  restore  the  latitude  given  to  claims  as  defined  by  the  first 
convention,  and  which  is  narrowed  and  obscured  by  the  text  of  the 
last,  it  will  be  proper  to  settle  with  the  Government,  if  it  can  be  done, 
such  a  construction  of  this  text  as  will  be  most  favorable  to  all  just 
claims,  particularly  those  for  freights,  indemnities,  property  put  in 
requisition,  and  the  separate  property  of  individuals  who  are  concerned 
in  the  disqualifying  partnerships  mentioned  in  the  convention,  which 
are  said  to  be  threatened  with  rejection  by  the  board  at  Paris.  It  is 
to  be  kept  in  view,  however,  that  in  case  the  whole  sum  of  three 
million  seven  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars  should  not  be  a*:  i  r^tv- 
H.  Doc.  ±31 18 


274  '  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

by  the  construction  of  the  board,  the  construction  settled  with  the 
French  Government  is  not  to  enlarge  the  sum  to  be  paid  by  the  Treas 
ury  of  the  United  States  beyond  that  to  which  the  Treasury  would  be 
made  liable  by  the  construction  of  the  board. 

It  will  occur  to  you  that,  in  case  the  field  of  claims  should  be  enlarged, 
the.  time  for  presenting  and  settling  them  ought  to  be  lengthened.  You 
can  yourself  best  decide  how  far  a  prolongation  of  the  time  necessary 
for  the  claims  now  admissible  before  the  board  may  be  necessary,  and 
ought  to  be  attempted. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  not  a  few  of  this  description  are  yet 
to  be  forwarded  from  this  side  the  Atlantic. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  &c., 

JAMES  MADISON. 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON,  Esq. 


[Extract.] 

President  Jefferson  to  Dr.  Priestley.   / 

WASHINGTON,  January  29,  1804.. 

I  very  early  saw  that  Louisiana  was  indeed  a  speck  in  our  horizon 
which  was  to  burst  in  a  tornado;  and  the  public  are  unapprized  how 
near  this  catastrophe  was.  Nothing  but  a  frank  and  friendly  develop 
ment  of  causes  and  effects  on  our  part,  and  good  sense  enough  in  Bona 
parte  to  see  that  the  train  was  unavoidable,  and  would  change  the  face 
of  the  world,  saved  us  from  the  storm.  I  did  not  expect  he  would 
yield  till  a  war  took  place  betweer  France  and  England,  and  my  hope 
was  to  palliate  and  endure,  if  Messrs.  Ross,  Morris,  &c.  did  not  force 
a  premature  rupture,  until  that  event.  I  believed  the  event  not  very 
distant,  but  acknowledge  it  came  on  sooner  than  I  had  expected. 
Whether,  however,  the  good  sense  of  Bonaparte  might  not  see  the 
course  predicted  to  be  necessary  and  unavoidable,  even  before  a  war 
should  be  imminent,  was  a  chance  which  we  thought  it  our  duty  to  try; 
but  the  immediate  prospect  of  rupture  brought  the  case  to  immediate 
decision.  The  denounient  has  been  happy;  and  I  confess  I  look  to  this 
duplication  of  area  for  the  extending  a  government  so  free  and  eco 
nomical  as  ours,  as  a  great  achievement  to  the  mass  of  happiness  which 
is  to  ensue.  Whether  we  remain  in  one  confederacy,  or  form  into 
Atlantic  and  Mississippi  confederacies,  I  believe  not  very  important  to 
the  happiness  of  either  part.  Those  of  the  western  confederacy  will 
be  as  much  our  children  and  descendants  as  those  of  the  eastern,  and 
I  feel  myself  as  much  identified  with  that  country,  in  future  time,  as 
with  this;  and  did  I  now  foresee  a  separation  at  some  future  day,  yet 
I  should  feel  the  duty  and  the  desire  to  promote  the  western  interests 
as  zealously  as  the  eastern,  doing  all  the  good  for  both  portions  of  our 
future  family  which  should  fall  within  my  power. .  . 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  275 

[Extract.] 

President  Jefferson  to  Wm.  Dunbar. 

WASHINGTON,  March  13,  1804- 

In  the  first  visit,  after  receiving  the  treaty,  which  I  paid  to  Monti- 
cello,  which  was  in  August,  I  availed  myself  of  what  I  have  there,  to 
investigate  the  limits.  While  I  was  in  Europe,  I  had  purchased  every 
thing  I  could  lay  my  hands  on  which  related  to  any  part  of  America, 
and  particularly  had  a  pretty  full  collection  of  the  English,  French 
and  Spanish  authors,  on  the  subject  of  Louisiana.  The  information  I 
got  from  these  was  entirely  satisfactory,  and  I  threw  it  into  a  shape 
which  would  easily  take  the  form  of  a  memorial.  I  now  enclose  you 
a  copy  of  it.  One  single  fact  in  it  was  taken  from  a  publication  in  a 
newspaper,  supposed  to  be  written  by  Judge  Bay,  who  had  lived  in 
West  Florida.  This  asserted  that  the  country  from  the  Iberville  to 
the  Perdido  was  kTthis  day  called  Louisiana,  and  a  part  of  the  gov 
ernment  of  Louisiana.  I  wrote  to  you  to  ascertain  that  fact,  and 
^received  the  information  you  were  so  kind  as  to  send  me;  on  the 
receipt  of  which,  I  changed  the  form  of  the  assertion,  so  as  to  adapt 
it  to  what  I  suppose  to  be  the  fact,  and  to  reconcile  the  testimony  I 
have  received,  to- wit,  that  though  the  name  and  division  of  Wrest 
Florida  have  been  retained;  and  in  strictness,  that  country  is  still 
called  by  that  name;  yet  it  is  also  called  Louisiana  in  common  par 
lance,  and  even  in  some  authentic  public  documents. 


Mr.  Madison  to  Mr.  Livingston. 

"|  o    DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  March  31,  180 J^. 

SIR:  Since  my  acknowledgment  of  yours  of  October  20  and  31,  I 
have  received  those  of  2d,  15th,  and  23d,  November,  and  llth  December. 

In  mine  of  January  31,  I  informed  you  that  Louisiana  had  been 
transferred  by  the  French  Commissioner  to  our  Commissioners  on  the 
20th  of  December;  that  nothing  had  officially  passed  on  the  occasion 
concerning  the  boundaries  of  the  ceded  territory;  but  that  M.  Laussat 
had  confidentially  signified  that  it  did  not  comprehend  any  part  of 
West  Florida;  adding,  at  the  same  time,  that  it  extended  westwardly 
to  the  Rio  Bravo,  otherwise  called  Rio  del  Norte.  Orders  were  accord 
ingly  obtained  from  the  Spanish  authority  for  the  delivery  of  all  the 
posts  on  the  west  side  of  the  Mississippi,  as  well  as  on  the  island  of 
New  Orleans.  With  respect  to  the  posts  in  West  Florida,  orders  for 
the  delivery  were  neither  offered  to,  nor  demanded  by,  our  Commis 
sioners.  No  instructions  have,  in  fact,  been  ever  given  them  to  make 
the  demand.  This  silence  on  the  part  of  the  Executive  was  deemed 
eligible;  first,  because  it  was  foreseen  that  the  demand  would  not  only 
be  rejected  by  the  Spanish  authority  at  New  Orleans,  which  had,  in 


276  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

an  official  publication,  limited  the  cession  westwardly  by  the  Missis 
sippi  and  the  island  of  New  Orleans,  but  it  was  apprehended,  as  has 
turned  out,  that  the  French  Commissioner  might  not  be  ready  to  sup 
port  the  demand,  and  might  even  be  disposed  to  second  the  Spanish 
opposition  to  it;  secondly,  because,  in  the  latter  of  these  cases,  a  serious 
check  would  be  given  to  our  title;  and,  in  either  of  them,  a  premature 
dilemma  would  result  between  an  overt  submission  to  the  refusal,  and 
a  resort  to  force;  thirdly,  because  mere  silence  would  be  no  bar  to  a 
plea  at  any  time  that  a  delivery  of  a  part,  particularly  of  the  seat  of 
Government,  was  a  virtual  delivery  of  the  whole;  whilst,  in  the  mean 
time,  we  could  ascertain  the  views,  and  claim  the  interposition  of  the 
French  Government,  and  avail  ourselves  of  that  and  any  other  favor 
able  circumstances  for  effecting  an  amicable  adjustment  of  the  ques 
tion  with  the  Government  of  Spain.  In  this  state  of  things,  it  was 
deemed  proper  by  Congress,  in  making  the  regulations  necessary  for 
the  collection  of  revenue  in  the  ceded  territory,  and  guarding  against 
the  new  danger  of  smuggling  into  the  United  States,  througn  tne  chan 
nels  opened  by  it,  to  include  a  provision  for  trio  case  ot  West  Florida, 
by  vesting  in  the  President  a  power  which  his  discretion  might 
accommodate  to  events. 

This  provision  is  contained  in  the  eleventh,  taken  in  connexion  with 
the  fourth,  section  of  the  act  herewith  inclosed.  The  act  had  been  many 
weeks  depending  in  Congress  with  these  sections,  word  for  word,  in  it; 
the  bill  had  been  printed  as  soon  as  reported  by  the  committee,  for  the 
use  of  the  members,  and  as  two  copies  are,  by  a  usage  of  politeness, 
always  allotted  for  each  foreign  Minister  here,  it  must  in  all  probability 
have  been  known  to  the  Marquis  d'Yrujo  in  an  early  stage  of  its  prog 
ress.  If  it  was  not,  it  marks  much  less  of  that  zealous  vigilance  over  the 
concerns  of  his  Sovereign  than  he  now  makes  the  pleaforhis  intemperate 
conduct.  For  some  days  even  after  the  act  was  published  in  the  gazette 
of  this  city,  he  was  silent.  At  length,  however,  he  called  at  the  Office  of 
State,  with  the  gazette  in  his  hand,  and  entered  into  a  very  angry  com 
ment  on  the  eleventh  section,  which  was  answered  by  remarks  (some 
of  which  it  would  seem  from  his  written  allusion  to  them  were  not 
well  understood)  calculated  to  assuage  his  dissatisfaction  with  the  law, 
as  far  as  was  contestant  with  a  candid  declaration  to  him  that  we  con 
sidered  all  of  West  Florida,  westward  of  the  Pcrdido,  as  clearly  ours 
by  the  treaty  of  April  30,  1803,  and  that  of  St.  Ildefonso.  The  con 
versation  ended,  as  might  be  inferred  from  his  letters  which  followed 
it  on  the  Tth  and  17th  instant,  of  which  copies  are  herewith  enclosed, 
as  are  also  copies  of  my  answer  of  — ,  and  of  his  reply  of  — .  You  will 
see  by  this  correspondence  the  footing  on  which  a  rudeness,  which  no 
Government  can  tolerate,  has  placed  him  with  this  Government,  and 
the  view  of  it  which  must  be  unavoidably  conveyed  to  our  Minister  at 
Madrid.  It  may  be  of  some  importance,  also,  that  it  be  not  miscon- 


PUKCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  277 

ceived  where  you  are.  But  the  correspondence  is  chiefly  of  importance 
as  it  suggests  the  earnestness  with  which  Spain  is  likely  to  contest  our 
construction  of  the  treaties  of  cession,  and  the  Spanish  reasoning  which 
will  be  employed  against  it;  and,  consequently,  as  it  urges  the  expe 
diency  of  cultivating  the  disposition  of  the  French  Government  to  take 
our  side  of  the  question.  To  this  she  is  bound  no  less  by  sound  policy 
than  by  regard  to  right. 

She  is  bound  by  the  former,  because  the  interest  she  has  in  our 
friendship  interests  her  in  the  friendship  between  us  and  Spain,  which 
can  not  be  maintained  with  full  effect,  if  at  all.  without  removing  the 
sources  of  collision  lurking  under  a  neighborhood  marked  by  such 
circumstances;  and  which,  considering  the  relation  between  France 
and  Spain,  can  not  be  interrupted  without  endangering  the  friendly 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  France.  A  transfer  from 
Spain  to  the  United  States  of  the  territory  claimed  by  the  latter,  or 
rather  of  the  whole  of  both  the  Floridas,  on  reasonable  conditions,  is, 
in  fact,  nothing  more  than  a  sequel  and  completion  of  the  policy  which 
led  France  into  her  own  treaty  of  cession;  and  her  discernment  and  her 
consistency  are  both  pledges  that  she  will  view  the  subject  in  this  light. 
Another  pledge  lies  in  the  manifest  interest  which  France  has  in  the 
peaceable  transfer  of  these  Spanish  possessions  to  the  United  States, 
as  the  only  effectual  security  against  their  falling  into  the  hands  of 
Great  Britain.  Such  an  event  would  be  certain  in  case  of  a  rupture 
between  Great  Britain  and  Spain,  and  would  be  particularly  disagree 
able  to  France,  whether  Great  Britian  should  retain  the  acquisition 
for  the  sake  of  the  important  harbors  and  other  advantages  belonging 
to  it,  or  should  make  it  the  basis  of  some  transaction  with  the  United 
States,  which,  notwithstanding  the  good  faith  and  fairness  toward 
France,  (which  would  doubtless  be  observed  on  our  part,)  might  involve 
conditions  too  desirable  to  her  enemy  not  to  be  disagreeable  to  herself. 
It  even  deserves  consideration  that  the  use  which  Great  Britain  could 
make  of  the  territory  in  question,  and  the  facility  in  seizing  it,  may 
become  a  casting  motive  with  her  to  force  Spain  into  war,  contrary  to 
the  wishes  and  the  policy  of  France. 

The  territory  ceded  to  the  United  States  is  described  in  the  words 
following:  "The  colony  or  province  of  Louisiana,  with  the  same 
extent  that  it  now  has  in  the  hands  of  Spain,  that  it  had  when  France 
possessed  it,  and  such  as  it  ought  to  be,  according  to  the  treaties 
subsequently  passed  between  Spain  and  other  States." 

In  expounding  this  three-fold  description  the  different  forms  used 
must  be  so  understood  as  to  give  a  meaning  to  each  description,  and  to 
make  the  meaning  of  each  coincide  with  the  others. 

The  first  form  of  description  is  a  reference  to  the  extent  which 
Louisiana  now  has  in  the  hands  of  Spain.  What  is  that  extent,  as 
determined  by  its  eastern  limits  \  It  is  not  denied  that  the  Perdido 


278  PURCHASE    OF   THE   TERRITORY    OF   LOUISIANA. 

was  once  the  eastern  limit  of  Louisiana.  It  is  not  denied  that  the 
territory  now  possessed  by  Spain  extends  to  the  river  Perdido.  The 
river  Perdido,  we  say,  then,  is  the  limit  to  the  eastern  extent  of  Loui 
siana  ceded  to  the  United  States. 

This  construction  gives  an  obvious  and  pertinent  meaning  to  the 
term  "now,"  and  to  the  expression  "in  the  hands  of  Spain,"  which 
can  be  found  in  no  other  construction.  For  a  considerable  time  pre 
vious  to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  in  1783,  between  Great  Britain  and  Spain, 
Louisiana,  as  in  the  hands  of  Spain,  was  limited  eastwardly  by  the 
Mississippi,  the  Iberville,  &c.  The  term  "now"  fixes  the  extent,  as 
enlarged  by  that  treaty,  in  contradistinction  to  the  more  limited  extent 
in  which  Spain  held  it  prior  to  that  treaty.  Again:  the  expression 
"in  the  hands  or  in  the  possession  of  Spain,"  fixes  the  same  extent; 
because,  the  expression  can  not  relate  to  the  extent  which  Spain,  by 
her  internal  regulations,  may  have  given  to  a  particular  district  under 
the  name  of  Louisiana,  but  evidently  to  the  extent  in  which  it  was 
known  to  other  nations,  particularly  to  the  nation  in  treaty  with  her, 
and  in  which  it  was  relatively  to  other  nations  in  her  hands,  and  not  in 
the  hands  of  any  other  nation.  It  would  be  absurd  to  consider  the 
expression  "  in  the  hands  of  Spain,"  as  relating  not  to  others,  but  to 
herself  and  her  own  regulations;  for  the  territory  of  Louisiana  in  her 
hands  must  be  equally  so,  and  be  the  same,  whether  formed  into  one 
or  twenty  districts,  or  by  whatever  name  or  names  it  may  be  called  by 
herself. 

What  may  now  be  the  extent  of  a  provincial  district  under  the  name 
of  Louisiana,  according  to  the  municipal  arrangements  of  the  Spanish 
Government,  is  not  perfectly  known.  It  is  at  least  questionable,  even 
whether  these  arrangements  have  not  incorporated  the  portion  of 
Louisiana  acquired  from  Great  Britain  with  the  western  portion  before 
belonging  to  Spain,  under  the  same  provincial  Government.  But, 
whether  such  be  the  fact  or  not,  the  construction  of  the  treaty  will  be 
the  same. 

The  next  form  of  description  refers  to  the  extent  which  Louisiana 
had  when  possessed  by  France.  What  is  this  extent?  It  will  be 
admitted,  that  for  the  whole  period  prior  to  the  division  of  Louisiana 
between  Spain  and  Great  Britain  in  1762-3,  or  at  least  from  the 
adjustment  of  boundary  between  France  and  Spain  in  1719,  to  that 
event,  Louisiana  extended,  in  the  possession  of  France,  to  the  river 
Perdido.  Had  the  meaning,  then,  of  the  first  description  been  less 
determinate,  and  had  France  been  in  possession  of  Louisiana  at  any 
time  with  less  extent  than  to  the  Perdido,  a  reference  to  this  primitive 
and  long-continued  extent  would  be  more  natural  and  probable  than 
to  any  other.  But  it  happens  that  France  never  possessed  Louisiana 
with  less  extent  than  to  the  Perdido;  because,  on  the  same  day  that 
she  ceded  a  part  to  Spain,  the  residue  was  ceded  to  Great  Britain;  and, 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  279 

consequently,  as  long  as  she  possessed  Louisiana  at  all,  she  possessed 
it  entire,  that  is,  in  its  extent  to  the  Perdido.  It  is  true,  that  after 
the  cession  of  Western  Louisiana  to  Spain  in  the  year  1762-3,  the 
actual  delivery  of  the  territory  by  France  was  delayed  for  several 
years:  but  it  can  never  be  supposed,  that  a  reference  could  be  intended 
to  this  short  period  of  delay,  during  which  France  held  that  portion 
in  the  right  of  Spain  only,  not  in  her  own  right,  when,  in  other  words, 
she  held  it  as  the  trustee  of  Spain;  and,  that  a  reference  to  such  a  pos 
session  for  such  a  period  should  be  intended,  rather  than  a  reference 
to  the  long  possession  of  the  whole  territory  in  her  own  acknowledged 
right,  prior  to  that  period. 

In  the  order  of  the  French  King  in  1764,  to  Monsieur  d'Abbadie, 
for  the  delivery  of  Western  Louisiana  to  Spain,  it  is  stated  that  the 
cession  by  France  was  on  the  3d  of  November,  and  the  acceptance  by 
Spain,  on  the  13th  of  that  month,  leaving  an  interval  of  ten  days.  An 
anxiety  to  find  a  period,  during  which  Louisiana,  as  limited  by  the 
Mississippi  and  the  Iberville,  as  held  by  France  in  her  own  right,  may 
possibly  lead  the  Spanish  Government  to  seize  the  pretext  into  which 
this  momentary  interval  may  be  converted.  But  it  will  be  a  mere 
pretext.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  probable  that  the  treaty  of  cession  to 
Spain,  which  is  dated  on  the  same  day  with  that  to  Great  Britain,  was, 
like  the  latter,  a  preliminary  treaty,  consummated  and  confirmed  by  a 
definitive  treaty  bearing  the  same  date  with  the  definitive  treaty, 
including  the  cession  to  Great  Britain;  in  which  case,  the  time  and 
effect  of  each  cession  would  be  the  same,  whether  recurrence  be  had 
to  the  date  of  the  preliminary  or  definitive  treaties. 

In  the  next  place,  the  cession  by  France  to  Spain  was  essentially 
made  on  the  3d  of  November,  1762,  on  which  day,  the  same  with  that 
of  the  cession  to  Great  Britain,  the  right  passed  away  from  France. 
The  acceptance  by  Spain,  ten  days  after,  if  necessary  at  all  to  perfect 
the  deed,  had  relation  to  the  date  of  the  cession  by  France,  and  must  have 
the  same  effect,  and  no  other,  as  if  Spain  had  signed  the  deed  on  the 
same  day  with  France.  This  explanation,  which  rests  on  the  soundest 
principles,  nullifies  the  interval  of  ten  days,  so  as  to  make  the  cession 
to  Great  Britain  and  Spain  simultaneous,  on  the  supposition  that  recur 
rence  be  had  to  the  preliminary  treaty,  and  not  to  the  definitive  treaty; 
and,  consequently,  establishes  the  fact  that  France,  at  no  time,  possessed 
Louisiana  with  less  extent  than  to  the  Perdido;  the  alienation  and  par 
tition  of  the  territory  admitting  no  distinction  of  time.  In  the  last 
place,  conceding  even  that  during  an  interval  of  ten  days  the  right  of 
Spain  was  incomplete,  and  was  in  transitu  only  from  France;  or  in 
another  form  of  expression,  that  the  right  remained  in  France,  subject 
to  the  eventual  acceptance  of  Spain,  is  it  possible  to  believe  that  a 
description,  which  must  be  presumed  to  aim  at  clearness  and  certainty, 
should  refer  for  its  purposes  to  so  fugitive  and  equivocal  state  of 


280  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

things,  in  preference  to  a  state  of  things  where  the  right  and  the 
possession  of  France  were  of  long  continuance,  and  susceptible  of 
neither  doubt  nor  controversy  ?  It  is  impossible.  And,  consequent!}7, 
the  only  possible  construction  which  can  be  put  on  the  second  form  of 
description  coincides  with  the  only  rational  construction  that  can  be  put 
on  the  first:  making  Louisiana  of  the  same  extent,  that  is  to  the  river 
Perdido,  both  u  as  in  the  hands  of  Spain  "  and  "  as  France  possessed  it." 

The  third  and  last  description  of  Louisiana  is  in  these  words:  "  Such 
as  it  ought  to  be,  according  to  the  treaties  subsequently  passed  between 
Spain  and  other  States." 

This  description  may  be  considered  as  auxiliary  to  the  two  others, 
and  is  conclusive  as  an  argument  for  comprehending  within  the  cession 
of  Spain  territory  eastward  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  Iberville,  and 
for  extending  the  cession  to  the  river  Perdido. 

The  only  treaties  between  Spain  and  other  nations  that  affect  the 
extent  of  Louisiana,  as  being  subsequent  to  the  possession  of  it  by 
France,  are,  first,  the  treaty  of  1783  between  Spain  and  Great  Britain; 
and,  secondly,  the  treaty  of  1795  between  Spain  and  the  United  States. 

The  last  of  these  treaties  affects  the  extent  of  Louisiana,  as  in  the 
hands  of  Spain,  by  defining  the  northern  boundary  of  that  part  of  it 
which  lies  east  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  Iberville;  and  the  first  affects 
the  extent  of  Louisiana,  by  including  in  the  cession  from  Great  Britain  to 
Spain  the  territory  between  that  river  and  the  Perdido;  and  by  giving 
to  Louisiana,  in  consequence  of  that  reunion  of  the  eastern  and  west 
ern  part,  the  same  extent  eastwardly  in  the  hands  of  Spain  as  it  had 
when  France  possessed  it.  Louisiana,  then,  as  it  ought  to  be,  accord 
ing  to  treaties  of  Spain  subsequently  to  the  possession  by  France,  is 
limited  by  the  line  of  demarcation  settled  with  the  United  States,  and 
forming  a  northern  boundary,  and  is  extended  to  the  river  Perdido  as 
its  eastern  boundary. 

This  is  not  only  the  plain  and  necessary  construction  of  the  words, 
but  is  the  only  construction  that  can  give  a  meaning  to  them.  For 
they  are  without  meaning,  on  the  supposition  that  Louisiana,  as  in  the 
hands  of  Spain,  is  limited  by  the  Mississippi  and  the  Iberville,  since 
neither  the  one  nor  the  other  of  those  treaties  have  any  relation  to 
Louisiana  that  can  affect  its  extent,  but  through  their  relation  to  the 
limits  of  that  part  of  it  which  lies  eastward  of  the  Mississippi  and  the 
Iberville.  Including  this  part,  therefore,  as  we  contend,  within 
the  extent  of  Louisiana,  and  a  meaning  is  given  to  both  as  pertinent  as 
it  is  important.  Exclude  this  part,  as  Spain  contends,  from  Louisiana, 
and  no  treaties  exist  to  which  the  reference  is  applicable. 

This  deduction  can  not  be  evaded  by  pretending  that  the  reference 
to  subsequent  treaties  of  Spain  was  meant  to  save  the  right  of  deposit, 
and  other  rights  stipulated  to  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  by 
the  treaty  of  1795;  first,  because,  although  that  may  be  an  incidental 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  281 

object  of  the  reference  to  that  treaty,  as  was  signified  by  His  Catholic 
Majesty  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  yet  the  principal 
object  of  the  reference  is  evidently  the  territorial  extent  of  Louisiana; 
secondly,  because  the  reference  is  to  more  than  one  treaty — to  the 
treaty  of  1783,  as  well  as  to  that  of  1795;  and  the  treaty  1783  can  have 
no  modifying-  effect  whatever,  rendering  it  applicable,  but  on  the  sup 
position  that  Louisiana  was  considered  as  extending  eastward  of  the 
Mississippi  and  the  Iberville,  into  the  territory  ceded  by  that  treaty  to 
Spain. 

In  fine,  the  construction  which  we  maintain  gives  to  every  part  of 
the  description  of  the  territory  ceded  to  the  United  States  a  .meaning 
clear  in  itself,  and  in  harmony  with  every  other  part,  and  is  no  less 
conformable  to  facts  than  it  is  founded  on  the  ordinary  use  and  analogy 
of  the  expressions.  The  construction  urged  by  Spain  gives,  on  the 
contrary,  a  meaning  to  the  first  description  which  is  inconsistent  with 
the  very  terms  of  it;  it  prefers,  in  the  second,  a  meaning  that  is  impos 
sible  or  absurd;  and  it  takes  from  the  last  all  meaning  whatever. 

In  confirmation  of  the  meaning  which  extends  Louisiana  to  the  river 
Perdido,  it  may  be  regarded  as  most  consistent  with  the  object  of 
the  First  Consul  in  the  cession  obtained  by  him  from  Spain.  Every 
appearance,  and  every  circumstance,  pronounces  this  to  have  been  to 
give  lustre  to  his  Administration,  and  to  gratify  a  natural  pride  in  his 
nation,  by  re-annexing  to  its  domain  possessions  which  had,  without 
any  sufficient  consideration,  been  severed  from  it;  and  which,  being 
in  the  hands  of  Spain,  it  was  in  the  power  of  Spain  to  restore.  Spain, 
on  the  other  side,  might  be  the  less  reluctant  against  the  cession  in 
this  extent,  as  she  would  be  only  replaced  by  it  within  the  original 
limits  of  her  possessions;  the  territory  east  of  the  Perdido  having 
been  regained  by  her  from  Great  Britain  in  the  peace  of  1783,  and  not 
included  in  the  late  cession. 

It  only  remains  to  take  notice  of  the  argument  derived  from  a  criti 
cism  on  the  term  4;  retrocede,"  by  which  the  cession  from  Spain  to 
France  is  expressed.  The  literal  meaning  of  this  term  is  said  to  be 
that  Spain  gives  back  to  France  what  she  received  from  France;  and 
that  as  she  received  from  France  no  more  than  the  Territory  west  of  the 
Mississippi  and  the  Iberville,  that,  and  no  more,  could  be  given  back 
by  Spain. 

Without  denying  that  such  a  meaning,  if  uncontrolled  by  other 
terms,  would  have  been  properly  expressed  by  the  term  ";  retrocede," 
it  is  sufficient,  and  more  than  sufficient,  to  observe,  first,  that  with 
respect  to  France,  the  literal  meaning  is  satisfied;  France  receiving  back 
what  she  had  before  alienated;  secondly,  that  with  respect  to  Spain, 
not  only  the  greater  part  of  Louisiana  had  been  confessedly  received 
by  her  from  France,  and,  consequently,  was  literally  ceded  back  by 
Spain,  as  well  as  ceded  back  to  France;  but,  with  respect  to  the  part 


282  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

in  question,  Spain  might  not  unfairly  be  considered  as  ceding  back  to 
France  what  France  had  ceded  to  her,  inasmuch  as  the  cession  of  it  to 
Great  Britain  was  made  for  the  benefit  of  Spain,  to  whom,  on  that 
account,  Cuba  Avas  restored.  The  effect  was  precisely  the  same  as  if 
France  had,  in  form,  made  the  cession  to  Spain,  and  Spain  had  assigned 
it  over  to  Great  Britain;  and  the  cession  may  the  more  aptly  be  con 
sidered  as  passing  through  Spain,  as  Spain  herself  was  a  party  to  the 
treaty  by  which  it  was  conveyed  to  Great  Britain.  In  this  point  of 
view,  not  only  France  received  back  what  she  had  ceded,  but  Spain 
ceded  back  what  she  had  received,  and  the  etymology  even  of  the 
term  "  retrocede"  is  satisfied.  This  view  of  the  case  is  the  more  sub 
stantially  just,  as  the  territory  in  question  passed  from  France  to 
Great  Britain,  for  the  account  of  Spain,  but  passed  from  Great  Britain 
into  the  hands  of  Spain  in  1783,  in  consequence  of  a  war  to  which 
Spain  had  contributed  but  little  compared  with  France,  and  in  termi 
nating  which  so  favorably  in  this  article  for  Spain,  France  had  doubt 
less  a  preponderating  influence.  Thirdly,  that  if  a  course  of  pro 
ceeding  might  have  existed  to  which  the  term  ^  retrocede"  would  be 
more  literally  applicable,  it  may  be  equally  said  that  there  is  no  other 
particular  term  which  would  be  more  applicable  to  the  whole  proceed 
ing,  as  it  did  exist.  Fourthly.  Lastl}r,  that  if  this  were  not  the  case, 
a  nice  criticism  on  the  etymology  of  a  single  term  can  be  allowed  no 
weight  against  a  conclusion  drawn  from  the  clear  meaning  of  every 
other  term,  and  from  the  whole  context. 

In  aid  of  these  observations,- 1  enclose  herewith  two  papers,  which 
have  been  drawn  up  with  a  view  to  trace  and  support  our  title  to 
Louisiana  in  its  extent  to  the  Perdido.  You  will  find  in  them,  also,  the 
grounds  on  which  its  western  extent  is  maintainable  against  Spain, 
and  its  northern  in  relation  to  Great  Britain. 

On  the  whole,  we  reckon  with  much  confidence  on  the  obligations 
and  dispositions  of  the  French  Government,  to  favor  our  object  with 
Spain,  and  on  your  prudent  exertions  to  strengthen  our  hold  on  both; 
not  onlv  in  reference  to  the  true  construction  of  the  treaty,  but  to  our 
acquisition  of  the  Spanish  territory  eastward  of  the  Perdido  on  con 
venient  and  equitable  conditions. 

You  will  find  herewith  enclosed  copies  of  another  correspondence, 
sufficiently  explaining  itself,  with  the  Marquis  d'Yrujo,  on  the  com 
merce  from  our  ports  to  St.  Domingo;  to  which  is  added  a  letter  on 
that  subject  from  M.  Pichon.  The  ideas  of  the  President,  as  well  to 
the  part  which  the  true  interest  of  France  recommends  to  her,  as  to 
the  part  prescribed  both  to  her  and  to  the  United  States  by  the  law  of 
nations,  were  communicated  in  my  letter  of  the  31st  of  January  last. 
It  is  much  to  be  desired  that  the  French  Government  may  enter  into 
proper  views  on  this  subject. 

With  respect  to  the  trade  in  articles  not  for  war,  there  can  not  be  a 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  283 

doubt  that  the  interest  of  France  concurs  with  that  of  the  United 
States.  With  respect  to  articles  for  war,  it  is,  probably,  the  interest 
of  all  nations  that  they  should  be  kept  out  of  hands  likely  to  make  so 
bad  a  use  of  them.  It  is  clear,  at  the  same  time,  that  the  United 
States  are  bound  by  the  law  of  nations  to  nothing  further  than  to  leave 
their  offending  citizens  to  the  consequences  of  an  illicit  trade;  and  it 
deserves^  serious  consideration,  how  far  their  undertaking,  at  the 
instance  of  one  Power,  to  enforce  the  law  of  nations,  by  prohibitory 
regulations  to  which  they  are  bound,  may  become  an  embarrassing 
precedent,  and  stimulate  pretensions  and  complaints  of  other  Powers. 
The  French  Government  must  be  sensible,  also,  that  prohibitions  by  one 
nation  would  have  little  effect,  if  others,  including  Great  Britain,  should 
not  follow  the  example.  It  may  be  added,  that  the  most  which  the 
United  States  could  do  in  the  case,  short  of  prohibiting  the  export  of 
contraband  articles  altogether,  a  measure  doubtless  beyond  the  expec 
tations  of  France,  would  be  to  annex  to  the  shipment  of  these  articles 
a  condition,  that  they  should  be  delivered  elsewhere  than  in  St.  Domingo, 
and  that  a  regulation  of  this  kind  would  readily  be  frustrated  by  a 
reshipment  of  the  article  after  delivery  elsewhere,  in  the  same  or  other 
vessels,  in  order  to  accomplish  the  forbidden  destination.  If,  indeed, 
the  prohibitory  regulations,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  were  the 
result  of  a  stipulation,  and  recommended  by  an  equivalent  concession, 
the  objection  to  it  as  an  inconvenient  precedent  would  be  avoided.  If, 
for  example,  Fiance  would  agree  to  permit  the  trade  with  Santo 
Domingo  in  all  other  articles,  on  condition  that  we  would  agree  to  pro 
hibit  contraband  articles,  no  objection  of  that  sort  would  lie  against  the 
arrangement;  and  the  arrangement  would,  in  itself,  be  so  reasonable, 
on  both  sides,  and  so  favorable,  even  to  the  people  of  Santo  Domingo, 
that  the  President  authorizes  you  not  only  to  make  it,  if  you  find  it  not 
improper,  the  subject  of  a  frank  conference  with  the  French  Govern 
ment,  but  tc  put  it  into  the  form  of  a  conventional  regulation;  or, 
should  this  be  objectionable,  the  object  may  be  attained,  perhaps,  by 
a  tacit  understanding  between  the  two  Governments  which  may  lead 
to  the  regulations  on  each  side  respectively  necessary.  Although  a 
legal  regulation,  on  our  part,  can  not  be  absolutely  promised,  otherwise 
than  by  a  positive  and  mutual  stipulation,  yet,  with  a  candid  explana 
tion  of  this  constitutional  circumstance,  there  can  be  little  risk  in 
inspiring  the  requisite  confidence  that  the  legislative  authority  here 
would  interpose  its  sanction. 

It  is  the  more  important  that  something  should  be  done  in  the  case, 
and  done  soon,  as  the  pretext,  founded  upon  the  supposed  illegality  of 
any  trade  whatever  with  the  negroes  in  St.  Domingo,  is  multiplying 
depredations  on  our  commerce,  not  only  with  that  island,  but  with 
the  West  Indies  generally,  to  a  degree  highly  irritating,  and  which  is 
laying  the  foundations  for  the  extensive  claims  and  complaints  on  our 


284  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

part.  You  will  not  fail  to  state  this  fact  to  the  French  Government 
in  its  just  importance;  as  an  agreement  for  some  such  arrangement  as 
is  above  suggested,  or  if  that  be  disliked,  as  requiring  such  other  inter 
position  of  that  Government  as  will  put  an  end  to  the  evil. 

It  is  represented  that  a  part  of  the  depredations  are  committed  by 
French  armed  vessels  without  commissions,  or  with  commissions  from 
incompetent  authorities.  It  appears,  also,  that  these  lawless  proceed 
ings  are  connected  with  Spanish  ports  and  subjects,  probably  Spanish 
officers,  also,  in  the  West  Indies,  particularly  in  the  island  of  Cuba. 
So  far  as  the  responsibility  of  Spain  may  be  involved,  we  shall  not  lose 
sight  of  it.  An  appeal,  at  the  same  time,  to  that  of  France,  is  as 
pressing  as  it  is  just;  and  you  will  please  to  make  it  in  the  manner  best 
calculated  to  make  it  effectual. 

In  one  of  }'our  letters  you  apprehended  that  the  interest  accruing 
from  the  delay  of  the  Commissioners  at  Paris  may  be  disallowed  by 
the  French  Government,  and  wish  for  instructions  on  the  subject.  I 
am  glad  to  find,  by  later  communications  from  Mr.  Skipwith,  that  the 
apparent  discontent  at  the  delay  had  subsided.  But  whatever  solici 
tude  that  Government  might  feel  for  despatch  in  liquidating  the  claims, 
it  would  be  a  palpable  wrong  to  make  a  disappointment  in  that  par 
ticular  a  pretext  for  refusing  any  stipulated  part  of  the  claims.  In  a 
legal  point  of  view,  the  treaty  could  not  be  in  force  until  mutually 
ratified;  and  every  preparatory  step  taken  for  carrying  it  into  effect, 
however  apposite  or  useful,  must  be  connected  with  legal  questions 
arising  under  the  treaty. 

In  other  parts  of  your  correspondence,  you  seem  to  have  inferred 
from  some  passage  in  mine,  that  I  thought  the  ten  millions  of  livres  in 
cash,  over  which  a  discretion  was  given,  ought  to  have  been 'paid 
rather  to  France  than  to  our  creditor  citizens.  If  the  inference  be 
just,  my  expressions  must  have  been  the  more  unfortunate  as  they 
so  little  accord  with  the  original  plan,  communicated  in  the  instructions 
to  yourself  and  Mr.  Monroe;  the  more  unfortunate  still,  as  they  not 
only  decide  a  question  wrong,  but  a  question  which  could  never  occur. 
The  cash  fund  of  ten  millions  was  provided  on  the  supposition,  that,  in 
a  critical  moment,  and  in  a  balance  of  considerations,  the  immediate 
payment  of  that  sum,  as  a  part  of  the  bargain,  might  either  tempt  the 
French  Government  to  enter  into  it,  or  to  reduce  the  terms  of  it.  If 
wanted  for  either  of  these  purposes,  it  was  to  be  paid  to  the  French 
Government;  if  not  wanted  for  either,  it  was  made  applicable  to  no 
other.  The  provision  contemplated  for  the  creditors  had  no  reference 
to  the  fund  of  ten  millions  of  livres;  nor  was  it  even  contemplated  that 
any  other  cash  fund  would  be  made  applicable  to  their  claims.  It  was 
supposed  not  unreasonable,  that  the  ease  of  our  Treasury  and  the 
chance  arid  means  of  purchasing  the  territory  remaining  to  Spain  east 
ward  of  the  Mississippi,  might  be  so  far  justly  consulted  as  to  put  the 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  285 

indemnification  of  the  claims  against  France  on  a  like  footing  with  that 
on  which  the  indemnification  of  like  claims  against  Great  Britain  had 
been  put.  And  it  was  inferred,  that  such  a  modification  of  the  pay 
ments  would  not  only  have  fully  satisfied  the  expectations  of  the  cred 
itors,  but  would  have  encountered  no  objections  on  the  part  of  the 
French  Government,  who  had  no  interest  in  the  question,  and  who  were 
precluded  by  all  that  had  passed  from  urging  objections  of  any  other 
sort. 

Congress  adjourned  on  Tuesday,  the  27th  of  March,  to  the  first 
Monday  in  November  next.  Copies  of  their  laws  will  be  forwarded 
to  you  as  soon  as  they  issue  from  the  press.  For  the  present,  I  enclose 
herewith  a  list  of  all  their  acts,  and  copies  of  a  few  of  them,  particu 
larly  of  the  acts  providing  for  the  government  of  Louisiana,  and  for 
the  war  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  former,  it  is  hoped,  will  satisfy 
the  French  Government  of  the  prudent  and  faithful  regard  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  to  the  interest  and  happiness  of  the 
people  transferred  into  the  American  family. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  <fec.. 

JAMES  MADISON. 

ROBERT  R.  LIVINGSTON,  Esq. 


C\  ,S  •  <f°,  4   '•  S*    '  President's  Message. 

To  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States: 

In  execution  of  the  act  of  the  present  session  of  Congress  for  taking 
possession  of  Louisiana,  as  ceded  to  us  by  France,  and  for  the  tempo 
rary  government  thereof,  Governor  Claiborne  of  the  Mississippi 
Territory,  and  General  Wilkinson,  were  appointed  Commissioners  to 
receive  possession.  They  proceeded,  with  such  regular  troops  as  had 
been  assembled  at  Fort  Adams  from  the  nearest  posts,  and  with  some 
militia  of  the  Mississippi  Territory,  to  New  Orleans.  To  be  prepared 
for  anything  unexpected  which  might  arise  out  of  the  transaction,  a 
respectable  body  of  militia  was  ordered  to  be  in  readiness  in  the  States 
of  Ohio,  Kentucky,  and  Tennessee,  and  a  part  of  those  of  Tennessee 
was  moved  on  to  the  Natchez.  No  occasion,  however,  arose  for  their 
services.  Our  Commissioners,  on  their  arrival  at  New  Orleans,  found 
the  Province  already  delivered  by  the  Commissaries  of  Spain  to  that  of 
France,  who  delivered  it  over  to  them  on  the  20th  day  of  December, 
as  appears  by  their  declaratory  act  accompanying  this.  Governor 
Claiborne,  being  duly  invested  with  the  powers  heretofore  exercised 
by  the  Governor  and  Intendant  of  Louisiana,  assumed  the  government 
on  the  same  day,  and,  for  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order,  immedi 
ately  issued  the  proclamation  and  address  now  communicated. 

On  this  important  acquisition,  so  favorable  to  the  immediate  inter 
ests  of  our  Western  citizens,  so  auspicious  to  the  peace  and  security 


286  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

of  the,  nation  in  general,  which  adds  to  our  country  territories  so 
extensive  and  fertile,  and  to  our  citizens  new  brethren  to  partake  of 
the  blessings  of  freedom  and  self-government,  I  offer  to  Congress  and 
our  country  my  sincere  congratulations. 
JANUARY  It},  1804.  Tn.  JEFFERSON. 


Articles  of  Exchange  of  Possession. 

CITY  OF  NEW  ORLEANS,  December  °20,  1803. 

SIR:  We  have  the  satisfaction  to  announce  to  you  that  the  Province 
of  Louisiana  was  this  day  surrendered  to  the  United  States  bv  the 
Commissioner  of  France;  and  to  add,  that  the  flag  of  our  country  was 
raised  in  this  city  amidst  the  acclamations  of  the  inhabitants. 

The  enclosed  is  a  copy  of  an  instrument  of  writing,  which  was  signed 
and  exchanged  by  the  Commissioners  of  the  two  Governments,  and  is 
designed  as  a  record  of  this  interesting  transaction. 

Accept  assurances  of  our  respectful  consideration. 

WM.  C.  C.  CLAIBORNE. 
JAMES  WILKINSON. 
JAMES  MADISON, 

Secretary  of  State. 


/.s,e.  v.  ^3- 

The  undersigned,  William  C.  C.  Claiborne  and  James  Wilkinson, 
commissioners  or  agents  of  the  United  States,  agreeably  to  the  full 
powers  they  have  received  from  Thomas  Jefferson,  President  of  the 
United  States,  under  date  of  the  31st  October,  1803,  and  twenty-eighth 
year  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  of  America,  (8th  Bru- 
maire,  12th  year  of  the  French  Republic,)  countersigned  by  the  Secre 
tary  of  State,  James  Madison,  and  citizen  Peter  Clement  Laussat, 
Colonial  Prefect  and  Commissioner  of  the  French  Government,  for 
the  delivery,  in  the  name  of  the  French  Republic,  of  the  country,  terri 
tories,  and  dependencies  of  Louisiana,  to  the  commissioners  or  agents 
of  the  United  States,  conformably  to  the  powers,  commission,  and 
special  mandate  which  he  has  received,  in  the  name  of  the  French 
people,  from  citizen  Bonaparte,  First  Consul,  under  date  of  the  6th 
June,  1803,  (17th  Prairial,  eleventh  year  of  the  French  Republic,) 
countersigned  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  Hugues  Maret,  and  by  his 
Excellency  the  Minister  of  Marine  and  Colonies,  Decres,  do  certify  by 
these  presents,  that  on  this  day,  Tuesday,  the  20th  December,  1803,  of 
the  Christian  era,  (28th  Frimaire,  twelfth  year  of  the  French  Republic,) 
being  convened  in  the  hall  of  the  Hotel  de  Villo  of  Orleans,  accom 
panied  on  both  sides  by  the  Chiefs  and  Officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy, 
by  the  municipality  and  divers  respectable  citizens  of  their  respective 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF'  LOUISIANA.  287 

Republics,  the  said  William  0.  C.  Claiborne  and  James  Wilkinson, 
delivered  to  the  said  citizen  Laussat  their  aforesaid  full  powers,  by 
which  it  evidently  appears  that  full  power  and  authority  has  been 
given  them  jointly  and  severally  to  take  possession  of,  and  to  occupy 
the  territories  ceded  by  France  to  the  United  States  by  the  treaty 
concluded  at  Paris  on  the  30th  day  of  April  last  past,  (10th  Floreal,) 
and  for  that  purpose  to  repair  to  the  said  Territory,  and  there  to  exe 
cute  and  perform  all  such  acts  and  things,  touching  the  premises,  as 
may  be  necessary  for  f ulfiling  their  appointment  conformably  to  the 
said  treaty  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States;  and  thereupon  the  said 
citizen  Laussat  declared  that,  in  virtue  of,  and  in  the  terms  of  the 
powers,  commission,  and  special  mandate  dated  at  St.  Cloud,  6th  June, 
1803,  of  the  Christian  era,  (17th  Prairial,  llth  year  of  the  French 
Republic,)  he  put  from  that  moment  the  said  Commissioners  of  the 
United  States  in  possession  of  the  country,  territories,  and  depend 
encies  of  Louisiana,  conformably  to  the  first,  second,  fourth,  and  fifth 
articles  of  the  treaty  and  two  conventions,  concluded  and  signed  the 
30th  April,  1803,  (10th  Floreal,  llth  year  of  the  French  Republic,) 
between  the  French  Republic  and  the  United  States  of  America,  by 
citizen  Barbe  Marbois,  Minister  of  the  Public  Treasury,  and  Messrs. 
Robert  R.  Livingston  and  James  Monroe,  Ministers  Plenipotentiary  of 
the  United  States,  all  three  furnished  with  full  powers,  of  which 
treaty  and  two  conventions  the  ratifications,  made  by  the  First  Consul 
of  the  French  Republic  on  the  one  part,  and  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  on 
the  other  part,  have  been  exchanged  and  mutually  received  at  the  City 
of  Washington,  the  21st  October,  1803,  (28th  Vendemiaire,  12th  year 
of  the  French  Republic,)  by  citizen  Louis  Andre  Pichon,  charge  des 
affaires  of  the  French  Republic  near  the  United  States,  on  the  part  of 
France,  and  by  James  Madison,  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United 
States,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  according  to  the/>?v^s  verbal 
drawn  up  on  the  same  day;  and  the  present  delivery  of  the  country 
is  made  to  them,  to  the  end  that,  in  conformity  with  the  object  of  the 
said  treaty,  the  sovereignty  and  propert}rof  the  colony  or  province  of 
Louisiana  may  pass  to  the  said  United  States,  under  the  same  clauses 
and  conditions  as  it  had  been  ceded  by  Spain  to  France,  in  virtue  of 
the  treaty  concluded  at  St.  lldefonso,  on  the  1st  October,  1800,  (9th 
Vendemiaire,  9th  year,)  between  these  two  last  Powers,  which  has 
since  received  its  execution  by  the  actual  re-entrance  of  the  French 
Republic  into  possession  of  the  said  colony  or  province. 

And  the  said  citizen  Laussat  in  consequence,  at  this  present  time, 
delivered  to  the  said  Commissioners  of  the  United  States,  in  this  pub 
lic  sitting,  the  keys  of  the  City  of  New  Orleans,  declaring  that  he  dis 
charges  from  their  oaths  of  fidelity  towards  the  French  Republic,  the 
citizens  and  inhabitants  of  Louisiana,  who  shall  chose  to  remain  under 
the  dominion  of  the  United  States. 


288  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

And  that  it  may  forever  appear,  the  undersigned  have  signed  the 
proces  vwbal  of  this  important  and  solemn  act,  in  the  French  and  Eng 
lish  languages,  and  have  sealed  it  with  their  seals,  and  have  caused  it 
to  be  countersigned  by  the  secretaries  of  commission,  the  day,  month, 
and  year  above  written. 

WM.  C.  C.  CLAIBGRNE.     [L.  s.] 
JAMES  WILKINSON.  [L.  s.] 

LAUSSAT.  [L.  s.] 


Proclamation  by  His  Excellency,  William  C.  C.  Claiborne,  Governor  of  the 
Mississippi  Territory,  exercising  the  powers  of  Governor-general  and 
Intendant  of  the  Province  of  Louisiana. 

Whereas,  by  stipulations  between  the  Governments  of  France  and 
Spain,  the  latter  ceded  to  the  former  the  colony  and  province  of 
Louisiana,  with  the  same  extent  which  it  had  at  the  date  of  the  above- 
mentioned  treaty  in  the  hands  of  Spain,  and  that  it  had  when  France 
possessed  it,  and  such  as  it  ought  to  be  after  the  treaties  subsequently 
entered  into  between  Spain  and  other  States;  and  whereas  the  Govern 
ment  of  France  has  ceded  the  same  to  the  United  States  by  a  treaty 
duly  ratified,  and  bearing  date  the  30th  of  April  in  the  present  year, 
and  the  possession  of  said  colony  and  province  is  now  in  the  United 
States,  according  to  the  tenor  of  the  last-mentioned  treaty;  and  whereas 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States  on  the  31st  day  of  October  in  the 
present  year,  did  enact  that,  until  the  expiration  of  the  session  of 
Congress  then  sitting,  (unless  provisions  for  the  temporary  govern 
ment  of  the  said  territories  be  made  by  Congress,)  all  the  military, 
civil,  and  judicial  powers  exercised  by  the  then  existing  government 
of  the  same,  shall  be  vested  in  such  person  or  persons,  and  shall  be 
exercised  in  such  manner  as  the  President  of  the  United  States  shall 
direct,  for  the  maintaining  and  protecting  the  inhabitants  of  Louisiana 
in  the  free  enjoyment  of  their  liberty,  propert}T,  and  religion;  and  the 
Pi esident  of  the  United  States  has,  by  his  commission,  bearing  date 
the  same  31st  day  of  October,  invested  me  with  all  the  powers,  and 
charged  me  with  the  several  duties  heretofore  held  and  exercised  by 
the  Governor-General  and  Intendant  of  the  Province. 

1  have,  therefore,  thought  fit  to  issue  this,  my  proclamation,  making 
known  the  premises,  and  to  declare,  that  the  government  heretofore 
exercised  over  the  said  Province  of  Louisiana,  as  well  under  the 
authority  of  Spain  as  the  French  Republic  has  ceased,  and  that  of  the 
United  States  of  America  is  established  over  the  same;  that  the  inhab 
itants  thereof  will  be  incorporated  in  the  Union  of  the  United  States, 
and  admitted  as  soon  as  possible,  according  to  the  principles  of  the 
Federal  Constitution,  to  the  enjoyment  of  all  the  rights,  advantages, 


PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 


289 


and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States;  that,  iu  the  mean 
time,  they  shall  be  maintained  and  protected  in  the  free  enjoyment  of 
their  liberty,  property,  and  the  religion  which  they  profess;  that  all 
laws  and  municipal  regulations  which  were  in  existence  at  the  cessa 
tion  of  the  late  government,  remain  in  full  force;  and  all  civil  officers 
charged  with  tKeir  execution,  except  those  whose  powers  have  been 
specially  vested  in  me,  and  except,  also,  such  officers  as  have  been 
intrusted  with  the  collection  of  the  revenue,  are  continued  in  their 
functions,  during  the  pleasure  of  the  Governor  for  the  time  being,  or 
until  provision  shall  otherwise  be  made. 

And  1  do  hereby  exhort  and  enjoin  all  the  inhabitants,  and  other 
persons  within  the  said  province,  to  be  faithful  and  true  in  their  allegi 
ance  to  the  United  States,  and  obedient  to  the  laws  and  authorities  of 
the  same,  under  full  assurance  that  their  just  rights  will  be  under  the 
guardianship  of  the  United  States,  and  will  be  maintained  from  all 
force  or  violence  from  without  or  within. 

In  testimony  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand. 

Given  at  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  the  20th  day  of  December,  1803. 
and  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  of  America,  the  twenty- 


eighth. 


WM.  C.  C.  CLAIBOENE. 


The  Governor's  Address  to  the  Citizens  of  Louisiana. 

NEW  ORLEANS,  September  20,  1803. 

FELLOW-CITIZENS  OF  LOUISIANA:  On  the  great  and  interesting  event 
now  finally  consummated — an  event  so  advantageous  to  yourselves 
and  so  glorious  to  United  America— I  can  not  forbear  offering  you. 
my  warmest  congratulations.  The  wise  policy  of  the  Consul  of  France 
has,  by  the  cession  of  Louisiana  to  the  United  States,  secured  to  }TOU  a 
connexion  beyond  the  reach  of  change,  and  to  your  posterity  the  sure 
inheritance  of  freedom.  The  American  people  receive  you  as  brothers,, 
and  will  hasten  to  extend  to  you  a  participation  in  those  inestimable 
rights  which  have  formed  the  basis  of  their  own  unexampled  pros 
perity.  Under  the  auspices  of  the  American  Government,  you  may 
confidently  rely  upon  the  security  of  youT  liberty,  your  property,  and 
the  religion  of  your  choice.  You  may  with  equal  certainty  rest 
assured  that  your  commerce  will  be  promoted  and  }rour  agriculture 
cherished — in  a  word,  that  your  true  interests  will  be  among  the 
primary  objects  of  our  National  Legislature.  In  return  for  these 
benefits,  the  United  States  will  be  amply  remunerated  if  your  growing 
attachment  to  the  Constitution  of  our  country,  and  your  veneration 
for  the  principles  on  which  it  is  founded,  be  duly  proportioned  to  the 
blessings  which  the}r  will  confer.  Among  3-0111*  first  duties,  therefore, 
H.  Doc.  431 19 


290  PURCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA. 

you  should  cultivate  with  assiduity  among  yourselves  the  advancement 
of  political  information.  You  should  guide  the  rising  generation  in 
the  paths  of  republican  economy  and  virtue.  You  should  encourage 
literature;  for  without  the  advantages  of  education,  your  descendants 
will  be  unable  to  appreciate  the  intrinsic  worth  of  the  Government 
transmitted  to  them. 

As  for  myself,  fellow-citizens,  accept  a  sincere  assurance,  that 
during  my  continuance  in  the  situation  in  which  the  President  of  the 
United  States  has  been  pleased  to  place  me,  every  exertion  will  be 
made  on  my  part  to  foster  your  internal  happiness,  and  forward  vour 
general  welfare;  for  it  is  only  by  such  means  that  I  can  secure  to 
myself  the  approbation  of  those  great  and  just  men  who  preside  in 
the  councils  of  our  nation. 

WM.  C.  C.  CLAIBORNE. 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Cevallos  to  Mr.  Pinckney. 

PARDO,  February  10,  1804. 

At  the  same  time  the  Minister  of  His  Majesty  in  the  United  States 
is  charged  to  inform  the  American  Government  respecting  the  falsity 
of  the  rumor  referred  to,  he  has  likewise  orders  to  declare  to  it  that 
His  Majesty  has  thought  tit  to  renounce  his  opposition  to  the  aliena 
tion  of  Louisiana  made  by  France,  notwithstanding  the  solid  reasons 
on  which  it  is  founded;  thereby  giving  a  new  proof  of  his  benevolence 
and  friendship  toward  the  United  States. 


Mr.  Yrujo  to  Mr.  Madison. 

PHILADELPHIA,  May  14,  1*04. 

SIR:  The  explanations  which  the  Government  of  France  has  given 
to  His  Catholic  Majesty  concerning  the  sale  of  Louisiana  to  the  United 
States,  and  the  amicable  dispositions  on  the  part  of  the  King  my  mas 
ter  toward  these  States,  have  determined  him  to  abandon  the  opposi 
tion  which,  at  a  prior  period,  and  with  the  most  substantial  motives,  he 
had  manifested  against  that  transaction.  In  consequence,  and  by  spe 
cial  order  of  His  Majesty,  I  have  the  pleasure  to  communicate  to  you 
his  royal  intentions  on  an  affair  so  important;  well  persuaded  that  the 
American  Government  will  see,  in  this  conduct  of  the  King  my  mas 
ter,  a  new  proof  of  his  consideration  for  the  United  States,  and  they 
will  correspond,  with  a  true  reciprocity,  with  the  sincere  friendship  of 
the  King,  of  which  he  has  given  so  many  proofs. 

God  preserve  }Tou  man}7  years. 

M.  CASA  YRUJO. 

JAMES  MADISON,  Esq. 


Is  ri  .•> 


PUKCHASE    OF    THE    TERRITORY    OF    LOUISIANA.  291 

Remarks  on  Signing  the  Treaty. 

Mr.  Marbois  said:  As  soon  as  they  had  signed  they  rose,  shook 
hands,  and  Livingston,  expressing  the  satisfaction  of  all,  said:  "The 
treaty  we  have  signed  has  not  been  brought  about  by  pressure  nor 
dictated  by  force.  Equally  advantageous  to  both  the  contracting 
parties,  it  will  change  vast  solitudes  into  a  flourishing  country.  To-day 
the  United  States  take  their  place  among  the  Powers  of  the  first  rank. 
Moreover,  if  wars  are  inevitable,  France  will  have  in  the  new  world 
a  friend  increasing  year  by  year  in  power,  which  cannot  fail  to  become 
puissant  and  respected  on  all  the  seas  of  the  earth.  These  treaties 
will  become  a  guarantee  of  peace  and  good  will  between  commercial 
States.  The  instrument  we  have  signed  will  cause  no  tears  to  flow; 
It  will  prepare  centuries  of  happiness  for  innumerable  generations  of 
the  human  race.  The  Mississippi  and  the  Missouri  will  see  them 
prosper  and  increase  in  the  midst  of  equality,  under  just  laws,  freed 
from  the  errors  of  superstition,  from  the  scourges  of  bad  government, 
and  trulv  worthy  of  the  regard  and  care  of  Providence." 


[Extract.] 

Mr.  Madison  to  Dr.  J.  W.  Francis. 

MONTPELIER,  N<wr  7,  1831. 

The  friendly  relations  in  which  I  stood  to  both  Chancellor  Liv 
ingston  and  Mr.  Monroe  would  make  me  a  reluctant  witness,  if  I  had 
happened  to  possess  any  knowledge  of  facts  favoring  either  at  the 
expense  of  the  other  in  the  negotiations  which  preceded  the  transfer 
of  Louisiana  to  the  United  States.  But  my  recollections  throw  no 
light  on  the  subject  be}Tond  what  ma}T  be  derived  from  official  papers 
in  print,  or  on  the  files  of  the  Department  of  State,  and  especially  in 
the  work  on  Louisiana  by  Mr.  Marbois,  the  French  negotiator.  I  have 

O  *-._,.,  _u, — . 

no  doubt  that  each  of  the  envoys  did  everything,  according  to  his 
opportunities,  that  could  evince  official  zeal  and  anxious  patriotism; 
at  the  same  time  that  the  disclosures  of  Mr.  Marbois  sufficiently  shew 
that  the  real  cause  of  success  is  to  be  found  in  the  sudden  policy  sug 
gested  to  Napoleon  by  the  foreseen  rupture  of  the  peace  of  Amiens, 
and,  as  a  consequence,  the  seizure  of  Louisiana  by  Great  Britain,  who 
would  not  only  deprive  France  of  her  acquisition,  but  turn  it,  polit 
ically  and  commercially,  against  her,  in  relation  to  the  United  States 
or  Spanish  America. 


INDEX. 


Address  by  Governor  Claiborne,  289. 
Alliance  with  England,  Jefferson  suggests,  16. 
Alliance  with  France  or  England,  which,  52. 
American  boats  forbidden  to  trade,  57. 
American  claims  classified,  133. 

Livingston  remonstrates,  88,  116. 

Talleyrand  guarantees,  142. 

American  territory,  France  renounced  right  to  acquire,  26. 
Arkansas  Kiver  suggested  as  boundary,  83,  90,  100,  158. 
Articles  of  exchange  of  possession,  286. 

B. 

Bernadotte  will  treat  on  Livingston  basis,  100,  143. 
Boundaries  all  unsettled,  32. 

of  Louisiana,  234,  271. 

of  west  Florida.  86. 

Britain  would  have  seized  New  Orleans,  205. 
British  alliance,  Livingston  threatens,  150. 
British  Government  notified  of  cession,  196. 

C. 

Canada  and  Mexico  threatened,  21. 

Causes  that  led  to  cession  to  United  States,  187,  189,  203,  221,  225,  231,  268,  291. 

Same — Reasons  taken  from  Livingston  Memoirs,  225. 
Cede,  right  of  France  to  alienate,  244, 

Spain  denies  right  of  France  to,  233,  239,  242,  245. 
Cession  to  France,  disapproved  by  French  statesmen,  13. 

denied  by  French  minister,  9. 
y  confirmed  by  Livingston,  11. 

England's  objection,  4. 
England's  views  sounded,  25. 
Livingston's  discussion  of,  89. 
opposed  by  Frenchmen,  28. 
reasons  France  wanted  Louisiana,  12. 
reasons  for,  by  Madison,  5. 
rumors  of,  3,  5,  8. 

threatens  peace  with  United  States,  25. 
Cession  to  United  States,  Livingston  proposes,  121. 

what  mdu^ed"ifTI57";T89,  221,  225,  229,  231,  268,  291. 
Claims  commission  named,  171,  213. 

293 


294  INDEX. 

Claims,  classified,  133. 

Livingston  binds  First  Consul  to  payment,  190. 
Monroe's  draft  of  convention,  185. 
payments  to  be  prorated,  272. 
Talleyrand  guarantees  payment,  142. 
Colonial  commerce  discussed,  36. 

officers,  abuses  of,  64,  136,  139. 
Colonies,  are  they  useful  to  France,  39. 
Congress  appropriates  two  millions,  84. 

committee  report,  84. 
Constitutional  amendment  necessary,  235. 

limitations,  by  Jefferson,  237. 
Convention  of  purchase,  256. 
on  claims,  257. 

D. 

Deposit,  importance  of  right,  85. 

Jefferson  on  restoring,  182. 

Livington  presses  First  Consul,  119,  148. 

Madison  on  waiving  right,  181. 

right  of,  denied  by  Spanish  officer,  53. 

Intendant's  proclamation  suspending,  54. 

right  restored,  179. 

right  of  United  States  irrevocable,  149. 

right  of,  by  treaty,  31. 

suspension,  governor  of  Louisiana  disowns,  67. 

Governor  Claibome's  letter,  55. 

Livingston  remonstrates,  89. 

Madison  protests,  63. 

proclamation  of  Intendant,  54. 

protests  pour  into  Washington,  67. 

Western  indignation,  64. 
Discontent  with  treaty  in  France,  209,  225. 
Duplicity  of  French  minister,  11. 

E. 

England  and  Spain,  policy  to  alarm,  20. 

favors  acquisition  by  United  States,  156. 
England's  interest  in  Louisiana,  21. 
England  opposes  cession  to  France,  25,  27, 102. 

to  occupy  New  Orleans  in  case  of  war,  156. 
England's  opposition  to  cession  incited,  10. 
Expedition  for  Louisiana,  23,  29,  61,  81,  146. 

F. 

First  Consul  acknowledges  memoir,  142. 
autocracy  of,  51,  81. 
colloquy  with  British  minister,  145. 
friendly  disposition  of,  62,  143. 
Livingston  communicates  with,  59,  71,99, 115. 
makes  proposition  to  sell,  161. 
receives  Monrco,  169. 


INDEX.  295 

Floridas,  acquisition  of,  the  first  desire  of  United  States,  126. 

first  mention  of,  9. 

Florida,  West,  Livingston  advises  seizure,  201. 
Madison  discusses,  275. 
more  valuable  than  New  Orleans,  35. 
Monroe  discusses,  198. 
negotiation  with  France  for,  24. 
Spain  for,  ]71. 
Spain  declines  to  sell,  183. 

was  it  included  in  Louisiana?  23,  29,  33, 50,  60,  200,  212,  218,  236,  275. 
why  not  demanded  of  Spain,  275. 
Florida  rivers,  right  to  navigate,  126. 
Floridas,  First  Consul  advisee  postponement,  230. 
Foreign  colonies,  value  of,  Livingston,  36. 

territory,  United  States  can  not  acquire,  235. 
trade,  France  and  England  compared,  37. 
France  renounced  acquisition  in  America,  26. 
French  emigrants,  Louisiana  intended  for.  3,  11. 
minister  gives  assurances,  62. 

to  go  to  Washington  to  treat,  143. 

reasons  for  selling,  copied  from  Livingston,  225. 

G. 
Governor  Clai  home's  address,  289. 

letter,  55. 

proclamation,  288. 

protest,  56. 

Governor  of  Kentucky  protests,  57. 
Government  of  United  States,  its  nature,  87. 

H. 

House  of  Representatives,  resolutions  of,  67. 

I. 

Impotency  of  French  ministers,  64. 
Independent  Western  State,  124,  141,  234,  274. 
Indians,  attachment  of  to  France,  20. 
Instructions,  joint,  122. 

Livingston  asks  for,  23,  29,  35,  61,  101. 

Monroe  bears  them,  70. 

acquire  Florida,  first  purpose  of  United  States,  7. 

to  Livingston,  16,  17,  112. 

to  make  the  Mississippi  the  boundary,  28,  70,  122. 

to  minister  to  Spain,  98. 

later,  175,  205. 

limited,  Madison  explains,  223. 
Intendant's  order  without  authority,  67,  113. 

proclamation  suspending  deposit,  54. 

J. 

Jefferson's  cautious  instructions  to  Livingston,  52. 
Jefferson  describes  alarming  conditions,  68. 
on  restoring  deposit,  182. 


296  INDEX. 

Jefferson  on  the  pending  crisis,  94. 

on  independent  Western  States,  234,  274. 

remonstrates  against  cession  to  France,  16 

seeks  to  interest  Nemours,  18. 

value  of  purchase,  221,  261,  274. 
Joseph  Bonaparte  favors  Livingston's  propositions,  100. 

Livingston's  medium  with  First  Consul,  59,  82. 

L. 

Livingston  anticipates  instructions,  220. 

and  Monroe's  joint  report,  191. 

asks  instructions,  23,  29,  35,  61,  65,  101. 

advises  defensive  measures,  62. 

advises  negotiation  with  Britain  as  blind,  66. 

announces  events  ready  for  Monroe,  158. 

account  of  negotiation,  162,  173. 

advises  seizure  of  Floridas,  201. 

begins  making  propositions,  51. 

bewails  lack  of  instructions,  97. 

communicates  with  First  Consul  direct,  65,  99,  115. 

convinces  Frenchmen,  50,  157. 

discusses  right  of  deposit,  91. 

explains  activity  pending  Monroe's  arrival,  147. 

explains  letter  to  Monroe,  267. 

first  memoir,  36. 

gets  ear  of  First  Consul,  65. 

incites  English  opposition,  10.  - 

makes  many  converts,  50,  65. 

his  medium  is  Joseph  Bonaparte,  59. 

makes  converts  of  entire  court,  115,  157. 

midnight  letter,  159. 

outwits  French  minister,  160. 

persistency  with  FtrsTT^onsul,  140. 

presents  another  memoir,  66,  71,  82,  103,  108. 

remarks  at  signing  treaty,  291. 

error  in  his  commission,  221. 

replies  to  strictures  on  memoir,  266. 

recites  the  moving  causes,  187-189. 

seeks  to  alarm  England,  21. 

severe  expostulations  of,  149. 

suggests  Natchez  as  depot,  20. 

suggests  trans-Mississippi  expansion,  83. 

to  Joseph  Bonaparte,  82. 

to  Talleyrand,  153. 
Louisiana,  cession  of  whole  not  anticipated  at  Washington,  199. 

first  proposition  by  Talleyrand,  157. 

First  Consul  prepares  to  take  possession,  50. 

reasons  why  France  should  not  possess,  16. 

Talleyrand  offers  the  whole,  159. 

would  not  be  profitable  to  France,  39 

M. 

Madison  approves  purchase,  223. 
criticises  Livingston,  226. 
observations  on  proposed  treaty,  129. 


INDEX.  297 


Madison  discusses  Spain's  opposition,  247. 
West  Florida,  275. 

explains  why  instructions  were  limited,  223. 

on  causes,  twenty-eight  years  later,  291. 

outlines  treaty,  127. 

protests  to  Spanish  Government,  63. 

replies  to  Spanish  minister,  244.   v 

Marbois  deputed  to  treat,  163. 
Maritime  powers  compared,  72. 
Memoirs  of  Livingston,  36,  71,  103,  108. 
Merchant  marine,  French  interest  in,  37. 
Monroe's  appointment  a  disadvantage,  115. 
Monroe  and  Livingston's  joint  report,  191. 

arrives  in  London,  227. 
at  Havre,  159. 

cpmplains  of  Livingston,  164. 

differs  with  Livingston,  218. 

interview  with  First  Consul,  229. 

journal  of  the  negotiation,  165. 

letter  to  Virginia  Senators,  203. 

mission  to  Spain  suspended,  241. 

nomination  of,  Livingston  informed,  69. 
reasons  for,  68,  96,  114. 

predicts  long  delay  in  negotiations,  138.  — — * 

proceeds  to  London,  217. 

and  Livingston  equal  in  rank,  222. 

recites  incidents  of  negotiation,  227,  231. 

his  participation  limited,  267. 

to  Jefferson,  on  situation,  136. 
Motive  of  First  Consul  for  selling,  187,  203,  225,  231,  268,  291. 

N. 

Natchez  suggested  as  substitute  for  New  Orleans,  20,  23. 
Navigation  of  Florida  rivers  sought,  22. 

Mississippi,  a  treaty  right,  27,  30. 
guaranteed,  26. 
indefeasible  right  to,  125. 
its  importance,  84. 
treaty  obligations  of  Spain,  31. 
Negotiations  for  the  Floridas  postponed,  247. 

with  France,  Livingston's  account  of,  172. 

on  before  Monroe  is  presented,  163. 
with  Britain  authorized,  180. 
Nemour's  interest  sought  by  Jefferson,  18. 

New  Orleans,  cession  to  United  States  suggested  by  Jefferson,  17. 
and  Floridas,  why  United  States  must  possess,  87. 
alone  desired,  28,  34,  52,  70,  81,  84. 
Livingston  advises  United  State  to  seize,  101. 

suggests  independent  State,  141. 
why  it  should  be  a  free  port,  44. 
New  States,  Jefferson  on  admission,  236. 

out  of  new  territory  inadmissible,  236. 
Noninterference  in  Europe,  policy  of  United  States,  19. 

H.  Doc,  431 20 


298  INDEX. 


p. 

Penal  colony,  Louisiana  suggested  for,  13, 15. 
Politics  of  Europe,  Livingston  on,  58. 
Possession,  articles  of  exchange  of,  286. 

of  Louisiana  by  United  States  ordered,  265. 
Powers  of  United  States  ministers  insufficient,  172. 
President's  message  to  extra  session,  251. 

on  taking  possession,  285. 
Price,  eighty  millions  agreed  on,  168. 

First  Consul  asks  one  hundred  millions,  161. 
Jefferson  discusses,  95. 

places  limit  on,  133. 

Marbois  names  eighty  millions,  162, 166. 
Proclamation  of  Governor  Clai borne,  288. 
Protection  to  American  commerce,  12. 
Purchase  not  authorized  by  Constitution,  235. 

of  whole  not  anticipated  by  Administration,  199. 
why  made,  191. 

R. 

Ratification  by  Congress,  260. 

vote  on,  262. 

French  government  notified,  264. 
Livingston  urges  haste,  208,  211. 
Reticence  of  French  Government,  35,  61. 
Rivers  of  Florida,  navigation  of,  86. 


Sale  determined  before  Monroe's  arrival,  267. 
of  territory  beneath  dignity  of  France,  103. 
when  determination  was  taken,  232,  267. 
Secrecy  and  duplicity  of  French  minister,  11. 
remonstrance  of  Livingston,  14. 

Separate  government  for  Western  people,  124,  141,  234,  274. 
Slave  labor  indispensable,  38,  43. 
Spain's  guaranty  of  L^nited  States  right  to  deposit,  34. 

Spanish  Government  opposes  cession  to  United  States,  233,  239,  242-243,  245. 
opposition,  French  minister  replies,  249. 
withdrawn,  290. 

T. 

Talleyrand  guarantees  payment  of  claims,  142. 

offers  Louisiana,  159. 
Talleyrand's  hostility,  attempt  to  placate,  19. 

profession  of  friendliness,  152. 

promise  of  satisfaction,  151. 
Territorial  extension  disavowed,  59. 
The  garden  episode,  160. 
Trade  with  Americans  forbidden,  57. 

on  Mississippi,  value  of,  64. 
Treaties  forwarded  to  Washington,  209. 


INDEX.  299 

Treaty,  difficulties  after  signing,  210. 

of  purchase,  full  text,  253. 

of  1778  cited,  26. 

outlined  by  Livingston,  90. 
by  Madison,  127. 

rights  of  United  States  in  Mississippi,  30. 

Trans-Mississippi  territory  not  desired  by  United  States,  28,  34,  52,  59. 
Troops  ordered  to  New  Orleans,  263-265. 

U. 

United  States,  destiny  in  balance,  69,  97. 

will  maintain  her  rights,  Jefferson,  95. 


Value  of  Louisiana,. by  Jefferson,  221,  274. 
'    by  First  Consul,  214. 

prevalent  French  ideas,  20. 
to  United  States,  194. 

W. 

War  between  France  and  England  imminent,  146. 

cloud  appears,  51. 

declared  by  France,  207. 

with  United  States,  possession  of  Louisiana  can  alone  avert,  97. 

with  France,  United  States  will  be  ready  for,  88. 

will  result  from  French  occupation  of  Louisiana,  18. 
Western  commerce  affected  by,  126. 
Western  people,  predilections  of,  124. 
Western  independent  state,  124,  141,  234,  274. 

O 


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